Certainly the American structure and system have done wonderful things for America, and would provide an ideal framework for managing any hypothetical insurgency in the US. The extent to which it can assist in managing anyone else's insurgency is debatable.

There's a lot that emerging democracies can learn from the US structure, particularly from the manner in which it anticipates and manages the need to protect minority rights from a potential tyranny of the majority, always a danger in a democratic structure. That does not, of course, mean that the US system is necessarily adaptable to any other culture.

Political systems evolve, and when we see a political system that works for a country we're generally not looking at something that was created, we're looking at something that emerged over time. Because the evolution is often messy and often involves conflict (as it did in the US and most other working democracies), there's always a temptation to step in and try to short-cut the messy bits by showing them how it should be done. That's a temptation well worth resisting. Americans in particular often see structures and institutions as the defining factors of a working government, but the developing world is littered with governments that look ideal on paper but are poorly adapted to the society they're trying to govern, and in many cases simply don't work. What we think is right doesn't always translate. Compare Oman, a reasonably prosperous, well-managed, emerging nation ruled by a medieval monarchy, to Yemen, a basket case with (on paper) an admirable western-style republic structure.

Obviously there's no hard-and-fast rule on what works, but it should be obvious by now that what doesn't work is a bunch of well-meaning outsiders trying to come in and install a government.