James Madison - Greatest COIN leader in History

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

We don't celebrate Pickett's Charge in America the same way the Charge of the Light Brigade is celebrated in Europe. We respect the valor of those men, but we curse the vain, tragic stupidity of the order that sent them up that slope.

but does "Europe" celebrate the Charge of the Light Brigade? A charge by British light cavalry against Russian troops and batteries during a small bit of an obscure war on a peninsula in the Black Sea? Isn't "The Charge" really only famous outside Britain due to its relation to literature?

We respect the valor of those men, but we curse the vain, tragic stupidity of the order that sent them up that slope.

Tennyson's poem respects the valor of the British, but also in its turn curses the vain, tragic stupidity of the order that sent them up that valley futilely "charging an army, while all the world wonder'd."

"Not tho' the soldier knew
Someone had blunder'd:
Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die"

[Dayuhan]

The mission, today, is an intervention in the insurgency of another.

If we see the Karzai government as a functionally independent entity that is not a product of our presence and is not entirely sustained by our presence, that's true. I'm not sure that's the prevailing perception in Afghanistan, and I'm not sure it's an accurate perception. Forget about what we want to see, what's the reality: is the Karzai government "theirs" or is it "ours"?

My point being that we will be more effective in what we are doing when we see it as FID.

If the Karzai government is basically capable of governing but just needs a bit of help, if the ANA is basically capable of confronting the insurgency and just needs a bit of help, if the ANP is basically capable of maintaining order but just needs a bit of help... then absolutely our role is purely FID. If we're in a place where it's either done by us or not done at all, then our role is something else altogether. Do any of those conditions actually prevail?

It is up to Karzai to either prevail or lose, and arrogance for us to see it otherwise.

If Karzai's loss is accompanied by a return to the status quo ante that led us to intervene in the first place, Karzai's not the only one who loses.

As to making America safer, I contend that interventions that prop up illegitimate leaders put us more at risk, not the other way around. This is where we need to change our thinking.

I agree, absolutely. The time to think about that, though, was before we went around installing governments, not after.

We lost in Vietnam because we propped up 3 successive illegitimate governments and never understood the nature of the conflict; what was essential, and what was superficial. We are making very similar mistakes in Afghanistan. Ike predicted that if the 1956 election was held that Ho would have won 80% of the popular vote in Vietnam; so instead, to avoid a "loss" to the forces of Communism we threw our lot in with this series of illegitimate leaders. Did we learn nothing? No, but we didn't learn the really important lessons.

I think we learned the wrong lesson, not just from Vietnam, but from the entire Cold War experience. We emerged from the Cold War with a belated acknowledgment that installing compliant dictators to rule other countries was a counterproductive policy. For some reason, many seem to think that we can get away with installing governments in other countries as long as the governments we install are "good", as in not dictators. What we seem to be learning the hard way is that installing governments for others is a pretty problematic issue no matter what sort of government we install.

From Entropy:

Also, no one should be too worried about the Taliban taking over the country. They failed at that during the 1990's even with extensive Pakistani assistance and little opposition. Their rapid rout after the US invasion and their continued unpopularity demonstrates just how tenuous their hold on power was. There are a lot of nations that won't let a Taliban takeover happen again.

I doubt that they could seize control of the entire country, but I suspect that they could control enough of it to recreate the conditions that produced our intervention in the first place. I don't think popularity will have much to do with it: when we leave, power will be seized by whoever can field the largest and most effectively organized armed force, popular or not. As for other nations... sure, many won't want a Taliban takeover, but who has the will and the capacity to prevent it? Arming and supporting anti-Taliban factions may deny the Taliban control over some parts of Afghanistan, but it won't stop them from seizing and consolidating control over many other parts.

