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Thread: James Madison - Greatest COIN leader in History

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    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    The Afghan constitution was not designed to preserve rights, it was designed to prevent warlords. As such it created a national ponzi scheme of leadership and patronage that robs the government of local legitimacy and robs the locals of their wealth, while literally Billions of dollars are sent to banks in Dubai by Afghan officials. Maybe it was the right constitition for its time, but now it is arguably the root of the current insurgency.
    Was the system of patronage and privilege created by the constitution, or did it exist prior to the constitution? I suspect that documents reflect the pre-exisiting values and norms of a society as much as they shape those values and norms. There is no system that cannot be corrupted.

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    I'm not at all convinced that the Afghan constitution is at the root of the current insurgency.

    Certainly, aspects of it—especially regarding the centralization of power—aren't helpful, but the failing is more one of leadership (at a variety of levels) than the legal structure of power.
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Agreed. That and

    a not unique but very strongly embraced culture of independence and non-cooperation due to the geography...

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    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    I'm not at all convinced that the Afghan constitution is at the root of the current insurgency.

    Certainly, aspects of it—especially regarding the centralization of power—aren't helpful, but the failing is more one of leadership (at a variety of levels) than the legal structure of power.
    I agree but still say it's a pretty big factor. As I've said many times now, Afghanistan isn't merely an insurgency - it's still in a civil war. And the Taliban aren't merely insurgents - they are the former power looking to regain what they once had.

    Still, the over-centralization of Afghan governance causes all sorts of problems and prevents solutions and accommodations that could be made at the local level from occurring.
    Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.

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    Default patronage and peacebuilding

    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    I agree but still say it's a pretty big factor. As I've said many times now, Afghanistan isn't merely an insurgency - it's still in a civil war. And the Taliban aren't merely insurgents - they are the former power looking to regain what they once had.
    I certainly agree that it is a civil war--as was Iraq for a time too.

    However, the Afghan constitution per se has lots of wiggle room if the national leadership wanted to use Chapter 8 (especially Articles 2-3) creatively to devolve power and coopt local elements. That it doesn't do so is a function of both leadership choice and the (preexisting) social-political distribution of power.

    Moreover, it is entirely possible for centralized administrations with centralizing constitutions to effectively coopt into the periphery in a decentralizing way--Morocco would be a case in point. The problem with Afghan patron-client structures may not be that they exist, but that they exist in such an inefficient, corrupt, and predatory manner.

    As I've argued elsewhere, I don't think the development/peacebuilding/stabilization/COIN crowd has a good handle on this:

    ...conceptually, the peacebuilding and reconstruction community has largely failed to deal with this, and that as a consequence there is a current and potentially growing disconnect in both theory and practice. How is it that patronage politics can be limited, contained, channeled, or attenuated in ways that create maximum benefits in terms of stability and legitimization, and the least damage in terms of corruption, inefficiency, inequality, and delegitimization? How is it that we encourage countries emerging from conflict to look more like Jordan and less like Yemen—both places where neopatrimonialism has played a key role in domestic politics, but with strikingly different developmental and institutional outcomes?
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


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    Yes! My sense is that the powerbrokers view the government (almost wholly funded by the US) not as an instrument of governance, but as a vehicle to further their own factional interest. If that is the case, then it's no surprise that those parts of the constitution which favor devolved power remain anemic, while those that provide centralized control of largely foreign resources prosper. The constitution abets this process though by specifically favoring centralization.
    Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Bad governmental frameworks promote the type of bad behavior that leads to perceptions of Poor Governance; Good governmental frameworks promote the type of behavior that leads to perceptions of Good Governance.

    Madison was the driving force in ensuring that the US framework was designed to promote Good Governance perceptions. THAT is great COIN. Military efforts to deal with insurgency merely dealing with the mess after government has failed in a primary function of serving its populace in a manner that promotes perceptions of Legitimacy, Justice, Respect and Hope.

    The key is not to mimic the US constitution, but rather to understand why it works and to mold appropriate constructs to produce similar effects when developing constitutions elsewhere. Every culture is unique, and different things will contribute to these universal perceptions accordingly.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Default just to be contrary...

