Moving the Rhod. Fire Force concept to Afghanistan?

[Rex Brynen]

So what's special? Didn't the same fail to meet the hopes thousands of times in VN?

Given the remarkably high contact and kill rates claimed by the RLI, the question then becomes:

1) Were they doing something others weren't, or ISAF isn't; or

2) Were the conditions (poor opponent, terrain, ROE, etc) that led to the RLI's apparent operational success something that can't be replicated in Afghanistan; or

3) Are the contact and kill rates claimed for the RLI accurate.

As far as I can see, those are the three logical possibilities--and working out which apply is the purpose of the thread.

[Steve Blair]

I'd be tempted to go with door #2, Rex, and say that it was a combination of terrain and other operational factors. Count accuracy is always a question (no matter what), and there is also the very different political and military situation, but #2 is still (for me) the biggest factor.

[jcustis]

Given the remarkably high contact and kill rates claimed by the RLI, the question then becomes:

1) Were they doing something others weren't, or ISAF isn't; or

2) Were the conditions (poor opponent, terrain, ROE, etc) that led to the RLI's apparent operational success something that can't be replicated in Afghanistan; or

3) Are the contact and kill rates claimed for the RLI accurate.

As far as I can see, those are the three logical possibilities--and working out which apply is the purpose of the thread.

Rex, this outline is a good way to continue the analysis, and Fuchs' point stir things up sufficiently enough to merit a thought or two as well.

To Fuch's question, he is exactly right, there was nothing special about FF ops per se. The sequence of the contacts were often just as he lays out.

There were, however, a myriad of individual and discrete elements to FF that, when meshed together and synergized just right, posed a potent cocktail of firepower, aggressive action, and superb command and control that spun off from the right platforms used at the right time.

It has to be noted though, that FF ops experienced that evolution into the Jumbo FF over time, and the kill rate did not hit the ratio often quoted until later in the war. A lot of terrs got away during the early stages, until adaption came into play.

To Rex's points, there are several conditions that exist now that would prevent a similar capability from being employed to similar effect.

To question 1, the answer is ABSOLUTELY!!! The first thing that comes to mind is the mobility of the individual RLI or RAR trooper. The risk calculation favored their ability to jump off into the fight in shorts and tennis shoes early on for goodness sakes, and even thought the uniform changed to full fatigues later on, they never donned armor. Their mobility, relative to the enemy on the ground, was superb. A troop on the ground today, even wearing a plate carrier with front and back and side SAPI plates, plus helmet, plus nut flap, plus uniform and boots, has to easily weigh 20-25 pounds more than the RLI trooper, even though they used the SLR and 7.62 ammo is heavier. When you look at the loadouts that were used when conducting externals, the weights crept up there, but they never wore armor despite the similar threats of small arms fire.

To question 2, anecdotal evidence suggests that the opponents during the Rhodesian War were especially poorer than what we face today, and we less disciplined afield as well. I've spoken on the ROE, and I think Ken's comments about terrain stand alone. The terrain the EN chooses to fight us from here is typically more complex, and therefore easier to melt into in order to break contact through.

To question 3, there is always the possibility of exaggeration and inflation. IIRC, there was an additional payout for putting a terr down, and that there were reports of actual noncombatant deaths being claimed as kills. I can't remember which book it was in (At the Going Down of the Sun perhaps?).

Two constants, the weight of our equipment and the terrain, are always going to be there. The ROE has the potential to be changed, but even the boldest commander is not going to drop the protective equipment standard to a point where I think we could maneuver at great capability.

[davidbfpo]

Like Jon C. I have delved into the Rhodesian War and so from my "armchair" the big difference is the lack of intelligence to identify and fix the farmer, sorry Taliban fighter.

The Rhodesians had a variety of methods to get their intelligence and I suspect some is still not known. Whatever the criticism of the Rhodesian war effort for not understanding their Africans, they found alternatives - notably informants at the start, later on covert observations and the Selous Scouts in their recce role.

In Afghanistan we appear to have a mass of information and little intelligence. As Ken W. has posted there are successful operations that have identify and fix, they are the exception IMHO. All too often we appear to know little beyond a few hundred metres (as I have remarked before).

