Quote Originally Posted by Starbuck View Post
According to James Corum, approximately 20-30 RLI troops would be dispatched at any given time against insurgent bands (numbering anywhere from 6-30 men). Their primary mission would be to defend white homesteads against insurgent attacks. Thus, they were to hold ground. Their air support would be a Alouette helicopters with aerial munitions.
OK, we have a problem here. With respect to James Corum there was not "white homestead protection" as a primary mission. The primary role of the Fire Force was to kill the enemy. Farmhouses were in the main attacked at night the helos in Rhodesia had no night flying capability.

Dropping paratroopers in to combat--sometimes at 300' AGL--was a risky proposition. Certainly, based on experience in airborne units, this would be about as dangerous as the enemy.
The aim was to drop them at 90 knots from 500' and the ground height was normally measured by a touch landing by a helo and the tossing of a smoke generator. There were some accidents, not too many considering the number of jumps. There are chutes now available which make jumping at lower heights safe and should be used as it is in the air that the para is most vulnerable to enemy fire and wind etc. The injury statistics were not of the magnitude that gave rise to any concern so why your airborne contacts should be concerned is open to question. Maybe if you only have jumped at 800' with boots and not sneakers any other option seems a little risky, yes?

The RLI's air units were often tipped off by the Selous Scouts or horse-mounted scouts, many of whom might perform the same roles as UAVs.
Call-outs by Selous Scouts pseudo groups were responsible for 68% of all internal kills by the various Fire Forces. The Grey's Scouts (horse guys) played a small role in this regard.

Modern QRFs might consist of a platoon on alert with some UH-60s and AH-64s for fire support--not at all unlike the RLI's concept. Indeed, it appears we have a very similar set of TTPS, at least superficially.
The key would be under what ROE would this QRF deploy and the operational procedures once in combat.

The difference might be in the kill ratios, which would be interesting to examine. The RLI killed over 1600 insugents, with minimal losses, according to Corham. Why might this be so? It's worth looking in to.
The idea was to kill as many of each group contacted as possible. There were three tactical rules on the use of ground forces on such ops. 1) Never "sweep" uphill, 2) Never 'sweep' into the sun, 3) never 'sweep' from open ground into cover. (For others here: this probably accounts for my aversion for seeing toops moving over open ground.)

It should also be noted that, despite the RLI's professionalism, they were ultimately voted out of power in the early 1980s, giving rise to modern Zimbabwe. Tactics are important, no doubt, but strategy and politics always win.
Point taken but how this applies to the Fire Force concept and its TTPs is less obvious?