[Entropy]

I doubt that they could seize control of the entire country, but I suspect that they could control enough of it to recreate the conditions that produced our intervention in the first place. I don't think popularity will have much to do with it: when we leave, power will be seized by whoever can field the largest and most effectively organized armed force, popular or not. As for other nations... sure, many won't want a Taliban takeover, but who has the will and the capacity to prevent it? Arming and supporting anti-Taliban factions may deny the Taliban control over some parts of Afghanistan, but it won't stop them from seizing and consolidating control over many other parts.

A couple of factors to keep in mind: First, the AQ leadership has been a "guest" in the NWFP for longer now than they were guests of the Taliban in Afghanistan. It's not clear what they would gain by moving back into Afghanistan at this point. One of their greatest protections at the moment is Pakistani sovereignty - a move to Afghanistan would increase their vulnerability significantly for little practical gain.

Secondly, relations between the Taliban and AQ haven't been so good lately. Of course, that could change, but for now it seems like AQ is a secondary concern for the Taliban who are focused on regaining power in Afghanistan.

Third, yes, the Taliban could recapture some or even much of Afghanistan, thought that's not a certainty. That is still quite a bit different from a return to the status quo ante. Personally, I think the danger is really political, as Ken says.

[Dayuhan]

It's likely that the AQ leadership would stay in the NWFP. They would also presumably cultivate relationships with friendly Taliban commanders in Afghanistan, increasing their mobility and giving them a wider range of movement options. I'd also assume that a full US withdrawal from Afghanistan would limit our options (in terms of drone strikes, raids, etc) to some extent.

Certainly the political ramifications are a concern; the narrative that AQ/Taliban forced the US out of Afghanistan would circulate widely and have some impact. I don't know that any of us can reliably predict what that impact would be. I don't know that any of us can speak with authority on relations between the Taliban (or any portion thereof) and AQ. I don't think any of us knows what AQ's next move would be after a US withdrawal. The initiative at that point would be with them, and it seems safe to assume that they would not simply retire.

[Bob's World]

I think one major obstacle to clear thinking is the traditional definition of "Sanctuary" as being "ungoverned space."

I've always felt this was a superficial assessment; one that may often appear true on the surface, but does the sanctuary really come from the "space" or something else? At the end of the day, there isn't much "ungoverned" space out there (Antarctica comes to mind), and such spaces are also unpopulated, so not of much use to an insurgent.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan they do take advantage of what I would call "self-governed spaces," where official governance either does not extend, or is not appreciated or recognized when it does extend, but where the populace has traditional systems of governance that function very well without such official interference. These are also area where perceptions of "Poor Governance" prevail. So step one for me is to drop the focus on ungoverned space, and instead shift the focus to self-governed and/or poorly governed populaces.

So, step one frees us from an unhealthy focus on real estate, and a more addressable focus on the people who live there, and the state of how those populaces truly govern themselves, and how they feel about other governance that is imposed upon them (Just based on this approach one would quickly realize that the absolute worst move we could make is Pakistan is to force the government of Pakistan to extend itself up into the tribal areas that they have traditionally stayed out of.) Our misunderstanding of what makes "sanctuary" has driven us to drive the Pakistan government to take on a program that has greatly destabilized their country, while at the same time actually expanding the influence of insurgent and UW groups in that area.

Next is to drill into the current "nonstate" (AQ, etc) and "Quasi-state" (Hezbollah, Hamas, etc) organizations and ask, what is it that make these new information-age driven organizations so effective and frustrating for States to deal with??? For me, it comes down to this: "Legal Status" They find sanctuary in the fact that they are outside the law. They possess no real estate that they must defend, they simply borrow what dirt they need from some state, but then only for the time the need it. They possess no populace that they must govern or protect, again, they only borrow what aspect of whatever populace they might appeal to, and then only for what they need (some provide no more than moral support, some finance, some action officers to work network functions, some fighters, etc).

So, combining the two, I think that it is high time to retire the tired, overly simplistic (not the same as simple), and dangerously misleading term of "ungoverned space" and trade up to one of "a combination of poorly governed populaces, who are often also largely self-governed, combined with a legal status that combines to protect insurgent and terrorist organizations from the effective rule of law."