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Madison was the driving force in ensuring that the US framework was designed to promote Good Governance perceptions. THAT is great COIN.
    Am I missing something, or didn't you folks subsequently have a horribly bloody civil war over governance issues? And wasn't Madison--at least until after the War of 1812--a proponent of states' rights and a weak central government?

    We, on the other hand, managed to avoid having a civil war, and yet didn't have a constitutionally-entrenched Charter of Rights until 1982.
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


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    Default Why are patronage networks always the bad guy?

    To quote BW: "....it created a national ponzi scheme of leadership and patronage that robs the government of local legitimacy and robs the locals of their wealth..."

    Allow me to do some paraphrasing and intellectual thievery here (been thinking a few days about Mac McCallister's Agora post to which I'm starting to agree with more and more). Patronage is always eschewed as detrimental to good governance. Sure, JM wouldn't have approved, but that was the new nation of America under a completely different set of historical and cultural circumstances. How about if Kabul co-opts or install loyal (and effective) local patronage networks? Even during the Monarchy, hasn't the patronage network been one of Afghanistan's only effective governing tool primarily because of the limited direct reach of Kabul or 'illegitimacy' of the central government? Why do we keep thinking a central gov't under a republican/quasi-democratic Constitution will win hearts and minds and provide legitimacy? Because its all we know and that's the way its going to be come hell or high water apparently.

    Rather than try and twist Karzai's arm to install NATO-approved Governors with a 'clean' record, why not allow him to install people who *he* knows can get the job done after we do the clearing and holding. By Karzai co-opting and controlling the already in-place patronage nets with a loyal governor or sub-district governor and extend that network to Kabul, we don't have to worry about forcing an alien government into the inner workings of the Afghan culture. The insurgency is flamed when we remove a traditional and effective patronage network and have someone installed with no popular means of economic support or 'MOUs' for his area. Development and rule of law/governance will come but it will have an Afghan face to it and the population will be more readily inclined to see legitimacy in a patronage network as long as it provides them with the bare minimums of security and economic development (or at least economic stability). A 'legitimate' and effective patronage network can erode the shadow governments simply by co-opting (strong-arming) the trade, production, kickbacks, taxing, etc away from illicit sources....after, of course, we provide initial clear & hold top-cover.

    I realize this is getting off topic but patronage networks aren't inherently a bad thing, especially when they're effective and they are able to maintain order. It's also been effective in Afghanistan for an extremely long time. Did they ensure the democratic and civil rights of 100% of the population? No. Was there corruption, graft, and political backwardness? Yes. Will it look like an American or NATO solution? No. Did they provide at least a modicum of security and economic stability and maintain the status quo in a very volatile region of the world at very volatile times in recent history? Yes.

    I'm not saying historical reversion is ever a good thing (that's what the Talibs want; atavism, right?) but understanding what works and more importantly, what they know works for them, is more critical than a forced adoption of democracy with a vanilla solution nationwide. My $.02.

  10. #30
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    The problem in Afghanistan is not that they historically employ patronage systems throughout their governance and economy; the problem is that the current Constitution sets it so that EVERYBODY in Afghanistan is either INCLUDED in governance and opportunity; or EXCLUDED from governance and opportunity depending on their connection to ONE MAN.

    This is what created the Ponzi effect. Before patronage gathered and distributed goodness at all levels; most staying at that local level, but some going up to higher. Leaders largely were selected locally and drew their legitimacy from the populaces they served.

    Under the current Constitution, not only does every government official owe his position (sometimes with a degree or two of separation) to Karzai; so too does every major economic enterprise; so too does every major land owner.

    If Karzai is removed, then not only does every single pol lose there job; but every single person in Afghanistan with a good job or good land is likely to lose that as well. It is an all or nothing system. There is no way such a system cannot be corrupt and there is no way such a system can produce legitimate governance.

    They problem is not patronage, the problem is a framework that accentuates and elevates the negative aspects of patronage. By understanding that the lack of legitimacy of the central governance is far more contributive to instability and insurgency than the presence of warlords; one can design a system that produces and protects the things that are important.

    Karzai would argue the the current constitute;ion does I suspect; but that is valuing maintaining his own power over establishing stability in his country. We should not enable this situation; but we are. We enable it with our presence and with our money. We do this because we don't understand insurgency, not because we don't understand Afghanistan.

