James Madison - Greatest COIN leader in History

[Bob's World]

Far be it from me to cast doubt on the genius and statesmanship of James Madison, but the U.S. Bill of Rights owes its inspiration to an earlier document, the English Bill of Rights of 1689. By enumerating the rights of Englishmen it paved the way for William of Orange's ascent to the English throne. Indeed, like the American Bill of Rights it forbids excessive bails and cruel and unusual punishment. A different light is cast on the meaning of the Second Amendment when compared to the equivalent clause in the English Bill of Rights: "That the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law ... " The text of the English Bill of Rights can be read by clicking here.

The problem England fell into was that they saw colonials as being less than true Englishmen. This fed poor perceptions of Legitimacy, Respect, Justice and Hope.

Much of what America's founders pulled together was drawn from those who had gone before. Few good ideas are truely new.

[Bob's World]

That's the key question, isn't it?

We've recently shown a tendency to assume that any government we install is "the government" and anyone opposing it is "an insurgent". Those definitions are debatable.

In Iraq we faced an armed competition to fill the vacuum left by the removal of Saddam. To us that was insurgency, because we had already proclaimed one of the competing factions as "the government". To those who had never acknowledged that faction as the government, this wouldn't have made much sense.

A definition of what makes a government a government will likely be complex, but for starters I'd say it needs to be acknowledged as a government by its populace, and it has to govern. The situation in Somalia, for example, can't be reasonably called an insurgency because there is no government.

In Afghanistan, I'm not convinced that the paradigm we hold up - Taliban vs GIROA, US "doing FID" in support of GIROA's COIN - accurately reflects either popular perception or the reality on the ground. Possibly I'm wrong; I hope so.

The governance delivered to Marjah was a disaster on many levels. From the constitutional requirement that it be selected in Kabul by Karzai, to the fact that it was delivered in USMC helos, guarded by USMC troops.

[Dayuhan]

The governance delivered to Marjah was a disaster on many levels. From the constitutional requirement that it be selected in Kabul by Karzai, to the fact that it was delivered in USMC helos, guarded by USMC troops.

A unique case, or just the most obvious of many?

[Steve the Planner]

Far be it for me to contest genuine home rule, but my opinion was and remains that the only viable means for substantial and rapid transformation consistent with the stated US mission objectives and timetable (a very strange predicate for any authentic democracy) was to establish a PROVISIONAL government in places like Marjah.

Occupy, hold, make safe, manage----then, after all the refugees return due to security, set about transfer of authority to local governance. A provisional government is not a provincial government but an interim authority.

Sure there would be flack and some resistance, but not as much as a precarious "assistance" approach, and the real jockeying could turn to the transition, and less so to the effective, but probably not wise or efficient, interim provisional government. Risky, but less so than all other options.

There just was, and is not, any other approach to rapid transformation at the local level consistent with US mission, objective that has any possibility of success (as defined).

Great theories of democracy aside, the more traditional Roman occupation and transition to local participation under empirical control is more appropriate to mission. The rest is just pipedreaming.

[Bob's World]

Far be it for me to contest genuine home rule, but my opinion was and remains that the only viable means for substantial and rapid transformation consistent with the stated US mission objectives and timetable (a very strange predicate for any authentic democracy) was to establish a PROVISIONAL government in places like Marjah.

Occupy, hold, make safe, manage----then, after all the refugees return due to security, set about transfer of authority to local governance. A provisional government is not a provincial government but an interim authority.

Sure there would be flack and some resistance, but not as much as a precarious "assistance" approach, and the real jockeying could turn to the transition, and less so to the effective, but probably not wise or efficient, interim provisional government. Risky, but less so than all other options.

There just was, and is not, any other approach to rapid transformation at the local level consistent with US mission, objective that has any possibility of success (as defined).

Great theories of democracy aside, the more traditional Roman occupation and transition to local participation under empirical control is more appropriate to mission. The rest is just pipedreaming.

This is the problem with seeing our own operations as "COIN" when we intervene in the insurgency of another: Its just way too easy to say when the going gets tough- "Get out of my way, let me do it."

If one believes COIN is all about defeating the insurgent (of today) and providing an effective, though wholly illegitimate, government to the populace, then drive on. My contention is that such methods are far less durable today than in the past due to the tools of the information age; and that even in the past they produced only temporal effects as they never address the root causes of insurgency.

Better a slow, sloppy, ineffective Afghan solution than a quick, efficient, effective American one. Period. Unless we intend to colonize Afghanistan and raise the US flag, that is. I hope that is not our intent.

