Insurgency vs. Civil War

[marct]

This seems to have been pretty well covered, but insurgency is a strategy that is sometimes used in civil wars. A civil war is simply an armed conflict where the antagonists are exclusively or primarily citizens of the same state.

But if this is the official answer, I think it is worthy of a deeper look.

If insurgency is merely a strategy employed by a civil war opponent to the state it really doesn't offer much to the counterinsurgent in terms of helping him understand and resolve the threat. Simply defeat the civil war opponent and the insurgency will go away.

Hmmm, well "insurgency", at least in the sense of a popular uprising, might be a tactic employed in a civil war but, on the whole, I have to agree with Bob that it certainly can't be limited to that.

I think we do better when we look at insurgency as a set of conditions that may well manifest in several forms: a miserable populace that does not dare act out; a populace that does act out - either choosing non-violent (subversion) or violent (insurgency) means. The key to effective COIN is to address the conditions and not merely set out to defeat those who dare to respond to the conditions.

Agreed about manifesting in several forms, but I'm not sure I agree with you on the implied crisp distinction between insurgency and subversion. For example, I would argue that Ghandi was an insurgent rather than a "subversive".

[ryanmleigh]

Based on a lot of the recent discussion is there a need to distinguish between the political and military aspects of conflict. Could it be as simple as saying that civil war is primarily a military conflict with political action secondary while an insurgency is primarily a political conflict with military action secondary?

Probably far to simplistic, but still trying to wrap my head around the differences.

[Bob's World]

Just applying Kitson's distinction. Same root cause, Subversion as it grows, Insurgency once the violence exceeeds a certain level (just to show I don't have to come up with my own approach for everything, and to throw Wilf a well-earned bone). But it is these causal conditions of insurgency at the roots of this whole mess that must be the main effort focus of good (effective) COIN. Too often we slave away at defeating the symptoms as they manifest and largely ignore the root causes.

This gets to the crux of my work; and why I see Karzai's efforts with reconciliation as the key to success in Afghanistan, regardless of what General we put in charge of the military coalition efforts. The coalition's military efforts have to be a supporting effort to a supporting effort (Afghan military efforts) for there to be true success. But that is not how we're approaching this.

By focusing on what Karzai is doing at the GIROA level we get at the actual heart of the insurgency. If he is unwilling to go all in on addressing the causal factors, then that is the metric we are looking for in terms of beginning our down-sizing of military effort. We can't just be the goon squad that keeps him in power.

[marct]

Based on a lot of the recent discussion is there a need to distinguish between the political and military aspects of conflict. Could it be as simple as saying that civil war is primarily a military conflict with political action secondary while an insurgency is primarily a political conflict with military action secondary?

It might, possibly, be easier to concentrate on the concept of civil war as a conflict to determine who will rule, while and insurgency would be closer to how they will rule.

Just applying Kitson's distinction. Same root cause, Subversion as it grows, Insurgency once the violence exceeeds a certain level (just to show I don't have to come up with my own approach for everything, and to throw Wilf a well-earned bone). But it is these causal conditions of insurgency at the roots of this whole mess that must be the main effort focus of good (effective) COIN. Too often we slave away at defeating the symptoms as they manifest and largely ignore the root causes.

Agreed (sort of ). As I said earlier, I can think of "insurgencies" that were basically non-violent. I came up with another one as I was dealing with my "microsoft moment" (you know "Install these updates now or we will destroy your computer...."): the Catholic Church.

This gets to the crux of my work; and why I see Karzai's efforts with reconciliation as the key to success in Afghanistan, regardless of what General we put in charge of the military coalition efforts. The coalition's military efforts have to be a supporting effort to a supporting effort (Afghan military efforts) for there to be true success. But that is not how we're approaching this.

By focusing on what Karzai is doing at the GIROA level we get at the actual heart of the insurgency. If he is unwilling to go all in on addressing the causal factors, then that is the metric we are looking for in terms of beginning our down-sizing of military effort. We can't just be the goon squad that keeps him in power.

Totally agree in the specifics of Afghanistan, Bob. I would argue, in fact, that a number of ISAF efforts have been counter-productive to resolving that conflict.

[jmm99]

Let me take just one very narrow topic - how have insurgencies and civil wars been treated under domestic law and international law over the last 200 years ?

To answer that, I'd have to put together a list of armed conflicts (which is the key I Law term) that may be called a lot of different names - insurgencies, civil wars, insurrections, rebellions, resistence to occupiers, national liberation wars, etc.

