Moving the Rhod. Fire Force concept to Afghanistan?

[Ken White]

...(or, for that matter, Vietnam).

Afghanistan is four times larger than Viet Nam with about twice the population and has about one fourth the number of friendly troops that were serving in VN at the peak. Populace attitudes are antithetical and the enemy contrasts in many respects. If all that weren't difference enough, the terrain is almost diametric and is far more troublesome for military purposes. The altitude alone has a significant impact on operations for humans, vehicles and especially for aviation...

That said, many of the same TTP can still be and are being applied with environmental modifications.

[jcustis]

I hate to sound like a broken record with this, but the current ROE cannot facilitate the employment of firepower and supporting arms that made FF ops successful. Everything else is totally feasible, save that one issue. In fact, it isn't even so much a question about the ROE in total, but the element of positive identification (PID) that is required. We are fighting a population-centric fight, and I'll go out on a limb in doing so, but I think I can state unequivocally that the RSF were fighting a counterinsurgent fight. Means to the ends then would not nest with the options we are employing today. Unfortunately, FF was born out of that counterinsurgent strategy, and would have limited applicability if used by main force units.

[Fuchs]

I've read about the "Fire Force" tactics again and again, but I simply don't get what's special about it.

Enemies on foot are detected, airborne encircles the enemy (or blocks at least some escape routes), slow-movers do some air/ground attacks, airborne keeps fighting.

So what's special? Didn't the same fail to meet the hopes thousands of times in VN?

[Rex Brynen]

So what's special? Didn't the same fail to meet the hopes thousands of times in VN?

Given the remarkably high contact and kill rates claimed by the RLI, the question then becomes:

1) Were they doing something others weren't, or ISAF isn't; or

2) Were the conditions (poor opponent, terrain, ROE, etc) that led to the RLI's apparent operational success something that can't be replicated in Afghanistan; or

3) Are the contact and kill rates claimed for the RLI accurate.

As far as I can see, those are the three logical possibilities--and working out which apply is the purpose of the thread.

[Steve Blair]

I'd be tempted to go with door #2, Rex, and say that it was a combination of terrain and other operational factors. Count accuracy is always a question (no matter what), and there is also the very different political and military situation, but #2 is still (for me) the biggest factor.

[jcustis]

Given the remarkably high contact and kill rates claimed by the RLI, the question then becomes:

1) Were they doing something others weren't, or ISAF isn't; or

2) Were the conditions (poor opponent, terrain, ROE, etc) that led to the RLI's apparent operational success something that can't be replicated in Afghanistan; or

3) Are the contact and kill rates claimed for the RLI accurate.

As far as I can see, those are the three logical possibilities--and working out which apply is the purpose of the thread.

Rex, this outline is a good way to continue the analysis, and Fuchs' point stir things up sufficiently enough to merit a thought or two as well.

To Fuch's question, he is exactly right, there was nothing special about FF ops per se. The sequence of the contacts were often just as he lays out.

There were, however, a myriad of individual and discrete elements to FF that, when meshed together and synergized just right, posed a potent cocktail of firepower, aggressive action, and superb command and control that spun off from the right platforms used at the right time.

It has to be noted though, that FF ops experienced that evolution into the Jumbo FF over time, and the kill rate did not hit the ratio often quoted until later in the war. A lot of terrs got away during the early stages, until adaption came into play.

To Rex's points, there are several conditions that exist now that would prevent a similar capability from being employed to similar effect.

To question 1, the answer is ABSOLUTELY!!! The first thing that comes to mind is the mobility of the individual RLI or RAR trooper. The risk calculation favored their ability to jump off into the fight in shorts and tennis shoes early on for goodness sakes, and even thought the uniform changed to full fatigues later on, they never donned armor. Their mobility, relative to the enemy on the ground, was superb. A troop on the ground today, even wearing a plate carrier with front and back and side SAPI plates, plus helmet, plus nut flap, plus uniform and boots, has to easily weigh 20-25 pounds more than the RLI trooper, even though they used the SLR and 7.62 ammo is heavier. When you look at the loadouts that were used when conducting externals, the weights crept up there, but they never wore armor despite the similar threats of small arms fire.

