Moving the Rhod. Fire Force concept to Afghanistan?

[JMA]

Very valid point. The good news is that we use the QRF term and it has various permutations -- to include the type operation of which you write.

That particular type of op we used heavily in Viet Nam from 1961-72 and we then called it 'Eagle Flight' ...

There you go, you have you now have Eagle Flight II or whatever.

Much has changed in the aircraft available to be used on such a mission.

The Alouette III had a number of advantages in that it was cheap (not for Rhodesia) but cheap anyway, difficult to shoot down with pilot wrapped in an armoured seat and the tail rotor and fuel line being the other vulnerabilities. It could also land in tight LZs and we loved the little baby but when we got 11 AB205As via the Lebanon in a sanctions busting deal we gained loiter time benefits to off set the need for slightly larger LZs. (To illustrate the LZ thing my callsign was once uplighted out of Mozambique by three choppers which picked us up from under the Cohora Bassa power lines which required some deft maneuver by young but experienced pilots.)

I don't know what choppers are available to which service today. Perhaps one would look for one which best meets the following:
* Armed with suitable multibarrelled machine gun (with night firing ability)
* Can carry at least eight troops plus crew
* Have low natural vulnerability to ground fire (few vulnerable points)
* Good range/loiter time
* Ability to operate at higher altitudes.
* Night flying ability with thermal imaging.

Gunship could be anything as it should probably be assumed that no suitable command chopper/gunship combo exists. Then a command chopper should be selected as it would carry the airborne commander. Could be one of the troop carrier type but differently fitted out.

Then the CAS, the Cessna 337G was what we had and it was able to provide CAS at less than 50m from FLOT. Even had a 18 gallon Frantan (Napalm) just to cook a few at a time. I don't what is available to provide that degree of CAS? This aircraft would mark for any swift air to follow.

Occasionally, when required, fixed wing aircraft were also used. Generally in Viet Nam due to the size of the country and location of forces, no parachute capability was required (Though the entire First Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division [Airmobile] was initially parachute qualified for that purpose). Success in Viet Nam was mixed, usually they were effective, sometimes extremely effective. Occasionally range / time / bureaucratic constraints allowed Clyde to escape.

In theory it seems like a standard infantry type operation. But as we all know not all infantry soldiers are the same. So one needs to find a source for aggressive soldiers with or without para training (depending on the requirement). The RLI were quicker/more confident/more aggressive than other units with a highest kill rate. From my experience of the Brits who came to Rhodesia I would say go for a Scottish regiment, they had about the right skill/aggression mix.

We only did parachuting because we did not have enough choppers. The para requirement may be necessary where there is a need to react to a distant contact/call out where the choppers can fly in with full fuel plus maybe a temporary tank on board and pick up their troops from an LZ closer to the area where troops extra fuel etc have been dropped.

If ineffective then one can ask why? A debrief should spell it out and lessons can be learned. I don't know the type of bureaucratic constraints that were endured but time and distance were always factors and where we would have little time on the ground before nightfall we tried to delay the call-out until the next day (impossible of course if responding to own forces in trouble).

I would suggest that the person who drives this would have to have the seniority and the willingness to bang some heads together to get units to cooperate to achieve the best outcome.

In Afghanistan, it is sometimes is required and is used by elements of SF and SOF including the 75th Ranger Regiment; one company of 3-504 Parachute Infantry made one jump in conjunction with a heliborne force and other parachute elements. There have probably been others. One of the problems with the concept in Afghanistan is the large amount of open and large amount of very mountainous terrain. The density altitude has an effect on aircraft capability in some places as well.

The current usage is in fact to call it a QRF (or a local peculiar name) but the Eagle Flight concept dates from the late 50s in the US Army and was the model for several variants in other nations.

Once you have a permanent QRF serving an area then its amazing what changes. Suddenly vehicle ambushes reduce as they know they will have to run for their lives possibly for days. Patrols being randomly fired on will reduce as they will get to know that they will be met with a very aggressive air borne response. And as a result troops can patrol in smaller numbers because of the guaranteed quick response.

[Rex Brynen]

JMA:

At what distance from the (potential) contact were the LZs, typically? And how often did the LZs end up being hot?

I ask because, as I remember ZANLA and ZIPRA, they had a relatively low ratio of RPG-2 and RPG-7s, and weren't terribly competent with mortars, heavier MGs, or RCL. I'm wondering how much adjustment might be necessary against a Taliban opponent who has a long history (dating back to the Soviet era) of using those weapons against helicopters LZs.

