I question whether my subject / title just above isn't an oxymoron. To use the vernacular, Ain't sure you can get there from here. More correctly, I'm unsure the US can get there...
Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
If one doesn't understand the role of ideology in insurgency, then they are not likely to understand how to employ information in support of the counterinsurgent either...
At that link, you list five points to which I provide five counterpoints :
1. Insurgent ideology is largely disposable, and any particular message is useful only so long as it binds the populace to the cause, and the counterinsurgent is also either unwilling or unable to co-opt it.
True. However, a third party has little to no leverage in countering the insurgent message for numerous reasons.
2. The insurgent only has to tell the populace what they want to hear, the counterinsurgent must actually perform in providing the populace what they need.
Again true; again a third party has little sway in providing the populace of the host nation goods or services or forcing host nation performance.
3. There are two steps to an effective counter-ideology program:
-- Compete a superior ideology with the populace in the marketplace of ideas, and
-- Assess the populace, and co-opt or agree with the insurgent where logical.
Again true, my comments above apply.
4. Actions speak louder than words. Ones major operations are their true Strategic Communications, and any official messages to describe those actions will either lend or take credibility based upon their consistency with the public’s perception of the nature of those operations.
Ah, at last we get to the thread topic, information operations. Again I agree that you are correct -- and one more time, I cite the fact that an intervenor can suggest, assist and provide support of all sorts -- but is unlikely to be able to do the things you suggest.

Specifically, an intervenor will be unable perform actions -- or provide information -- rapidly enough if for no other reason due to the coordination required with the host government.

My question of you, then, is how does an intervening nation arrive at the point of being able to influence the population of the host nation by using the counter actions you list?
5. U.S. ideology holds that when government fails, insurgency is both the right and the duty of the populace.
That may be correct in the eyes of some in the US, others may not agree. Regardless, I'm unsure that it has anything to do with Information Operations or is the policy of the US Government...

I do not disagree with the thrust of your linked paper. However, I do not see how the counters you suggest, the examples you provide, apply to our current efforts in Afghanistan. We could apply them if we had a domestic insurgency but we cannot apply them to the insurgencies of others. While I understand the linkage of information operations to counter ideology, I do not understand how the US can apply your prescriptions elsewhere in the world, particularly in nations with significant economic and structural problems.

Further, I question how we, as large, cumbersome and bureaucratic as we are, can ever be expected to succeed in besting a lighter, more decentralized and agile opponent in many facets of information operations. We can certainly outperform many opponents (including the current crew) in some aspects but in the defeat of an ideology, I'm curious to know how you would address our lack flexibility and speed issues?