In short, I look at a bunch of "Small Wars" in Callwell's jargon (or "Shadow Wars" in Asprey's jargon) and end up with some "operational definitions" as brother Fishel terms them - definitions not carved in stone but set up for working purposes.

Then I'd look at how each of those armed conflicts was treated legally, domestically (at least two views there - e.g., the War of Southern Rebellion vs the War of Northern Aggression) and internationally (many possible views).

That would be quite a study - one I don't plan on starting and finishing this month.

And - it would be largely immaterial to all except a small group of Laws of War folks.

Regards

Mike

[MikeF]

Here's what I was taught- the independent variable is the guerrila's capacity to conduct violence.

So,

An insurgency can be labeled a civil war once the guerrila builds the same capacity to conduct violence (military mass) that the host nation possesses.

Applied loosely, this does not have to mean the the guerrila possesses the same amount of tanks as the host nation. That's why one could justify Iraq moved into a civil war between late 2005 and early 2006.

[Bob's World]

Here's what I was taught- the independent variable is the guerrila's capacity to conduct violence.

So,

An insurgency can be labeled a civil war once the guerrila builds the same capacity to conduct violence (military mass) that the host nation possesses.

Applied loosely, this does not have to mean the the guerrila possesses the same amount of tanks as the host nation. That's why one could justify Iraq moved into a civil war between late 2005 and early 2006.

I don't like it though, don't see the difference as being one of scale or capacity, but rather one of nature. How is the nature of insurgency unique from that of civil war?

I see civil war as being much more like any other state on state war, except that in this case one state decided to form into two states and then wage state on state war. So for me civil war is war. It only denotes that both sides were a single state before it started and are fighting over the split.

Insurgency need never split the state. As I (frequently, Ken reminds me ) state, I see insurgency as a unique set of causal conditions rooted in certain fundamental failures on the part of the government as perceived by their populace. As Marc indicates, this can then manifest itself in several forms, some non-violent, some violent, some legal, some illegal. The causal roots are the same for this family of insurgency-based conflict. Regardless of how it manifests, addressing the causal roots must be the focus/main effort of the COIN effort. If it goes violent you have "classic insurgency"; if it goes illegal, but non-violent, you have "classic subversion; if it stays legal but stays non-violent you have politics. You may get each sequentially, or at the same time, or in a crazy mix over years and years. So long as the causal roots remain unaddressed it is the gift that keeps giving.

[Rex Brynen]

I see civil war as being much more like any other state on state war, except that in this case one state decided to form into two states and then wage state on state war. So for me civil war is war. It only denotes that both sides were a single state before it started and are fighting over the split.

Perhaps you're projecting too much from the US case? Most civil wars (English, Russian, Lebanese, Liberian, etc) aren't primarily about political separation, they're about control.

[MikeF]

I don't like it though, don't see the difference as being one of scale or capacity, but rather one of nature. How is the nature of insurgency unique from that of civil war?

Sir, it's just a matter of what lens that you are using. I don't think that has to be mutually exclusive. Rather, I can blend scale/capacity and what you'd describe as the soul. I'd suggest we put them together in order to have a better understanding of the conflict. For example, two dudes who act violently over justified grievances over bad governance are less of a concern to me than a million man army gathering in DC.

Insurgency need never split the state. As I (frequently, Ken reminds me ) state, I see insurgency as a unique set of causal conditions rooted in certain fundamental failures on the part of the government as perceived by their populace. As Marc indicates, this can then manifest itself in several forms, some non-violent, some violent, some legal, some illegal. The causal roots are the same for this family of insurgency-based conflict. Regardless of how it manifests, addressing the causal roots must be the focus/main effort of the COIN effort. If it goes violent you have "classic insurgency"; if it goes illegal, but non-violent, you have "classic subversion; if it stays legal but stays non-violent you have politics. You may get each sequentially, or at the same time, or in a crazy mix over years and years. So long as the causal roots remain unaddressed it is the gift that keeps giving.

That makes sense. And you still need to address the issue of control.

From Rex

Political control--over regime, territory, and the allocation of resources.

Excellent points Rex, but we must also remember that it's an illusion of control. That's actually one reason why I think that Glenn Beck is so paranoid these days. He finally realized most of the things he took for granted were illusions- security, economics, etc...They are based on the belief that something is true.

Economic example- My bank says that my savings account has $10000. Does the bank physically have my money on hand? No. They've reinvested it into loans, bonds, stocks, etc...If I go and ask for my money, then no problem. If everyone makes a run on the bank, then big problem.

Mike