Bottom line is that it was not Sherwood Forest in of itself that protected Robin Hood and his Merry Men (clearly an insurgent organization against the illegitimate government of John of England). They needed a place to hide, sure. But the primary sanctuary came from the people and their outlaw status. Remove/deny the forest and their primary sanctuary still exists.

The same is true for AQ, if we somehow deny them the "Sherwood Forest" of the AF/PAK border region, their primary sanctuary not only still exists, but has arguably been enhanced globally by the West's very actions to deny the physical sanctuary of that region.

[Steve the Planner]

What comes next?

Two visions keep smacking the insides of my skull.

First, virtual assimilation of Eastern Border areas into a continuum of Pakistan's border areas, largely under Pak control. Like some wise fella said, Af-Pak is wrong, it is really Pak-Af. At some point and on some levels there becomes a clear demarcation between Pahstun associations with pak, and the other parts of Afghanistan. Fractured, Fractious, Fractal. Dangerous, unstable, but probably less so once that next level of stability is reached between the spheres of influence.

Second, Mad Max. The monster trend is the re-emergence of the inland Silk Road pathways---from Turkey east to China and vice versa. From China south to and through to India and Pakistan; from all to and through Iran.

As the chaotic and unstable overland rail, road and air links continue to emerge and strengthen, the Big Picture of Afghanistan as a separate and free-standing entity becomes increasingly less significant than the maintenance and protection of key nodes and links. The rest can either find its own way or, at the least, expect massive Mad Max and Blackwater style retaliation for serious interference with movements.

None of these concepts seem, in my mind, to connect to petty discussions about re-arranging the Karzai deck chairs, or pretending that Pakistan is not both a major part of the current problems, and the only path to relevant solutions---none of which look pretty or will result from any more democracy than we provided to the indigenous americans when the railroads punched through.

Looking at these things through personalities, and high-fallutin' contemporary western ideals seems a bit lame until, perhaps, 20-50 years from now once the links, nodes and high-value locations emerge, grow, and stabilize.

Afghanistan doesn't need western governmental investment to carve out the next stages. There is plenty of cash for the warlords and opium czars to put to use once both stability and opportunity emerges. But, again, it ain't gonna be any prettier than Blazing Saddles: As the Governor disdainfully points out, "all that stands between us and that valuable property is the rightful owners."

So, which of these American historical analogies do we embrace for Afghanistan? The glossy text book myths, or the realities in the less well-governed places?

[Rex Brynen]

Next is to drill into the current "nonstate" (AQ, etc) and "Quasi-state" (Hezbollah, Hamas, etc) organizations and ask, what is it that make these new information-age driven organizations so effective and frustrating for States to deal with??? For me, it comes down to this: "Legal Status" They find sanctuary in the fact that they are outside the law. They possess no real estate that they must defend, they simply borrow what dirt they need from some state, but then only for the time the need it. They possess no populace that they must govern or protect, again, they only borrow what aspect of whatever populace they might appeal to, and then only for what they need (some provide no more than moral support, some finance, some action officers to work network functions, some fighters, etc).

While this may be true of AQ, it certainly isn't the case with Hamas and Hizbullah.

First, I'm not sure what is particularly "information age" about either orghanization--while they certainly use the modern media to advantage, both satellite TV and the internet could vanish tomorrow without much affecting their fundamentals or local support.

Second, both care deeply about territory, since their appeal is primarily one of territorial liberation rather than AQ's broader, messianic goal of global Islamist transformation. Hizbullah in particular derives its strength and legitimacy in particular from the widely-accepted narrative (within the Lebanese Shiite community) that it drove the IDF from Lebanese lands and deters future reoccupation. Neither relies heavily on sanctuaries outside their home turf. Both are intimately involved in governance: Hamas was democratically elected into government primarily on a platform of governance reform, and today runs Gaza. Hizbullah is a member of the Lebanese government, with cabinet responsibilities.