It is important to note that when the Rhodesians mounted external operations it removed almost all air assets for up to a week and in that time the internal kill rate slumped. Probably not an issue in Afghanistan air assets, where it is an issue is having "boots on the ground" that as RR says are simply not there.

For those who want a contrary viewpoint J.K. Cilliers book 'COIN in Rhodesia' from 1985 is worth a peek (and is listed in Ken's Post No.9).

Thinking and remembering now. The tactics used in South West Africa, now Namibia, by the Koevoet (a police unit), did not involve air assets, but armoured trucks, tracking and more.

[JMA]

Like Jon C. I have delved into the Rhodesian War and so from my "armchair" the big difference is the lack of intelligence to identify and fix the farmer, sorry Taliban fighter.

In the early days the police Special Branch (SB) had an effective network of informers across the country. Once the insurgents arrived in the populated areas they immediately started executing anyone suspected of being an SB source. Most of these killings were horrific mutilations and not surprisingly the intel from the field started to dry up.

Facing a desperate situation where usable intel from the local population was drying up the use of pseudo gangs (based on the Kenya experience) was attempted. This proved to wildly successful beyond our wildest dreams. This intel coming now front people with military training was markedly more accurate in all respects than what had been previously received from SB alone. By the end I think we were making contact on 8 out of 10 call outs and had the suspicion that the other two were ruses used by the Selous Scouts to try to authenticate themselves as insurgents to the local people. We lived with this.

So the end result is the receipt of accurate, clear and regular intel we were able to deploy on and get talked onto the target by pseudo team on the ground by then in an Op position.

The Rhodesians had a variety of methods to get their intelligence and I suspect some is still not known. Whatever the criticism of the Rhodesian war effort for not understanding their Africans, they found alternatives - notably informants at the start, later on covert observations and the Selous Scouts in their recce role.

Actually David as a city boy from Cape Town (who had grown up among but separate to non-black brown people from a different genealogy line with different, language, culture, history and religions) I found the Rhodesian understanding of the Africans to be spot on. (This contrary to Roger Marstons book). Of course this understanding was never politically correct hence the criticism from certain quarters but perhaps for another thread)

The key to the intel war was that the cities remained under control of the government until the end.

In Afghanistan we appear to have a mass of information and little intelligence. As Ken W. has posted there are successful operations that have identify and fix, they are the exception IMHO. All too often we appear to know little beyond a few hundred metres (as I have remarked before).

This is the last thing that will be changed it seems as some of these FOB's have found a place in Brit military history.

It is important to note that when the Rhodesians mounted external operations it removed almost all air assets for up to a week and in that time the internal kill rate slumped. Probably not an issue in Afghanistan air assets, where it is an issue is having "boots on the ground" that as RR says are simply not there.

Well as said by John Custis it was only when we concentrated the available resources in what was for Rhodesia a "Jumbo Fire Force" comprising 8-10 choppers, Lynx (Cessna 337) or two and a Dak.

So by concentrating troops at the right place and the right time for certain ops (internal and external) was in good military planning rather than anything negative which really only happened when there was no chopper available for a casevac (for example).

The boots on the ground thing remains interesting in that This Marston character and others say about force levels on the ground. Rhodesia/Zimbabwe is a bout the size of Montana. The claims are that 25,000 forces were on the ground at any time. Nonsense Professor Woods believes that the level of trained infantry soldiers deployed on average were 15 almost always understrength companies. He would say 1,500 but add another 300 if at full strength. That would leave the balance to be made up of police at police stations in Op areas, para-military police units, Armed Internal Affairs guards and Guardforce who guard the protected villages.

The decision was made out of necessity to use the best soldiers to the maximum effect. And for better or for worse that was down by some pretty resourceful senior officers.

Thinking and remembering now. The tactics used in South West Africa, now Namibia, by the Koevoet (a police unit), did not involve air assets, but armoured trucks, tracking and more.

If the Taliban have to move across large expanses of similar to the terrain found in northern Namibia then there is some potential for considering Koevoet tactics which led to the insurgents being run down by vehicle bourne troops using a combination of tracking, intel collected along the way and by leap-frogging tracking teams forward to cut for spore ahead to speed up the process. These guys kills 3,681 insurgents at a cost of 155 at a 1:24 ration.