To question 2, anecdotal evidence suggests that the opponents during the Rhodesian War were especially poorer than what we face today, and we less disciplined afield as well. I've spoken on the ROE, and I think Ken's comments about terrain stand alone. The terrain the EN chooses to fight us from here is typically more complex, and therefore easier to melt into in order to break contact through.

To question 3, there is always the possibility of exaggeration and inflation. IIRC, there was an additional payout for putting a terr down, and that there were reports of actual noncombatant deaths being claimed as kills. I can't remember which book it was in (At the Going Down of the Sun perhaps?).

Two constants, the weight of our equipment and the terrain, are always going to be there. The ROE has the potential to be changed, but even the boldest commander is not going to drop the protective equipment standard to a point where I think we could maneuver at great capability.

[davidbfpo]

Like Jon C. I have delved into the Rhodesian War and so from my "armchair" the big difference is the lack of intelligence to identify and fix the farmer, sorry Taliban fighter.

The Rhodesians had a variety of methods to get their intelligence and I suspect some is still not known. Whatever the criticism of the Rhodesian war effort for not understanding their Africans, they found alternatives - notably informants at the start, later on covert observations and the Selous Scouts in their recce role.

In Afghanistan we appear to have a mass of information and little intelligence. As Ken W. has posted there are successful operations that have identify and fix, they are the exception IMHO. All too often we appear to know little beyond a few hundred metres (as I have remarked before).

It is important to note that when the Rhodesians mounted external operations it removed almost all air assets for up to a week and in that time the internal kill rate slumped. Probably not an issue in Afghanistan air assets, where it is an issue is having "boots on the ground" that as RR says are simply not there.

For those who want a contrary viewpoint J.K. Cilliers book 'COIN in Rhodesia' from 1985 is worth a peek (and is listed in Ken's Post No.9).

Thinking and remembering now. The tactics used in South West Africa, now Namibia, by the Koevoet (a police unit), did not involve air assets, but armoured trucks, tracking and more.

[JMA]

Like Jon C. I have delved into the Rhodesian War and so from my "armchair" the big difference is the lack of intelligence to identify and fix the farmer, sorry Taliban fighter.

In the early days the police Special Branch (SB) had an effective network of informers across the country. Once the insurgents arrived in the populated areas they immediately started executing anyone suspected of being an SB source. Most of these killings were horrific mutilations and not surprisingly the intel from the field started to dry up.

Facing a desperate situation where usable intel from the local population was drying up the use of pseudo gangs (based on the Kenya experience) was attempted. This proved to wildly successful beyond our wildest dreams. This intel coming now front people with military training was markedly more accurate in all respects than what had been previously received from SB alone. By the end I think we were making contact on 8 out of 10 call outs and had the suspicion that the other two were ruses used by the Selous Scouts to try to authenticate themselves as insurgents to the local people. We lived with this.

So the end result is the receipt of accurate, clear and regular intel we were able to deploy on and get talked onto the target by pseudo team on the ground by then in an Op position.

The Rhodesians had a variety of methods to get their intelligence and I suspect some is still not known. Whatever the criticism of the Rhodesian war effort for not understanding their Africans, they found alternatives - notably informants at the start, later on covert observations and the Selous Scouts in their recce role.

Actually David as a city boy from Cape Town (who had grown up among but separate to non-black brown people from a different genealogy line with different, language, culture, history and religions) I found the Rhodesian understanding of the Africans to be spot on. (This contrary to Roger Marstons book). Of course this understanding was never politically correct hence the criticism from certain quarters but perhaps for another thread)

The key to the intel war was that the cities remained under control of the government until the end.

In Afghanistan we appear to have a mass of information and little intelligence. As Ken W. has posted there are successful operations that have identify and fix, they are the exception IMHO. All too often we appear to know little beyond a few hundred metres (as I have remarked before).