I accept that your model largely applies to AQ, and to the various AQ wannabes. It is misleading (and analytically dangerous) to place these very different groups into the same conceptual box, however.

[Bob's World]

A couple years back the world watched Hezbollah fight a war with Israel. How is that? Why, if they are part of the government, was it not Lebanon that fought a war with Israel? The media and governments made this distinction, partly out of a desire to protect Lebanon, and partly to avoid recognizing and legitimizing Hezbollah. We granted them a sanctuary of status.

First, it is not outsiders, but rather the people of Lebanon that grant legitimacy to Hezbollah, and I think that vote is in. We only spite ourselves and empower them at the same time with our misunderstanding of "sanctuary." Israel could defeat Lebanon in short order because as a state it lacks this sanctuary.

Quasi-states are different than non-states as they are indeed tied to a particular populace and territory. We grant them sanctuary by not recognizing them as in fact being agents of their respective states.

As to AQ, I never blend the many nationalist insurgent movements that take on the AQ brand with AQ itself. AQ has a broad political agenda of freeing the Middle East from Western influence and taking down of the many governments there that have subjugated themselves to that same Western influence They conduct UW. The subgroups are unique, distinct, and independent, and conduct Insurgency. The information age allows a small club to conduct effective global UW; and also allows the separate insurgencies to more effectively draw support, moral and otherwise, from each other.

[Bob's World]

Good constructs cannot be overrated. But indeed, every populace is unique.

In the American Colonies, coming out of England, it was essential to have a separation of church and state.

for Saudi dissidents it was equally important to have NO separation of church and state.

"separation between politics and religion, which defeats the very purpose of the establishment of the Islamic state." (From the JULY 1992 "Memorandum of Advice" submitted to the Gov't of Saudi Arabia by 109 Saudi religious scholars and intellectuals).

To each their own. 'Good Governance' is like good taste. To each (populace) their own.

[Dayuhan]

AQ has a broad political agenda of freeing the Middle East from Western influence and taking down of the many governments there that have subjugated themselves to that same Western influence

What governments in the Middle East have "subjugated themselves to western influence"?

I think this misses an important point about AQ and similar organizations. Too many people assume that these organizations are purely reactive, that they exist solely as a "lashing back" at Western intrusion. I'm not sure that's entirely the case, and I think we need to consider the possibility that they are proactively pursuing their own agenda, that they are not trying to free the Middle East from anyone's influence, but rather that they are trying to impose their own influence.

for Saudi dissidents it was equally important to have NO separation of church and state.

"separation between politics and religion, which defeats the very purpose of the establishment of the Islamic state." (From the JULY 1992 "Memorandum of Advice" submitted to the Gov't of Saudi Arabia by 109 Saudi religious scholars and intellectuals).

To each their own. 'Good Governance' is like good taste. To each (populace) their own.

Are you assuming that these 109 religious scholars represent the interests and desires of the Saudi populace, rather than representing their own interests and desires?

[Bob's World]

I may need to bump Madison and replace him with Charles Pinckney of South Carolina. While much of what Pinkney contributed has been downplayed due to his own tendency to exaggerate the same, it is also well to understand that much of what we know about the Constitutional Convention comes from notes compiled by Madison himself.

Both men played major roles in shaping history's finest Counterinsurgency tool; but to the writer of the history goes the lion's share of the credit.

[Rex Brynen]

I still don't get how the US Constitution or Bill of Rights--interesting and remarkable documents, I'll agree--were effective counter-insurgent tools.

The UK spawned five major Europeanized colonial-settler regimes: Australia, Canada, NZ, and the US.

Australia has no constitutional Bill of Rights. Canada didn't get a Charter of Rights until 1982. NZ didn't get a Bill of Rights until 1990. Until 1982, the Canadian Constitution was, in effect, a piece of British legislation. The NZ Constitution remains a mish-mash of a variety of legal documents and unwritten constitutional traditions. Indeed, unwritten constitutional provisions and traditions remain important in all three Commonwealth countries.