[Kiwigrunt]

Thanks for those links Ken (post 9), I too had not seen some of them.


@JMA.

Further to Rex’s last post and repeated emphasis by Ken and others that both the terrain and the enemy in A-stan are very different from what you encountered in Rhodesia, this article (Ken’s third link) is rather sobering indeed with regards to the relative, or should I say total, incompetence of your enemy.

This is by no means a criticism of the Rhodesian forces, which going by what I’ve read over the years I hold in high regard. However, an enemy as incompetent and almost docile as the one described in this article does paint a picture very different from what we are seeing in A-stan with the Taliban. They too may not be the most competent imaginable, and may by and large be crap shots, but they do appear to be actually using their AKs, which may go a long way to explaining why they initiate most contacts as opposed to your experience in Rhodesia. Especially the way (as described in the article) that you would advance to contact in extended line and just clean them up as if you picking up rubbish off a lawn is not likely to work in A-stan, where the ‘rubbish’ will shoot before you do.

I wonder if even a technique like Drake Shooting would be as effective or even achievable with a more proactive and aggressive enemy.

Also, your ability to, over time, separate the terrs from the locals may not be so easily done in A-stan.

In Timor, we too had a QRF platoon with one or two Hueys on standby. But our ‘enemy’ was probably not far different from yours. Over the nearly four years there we lost two soldiers KIA (one Kiwi and one Nepalese), but overall we had little reason to fill our nappies.
I don’t know what the losses were for the Eagle Flights that Ken linked to, but if this sort of QRF actions were to become the norm than I should think that it will not take the Taliban long to come up with a suitable response which may give NATO a much larger KIA count then they currently experience with IEDs. And that of course, as we know by now, flies in the face of our current ‘safety first’ approach. The only good thing about that (tongue in cheek) would be that that would remove the IED issue out of the lime-light, since the percentages would swing the other way. And then we’d have people asking why NATO is so stupid and callous to use so many helicopters…

Using QRF as stand-off blocking forces to increase the likelihood of cold LZs may not work so well either, given the Taliban’s ability to melt into the population.

Now, I’m not saying that I disagree with you. I think QRFs are a good idea and are probably used in A-stan a lot more than we know anyway. But to make something like that THE tactic, as per Selous Scouts, is IMO likely to be much more difficult and painful than you seem to imply and believe. But then, I too am not on the ground….

[Ken White]

Thanks for those links Ken (post 9), I too had not seen some of them.

You're welcome -- and thanks again to the original provider who lurks occasionally.

I don’t know what the losses were for the Eagle Flights that Ken linked to...

All anecdotal though I suppose the stats are out there somewhere...

Went on four in 1966, one very successful, two somewhat so and one failure to make contact. Only pulled the mission for about two weeks to allow the Platoon that normally did it to train up some replacements. I can recall hearing about four or five others they pulled which were good hits. There were many more from other Bns in our Brigade, one tended to hear about them only if they were really great or really bad and to hear of few if any from other Bdes locally and none from units in other Corps areas. Though I do know the Aero Rifle platoons from the Cav Sqns did a great many.

Can recall about a dozen or so more of probably three or four times that many conducted that year in the Bde from my second tour (most of which I spent in the Bde 3 shop). IIRC, only one was a success beyond expectations, most did okay, three or four were dry with no hits and two went into hot LZs and lost birds and people necessitating the launch of backup flights from other units -- in both latter cases that was in late 1968 when the VC had adapted and were using 12.7mm DShKs specifically brought in but not exclusively used to ambush Eagle Flights -- thus your comment about enemy adaptation to any successful technique is correct.

[William F. Owen]

So boiling this down, it's essentially the use of an Airmobile Reserve, that requires

a.) A Support Helicopter - UH-60, AB-412, EH-101, CH-47?
b.) Airborne Command Post - AH-64, UH-60?
c.) Attack Helicopters and/or FGA. - AH-64, A-10?

Obviously a UAV or some of the aircraft being equipped with suitable EO Payloads would help as well.

A near identical set up was used to get SOG-Recon Teams in and out of their AO between 1966 and 72. It could take 12-14 aircraft to get an 8 man RT on the ground, and even more to get their QRF Hatchet Force platoons in or out if required.
The Airborne CP was usually an OV-10, O-2 or O-1 with a "Covey Rider" who controlled the whole show.

[JMA]

Thanks for those links Ken (post 9), I too had not seen some of them.


@JMA.