[MikeF]

This is the problem with seeing our own operations as "COIN" when we intervene in the insurgency of another: Its just way too easy to say when the going gets tough- "Get out of my way, let me do it."

Better a slow, sloppy, ineffective Afghan solution than a quick, efficient, effective American one. Period. Unless we intend to colonize Afghanistan and raise the US flag, that is. I hope that is not our intent.

While you are absolutely correct on this thinking, I believe that over the next year in A'stan we're going to see a lot of "get out of the way and let me do it" do the the increased pressure for results. Hopefully, as the dust is settled, we'll turn it back over to SF.

[Bob's World]

While you are absolutely correct on this thinking, I believe that over the next year in A'stan we're going to see a lot of "get out of the way and let me do it" do the the increased pressure for results. Hopefully, as the dust is settled, we'll turn it back over to SF.

There are two aspects to the insurgency in Afghanistan: I'll call them "The Top" and "The Base".

Military tactics of Pop-Centric COIN go after the base. You cannot win, IMO, by focusing on the base. The Base is largely a resistance movement, so the more we surge, the more we fuel the base. The base is the target of reintegration; but reintegration cannot happen in an enduring fashion until reconciliation has occurred. The base fights because:
A. We are in their homeland
B. They are Pashtun
C. They earn an honorable wage to fight us
D. The leadership that makes up "The Top" encourages and funds such action.


The Top is largely a revolutionary Insurgency. This is the senior leadership, such as makes up the Qetta Shura. They are driven primarily by the causal factors I have included in the Jones Insurgency Model. They reject the claims of Legitimacy of the Karzai Government; They are excluded from participation in governance or economic opportunity; and they have no trusted, legal means available to them to effect such change. The are also strongly encouraged and enabled, perhaps even directed, by the Government of Pakistan; or at least key elements of The Top are.

The Top is where victory lies. This is the target of Reconciliation. It can be addressed not through Pop-Centric tactics aimed at the insurgent, but through thoughtful, Madison-like reform of the Afghan government. Overt outside support for the Karzai Government fuels The Top; which in turn keeps the base alive.

To resolve the Top cannot be done through man-hunting alone (though certainly there is a place for such activities). It requires addressing the failures of governance that drive them. Actions that could mitigate the Top:

A. True reconciliation Jirgas that are open to all and offer real and reasonable opportunity to include those who are currently excluded from governance and opportunity a chance to come in from the cold.

B. Cutting the strings from Karzai to the West; allowing him to either stand on his own and prove he is not a puppet, or collapse under his own weight as puppet would do. Then for the West to be willing to recognize and work with whatever might come of this.

C. Schedule and announce a constitutional convention to take place following the reconciliation Jirga; specifically so that the new team can address the flaws and make the changes that will most likely help prevent the failures of the current model.

The reason we go after the base rather than the top is that going after the base allows all blame to be placed on the challenger; while going after the top requires an assumption of responsibility on the part of government for Afghanistan; and the risk of an uncontrolled outcome for the West.

I have no problem with Pop-Centric tactics. Just make them a supporting effort, understand their role, and develop a companion main effort to address the Top. Its not only more likely to work, it is way less expensive, its quicker, and it will save thousands of lives on all sides.

[Dayuhan]

This is the problem with seeing our own operations as "COIN" when we intervene in the insurgency of another

I know I do the broken record thing on this point, but it's important: we didn't intervene in the insurgency of another. We intervened to remove and replace a government we didn't like, and in the process created both a government and an insurgency. We did this in pursuit of our own perceived national interest - presumably a vital interest, I'd hate to think of us going to war for less - not to improve Afghan governance.

It's dishonest of us to treat this purely as someone else's problem. The situation as it stands is our creation and to some degree we own it. We also have interests at stake.

B. Cutting the strings from Karzai to the West; allowing him to either stand on his own and prove he is not a puppet, or collapse under his own weight as puppet would do. Then for the West to be willing to recognize and work with whatever might come of this.

Again, I'm not sure how we can cut the strings and dump Karzai without surrendering the interests that brought us into Afghanistan in the first place. Realistically, also, we may be willing to work with whatever might come out of this, but there's no assurance at all that what comes out of this (likely a Taliban-controlled government) will be willing to work with us.

If we withdraw and leave Karzai to be toppled by the Taliban, the perception worldwide will be that the Taliban drove us out and we were defeated. We may not see that perception as accurate, but the perception will still be there, along with all the potential side effects that go with it. This is the core of the tar baby dilemma - leave and lose quickly, stay and be drained. This is also the reason I personally did not want us to stay on and try to create a government: it's a task neither we nor anyone else can accomplish (truly legitimate, effective government for Afghanistan will be a generational enterprise), and once committed to that task it's difficult to drop it and even more difficult to hold onto it.

