Influencing and Information Operations

[William F. Owen]

Correct, although the major failings were at formation HQ level training. At all levels the training and understanding of individuals and teams in Influence Ops was terrible and our ability to harness money as a weapon system correspondingly woeful.

Please do not tell me that you have brought into Influence Ops. It's twaddle of the worst sort.

[Ken White]

I do know from harsh experience they will believe little or nothing you say, take all you offer, ask for more and change little if at all. Many will even change to harden their opposition to you...

Not to mention that your opponents, generally decentralized with far less bureaucracy and no over cautious senior people to placate plus the ability to use terror and intimidation will generally out-influence you...

[Red Rat]

Please do not tell me that you have brought into Influence Ops. It's twaddle of the worst sort.

There could be a whole different thread starting here...

It depends on what you see Influence Ops being a means to an end or an end in itself. I err towards the role of armed forces being to kill the enemy thereby either solving the issue (you can't have a conflict if one side to the conflict no longer exists) or creating the necessary conditions whereby other organs of state can step in and start to solve the conflict. On that analysis then Influence Ops is a means to an end.

If on the other hand you regard the focused use of violence as one of several 'Influence' tools (the - AQ does Influence Operations with a kinetic element' analysis) then Influence becomes the end in itself with use of force one of the means.

I don't think you can write off the full panoply of Influence ACtivities and I also think that we (UK Armed Forces plc) remain mired in confusion as to what we want from Influence Activities at all levels; and by staffing (in true British fashion) with sometimes enthusiastic amateurs we do what little we do badly...

By Influence Activities/Ops I certainly do not mean that we can apply pressure or inducements with any degree of certainty as to what the 'influencing effect' will be (if x then y); most of us have problems understanding our wives let alone strangers in a foreign culture.

[Ken White]

This thread has been initiated at the suggestion of Red Rat in the Post just above. To start the thread, these two links have some background information:

Information Operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom – What Went Wrong? (.pdf).

Air University Cyberspace and Information Operations Study Center.

Here are links to previous Blog Posts or Threads on the topic from the SWJ Archives:

Here are links to earlier Threads on the topic that are in the Council Archives:

Who's Running the information War.

DoD Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan.

Winning the Ground Battles but Losing the Information War

Pentagon Reviewing Strategic Information Operations.

Newest evolution of FM 3-13, Information.

Consider the posts of Wilf, Red Rat and I above and then share your thoughts on coalition ability or lack thereof. Comments from practicing FA 30 and other IO types welcome...

[Bob's World]

If one doesn't understand the role of ideology in insurgency, then they are not likely to understand how to employ information in support of the counterinsurgent either.

Consider:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/jou...p/46-jones.pdf

[Ken White]

I question whether my subject / title just above isn't an oxymoron. To use the vernacular, Ain't sure you can get there from here. More correctly, I'm unsure the US can get there...

If one doesn't understand the role of ideology in insurgency, then they are not likely to understand how to employ information in support of the counterinsurgent either...

At that link, you list five points to which I provide five counterpoints :

1. Insurgent ideology is largely disposable, and any particular message is useful only so long as it binds the populace to the cause, and the counterinsurgent is also either unwilling or unable to co-opt it.

True. However, a third party has little to no leverage in countering the insurgent message for numerous reasons.

2. The insurgent only has to tell the populace what they want to hear, the counterinsurgent must actually perform in providing the populace what they need.

Again true; again a third party has little sway in providing the populace of the host nation goods or services or forcing host nation performance.

3. There are two steps to an effective counter-ideology program:
-- Compete a superior ideology with the populace in the marketplace of ideas, and
-- Assess the populace, and co-opt or agree with the insurgent where logical.

Again true, my comments above apply.

4. Actions speak louder than words. Ones major operations are their true Strategic Communications, and any official messages to describe those actions will either lend or take credibility based upon their consistency with the public’s perception of the nature of those operations.

Ah, at last we get to the thread topic, information operations. Again I agree that you are correct -- and one more time, I cite the fact that an intervenor can suggest, assist and provide support of all sorts -- but is unlikely to be able to do the things you suggest.