    Once we get past COIN tactics and step back to take form a clearer perspective on insurgency itself, I think new, and more effective COAs begin to emerge.

    The constitution is not the problem, but it codifies and enables behavior that contribute significantly to the problem. Plus its far cheaper to re-write a constitution than it is to manage the effects of Insurgency that are fueled by the current version.
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    Am I missing something, or didn't you folks subsequently have a horribly bloody civil war over governance issues? And wasn't Madison--at least until after the War of 1812--a proponent of states' rights and a weak central government?

    We, on the other hand, managed to avoid having a civil war, and yet didn't have a constitutionally-entrenched Charter of Rights until 1982.
    First, Civil War is not insurgency; and that debate could have gone many ways, it happens that it went violent.

    The idea that states had no right to pull out of the Union was established by Andrew Jackson; but I am sure that at the time of the Civil War reasonable minds could differ as to that rights existence. Lincoln held firm to enforcing Jackson's position. It was bloody indeed. I think it proves the strength of the documents rather than reveals their weakness.
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    First, Civil War is not insurgency
    I'm not sure I agree.
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Nor do I

    but Bob doesn't care...

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    Default Interesting thread.

    Ambassador Crocker was recently asked to comment on the current state of Iraq's political situation.

    He explained that, unfortunately, Iraq's political culture has always been a "Victor Gets the Spoils" system from way before Saddam's day. His hope is that they will, one day,rise above it to some level of attention to service. Inherent in that, of course, is this pregnant issue of Iraq's oil wealth---where wealth comes from the ground, and not from the people, taxation without representation has no meaning or purpose.

    At last, some actual and valid parallel between Iraq and Afghanistan.

    I've been active in local, county and state politics in the US for a decade or few, and just don't get this allusion to patronage-based systems. All systems of governance are patronage-based with the only question being who is the patron---a broader or narrower definition of "public."

    The US, in Madison's day, was still a former British Colony with substantial inherent unity---with a brutal civil war still occurring regardless.

    Look at Kyrgystan where Uzbek progroms are underway. Is the there any doubt that substantial underlying hostilities could easily emerge? How does this related to Madison's US?

    I had the good fortune of working with a guy who believed that "Money is a Weapon," and wisely took that as a threat, and not an opportunity. As the US dollars gush like an Oil Spill out to Dubai, there is no way our major contribution have, or could help, without substantial changes and solutions that are not in place.

    It sure was rattling to watch Gen. Petreaus's head hit the table, but images and imagery count for a lot. My concerns were quite different for him (personal health concern) that most others' will be.

    The trick that Old Hickory consistently demonstrated was the if you cross him, he will always get you, and he is, ultimately, the biggest tribe leader.

    On Monday Night, Chris Mathews explained that he knew Afghanistan was unwinnable solely because Gen.Petreaus would never come out publicly and stand-up for it and really sell it. What does he think today?

    Reality, from Madison to Jackson to Obama, is that US actions are driven by domestic politics, and not by genuine Afghan realities. So, where's the US headed now????

  15. #35
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Civil War is not insurgency
    I'm not sure I agree.
    Nor do I
    Nor do I... but once again, and not for the first time, discussion founders for want of a consensus definition of what "insurgency" actually is. Given the amount of discussion devoted to it, you'd think we'd have sorted that out by now.

    Personally, I'd say the most basic definition of insurgency would involve intra-state armed conflict between an acknowledged government and an organized populace or substantial portion thereof. I'm sure that could be picked apart, but it's a start.

    By that standard the US Civil War qualify as insurgency. I'm mot at all sure the Afghan conflict would. The question, really, is how Afghans define the conflict. If they see it as the Taliban fighting the Karzai administration, with the US supporting the Karzai administration, then yes, it's insurgency and the ability of the Karzai Government to provide adequate governance is a key factor. if the Afghans perceive the core conflict to be the Taliban vs the US, then we no longer have an intra-state conflict,and the ability of the Karzai administration to govern becomes a matter of secondary importance.

    What is the conflict about, at base? Are the Taliban fighting the Karzai administration because they think it governs badly, or are they fighting the US because they don't want foreigners in their country and they won't accept a government installed by foreigners no matter how it governs?

    Brought down to lowest terms, is this fight about the Karzai Government, or is it about our presence?