[Ken White]

We intervened to remove and replace a government we didn't like, and in the process created both a government and an insurgency...The situation as it stands is our creation and to some degree we own it. We also have interests at stake...but there's no assurance at all that what comes out of this (likely a Taliban-controlled government) will be willing to work with us... We may not see that perception as accurate, but the perception will still be there, along with all the potential side effects that go with it.

He and Jeremy have paid little attention. You said it far better than I have; hopefully they'll listen to you...

[kdog101]

I know I do the broken record thing on this point, but it's important: we didn't intervene in the insurgency of another. We intervened to remove and replace a government we didn't like, and in the process created both a government and an insurgency.

Didn't we intervene in the insurgency of the Northern Alliance and other tribes against the Taliban?

What is wrong with the approach where we support Karazi; support other groups opposed to Taliban, but leave it up to them. Let them do what needs to be done to rid the Taliban. Let them form governments if they decide to do so. Does anyone realistically think the Taliban could come back to full power?

By supporting more than just Karazi we open up our options for allies to work with in the region. We allow balance of power. We give our Afghan allies the freedom to shape their future.

Good governance is protecting the free will of the individual. I believe James Madison understood this better than most.

[Rex Brynen]

What is wrong with the approach where we support Karazi; support other groups opposed to Taliban, but leave it up to them. Let them do what needs to be done to rid the Taliban. Let them form governments if they decide to do so. Does anyone realistically think the Taliban could come back to full power?

By supporting more than just Karazi we open up our options for allies to work with in the region. We allow balance of power. We give our Afghan allies the freedom to shape their future.

I think this is where we might be headed. However, we should be clear on what the costs of an anyone-but-the-Taliban policy of arming local proxies could be: protracted, bitter Afghan civil war with no winner that could once again kill many, many thousands and displace millions.

[Bob's World]

He and Jeremy have paid little attention. You said it far better than I have; hopefully they'll listen to you...

The mission, today, is an intervention in the insurgency of another. If you want to debate what the mission was 5 year ago, or 8 years ago, fine; but I am arguing what the mission should be 5 days from now. How do we move forward.

We came in conducting UW, we hung around conducting CT; and now we are trying to figure out how to get out conducting COIN. My point being that we will be more effective in what we are doing when we see it as FID.

As to arguments based in "we can't look like the Taliban won", etc. Pure chest beating silliness. It isn't our war. I say again, it isn't our war. It is up to Karzai to either prevail or lose, and arrogance for us to see it otherwise.

Reason we came was primarily two-fold: Get revenge against the 9/11 attackers and to make the US safer. Most Americans would argue that the block is largely checked in terms of gaining revenge, at least from large-scale military operations. Time to take the revenge mission into a relentless pursuit in the shadows. As to making America safer, I contend that interventions that prop up illegitimate leaders put us more at risk, not the other way around. This is where we need to change our thinking.

We lost in Vietnam because we propped up 3 successive illegitimate governments and never understood the nature of the conflict; what was essential, and what was superficial. We are making very similar mistakes in Afghanistan. Ike predicted that if the 1956 election was held that Ho would have won 80% of the popular vote in Vietnam; so instead, to avoid a "loss" to the forces of Communism we threw our lot in with this series of illegitimate leaders. Did we learn nothing? No, but we didn't learn the really important lessons.

[William F. Owen]

We lost in Vietnam because we propped up 3 successive illegitimate governments and never understood the nature of the conflict; what was essential, and what was superficial. We are making very similar mistakes in Afghanistan. Ike predicted that if the 1956 election was held that Ho would have won 80% of the popular vote in Vietnam; so instead, to avoid a "loss" to the forces of Communism we threw our lot in with this series of illegitimate leaders. Did we learn nothing? No, but we didn't learn the really important lessons.

Bob. Run for office. Become elected. These are all policy issues. Nothing to with the setting forth of policy.

[Bob's World]

Bob. Run for office. Become elected. These are all policy issues. Nothing to with the setting forth of policy.

We can debate which hammer to use, how to use the hammer best, etc. But at the end of the day the challenges we face in places like Afghanistan are not about hammer (military) selection or application.

They are about problems with the engineers and the architects. The Policy makers, politicians and diplomats.

Now, quite often the place the problems are actually identified and solutions derived are at the level where the guys are swinging hammers. Should those men remain mute simply because their job is wield hammers? I don't think so. Not in America, anyway.

Our country was built on the principle of the rights and duties of any man to step forward with a better idea, or more energy, or a clearer vision and to lead based on those facts alone, and not be constrained by birth or position.