Specifically, an intervenor will be unable perform actions -- or provide information -- rapidly enough if for no other reason due to the coordination required with the host government.

My question of you, then, is how does an intervening nation arrive at the point of being able to influence the population of the host nation by using the counter actions you list?

5. U.S. ideology holds that when government fails, insurgency is both the right and the duty of the populace.

That may be correct in the eyes of some in the US, others may not agree. Regardless, I'm unsure that it has anything to do with Information Operations or is the policy of the US Government...

I do not disagree with the thrust of your linked paper. However, I do not see how the counters you suggest, the examples you provide, apply to our current efforts in Afghanistan. We could apply them if we had a domestic insurgency but we cannot apply them to the insurgencies of others. While I understand the linkage of information operations to counter ideology, I do not understand how the US can apply your prescriptions elsewhere in the world, particularly in nations with significant economic and structural problems.

Further, I question how we, as large, cumbersome and bureaucratic as we are, can ever be expected to succeed in besting a lighter, more decentralized and agile opponent in many facets of information operations. We can certainly outperform many opponents (including the current crew) in some aspects but in the defeat of an ideology, I'm curious to know how you would address our lack flexibility and speed issues?

[Bob's World]

Further, I question how we, as large, cumbersome and bureaucratic as we are, can ever be expected to succeed in besting a lighter, more decentralized and agile opponent in many facets of information operations. We can certainly outperform many opponents (including the current crew) in some aspects but in the defeat of an ideology, I'm curious to know how you would address our lack flexibility and speed issues?

We need to quit chasing the ball, position ourselves wisely, and allow our opponents to do the majority of the running around. If I am "countering" I am always chasing my opponent. If I am "competing" I am playing my own game, and making him come to me.

[Dayuhan]

If one doesn't understand the role of ideology in insurgency, then they are not likely to understand how to employ information in support of the counterinsurgent either.

Consider:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/jou...p/46-jones.pdf

I'm not quite sure how this fits with the insurgencies we're actually trying to manage today:

Bin Laden, on the other hand, is no Messiah. He uses an ideology infused with religious overtones to rally the populace to rise up for political change for the same reason so many leaders who have gone before him have: it works. The question then for the counterinsurgent, is how to defuse that message without affronting the valid religious beliefs of the very populace whose support, as the true center of gravity in any insurgency, we are battling for.

I can't see that Bin Laden's ideology has ever inspired any populace anywhere to "rise up for political change". It has inspired small numbers of people to commit and directly support acts of violence, but that's a very differnet thing. The "insurgencies" in Iraq and Afghanistan were not about Bin Laden's message rallying populaces to rise up for political change. They were driven by local narratives and local issues; bin Laden may have used them for his own ends but he and his ideology are beneficiaries, not the cause, of those insurgencies. What message are we actually fighting in Afghanistan? Is it "establish an Islamic caliphate dominated by Wahhabi and/or Deobandi beliefs" or is it "drive the foreigners out of Afghanistan"?

To some extent there is certainly an ideological component to insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan and Iraq, but the US has no duty, right, or capacity to launch competing ideologies into the local marketplaces of ideas.

In Afghanistan I suspect the core of the ideological battle lies in the struggle to frame the conflict. The US is trying to frame the war as an insurgency, the Taliban fighting to overthrow the Karzai Government with the US "doing FID" in support of the Karzai Government's COIN. The Taliban want to frame the conflict not as an insurgency, but as resistance to foreign occupation: Taliban vs the invaders, us vs them. I'm not at all sure we're winning that particular fight.

[William F. Owen]

.
I don't think you can write off the full panoply of Influence ACtivities and I also think that we (UK Armed Forces plc) remain mired in confusion as to what we want from Influence Activities at all levels; and by staffing (in true British fashion) with sometimes enthusiastic amateurs we do what little we do badly...