This is the last thing that will be changed it seems as some of these FOB's have found a place in Brit military history.

It is important to note that when the Rhodesians mounted external operations it removed almost all air assets for up to a week and in that time the internal kill rate slumped. Probably not an issue in Afghanistan air assets, where it is an issue is having "boots on the ground" that as RR says are simply not there.

Well as said by John Custis it was only when we concentrated the available resources in what was for Rhodesia a "Jumbo Fire Force" comprising 8-10 choppers, Lynx (Cessna 337) or two and a Dak.

So by concentrating troops at the right place and the right time for certain ops (internal and external) was in good military planning rather than anything negative which really only happened when there was no chopper available for a casevac (for example).

The boots on the ground thing remains interesting in that This Marston character and others say about force levels on the ground. Rhodesia/Zimbabwe is a bout the size of Montana. The claims are that 25,000 forces were on the ground at any time. Nonsense Professor Woods believes that the level of trained infantry soldiers deployed on average were 15 almost always understrength companies. He would say 1,500 but add another 300 if at full strength. That would leave the balance to be made up of police at police stations in Op areas, para-military police units, Armed Internal Affairs guards and Guardforce who guard the protected villages.

The decision was made out of necessity to use the best soldiers to the maximum effect. And for better or for worse that was down by some pretty resourceful senior officers.

Thinking and remembering now. The tactics used in South West Africa, now Namibia, by the Koevoet (a police unit), did not involve air assets, but armoured trucks, tracking and more.

If the Taliban have to move across large expanses of similar to the terrain found in northern Namibia then there is some potential for considering Koevoet tactics which led to the insurgents being run down by vehicle bourne troops using a combination of tracking, intel collected along the way and by leap-frogging tracking teams forward to cut for spore ahead to speed up the process. These guys kills 3,681 insurgents at a cost of 155 at a 1:24 ration.

[JMA]

I've read about the "Fire Force" tactics again and again, but I simply don't get what's special about it.

Enemies on foot are detected, airborne encircles the enemy (or blocks at least some escape routes), slow-movers do some air/ground attacks, airborne keeps fighting.

So what's special? Didn't the same fail to meet the hopes thousands of times in VN?

Simple it was indeed. Find, encircle, attack, kill.

If you listen to those with VN experience that talk much about LZs because they were a problem there. There are those without Afghanistan experience who see to be greatly concerned about RPG7s. There are terrain concerns what for I not sure being more open than VN certainly assists the attacker.

[Rex Brynen]

If you listen to those with VN experience that talk much about LZs because they were a problem there. There are those without Afghanistan experience who see to be greatly concerned about RPG7s. There are terrain concerns what for I not sure being more open than VN certainly assists the attacker.

JMA, I think that one of the questions that is being asked is how frequently RLI Fire Force missions engaged ZIPRA/ZANLA forces armed almost solely with SKSs and AK47s, and how often a contact resulted in encounters with groups fielding (and using) anything heavier. I'm not thinking of missions outside Rhodesia (where presumably you ran into the occasional ZPU-2, etc), but the routine QRF-type missions inside the country.

Were there any cases of FF being lured into AA or LZ ambushes, or similar? Or did terrain and ZIPRA/ZANLA competence make that unlikely?

What was the comms status of ZIPRA/ZANLA units? Presumably, they didn't have advance warning of missions departing (which has sometimes been a problem in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it can be reasonably easy to put a spotter in communications eyes-on a FOB).

I'm not raising this because I think it makes the FF/QRF model untenable, but rather because we need a much better sense of the threat profile associated with a typical RLI contact, and what would be expected in other theatres.

[JMA]

JMA, I think that one of the questions that is being asked is how frequently RLI Fire Force missions engaged ZIPRA/ZANLA forces armed almost solely with SKSs and AK47s, and how often a contact resulted in encounters with groups fielding (and using) anything heavier. I'm not thinking of missions outside Rhodesia (where presumably you ran into the occasional ZPU-2, etc), but the routine QRF-type missions inside the country.