Although Australia, Canada, and NZ have experienced minor sporadic disturbances of public order, none faced a civil war, or even a major insurgency that threatened the regime. (Quebec has come near to secession-by-referendum on two occasions, but peacefully.. and the Riel Rebellion and 1837-38 rebellions were insurgencies, but small ones)

The US experienced a devastating insurgency and civil war, in large part over constitutional issues.

On that evidence, how was the US constitutional system a particularly effective counter-insurgency tool? If anything--and again, for all its wonders and achievements in other regards--it seems to have been a strikingly inefficient one in comparative historical terms.

[Bob's World]

Well, first, the US didn't have an insurgency, but the issue of Slavery did drive the issues of states rights vs Central government power to a head leading to a civil war. (I.e., Governments moved to legally withdraw from the Union and form a new Confederation - leading to state on state warfare, not insurgency).

One must remember that the US was 13 separate sovereigns under the articles of confederation, and it was the Constitution (bearing this one ticking timebomb of an avoided issue) that made it one country for the first time.

The closest the US has come to insurgency, for all of its diversity, is the Civil Rights movement; by a segment of the populace that was excluded by racisim from full inclusion in the Good Governance provided by the Constitution.

The question I guess is, what is insurgency and what truly causes it, and what truly prevents it??

The lessons in the US example is that the country was formed through insurgency, and then, that same group of insurgents when faced with the challenges of governing on their own (at which we very nearly failed), came together and created a system of governance that carefully balanced power and rights between elements of the central government, as well as between state and central; and between individual and government based on the lessons learned as suppressed subject of England; as insurgents against England, and as failing counterinsurgents themselves under the articles of Confederation, to form a system of govenance designed specifically not to be perfect, but rather to be durable.

A government untested is not necessarily a government better designed to prevent or withstand insurgent pressures. I suspect though, that when Canada, NZ and Aus looked to form their governments, they drew from the successful model of England, and from other successful models such as the US as well. There are many paths to success, but their are common elements as well.


So much on insurgency and COIN these days is cast in the context of the violence that is often associated with such conditions. It is good to look at movements that opt for non-voilent ways and means to achieve their ends; and also at systems of governance that have proven effective at preventing insurgency in the first place.

[Rex Brynen]

Well, first, the US didn't have an insurgency, but the issue of Slavery did drive the issues of states rights vs Central government power to a head leading to a civil war. (I.e., Governments moved to legally withdraw from the Union and form a new Confederation - leading to state on state warfare, not insurgency).

This, of course, is a semantic issue that we've discussed a great deal in various SWC threads. I would define armed secession as a form of insurgency.

As to the legality of secession in the context of the American Civil War, I had thought that it had been subsequently been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Texas vs White (1869). However, I'll legal folks debate that.

[Pete]

In this thread Bob has mixed up the Clausewitz stuff about politics and war and decided that the men who replaced the old Articles of Confederation that had not worked were "counterinsurgents" of some sort or another because they preserved us as a nation and thereby prevented us from fighting a civil war.

This thread is about politics, not the military, and I don't see how current military policy overseas enters into it when abstractions about the Constitution or how it came to be ratified are discussed. Bob I'm afraid is sending us far afield from the issues in the combat zone that are at hand.

[Dayuhan]

Well, first, the US didn't have an insurgency, but the issue of Slavery did drive the issues of states rights vs Central government power to a head leading to a civil war. (I.e., Governments moved to legally withdraw from the Union and form a new Confederation - leading to state on state warfare, not insurgency).

I recall that tariff issues also had a fair bit to do with the problem... possibly as much to do with it as slavery, though "free the slaves" has a better ring to it than "make 'em buy American".

Would the wars with the Native Americans be classed as "insurgency", or as state-on-state warfare? Semantics, I suppose...