Further to Rex’s last post and repeated emphasis by Ken and others that both the terrain and the enemy in A-stan are very different from what you encountered in Rhodesia, this article (Ken’s third link) is rather sobering indeed with regards to the relative, or should I say total, incompetence of your enemy.

This is by no means a criticism of the Rhodesian forces, which going by what I’ve read over the years I hold in high regard. However, an enemy as incompetent and almost docile as the one described in this article does paint a picture very different from what we are seeing in A-stan with the Taliban. They too may not be the most competent imaginable, and may by and large be crap shots, but they do appear to be actually using their AKs, which may go a long way to explaining why they initiate most contacts as opposed to your experience in Rhodesia. Especially the way (as described in the article) that you would advance to contact in extended line and just clean them up as if you picking up rubbish off a lawn is not likely to work in A-stan, where the ‘rubbish’ will shoot before you do.

I wonder if even a technique like Drake Shooting would be as effective or even achievable with a more proactive and aggressive enemy.

Also, your ability to, over time, separate the terrs from the locals may not be so easily done in A-stan.

In Timor, we too had a QRF platoon with one or two Hueys on standby. But our ‘enemy’ was probably not far different from yours. Over the nearly four years there we lost two soldiers KIA (one Kiwi and one Nepalese), but overall we had little reason to fill our nappies.
I don’t know what the losses were for the Eagle Flights that Ken linked to, but if this sort of QRF actions were to become the norm than I should think that it will not take the Taliban long to come up with a suitable response which may give NATO a much larger KIA count then they currently experience with IEDs. And that of course, as we know by now, flies in the face of our current ‘safety first’ approach. The only good thing about that (tongue in cheek) would be that that would remove the IED issue out of the lime-light, since the percentages would swing the other way. And then we’d have people asking why NATO is so stupid and callous to use so many helicopters…

Using QRF as stand-off blocking forces to increase the likelihood of cold LZs may not work so well either, given the Taliban’s ability to melt into the population.

Now, I’m not saying that I disagree with you. I think QRFs are a good idea and are probably used in A-stan a lot more than we know anyway. But to make something like that THE tactic, as per Selous Scouts, is IMO likely to be much more difficult and painful than you seem to imply and believe. But then, I too am not on the ground….

I'll answer this fully a little later when I get a chance. In the meantime let me put on my old "School of Infantry hat" and say that you have put forward a number of reasons why you think this concept won't work in Afghanistan. Now try to put your positive hat on and think of a few (at least) reasons why you think it could. We can compare notes later.

[JMA]

JMA:

At what distance from the (potential) contact were the LZs, typically? And how often did the LZs end up being hot?

I ask because, as I remember ZANLA and ZIPRA, they had a relatively low ratio of RPG-2 and RPG-7s, and weren't terribly competent with mortars, heavier MGs, or RCL. I'm wondering how much adjustment might be necessary against a Taliban opponent who has a long history (dating back to the Soviet era) of using those weapons against helicopters LZs.

Let me use a simple example (for ease of explanation without a diagram).

Say a patrol has made contact with insurgents and are currently engaged in contact.

The force deploys (maybe 30 minutes flying time maybe less). On the run in the Airborne commander gets what briefing he can from the commander on the ground and as he comes over target the troops mark FLOT and indicates the insurgent position with whatever (anything but mortars).

The Airborne Comdr is now in command of the battle.

(Note: As there is already a contact in progress the route of the aircraft to the target can be direct as opposed to a route where the sound of the approaching choppers is attempted to be hidden.)

* The command chopper orbits the main contact area (+ 1,000 ft) to assess the situation and if not a gunship itself could instruct the attached gunship/gunships to engage the insurgent position.

* The fixed wing goes into higher orbit and observes.

* Trooping choppers are instructed to go into low level orbits over 'areas of interest' outside the main contact area to observe and await instructions to drop their troops. (These choppers served to either force insurgents under their orbit to go to ground or draw fire which would give away the insurgents position).

Once the Airborne Cmdr had made his plan then he would instruct the trooping choppers where to drop their troops. The idea being to prevent the escape/withdrawal of the insurgents. The individual LZs would be as close to where the troops were needed as possible. Where it was necessary a gunship may provide suppressing fire to cover the landing.

Once the trooping choppers have dropped their troops they may be instructed to stay in orbit over a particular area or to return to collect more troops.

The LZs are individual to each chopper and not one large LZ to take all the choppers at the same time. If necessary the chopper itself can prep-fire the area around the LZ or get covered by a gunship when going in.