You can't understand what is going on in the world today if you don't understand the nature of insurgency. Most of today's "COINdinistas" skipped the study of insurgency and went straight to gathering, studying and applying techniques of COIN, so they are lacking in understanding. When one gets to the politician/policy level there is even less understanding of insurgency (additionally blinded by the fact that since failures of politicians and policy types are the CAUSE of insurgency, they have a tremendous conflict of self-interest that blinds them even more).

I'm not running for office, but I am well within my rights and duty, as a student of insurgency and a practitioner of COIN/FID, to point out my professional opinion regarding how to redraw, re-engineer the plan so as to allow the hammer swingers to succeed.

It also is within the US system of mission orders and commander's intent. We know what the desired end state is; we have a duty to report back following mission analysis with our professional assessment as to HOW to best achieve those effects. That does not preclude coming back and reporting that no amount of military engagement can make the current policy approach work, particularly if you come back with suggested changes to policy that would enable such actions.

We don't celebrate Pickett's Charge in America the same way the Charge of the Light Brigade is celebrated in Europe. We respect the valor of those men, but we curse the vain, tragic stupidity of the order that sent them up that slope. So, like a Longstreet, I have a duty to point out what I see as more viable options; and similarly a duty to salute and move out if those suggestions are overruled by a higher authority.

To remain silent is the worst kind of insubordination and moral cowardice.

[William F. Owen]

Our country was built on the principle of the rights and duties of any man to step forward with a better idea, or more energy, or a clearer vision and to lead based on those facts alone, and not be constrained by birth or position.

In mine too.

You can't understand what is going on in the world today if you don't understand the nature of insurgency. Most of today's "COINdinistas" skipped the study of insurgency and went straight to gathering, studying and applying techniques of COIN, so they are lacking in understanding.

An "insurgency" (silly word) is an armed revolt against a government. What's complicated about that?

I'm not running for office, but I am well within my rights and duty, as a student of insurgency and a practitioner of COIN/FID, to point out my professional opinion regarding how to redraw, re-engineer the plan so as to allow the hammer swingers to succeed.

Bob, you have the right to disagree with the policy. You have a duty to express that disagreement, but at the end of the day the job of the military to make it happen.
For me, that means dealing the problems as they exist, not asking an easier question.

We don't celebrate Pickett's Charge in America the same way the Charge of the Light Brigade is celebrated in Europe.

OK, off topic but.....
The action by the Light Brigade was the product of poorly conveyed orders. Nothing more. Detailed study of the event does show why it should be celebrated. It was never intended for the Brigade to ride against the Russian Guns. - the opposite was intended. To prevent the Russians carrying off the British Guns from the redoubts that had been overrun earlier.
I submit that is entirely different from the gross stupidity that lead to Pickett's Charge, and the stunning failure of Pickett's commander to over rule him!

[Entropy]

The mission, today, is an intervention in the insurgency of another. If you want to debate what the mission was 5 year ago, or 8 years ago, fine; but I am arguing what the mission should be 5 days from now. How do we move forward.

We came in conducting UW, we hung around conducting CT; and now we are trying to figure out how to get out conducting COIN. My point being that we will be more effective in what we are doing when we see it as FID.

And that's something I have to keep questioning. Certainly FID has it's place and looking at things solely from OUR perspective you're right, which is why we're doing COIN now. Our perspective, however, isn't shared by relevant portions of the population.

I think Andrew Exum went off the rails for a couple of years there, but he's starting to get it and this comment is particularly appropriate:

"Afghanistan is a binary conflict between the government and the insurgents".* Certainly False. Take a close look at Helmand Province or read the chapter written by Tom Coughlin in this book. On the one hand, you have a binary conflict between insurgents and the government. On the other hand, you have inter-tribal rivalries layered on top of that conflict. And on someone else’s hand, you have the drug trade layered onto both. Try to imagine a battalion commander who speaks only English figuring all that out by June 2011. And if most counterinsurgency strategies are about extending the reach of the government, should we still do that if the government is known to be corrupt and predatory?

That's not an complete list of reasons for conflict in Afghanistan. If we insist on viewing actions through a COIN/FID lens then we are bound to repeat mistakes we've been making for eight years, like misinterpreting an inter-tribal conflict for an insurgent action. You keep saying this isn't our war, but it seems to me you keep defining it in our terms which limits our ability to see and pursue other options. We simply can't limit ourselves to an exclusive COIN/FID construct - Afghanistan is too complex for that.

[Entropy]

Also, no one should be too worried about the Taliban taking over the country. They failed at that during the 1990's even with extensive Pakistani assistance and little opposition. Their rapid rout after the US invasion and their continued unpopularity demonstrates just how tenuous their hold on power was. There are a lot of nations that won't let a Taliban takeover happen again.