The closest the US has come to insurgency, for all of its diversity, is the Civil Rights movement; by a segment of the populace that was excluded by racisim from full inclusion in the Good Governance provided by the Constitution.

Does the Constitution provide good governance? With all due respect to the documents, I'd suggest that it is people who govern, not documents. Despite the Constitution, American governance has not been universally admirable: for much of our history our government has been as corrupt and as elite-centric as many of the governments we see threatened by insurgents today. Certainly wise principles help, but a great Constitution does not necessarily provide great governance, and I suspect that, say, Afghanistan, Chad, or Zimbabwe need a lot more than a better document to make their governance function.

The question I guess is, what is insurgency and what truly causes it, and what truly prevents it??

I'd say it is many things in many places, caused by many things in many places, and preventable (or not) by many things in many places. I doubt very much that it's possible to come up with a universally applicable cause or cure for insurgency, unless we constrict the definition of insurgency beyond any possible utility.

[Bob's World]

Pete,

When the field one is in is barren, sometimes one must travel far afield to find what they seek. I seek a clearer understanding of the causes, and therein the cures, to insurgency.

Combat with insurgents is arguably the least important line of operation for resolving an insurgency. Admittedly it is the most in-your-face obvious part of insurgency, but it is just a side product of the greater "insurgency" itself. There are many threads on the SWJ devoted to discussing the pros and cons of various tactics and equipment used for these operations, right?

This thread is to take a look at the roots of the insurgency itself, to look at WHY insurgencies happen or don't happen. It is all about the dynamic between a populace and its governance; and my experience in studying the problem (and observing the nature of governance in general) is that government officials rarely take responsibility for the bad things that happen on their watch. They blame them on those who came before them, or if possible on some evil outside factor. Certainly in insurgency this is true.

Many who study COIN, rather than insurgency itself (which I find to be a bit like studying medicine without also studying Disease and anatomy) focus on the surface issues of insurgencies.

-- They see people living in conditions that lack the types of government services we have at home, and assume that these guys are insurgents and we are not because they don't have these things. Give them these things and the insurgency will stop. This is the mantra of the Development crowd.

-- Others see that they do not have democracy. We have democracy and don't have an insurgency, so give them democracy and they won't have one either. This is the mantra of the Governance crowd.

-- Some see that their security forces are not as well trained and equipped as ours are. We do not have insurgency, so if we build their security forces capacity they will not have insurgency either. This is the mantra of the security crowd.

-- Then there are those who see that in some of these places there is corruption in the government, or that women have different rights than those that currently exist in the US. We have worked through some overt aspects of corruption (but have plenty of what must be a more acceptable type?) and have empowered our women over the years and we don't have insurgency, so if we project our values onto others their will be no insurgency. This the mantra of the moralist crowd.

-- Some see the presence of those who wrap messages of political change in a conservative, and often corrupted, form of Islam to motivate the populace to stand up to both external and internal oppression. We don't have that in America and we don't have insurgency, so it must be this Islamist Ideology that is causing insurgency and terrorism. This is the mantra of the ideologues.

Now, there are elements of truth in all of these things, and all of these thing provide clues and insights into the nature of insurgency; but when you really look at them what you see is that none tell the full story. Some are merely symptoms of the insurgency, such as violence that demands more effective security forces, or ideology, of which some form must be employed in any successful insurgency, picked much more for its effectiveness on the target populace rather than its content itself.

Some are true, but largely unrelated. Rich countries and poor countries alike erupt in insurgency, so poor living conditions is not a cause unto itself.

Every form of government, at some time and some place, finds itself challenged by insurgency, so it is not the form of government, but rather some deeper aspect of governance that is common to all forms and all populaces that must be at work.

This led me down the path that produced the paper I wrote regarding my insurgency model. That four key factors appear to be at play in every insurgency that truly drive a populace to rise up to challenge its governance, not just once, but over and over again over the years of insurgency and peace until it is resolved. This resolution always ultimately resides in changes on the part of the government.