If the troops are being dropped to block any flight down a river line they would drop the troops as close to the river line as possible then the Airborne Cmdr would give instructions to the callsign on what direction to move in to get into position.

Should there be a need to redeploy troops they would be instructed to move to a LZ (if necessary the Airborne Cmdr may need to direct them (say "go 200m west and you will find an LZ, call when ready for uplift")

OK, Rex thats about what we did. And yes we took a lot of fire in the air. And we managed it.

I would suggest if you are looking for Afghan experience you find out what happened to the Soviets. This should be detailed research by intel guys who would try to speak to the old Mujahideen fighters, the Pakistanis who trained them the CIA who in trained trained them as to what the anti-air tactics were. Then get the Moscow embassy to speak to old soviet pilots as to their experiences and counter measures. For now though look at the site List of Soviet aircraft losses in Afghanistan

Rex there are always counter measures and certainly any guy who fires a RPG should be turned into an instant martyr as all guns turn on him. That should be golden rule number one. This whole thing would be a journey or a process. Starting with baby steps and building up from there. Ken has touched on similar type ops in Vietnam, read up on them as well.

As to RPGs. In our situation it was only the command chopper that was at 1,000 ft in the orbit which was vulnerable to this. The low level orbits were vulnerable to small arms fire but only for a few seconds if very close by.

Again all you have to do is go a speak to the hundreds of old guys who flew choppers in Vietnam and other wars and they would be honoured to share their experiences with you and offer some advice. All the info you need is out there all you have to do is go and find it. So don't sweat the RPG risk, go ask the pilots how they would fly in that sort of terrain with that sort of risk. Its actually easier than you may think.

(Rex, I don't know your military experience, you may well have flown choppers at some point for all I know. I write this like you haven't forgive me.)

[Red Rat]

What was the balance between the FireForce being Proactive and Reactive? I have never done airmobile but the FireForce concept sounds like Combined Arms (Air) Manoeuvre in concept, I am intrigued by the tasking of it however. In UK doctrine a QRF or ARF (Airborne Reaction Force) is reactive, whereas I get the impression that that distinction was not necessarily the case with the FireForce.

IMHO part of the problem, certainly for UK elements in AFG, is that they are essentially fixed in ground holding roles and have very little capability at BG and Bde level to manouevre. Whether it is done by air, land (or sea ) the ability to maintain an uncommitted reserve and manoeuvre force at the time and place of your chosing is one of the fundamentals.

[William F. Owen]

IMHO part of the problem, certainly for UK elements in AFG, is that they are essentially fixed in ground holding roles and have very little capability at BG and Bde level to manouevre. Whether it is done by air, land (or sea ) the ability to maintain an uncommitted reserve and manoeuvre force at the time and place of your chosing is one of the fundamentals.

IMO, When and if you do not have an un-committed reserve, you have become "fixed." If that is a permanent state, you can do nothing which is effective.

[Starbuck]

When I created a "COIN for Aviators" class, I used the example of the Rhodesian light infantry as a prime example of a rudimentary Quick Reaction Force. While some of the specifics seem to have changed (parachute drop vs. helicopter landing), the concept seems largely the same as a modern-day QRF.

It's important we put much of the RLI's tactics in perspective: their development of a parachute-in approach was the result of a lack of helicopter transports. The RLI's air assets would be dwarfed by a modern-day Army Combat Aviation Brigade, with seven C-47s (DC-3s) and eight Alouette helicopters (plus a few miscellaneous fighters and bombers) consisting of the entire air contingent. That was about it. The entire air lift portion would be dwarfed by a mere two companies in an assault helicopter battalion.

Thus, the concept of parachuting in was one of necessity. While it might sound attractive and novel, it was not without its shortfalls. A DC-3 can only travel at around 130 knots, which is roughly the cruise speed of a Black Hawk or Chinook. Each C-47 also had a payload of, at maximum, 26 paratroopers. According to James Corum, approximately 20-30 RLI troops would be dispatched at any given time against insurgent bands (numbering anywhere from 6-30 men). Their primary mission would be to defend white homesteads against insurgent attacks. Thus, they were to hold ground. Their air support would be a Alouette helicopters with aerial munitions.

Dropping paratroopers in to combat--sometimes at 300' AGL--was a risky proposition. Certainly, based on experience in airborne units, this would be about as dangerous as the enemy.

The RLI's air units were often tipped off by the Selous Scouts or horse-mounted scouts, many of whom might perform the same roles as UAVs.

Modern QRFs might consist of a platoon on alert with some UH-60s and AH-64s for fire support--not at all unlike the RLI's concept. Indeed, it appears we have a very similar set of TTPS, at least superficially.