[Ken White]

The mission, today, is an intervention in the insurgency of another. If you want to debate what the mission was 5 year ago, or 8 years ago, fine; but I am arguing what the mission should be 5 days from now. How do we move forward.

No wish to debate either. I've contended that Afghanistan is on short final for a couple of years. It is. Nothing you or I write is going to change anything. The issue is what the future holds and your good ideas are going to get lost in a cloud of excessive idealism and unreality.

My point being that we will be more effective in what we are doing when we see it as FID.

I agree. So?

As to arguments based in "we can't look like the Taliban won", etc. Pure chest beating silliness. It isn't our war. I say again, it isn't our war. It is up to Karzai to either prevail or lose, and arrogance for us to see it otherwise.

That's where you're wrong. On two counts. First and foremost, this is primarily an information and ideological struggle, it is not not a war in the traditional sense; it isn't even traditional FID, not by a long shot. What is silliness to your western eyes is seen quite differently by a half a billion Muslims worldwide -- and by a larger number of non-Muslims who do not wish us well and routinely seize on any excuse the beat up on the 600 pound Gorilla. You ignore their opinion at some peril. You are volunteering to cede points to the opponent and his fans. I believe that to be a step or two beyond very unwise.

Secondly, Karzai is a creation of the US. You cannot -- certainly should not if you're at all ethical -- create a situation and then say you're tired of it. We created the problem and we have not yet solved it. That is the point that I've been trying to make to you for a couple of years and which Dayuhan stated well. To say the mission changed is incorrect. We are changing the mission to suit US domestic politics and while the policy makers have every legal right to do that, it is not smart and it does not change the fact that there would be no 'insurgency' or FID with our involvement had we not interfered in the first place. While I agree that such interference on our part is unwise and should cease in the future, that doesn't change the other fact -- we are there.

What you used to advocate, an abrupt departure from Afghanistan on the basis the intervention there was inimical to our strategic interests is what's likely to happen regardless and the results will almost certainly be another blow to US credibility to rank with that earlier war you cited.

...I contend that interventions that prop up illegitimate leaders put us more at risk, not the other way around. This is where we need to change our thinking.

I totally agree. However, that laudable future goal doesn't solve the problems of 5 days from now.

We lost in Vietnam... Did we learn nothing? No, but we didn't learn the really important lessons.

True. One important lesson is that the lack of continuity in the US political process leads to strategic shortsightedness and that excessive emphasis on US domestic politics often clouds the judgment of senior policymakers, military and civilian. A second lesson is that if the policy makers start something they should not have, failure to adequately perform by the Armed Forces can severely complicate the issue. A third lesson is that in event of the second possibility, if as is likely the policy makers continue to show clouded judgment, everything will become even more complex and the potential for failure increases to a probability.

An old lesson to be learned anew is that all those potential problems are the norm.

Until those lessons are embedded or the Armed forces develop workarounds for the first and last and fix the second to the extent they are able, you're the one whistling past the old bone orchard.

[Ken White]

Our perspective, however, isn't shared by relevant portions of the population...We simply can't limit ourselves to an exclusive COIN/FID construct - Afghanistan is too complex for that.

We don' need no steenkin' complexity. We can Simplicate!

With apologies to Bob's World but that was too good to pass. Seriously, you're absolutely correct on both counts. It is interesting that the population centric folks in all their guises are often those most prone to not consider the fact that humans are infinitely variable and that 'rules' just will be broken by many of the pesky critters.

And that excessively forceful quests for simplicity can lead to the dismissal of important nuances...

[Backwards Observer]

"...Do you have any idea why you got infantry instead of finance...even though you have a degree in accounting?"
"I requested infantry, sir."
The colonel waited for more of an explanation but, when he saw none coming, went on. "I had a feeling you did...As I was saying, you're going to see a lot of things done here you won't like. You're also going to see men get killed following orders you question. It's important, in fact it's your job, to see that there's as little of this as possible. You notice I say possible, because in most cases you won't be able to do a damn thing about it. This war's been going on a long time. There's about as much chance of you changing the way it's fought as there is of you winning it single-handed. Your job is to make decisions within the boundaries set by your superiors , and no more. Otherwise you'll be risking your own neck and maybe the lives of your men. This war is just like any other - things are done in certain ways, not because they're the best, but because they're judged best by those that make the decisions. Don't try and change things that can't be changed. You'll only end up doing more harm than good. Any questions so far?"

From Sand In The Wind by Robert Roth (1973)

Go figure.