Were there any cases of FF being lured into AA or LZ ambushes, or similar? Or did terrain and ZIPRA/ZANLA competence make that unlikely?

What was the comms status of ZIPRA/ZANLA units? Presumably, they didn't have advance warning of missions departing (which has sometimes been a problem in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it can be reasonably easy to put a spotter in communications eyes-on a FOB).

I'm not raising this because I think it makes the FF/QRF model untenable, but rather because we need a much better sense of the threat profile associated with a typical RLI contact, and what would be expected in other theatres.

We have one incident where it was assumed that a Lynx (Cessna 337) was lured into attacking a ground target running in parallel to a ridge line on which gooks were sitting and the aircraft was shot down. They have been given the benefit of the doubt on that one. Other problems we caused when one suddenly overflew a hitherto unknown camp and all hell broke out.

In bush where the vegetation is head height and above the RPG is less of a problem to low flying choppers than one at first thinks. There were quite a few RPGs around but thanks to the high kill rates achieved in fire force actions not too many of them survived long enough to be start to reach a level of proficiency where they were shooting down aircraft. RPDs and RPKs were coming in and when we heard one of them start firing we targeted them for special attention. AAA was there outside the country as was SAM7-Strela. The Rhodesians defeated the Strela risk with special paint and exhaust modifications after loosing two small piston engined recce aircraft early on there after it was never a problem other than they shot down two civilian aircraft.

As to ambushes. One has to learn to read the terrain. Pilots do because their lives depend upon it. Its where a contact has been staged ie vehicles ambushed where one needs to look for the bait and trap routine. While flying in look carefully at the maps and decided whether some threatening high ground needs to be cleared before the ambush business can be dealt with. You must remember that quite often the pilots would fly over a suspect area to try and draw fire. I was in the gunship one day when a chopper deliberately flew down a river line while we shadowed at 1,000 ft and when the opened up on him we returned the favour. So what I'm saying to you is that being fired on in an aircraft is not necessarily the end of the world. Not easy to hit aircraft on places that matter. At 1,000 ft when you see the tracer coming directly at you they will miss. Its when the tracer appears aimed in front of the chopper that its a different story. For example on Op Dingo there were 10 gunships up that day and every one was hit by small arms fire. These guys are trained to watch each others backs and deal with pockets of small arms and other fire. These guys also took out the AAA. No pilots resigned after that experience.

Of course where the initiative lies with you and the call-out is based on intel that the insurgents don't know you are on the way then no such problem exists. Again this stuff is why proper interrogation of ALL prisoners is so necessary. What is their training, what are their tactics, what are their weapons?

As to sign posting air activity as early warning. Yes one must consider deception if needed and vary the routes. We would also plan approach routes to each target based on hiding the sound of the approaching choppers for as long as possible. When your callsign on the ground says they can hear you then you assume the insurgents have too.

I would say that a lot of the concerns getting raised seem to be about air vulnerability. I suggest that pilot perspective must be brought in to respond to these issues as there is a natural fear among soldiers that they could be shot in an aircraft or have their air craft shot down. As I have said repeatedly now what are raised as serious concerns would be dealt with quite simply by any competent combat pilot who as a team work through these issues most everyday in training, discussions and on ops.

What do you mean by the threat profile?

I would suggest you apply the same risks to this form of helicopter usage as you would to CASEVAC / MEDEVAC / AIR RESCUE choppers. The risk of a ambush of an CASEVAC chopper is probably the biggest there is. I believe some LZs have been IED'd (don't know for the troops or the chopper though). So speack to the CASEVAC pilots and ask them what their daily concerns are and find out how many of these choppers have been shot down in Afghanistan.

[Ken White]

If you listen to those with VN experience that talk much about LZs because they were a problem there.

Huh? not so -- I probably made somewhere betwen 40 and 60 combat assaults, only two were into hot LZs and only one was really bad. By far the vast majority of LZs were not hot, at a guess, I'd say 90+% were clean, a simple product of decent planning. More could've been with better planning and the trendline on hitting hot LZs was generally downward from 1962 until 1972 as we developed the process. Eagle Flights were often hot due to landing close to prevent an escape but they were opposing an enemy element that was generally trying to escape so LZ fire was usually not overpowering.