The difference might be in the kill ratios, which would be interesting to examine. The RLI killed over 1600 insugents, with minimal losses, according to Corham. Why might this be so? It's worth looking in to.

It should also be noted that, despite the RLI's professionalism, they were ultimately voted out of power in the early 1980s, giving rise to modern Zimbabwe. Tactics are important, no doubt, but strategy and politics always win.

[Starbuck]

1) Were they doing something others weren't, or ISAF isn't; or

2) Were the conditions (poor opponent, terrain, ROE, etc) that led to the RLI's apparent operational success something that can't be replicated in Afghanistan; or

3) Are the contact and kill rates claimed for the RLI accurate.

As far as I can see, those are the three logical possibilities--and working out which apply is the purpose of the thread.

Rex: These are the million-dollar questions. Let me try to investigate the RLI and Zimbabwe and find out.

[JMA]

According to James Corum, approximately 20-30 RLI troops would be dispatched at any given time against insurgent bands (numbering anywhere from 6-30 men). Their primary mission would be to defend white homesteads against insurgent attacks. Thus, they were to hold ground. Their air support would be a Alouette helicopters with aerial munitions.

OK, we have a problem here. With respect to James Corum there was not "white homestead protection" as a primary mission. The primary role of the Fire Force was to kill the enemy. Farmhouses were in the main attacked at night the helos in Rhodesia had no night flying capability.

Dropping paratroopers in to combat--sometimes at 300' AGL--was a risky proposition. Certainly, based on experience in airborne units, this would be about as dangerous as the enemy.

The aim was to drop them at 90 knots from 500' and the ground height was normally measured by a touch landing by a helo and the tossing of a smoke generator. There were some accidents, not too many considering the number of jumps. There are chutes now available which make jumping at lower heights safe and should be used as it is in the air that the para is most vulnerable to enemy fire and wind etc. The injury statistics were not of the magnitude that gave rise to any concern so why your airborne contacts should be concerned is open to question. Maybe if you only have jumped at 800' with boots and not sneakers any other option seems a little risky, yes?

The RLI's air units were often tipped off by the Selous Scouts or horse-mounted scouts, many of whom might perform the same roles as UAVs.

Call-outs by Selous Scouts pseudo groups were responsible for 68% of all internal kills by the various Fire Forces. The Grey's Scouts (horse guys) played a small role in this regard.

Modern QRFs might consist of a platoon on alert with some UH-60s and AH-64s for fire support--not at all unlike the RLI's concept. Indeed, it appears we have a very similar set of TTPS, at least superficially.

The key would be under what ROE would this QRF deploy and the operational procedures once in combat.

The difference might be in the kill ratios, which would be interesting to examine. The RLI killed over 1600 insugents, with minimal losses, according to Corham. Why might this be so? It's worth looking in to.

The idea was to kill as many of each group contacted as possible. There were three tactical rules on the use of ground forces on such ops. 1) Never "sweep" uphill, 2) Never 'sweep' into the sun, 3) never 'sweep' from open ground into cover. (For others here: this probably accounts for my aversion for seeing toops moving over open ground.)

It should also be noted that, despite the RLI's professionalism, they were ultimately voted out of power in the early 1980s, giving rise to modern Zimbabwe. Tactics are important, no doubt, but strategy and politics always win.

Point taken but how this applies to the Fire Force concept and its TTPs is less obvious?

[Rifleman]

Modern QRFs might consist of a platoon on alert with some UH-60s and AH-64s for fire support--not at all unlike the RLI's concept. Indeed, it appears we have a very similar set of TTPS, at least superficially.

FWIW, it's also not at all unlike the Viet Nam era air cavalry. When I say air cavalry, I don't mean airmobile infantry battalions but the cavalry squadrons made famous (infamous?) by Apocolype Now's portrayal of 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (1/9 Headhunters) of the 1st Cavalry Division.

Supposedly 1/9 was responsble for more kills than all the airmoble infantry battalions in the 1st Cavalry Division?

The squadron had three troops with each troop having a red, white, and blue platoon. I think red was aero-guns, white was aero-scouts, and blue was aero-rifles?

Does the Army still use that particular organization?

[JMA]

IMO, When and if you do not have an un-committed reserve, you have become "fixed." If that is a permanent state, you can do nothing which is effective.

I agree. This is why all the FOBs and PBs serve in the main to restrict mobility and tie forces down.

[William F. Owen]

I agree. This is why all the FOBs and PBs serve in the main to restrict mobility and tie forces down.

