Influencing and Information Operations

[Dayuhan]

How do we balance the need for PsyOps and Info coloration with the need for legitimacy, honesty and more clarity in news releases for both domestic and international consumption?

One of the problems we have with things like "info coloration" in disordered environments is that we tend to work through official media, which people in these environments have for the most part ceased to trust. They trust their own networks, variants of the old bush telegraph, and we've little capacity to influence that.

Our info ops often shoot themselves in the proverbial foot by vastly underestimating the sophistication, access to information, and ability to detect BS that prevail among the populace. It's harder to fool people than we sometimes seem to think. I once read a comment (on OEF/Philippines) from an American offcier to the effect that we needed to conduct information ops so that the populace of Basilan would know how cruel the Abu Sayyaf are. That was a bit of a laugh out lou moment: the citizens of Basilan already know all there is to know about the Abu Sayyaf. Many of them know more about the Abu Sayyaf than the CIA does. It's not a big island, and word gets around.

Again re the Philippines, another point from the referenced article that could use clarification... and another example of how our interpretation of information ops can vary with perception.

Recognizing that actions speak louder than words, the current Western message is dominated by our operations in Iraq. One of the most notable aspects of U.S. actions in Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines, is that because the operations there are so clearly consistent with the West’s message, that it not only sends a powerful Strategic Communication throughout South East Asia, it has also proven to be quite resilient to regular attacks by various Muslim and Philippine media. Applying what is termed the “Indirect Approach,” no U.S. actions are done unilaterally, no U.S. bases have been built, and most importantly, nationalist insurgents are recognized as distinct from terrorist organizations, and all actions, be they counterterrorist or counterinsurgency, are done by, through and with the forces of the government of the Philippines.

The picture is a bit more complex than that. Attacks on the US presence from the mainstream (Manila-based) media and intelligentsia are dominated by the left, which has little popular credibility; they're loud, but nobody listens. The broader populace in the Christian north views the Muslim populace as an uncontrollable and irretrievably violent blight that needs to be brought under control by the harshest available methods ("it's the only language they understand". This audience is happy to get any possible help and if anything thinks we haven't gone far enough: many would be perfectly delighted to see the US go in en masse and put the boot down.

On the other side, the US presence in Basilan in particular has won widespread approval from the Muslim populace, not because of projects and funds but because of a near universal recognition that Philippine forces are far less abusive when Americans are around. It is fairly ironic that with all the talk of protecting the populace from the insurgents, we have in this case won over much of the populace by protecting them from our allies.

[Ken White]

... They trust their own networks, variants of the old bush telegraph, and we've little capacity to influence that.

That's been my observation -- here and abroad. Or domestically and internationally -- cell phones are neat gadgets.

Our info ops often shoot themselves in the proverbial foot by vastly underestimating the sophistication, access to information, and ability to detect BS that prevail among the populace. It's harder to fool people than we sometimes seem to think.

Yep. I've seen that self inflicted wound bit many times in many places. A lot of Americans tend to forget others have been playing their own variations of information games a lot longer than we have. We often come across like marketers or used car sales people, tripping every BS meter for miles around...

They're generally better at our version as well.

It is fairly ironic that with all the talk of protecting the populace from the insurgents, we have in this case won over much of the populace by protecting them from our allies.

Not ironic, sad. Basilan is not the first place that's occurred.

[Red Rat]

When I have sorted out my IT issues and in-tray I will be able to give this thread the time and effort it deserves. In the meantime here is what the current UK COIN doctrine says about the importance of Influence Activities.

The Psychological Dimension : Influence Activity

The need to win and maintain popular support in the theatre of operations and at home is vital to both sides. Gaining and Maintaining Popular Support is a principle of COIN. The idea of ‘popular support’ is acknowledgement that COIN operations have a very strong psychological dimension. All actions taken by military forces, whether or not they involve the use of force, have an effect, and such effects as can be determined require to be considered as plans are drawn up and operations undertaken. In the same way, actions carried out by the enemy require careful consideration so that weaknesses and inconsistencies can be exploited.