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    I care deeply what each of you think, and I consider your responses carefully. Afterall, typically they are positions that I have held myself at one point in time. I just have come to where I have found them lacking in substance and have moved on to what I see as firmer ground. If you want me to move back to shakey ground you have to lead me there, not just order me return.

    Webster

    Civil War: a war between opposing groups of citizens of the same country.

    Insurgency: : a condition of revolt against a government that is less than an organized revolution and that is not recognized as belligerency.

    revolution:
    : a fundamental change in political organization; especially : the overthrow or renunciation of one government or ruler and the substitution of another by the governed

    Belligerency: : the state of being at war or in conflict; specifically : the status of a legally recognized belligerent state or nation


    OK, not sure if that is helpful. Frankly I have admit that I am typically a bit baffled when pundits have thrown on the table with no real explanation as to what they mean that the conflict is Iraq/Afghanistan "is no longer an insurgency, its a civil war."

    Ok, I'll bite. WTF? What do you base this assessment on (asking no one in particular), and how does the making of this assessment help you resolve the problem? I mean, if you can clearly define that situation A. is an insurgency, and therefore is cured with process A.; and that situation B. is a civil war, and is therefore cured with process B.; fine. That is helpful.

    But if you are simply overwhelmed and confused by what is happening and figure that this is harder than insurgency, so it must be civil war; that doesn't help. It also makes little sense in general. These are not steps on a single scale, they are very different things. Granted, historically the these terms are used in an intermixed, inartful manner, so there is little to rely on by simply going to the historically accepted terms applied to various conflicts.

    For example, the "American Revolution" was in my mind much more accurately a Separatist Insurgency. An illegal shadow government was formed with the purpose of leading a violent movement to break a piece of Great Britain off to form a new nation.

    The American Civil War is very different in that the legal governments of each Confederate state voted for secession. Only after that was done was a new government formed to head the new country that was formed.

    I'm not sure why some argue that there was civil war in Iraq; and I definitely do not see civil war in Afghanistan. Every populace has many unique and distinct segments. Insurgency is not caused by these segments, it is caused by the failure of the single government to provide good governance. It is only natural that many of these groups would define this differently and have distinct goals, ideology, leadership, etc in their approach to Poor Governance. This is why one must understand each dissatisfied segment of the populace's concerns as one works to fix the government. To merely play whack a mole with each group that dares to stand up and complain is arrogant insanity.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  17. #37
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post

    Brought down to lowest terms, is this fight about the Karzai Government, or is it about our presence?
    My assessment is that the senior leadership of the various insurgent movements are what I would term "revolutionary" movements. They are primarily rooted in there perceptions of the illegitimacy of the Karzai government, and inherent disrespect associated with being excluded based on tribal, regional, etc affiliations. This is what I see as the head of the snake that must be addressed to end the violence and begin on the path to stability. This is the target of Reconciliation. This is perhaps 10% of the insurgency, but it is the essential 10%.

    The rank and file fighters are waging what I see as a resistance movement. They fight primarily because we are there. (Also for a sense of the reasons driving the leaderships revolution; and because they get paid to do what is good, honorable Afghan work). This is 90 % of the insurgency that population centric tactics go at, but is not the critical part of the insurgency, and so long as the head is in place there will always be a tail. This is the part of the insurgency that the military is typically set against. The government does not want to change itself in ways required to deal with the head, so they set their military against the tail. This is why most insurgencies are long, drawnout affairs. Sometimes the tail is in fact "defeated", but with a healthy head it always grows back. This is also what "reintegration" is aimed at. The irony of the surge is that the more we surge, the more we incentivize the resistance movement.

    Logic dictates that smart COIN be aimed at the head of the snake, and the best way to do this is to talk, make reasonable concessions, deal strongly with the unreasonable, but to make room in government for those who are willing to participate. This is where the Afghan Constitution is such a problem. It excludes huge segments of society from participation simply because one man deems it so. This is a recipe for insurgency.

    Enable reconciliation and REDUCE (not surge) our presence for best effects.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  18. #38
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Since you asked...