That is certainly true, IF the FOBs and PBs are under-manned, too widely dispersed and no higher reserve force is held.
EG: Like the Mike Force Battalions held by each US Corps in RVN.

[JMA]

What was the balance between the FireForce being Proactive and Reactive? I have never done airmobile but the FireForce concept sounds like Combined Arms (Air) Manoeuvre in concept, I am intrigued by the tasking of it however. In UK doctrine a QRF or ARF (Airborne Reaction Force) is reactive, whereas I get the impression that that distinction was not necessarily the case with the FireForce.

IMHO part of the problem, certainly for UK elements in AFG, is that they are essentially fixed in ground holding roles and have very little capability at BG and Bde level to manouevre. Whether it is done by air, land (or sea ) the ability to maintain an uncommitted reserve and manoeuvre force at the time and place of your chosing is one of the fundamentals.

Suddenly there were three pages, sorry.

I can say that somewhere between 80-90% were proactive if that means a fire force call out being initiated from a sighting from an OP, camp identification by air recce, or by pseudo gang all unbeknown to the insurgents. The balance would be responding to troops in contact, vehicles being ambushed etc.

Are you familiar with the JOC system we used? Each Brigade HQ was a JOC (Joint Operations Command) which had Army, police, Air Force and Internal Affairs reps. These JOCs normally sat at airfields where the FF sat.

Siren would sound and Officers and pilots to the Ops room. Briefing held (shorter or longer depending on the circumstances) and then tally-ho the fox.

Sometimes when there was something brewing we would get called for regular updates until the word GO was given.

Troops wise we used a RLI Commando (company strength in Rhodesia) on a fire force (normally) who based at the airfield. From this force certain patrolling tasks (mostly external) were given to best utilize the troops.

IMHO opinion in a fire force type operation it is as important to train and special the troops as it is for same with the Airborne Commanders and pilots.

[William F. Owen]

Suddenly there were three pages, sorry.

Why sorry? There is actually some useful stuff here.

IMHO opinion in a fire force type operation it is as important to train and special the troops as it is for same with the Airborne Commanders and pilots.

I can agree with that for parachuting but I don't see why if you are just using helicopters.
I locked horns with Parachute Regiment Major a few years back who tried to convince me that working with helicopters "was not a pick-up and run game." I cannot see how?
It takes about an hours to do an aircraft safety brief, and practice emplaning and deplaning. - and all infantry do it.
IF needed:
Fast roping can be done in a day. Ground to air signalling brief in another. - 2.5 days worth of skills and drills. Sound right?

[Rex Brynen]

(Rex, I don't know your military experience, you may well have flown choppers at some point for all I know. I write this like you haven't forgive me.)

Thank you for writing in simple words that wouldn't confuse me. I had to look up "chopper," but found a nice book with a picture in it.



The Soviets lost approximately a helicopter a week in Afghanistan, although I'm not sure what proportion of those were MANPADs versus other things. There's some discussion of both hiliborne operations and mujahiddin counters in Lester Grau et al, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan and The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War.

As I remember it, the RLI also suffered its largest single losses of the war when a SAAF Puma was hit--by an RPG 7, I think--in Mozambique in 1979, during Ops Uric/Bootlace.

None of this, of course, is a reason not to use a modified Fire Force technique in Afghanistan. However, as several have pointed out, it is important to identify how conditions may differ there from southern Africa (or, for that matter, Vietnam).

[Ken White]

...(or, for that matter, Vietnam).

Afghanistan is four times larger than Viet Nam with about twice the population and has about one fourth the number of friendly troops that were serving in VN at the peak. Populace attitudes are antithetical and the enemy contrasts in many respects. If all that weren't difference enough, the terrain is almost diametric and is far more troublesome for military purposes. The altitude alone has a significant impact on operations for humans, vehicles and especially for aviation...

That said, many of the same TTP can still be and are being applied with environmental modifications.

[jcustis]

I hate to sound like a broken record with this, but the current ROE cannot facilitate the employment of firepower and supporting arms that made FF ops successful. Everything else is totally feasible, save that one issue. In fact, it isn't even so much a question about the ROE in total, but the element of positive identification (PID) that is required. We are fighting a population-centric fight, and I'll go out on a limb in doing so, but I think I can state unequivocally that the RSF were fighting a counterinsurgent fight. Means to the ends then would not nest with the options we are employing today. Unfortunately, FF was born out of that counterinsurgent strategy, and would have limited applicability if used by main force units.