The contest for the support of the population provides COIN with its principle distinguishing characteristic; it is concerned primarily with moulding the population’s perceptions. This is a difficult and intangible business. It is one made even more complicated when operating in a country whose culture is not well understood by the intervening forces. It places a premium on developing cultural awareness and maintaining continuity in approach. Each COIN campaign requires an agreed single vision of the future for the host nation that is consistent across any coalition or alliance. The ‘vision’ is a competing narrative, the statement of what the UK with allies and civilian partners is trying to achieve. The narrative should be stronger then the insurgent’s message, should seek to persuade rather than coerce, should emphasise security and development within its text and should be reflected in the UK information strategy.

The narrative is central to the COIN effort. The narrative must be a carefully crafted message which aims to strengthen the legitimacy and build the authority of the indigenous government in the eyes of the population. It has to resonate with the local population, use their words and imagery in a way that taps into deep cultural undercurrents. The narrative aims to convince the people that the indigenous government, supported by international forces and organisations, can deliver a better future in terms of security, justice and material wealth.

It should be assumed that every decision made, every action taken and message published or broadcast shapes the opinion of the indigenous population, the insurgent, allies and the domestic and international audiences. Commanders should focus on shaping perceptions through their activities in the physical, cognitive and information domains.

[William F. Owen]

The narrative is central to the COIN effort. The narrative must be a carefully crafted message which aims to strengthen the legitimacy and build the authority of the indigenous government in the eyes of the population. It has to resonate with the local population, use their words and imagery in a way that taps into deep cultural undercurrents. The narrative aims to convince the people that the indigenous government, supported by international forces and organisations, can deliver a better future in terms of security, justice and material wealth.

This is just rubbish. Narratives do not change peoples minds. To assume that a narrative is anything other than the story that informs the political belief is delusional. You do not, and cannot win by having a "better story." That is fatuously optimistic at best.

30 years of violence in Northern Ireland did not change either sides' "narrative." 90 years of violence in Israel/Palestine has never changed or altered either sides "narrative."

[Red Rat]

This is just rubbish. Narratives do not change peoples minds. To assume that a narrative is anything other than the story that informs the political belief is delusional. You do not, and cannot win by having a "better story."

Narratives in themselves do not change peoples minds. But I view narratives as a means by which the campaign across the lines of operation (LOO) can be articulated and understood. This is the story we want to tell - how can we tell it across the LOOs and do our actions fit into this or are they counter-productive? Then our actions and words develop coherence and people may decide to support us (based on the fact that we are winning and we will make them rich (er).

[William F. Owen]

But I view narratives as a means by which the campaign across the lines of operation (LOO) can be articulated and understood. This is the story we want to tell - how can we tell it across the LOOs and do our actions fit into this or are they counter-productive?

So what you are saying is the "Narrative" is the basically the Policy? - the reason why we are "there."
We put the Policy into a story form so that we can check if it is coherent with the levels of force used and all instruments of power?

So it's a story we tell to ourselves to check we are doing the right thing? OK, that's interesting. How does this have anything to with the merits IO?

Is IO really just stating the policy?

[Hacksaw]

In a sense I think yes and more regarding what IO is simply because it involves both internal and external consumption and it is damn near impossible to narrowly deliver info...

So it is in the end about consistency... and if we aren't consistent we cannot expect anyone to believe our sources/networks... along with Red Rat the sum of our activity conveys a message... if I send a foot patrol through town I am making a statement and that statement is nuanced by how the patrol is executed... what is their combat load, how do they interact with the population... I'm not talking about handing out candy because they makes us nice guys... always thought one of the worst decisions in OIF 1 was not sending a significant force through Fallja and Tikrit... nothing like a little discomfort for folks to understand that they don't control their own destinies...

I'm rambling so i'll stop here, but I disagree vehemently with what you call twaddle as a general rule... IO doctrine in US Army is actually moving towards the wholistic consistency viewpoint and less towards messages, tlaking points and the like