As I have said, and will continue to say: Populaces do not fail governments, it is governments that fail their populace. COIN therefore is not about "fixing" a broken populace, or even about defeating the militant arm of that populace, it is about understanding what, of all the things that are likely to be broken, must actually be addressed and in what way to actually produce results in reducing the the conditions that produce insurgency.

When you "pop the hood" on a country, what do you look at first, what do you ignore or defer, and how do you actually "repair" those critical failures??

It is my opinion that these four perceptions existing in any populace, regardless of any other conditions of security, development, government, ideology, etc, will produce the causal conditions that lead populaces to act out illegally (though often peacefully) to challenge their government: (All of these are as assessed through the perceptions of segment of a populace that is rising up to challenge its governance)

Legitimacy of Governance. Regardless of its form, does the governed populace, or even just the insurgent element of the populace recognize and accept the legitimacy of the governance over them?

Justice. Not the existence of "rule of law", but rather the perception that the law as it is applied to them is just.

Respect. is this segment of the populace treated differently (in a bad way) from the larger populace with in the country, or than populaces in other countries, as a matter of status.

Hope. Does this segment of the populace believe that it has any trusted, certain and legal means to affect change to address the other three issues in particular, but also change in general?


I see the US experience as a unique, rather than universal, window into this dynamic; that once understood helps to understand other insurgencies elsewhere in place and time. All of these factors were at play when the Declaration of Independence was published. They were also at play in Vietnam; in Algeria; in Iraq; in occupied France in WWII; in certain neighborhoods in Paris and London today; in Saudi Arabia; in Yemen; throughout the Philippines; and certainly in Afghanistan.

They were also coming back into play in post-revolutionary America. We had a guiding document and form of government designed not for effectiveness and goodness into the future, but rather designed to prevent the main feature of British Government that was seen as the source of evil: The strong central government far removed from the realities of the states it governed.

At the Constitutional Convention, and later with the Bill of Rights, about 60 smart men, all raised in oppression, all former insurgents, all representing the elites of their respective societies, came together and debated for months how to best address their fears and concerns in a way that gave the central government enough power to be effective, but without becoming also oppressive to either the then sovereign states; similarly how to divide power between the people and the government as well. This was a low trust environment. They did not trust central government, and they did not trust the common man. They all feared and warned against "Democracy" every bit as much as they did against Monarchy. The end result, granted with the built in flaw wrapped around the issue of slavery, was a system that for all of its flaws, addressed these concerns and allowed for self-correction over time in a manner that ensures that:

Americans may not like their government, but they recognize its legitimacy to rule over them.

Americans may not like the law, but as a whole believe that they can find justice under it.

Americans may not have everything they want, but as a whole do not believe that they are prevented from opportunity and earned success as a matter of status.

And perhaps most importantly, they know, with absolute certainty, that for all the flaws and frustrations, that any government that they find unendurable, that it will either expire a natural death, or they can act legally to remove it.

In places where insurgency exists, this is not the case. Each is unique in culture and specific issues that drive at these perceptions, but these are the things I think we need to go after first when we pop the hood. These are also the things that need to be maintained and monitored with the greatest diligence to avoid insurgency in the first place. If you could put idiot lights on the President's desk, I would attach them to censors that monitor these four perceptions across the the populace.

For what it's worth, we still have not fully resolved the causal perception issues around our African American populace. These things are always a work in progress, and a good system makes up for a whole lot of bad outcomes. We need to focus on understanding and addressing the flaws in the system, not in the men who run the system, or those who do not like how they are governed by it.

[Pete]

Bob, you make good points. However, if this line of reasoning is taken to its logical conclusion it's a bit like saying that success in war will always elude us until the day comes that we develop a foreign policy that eradicates all the evils and injustices in the world. Before we reach that state of perfection on this planet there will be times when guys with grievances start things that will require armed force, police or military, to resolve. We're going far beyond the realm of military doctrine and entering into the field of existential philosophy.