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    I care deeply what each of you think, and I consider your responses carefully.
    Uh, forgive me but a number of folks here have, over the last couple of years offered considered and consistent responses to your thesis. As nearly as I can determine, you haven't cared other than superficially what any of them had to say.
    Afterall, typically they are positions that I have held myself at one point in time. I just have come to where I have found them lacking in substance and have moved on to what I see as firmer ground.
    How very nice of you to condescend to admission that at one point you too were ignorant...
    If you want me to move back to shakey ground you have to lead me there, not just order me return.
    No one has attempted to order you to do anything. Several have acknowledged the logic of your focus and some of your prescriptions while disagreeing with other prescriptions and your one size fits all approach. You offer counter argument which is predictably poor governance and / or lessons the American Revolution and picking on poor old George III.

    Consider the possibility that some of us also progressed from accepting the common wisdom to omniscience -- then realized that the world and humans are not really that simple and that common wisdom exists for valid reasons. Many of us also realize that common wisdom is merely a broad guide and is not definitive...
    Webster

    Civil War: a war between opposing groups of citizens of the same country.

    Insurgency: : a condition of revolt against a government that is less than an organized revolution and that is not recognized as belligerency.
    Is the implication here that a Civil War and an Insurgency are mutually exclusive?
    OK, not sure if that is helpful.
    Nor am I...

    Webster:
    Belligerency: 1 : the state of being at war or in conflict; specifically : the status of a legally recognized belligerent state or nation.

    What does that definition add to the clarity?

    I submit it adds nothing. You Lawyers can get wrapped up in word games but no one else much cares. Most Lawyers know that there are varying definitions and vernacular uses of words but tend to strongly adhere to the definition that best serves them in presenting their case...

    Specifically, groups of people who do not object to the governance of a State but who simply wish to seize power for themselves, crooks and / or various other non-state actors can precipitate an insurgency, engage in belligerent conduct (if not a de jure 'belligerency') or participate in a civil war -- or they can do both at the same time.

    Over-define your 'rules' and you will inhibit your ability to respond to the actual problem. You continually carp that the US is still in the strait jacket of 'Cold War responses' yet propose replacing that strait jacket with your own design.
    Insurgency is not caused by these segments, it is caused by the failure of the single government to provide good governance. It is only natural that many of these groups would define this differently and have distinct goals, ideology, leadership, etc in their approach to Poor Governance. This is why one must understand each dissatisfied segment of the populace's concerns as one works to fix the government.
    Using that rationale, the Taliban were the government, they must not have provided good governance because the Northern Alliance objected, we helped the NA overthrow the Talibs and now they want their power, such as it was, back. Apparently Karzai is seen as unable to provide good governance, the Talibs are seen as unable to provide good governance, the US / NATO / ISAF are unlikely to be seen as capable of providing good governance -- thus there is no solution to the problem as you define it. Yet, I suspect a solution of sorts that satisfies no one will appear.

    'Good Governance' as you use it appears to be a code for 'making everyone happy' (I know you have explained that's not the case but you keep getting back, indirectly, to that premise as you do in your last couple of sentences quoted below...). Not going to happen. Thus we all suffer from bad governance. The issue is, per Ed McMahon, "How bad is it?"
    This is why one must understand each dissatisfied segment of the populace's concerns as one works to fix the government. To merely play whack a mole with each group that dares to stand up and complain is arrogant insanity.
    Uh, yes, we can agree on that last. If we had good governance and made everyone happy, they wouldn't do that...

    Like I said, the key is "How bad is it?" and as many have pointed out to you for some time, recognition of many subtle variations in the cause of insurgencies is necessary. There's never a one size fits all where humans are concerned...

  19. #39
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Default Good Governance isn't about making people happy

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Uh, forgive me but a number of folks here have, over the last couple of years offered considered and consistent responses to your thesis. As nearly as I can determine, you haven't cared other than superficially what any of them had to say.How very nice of you to condescend to admission that at one point you too were ignorant... No one has attempted to order you to do anything. Several have acknowledged the logic of your focus and some of your prescriptions while disagreeing with other prescriptions and your one size fits all approach. You offer counter argument which is predictably poor governance and / or lessons the American Revolution and picking on poor old George III.

    Consider the possibility that some of us also progressed from accepting the common wisdom to omniscience -- then realized that the world and humans are not really that simple and that common wisdom exists for valid reasons. Many of us also realize that common wisdom is merely a broad guide and is not definitive...Is the implication here that a Civil War and an Insurgency are mutually exclusive?Nor am I...

