I think that we are agreeing here?
Hmm, two points:
- Does it work? There have been successful COIN campaigns so COIN does work. Why the successful campaigns were successful is often a matter of debate, take the ongoing debate about the effectiveness of the campaign in Iraq and what role the Surge played. The current US narrative is very different from the Iraqi narrative and the truth is that success was down to a combination of factors and probably no single factor. Does the current system in AFG work - not sure yet! How can we measure success? Even less clear!
- Is there a boundary between COIN and non-COIN?
IMHO there is not a clear distinction between COIN and non-COIN, it is on a sliding (and blurred) scale of warfare. For an army conducting operations however there are major differences in how it organises, trains and operates between COIN and major combat operations (combined arms manoeuvre ops at bde level and above).
I think an army has an advantage in firepower, not necessarily in intelligence, and certainly not in the early stages of a campaign and not in foreign cultures. One of the fundamental problems of COIN is that armed forces often find it difficult to bring their advantages in firepower and tactical mobility to bear effectively, normally because they lack the intelligence to do so. Plus an army's hierarchical command structure, under civilian control is normally slower and less responsive then an insurgent's structure.
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