Influencing and Information Operations

[Red Rat]

When I have sorted out my IT issues and in-tray I will be able to give this thread the time and effort it deserves. In the meantime here is what the current UK COIN doctrine says about the importance of Influence Activities.

The Psychological Dimension : Influence Activity

The need to win and maintain popular support in the theatre of operations and at home is vital to both sides. Gaining and Maintaining Popular Support is a principle of COIN. The idea of ‘popular support’ is acknowledgement that COIN operations have a very strong psychological dimension. All actions taken by military forces, whether or not they involve the use of force, have an effect, and such effects as can be determined require to be considered as plans are drawn up and operations undertaken. In the same way, actions carried out by the enemy require careful consideration so that weaknesses and inconsistencies can be exploited.

The contest for the support of the population provides COIN with its principle distinguishing characteristic; it is concerned primarily with moulding the population’s perceptions. This is a difficult and intangible business. It is one made even more complicated when operating in a country whose culture is not well understood by the intervening forces. It places a premium on developing cultural awareness and maintaining continuity in approach. Each COIN campaign requires an agreed single vision of the future for the host nation that is consistent across any coalition or alliance. The ‘vision’ is a competing narrative, the statement of what the UK with allies and civilian partners is trying to achieve. The narrative should be stronger then the insurgent’s message, should seek to persuade rather than coerce, should emphasise security and development within its text and should be reflected in the UK information strategy.

The narrative is central to the COIN effort. The narrative must be a carefully crafted message which aims to strengthen the legitimacy and build the authority of the indigenous government in the eyes of the population. It has to resonate with the local population, use their words and imagery in a way that taps into deep cultural undercurrents. The narrative aims to convince the people that the indigenous government, supported by international forces and organisations, can deliver a better future in terms of security, justice and material wealth.

It should be assumed that every decision made, every action taken and message published or broadcast shapes the opinion of the indigenous population, the insurgent, allies and the domestic and international audiences. Commanders should focus on shaping perceptions through their activities in the physical, cognitive and information domains.

[William F. Owen]

The narrative is central to the COIN effort. The narrative must be a carefully crafted message which aims to strengthen the legitimacy and build the authority of the indigenous government in the eyes of the population. It has to resonate with the local population, use their words and imagery in a way that taps into deep cultural undercurrents. The narrative aims to convince the people that the indigenous government, supported by international forces and organisations, can deliver a better future in terms of security, justice and material wealth.

This is just rubbish. Narratives do not change peoples minds. To assume that a narrative is anything other than the story that informs the political belief is delusional. You do not, and cannot win by having a "better story." That is fatuously optimistic at best.

30 years of violence in Northern Ireland did not change either sides' "narrative." 90 years of violence in Israel/Palestine has never changed or altered either sides "narrative."

[Red Rat]

This is just rubbish. Narratives do not change peoples minds. To assume that a narrative is anything other than the story that informs the political belief is delusional. You do not, and cannot win by having a "better story."

Narratives in themselves do not change peoples minds. But I view narratives as a means by which the campaign across the lines of operation (LOO) can be articulated and understood. This is the story we want to tell - how can we tell it across the LOOs and do our actions fit into this or are they counter-productive? Then our actions and words develop coherence and people may decide to support us (based on the fact that we are winning and we will make them rich (er).

[William F. Owen]

But I view narratives as a means by which the campaign across the lines of operation (LOO) can be articulated and understood. This is the story we want to tell - how can we tell it across the LOOs and do our actions fit into this or are they counter-productive?

So what you are saying is the "Narrative" is the basically the Policy? - the reason why we are "there."
We put the Policy into a story form so that we can check if it is coherent with the levels of force used and all instruments of power?

So it's a story we tell to ourselves to check we are doing the right thing? OK, that's interesting. How does this have anything to with the merits IO?

Is IO really just stating the policy?

[Hacksaw]

In a sense I think yes and more regarding what IO is simply because it involves both internal and external consumption and it is damn near impossible to narrowly deliver info...

So it is in the end about consistency... and if we aren't consistent we cannot expect anyone to believe our sources/networks... along with Red Rat the sum of our activity conveys a message... if I send a foot patrol through town I am making a statement and that statement is nuanced by how the patrol is executed... what is their combat load, how do they interact with the population... I'm not talking about handing out candy because they makes us nice guys... always thought one of the worst decisions in OIF 1 was not sending a significant force through Fallja and Tikrit... nothing like a little discomfort for folks to understand that they don't control their own destinies...

I'm rambling so i'll stop here, but I disagree vehemently with what you call twaddle as a general rule... IO doctrine in US Army is actually moving towards the wholistic consistency viewpoint and less towards messages, tlaking points and the like

[William F. Owen]

So it is in the end about consistency... and if we aren't consistent we cannot expect anyone to believe our sources/networks... along with Red Rat the sum of our activity conveys a message...

That message is the policy. The other side oppose your policy. Is IO merely the desire for your actions (strategy) to match your message (policy)?

but I disagree vehemently with what you call twaddle as a general rule... IO doctrine in US Army is actually moving towards the wholistic consistency viewpoint and less towards messages, tlaking points and the like

OK, so IO doctrine is a good thing? Is that good thing "Information Operations" or "Influence Operations?" - because these are two different things.

[Hacksaw]

In most things we are in violent agreement...
As for which it depends on whose definitions you use and in the case of the US Army it seems torn as to which it will use internally and whether they will remain consistent with joint doctrine or attempt to influence AGAIN the direction that joint doc takes...

I can certainly agree that the tortuous path that this has taken has been... well toruous...

Agree it is what the policy is or what we want the policy to be in the absence of policy

and this is topic in which we can play parlour word games for as long as we wish... I just never thought any of this was NEW... as a division planner I explicitly/in parallel considered the conduct of operations regardless of intensity... if we are conducting an attack to destroy... reduce to the point that the organization can not be reconstituted (well that has an info content to it in terms of the immediate task and subsequent conduct of operations) that is probably coached in terms of defeat...

and if as a planner I'm not thinking in those terms... well I cheated the CDR and the unit