[Bob's World]

Bob, you make good points. However, if this line of reasoning is taken to its logical conclusion it's a bit like saying that success in war will always elude us until the day comes that we develop a foreign policy that eradicates all the evils and injustices in the world. Before we reach that state of perfection on this planet there will be times when guys with grievances start things that will require armed force, police or military, to resolve. We're going far beyond the realm of military doctrine and entering into the field of existential philosophy.

When we stop thinking of COIN as war, and thinking of every intervention as COIN we will begin to be able to step back and see more clearly what actions are most likely to support our national interests in a region.

Insurgency and COIN are very much family business, and family violence. It is between a populace and its governance, outsiders can and do get involved on both sides, but for them outside the national family it is a totally different dynamic best described by our military doctrine as UW and FID.

But back to "All in the Family." I think everyone instinctively understands that domestic violence is different than violence outside the family. If a stranger assaults you on the street, and you beat him to a pulp in response, you can both go on about your lives with little residual baggage. Once it is over it is over.

If, on the other hand, your son punches you and you beat him to a pulp, it is never over. Same action, same reaction, totally different results.

This same dynamic is at work in Insurgency. We would do well to appreciate and recognize that possibility. At least long enough to go "Hmm, how does that affect my operations as either the COIN force or the FID force if that is true?"

Also, just as all violence is not war, not all internal violence is insurgency. Insurgency is a unique, distinct dynamic of populaces being pushed into a corner to where in their minds they have no alternative way to address their concerns with the government other than acting out illegally.

This is very different than say the violence between organized crime and the state.

It is also very different than situations like the American Civil War. People need to understand that under the Articles of Confederation All sovereignty was vested in the state, and none in the central government. It was an alliance, a treaty, not unlike the EU today. The Constitution was enacted to divide that sovereignty between the States and the central government. When Southern states voted to withdraw from the Union they were in there mind simply rejecting the concept of shared sovereignty as they felt it was becoming too intrusive on rights they felt were within the sovereignty of the State. This was not insurgency by any stretch of the imagination. Members of the populace did not rise up to challenge the Federal government, Sovereign states voted and in their minds withdrew the portions of their sovereignty they had given to the state some 70 odd years earlier.

This isn't about definitions, it is about very different forms of causation that then in turn drive very different solutions.

We can talk about war, but that is for another thread. This thread is about insurgency, and how a government that is formed so as to mitigate the causal perceptions of insurgency (even if done so for other reasons, and as much by accident as by Divine design) will lead to a nation that is much more resilient to the pressures of UW, ideology, ineffectiveness, etc that can lead to insurgency in states less well equipped.

Currently the Constitution of Afghanistan is an absolute train wreck disaster as in regard to its effect on insurgency. It is like they designed it to create insurgency. I know they designed it to prevent warlords, but the effect is the same. Accidental stupidity will kill you just as dead as the intentional variety.

[Dayuhan]

When we stop thinking of COIN as war, and thinking of every intervention as COIN we will begin to be able to step back and see more clearly what actions are most likely to support our national interests in a region.

Insurgency and COIN are very much family business, and family violence. It is between a populace and its governance, outsiders can and do get involved on both sides, but for them outside the national family it is a totally different dynamic best described by our military doctrine as UW and FID.

This is certainly true in what most of us would see as a "typical" insurgency. I'm not sure it's completely accurate in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are of course the only insurgencies we need to deal with at this point.

We are not an external player in these insurgencies. These insurgencies exist because we intervened, removed governments, and replaced them with governments of our choosing. We can't approach these problems as if we're intervening to support pre-existing governments that have gotten into trouble with their people, because that's not what we're doing. We're trying to support governments that are an extension of our presence until they have the capacity to govern on their own... if they ever do. We can't pretend to be a peripheral player in these cases, because we're not: we placed ourselves in the center of the picture, wisely or not, and that's where we remain.