Based on that, I think we can!
I just re-read The UK COIN Manual, Army Code 71876, 2009. The Chapter on Influence activity is painful. It seems not to understand that the best way to gain support is to win. Support does not create power. Power creates support.
People come on side when it's clear you are the winning team. That is the only influence you want to have.

most of us have problems understanding our wives let alone strangers in a foreign culture.

Amen. So why try and employ the same ideas as you would canvassing for a political party or selling washing powder to warfare?

[Backwards Observer]

Welcome To Your Nightmare

[RobSentse]

Think at how difficult it is to influence, say, your teenage kids, into a particular course of action. You know them. They have grown up in your house.
You know the groups they belong to, their interests, their likes and dislikes. Yet as every parent knows influencing a 16 year old into a particular course of action can be difficult.

Now apply this thinking to any person whom you do not know, who has grown up in a completely different culture with different values and beliefs anchored in a wholly different world from our own.

How do you want to influence them?

http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/d...s_Web.pdf/view

www.linkedin.com
www.scribd.com/amniat

[RobSentse]

Know the human environment as operations are predominantly conducted in urbanized terrain.
Understanding the environment is fundamental in either conducting operations and analyzing any threat.

Current and future operations is like Microsoft fighting Google: You do not fight the competition; you fight for the approval of the client.
So, you fight fair, your competition fights 'unfair' and uses 'dirty' tricks Be aware that your clients can also be your supplier, but also your competitor.
After all, your competitor of yesterday, could be your client of tomorrow.

It is possible to get in control by providing superior service, products, marketing (presence, posture, profile) at a reasonable cost anytime, all the time.
For that it is important not to force your client. Instead of that, persuade him, influence his perception, give him choices. In order to not let your competitor define your actions you have to maintain the initiative and get his best people to join you.
The challenge is to give the market confirmation, via their own opinion leaders, that his choice is right/wrong (peer pressure!).

So, be present in the market all the time, everywhere.
Understand your clients and synchronize your strategy accordingly.
Avoid misinterpretation and not changing fast enough because otherwise you will lose your best people to your competition.

Do not think that you have to defeat an opponent to "win" (which is quite un-military).

www.linkedin.com
www.scribd.com/amniat

[William F. Owen]

Current and future operations is like Microsoft fighting Google: You do not fight the competition; you fight for the approval of the client.

That is dangerous rubbish. Current and future conflict is and will always be about killing for political purpose. Breaking of will is what wins the military competition and thus is most likely to deliver an opposed political objective.

For that it is important not to force your client. Instead of that, persuade him, influence his perception, give him choices. In order to not let your competitor define your actions you have to maintain the initiative and get his best people to join you.

Again, rubbish. You break his will. the enemy's armed faction is not a client. It's an opponent.

Do not think that you have to defeat an opponent to "win" (which is quite un-military).

Yes you do. If you are not fighting then you are just doing politics. No fighting, no armies. Normal political discourse.

[slapout9]

Know the human environment as operations are predominantly conducted in urbanized terrain.
Understanding the environment is fundamental in either conducting operations and analyzing any threat.

Current and future operations is like Microsoft fighting Google: You do not fight the competition; you fight for the approval of the client.
So, you fight fair, your competition fights 'unfair' and uses 'dirty' tricks Be aware that your clients can also be your supplier, but also your competitor.
After all, your competitor of yesterday, could be your client of tomorrow.

It is possible to get in control by providing superior service, products, marketing (presence, posture, profile) at a reasonable cost anytime, all the time.
For that it is important not to force your client. Instead of that, persuade him, influence his perception, give him choices. In order to not let your competitor define your actions you have to maintain the initiative and get his best people to join you.
The challenge is to give the market confirmation, via their own opinion leaders, that his choice is right/wrong (peer pressure!).

So, be present in the market all the time, everywhere.
Understand your clients and synchronize your strategy accordingly.
Avoid misinterpretation and not changing fast enough because otherwise you will lose your best people to your competition.

Do not think that you have to defeat an opponent to "win" (which is quite un-military).

www.linkedin.com
www.scribd.com/amniat

Been thinking about your comparison of war and business models and I am not convinced yet, but what you say is interesting. Could you go into more detail?