    Webster:
    Belligerency: 1 : the state of being at war or in conflict; specifically : the status of a legally recognized belligerent state or nation.

    What does that definition add to the clarity?

    I submit it adds nothing. You Lawyers can get wrapped up in word games but no one else much cares. Most Lawyers know that there are varying definitions and vernacular uses of words but tend to strongly adhere to the definition that best serves them in presenting their case...

    Specifically, groups of people who do not object to the governance of a State but who simply wish to seize power for themselves, crooks and / or various other non-state actors can precipitate an insurgency, engage in belligerent conduct (if not a de jure 'belligerency') or participate in a civil war -- or they can do both at the same time.

    Over-define your 'rules' and you will inhibit your ability to respond to the actual problem. You continually carp that the US is still in the strait jacket of 'Cold War responses' yet propose replacing that strait jacket with your own design. Using that rationale, the Taliban were the government, they must not have provided good governance because the Northern Alliance objected, we helped the NA overthrow the Talibs and now they want their power, such as it was, back. Apparently Karzai is seen as unable to provide good governance, the Talibs are seen as unable to provide good governance, the US / NATO / ISAF are unlikely to be seen as capable of providing good governance -- thus there is no solution to the problem as you define it. Yet, I suspect a solution of sorts that satisfies no one will appear.

    'Good Governance' as you use it appears to be a code for 'making everyone happy' (I know you have explained that's not the case but you keep getting back, indirectly, to that premise as you do in your last couple of sentences quoted below...). Not going to happen. Thus we all suffer from bad governance. The issue is, per Ed McMahon, "How bad is it?"Uh, yes, we can agree on that last. If we had good governance and made everyone happy, they wouldn't do that...

    Like I said, the key is "How bad is it?" and as many have pointed out to you for some time, recognition of many subtle variations in the cause of insurgencies is necessary. There's never a one size fits all where humans are concerned...
    The Tea Party crowd isn't happy under Obama; and the Liberals weren't happy under Bush. Our current "COIN" approach of focusing on development to buy off the populace appears to be rooted in trying to make people happy to win.

    No, creating a perception of legitimacy has little indeed to do with making people happy, it is just gaining their acceptance that you deserve to be there. The Tea Party in large part accepts that Obama deserves to be there. Similarly creating perceptions of Justice under the law for all groups as little to do with making people happy; nor is treating all groups with respect or providing them with a structure that gives them the same hope that the liberals and Tea Parters use to sustain themselves between elections.

    No, good governance has nothing to do with trying to make everyone happy. It has to do with creating governance that represents everybody equally, is from a source they recognize, and is within their power to change within the law.

    The US Constitution and Bill of Rights provides such a construct. The current Afghan Constitution does not. I see it as a deal breaker flaw that we are ignoring in favor of doing just such efforts to try to "make people happy" instead. I am actually quite against trying to make everyone happy.
    Last edited by Bob's World; 06-16-2010 at 10:15 PM.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    I would also add, to Ken's comment above, that there's no clear link between "bad governance" in general and insurgency.

    The Middle East is full of regimes that, by most external measures, are characterized by bad governance: social conditions that lag behind GNP/capita, repressive non-participatory regimes, bloated and ineffective public sectors. However, those regimes have been, on average, the most stable in the developing world over the past 40 years.

    Oh, there are exceptions, of course--notably Iraq (but only after the US overthrew the regime--Saddam was doing fine maintaining his hold on power against domestic threats) as well as Algeria in the 1990s (ironically, due to a failed effort to provide better governance through economic reform and democratization--and there the "regime" survived in the end). Yemen has its problems too (with almost no governance at all), but Saleh shows no sign of being under fundamental threat.

    I think we need a rather nuanced view of the possible relationship between governance and insurgency/stability. In Afghanistan, ironically, part of the challenge is that a large share of the population likely sees national "governance" itself as a threat.

    Social scientists have long observed that material conditions are a poor predictor of rebellion. All sorts of other factors-- "relative" deprivation, mobilized social cleavages, shifts in societal resources, the presence of lootable resources (and many other things beside)--can also play a role.

    So too does fear, apathy, and/or resignation ("the regime can't be changed, so I'll watch football").
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


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