Hot LZs are a problem anywhere and there are degrees of hot; AKs don't do as much damage as RPGs and they in turn aren't as dangerous as a Dushka or two, much less a ZSU 23. The Talibs have all those less the ZSU 23 (so far...).

There are those without Afghanistan experience who see to be greatly concerned about RPG7s.

Probably because most of the US helicopters downed in Afghanistan by enemy action were hit with RPGs and the reports make the US newspapers...

There are terrain concerns what for I not sure being more open than VN certainly assists the attacker.

You aren't sure why the terrain in Afghanistan is a problem?

First, Viet Nam is mostly scrub and agricultural land, the real jungle isn't all that prevalent. It is generally open and the few mountains that exist are generally small, isolated and few in south topped 1,200 meters. Secondly, in Afghanistan, the vast open spaces aren't a problem, they're in the north and the southwest. The primary operational areas for most of ISAF is in the south and east -- dominated by the Hindu Kush where mountains typically run in the 3-6000 meter range and many ridges are 500 to 1,000 meters above their associated valleys. Look at the pictures below.

Picture 1 is typical operational area. Open space for the birds -- but it is dominated by the high ground which is where the bad guys will be...

Picture 2 is also typical, open area to land in but no sense in doing so because there's nothing there. The mountains are steep enough that few if any enemy will be there...

Picture 3 offers lower hills -- but still dominating the open ground. If you believe that landing a helicopter in any of that open ground against a known enemy "favors the attacker" you and I fought in very different wars.

Not to mention that if one landed far enough away to avoid being hit, one would have to walk or fight across a lot of open ground to get to the objective...

[JMA]

Huh? not so -- I probably made somewhere betwen 40 and 60 combat assaults, only two were into hot LZs and only one was really bad. By far the vast majority of LZs were not hot, at a guess, I'd say 90+% were clean, a simple product of decent planning. More could've been with better planning and the trendline on hitting hot LZs was generally downward from 1962 until 1972 as we developed the process. Eagle Flights were often hot due to landing close to prevent an escape but they were opposing an enemy element that was generally trying to escape so LZ fire was usually not overpowering.

Glad you dispelled the myth that many believe about LZs in VN being a massive problem. I hope due note is taken.

The fire force was very like how you explain Eagle Flights in the last four lines. On the arrival overhead of the fire force the insurgents would become disorientated by the noise and firing and be looking for a way out. Insurgent fire was then less about aimed shots and more about the actions of increasingly desperate men.

Hot LZs are a problem anywhere and there are degrees of hot; AKs don't do as much damage as RPGs and they in turn aren't as dangerous as a Dushka or two, much less a ZSU 23. The Talibs have all those less the ZSU 23 (so far...).Probably because most of the US helicopters downed in Afghanistan by enemy action were hit with RPGs and the reports make the US newspapers...You aren't sure why the terrain in Afghanistan is a problem?

Would you find enemy in any of those three photos? Discard the two where there are no soldiers. If you catch the enenmy out in the open there you don't need troops your just send out a few gunships to wrap that up.

On the third photo I assume there would only be day sniping or night attacks, yes? Rule 1: never seep uphill. So if the enemy are on the slopes of the hills and they survive the bombing runs then you drop troops on top and they work their way down. as maybe required.

First, Viet Nam is mostly scrub and agricultural land, the real jungle isn't all that prevalent. It is generally open and the few mountains that exist are generally small, isolated and few in south topped 1,200 meters. Secondly, in Afghanistan, the vast open spaces aren't a problem, they're in the north and the southwest. The primary operational areas for most of ISAF is in the south and east -- dominated by the Hindu Kush where mountains typically run in the 3-6000 meter range and many ridges are 500 to 1,000 meters above their associated valleys. Look at the pictures below.

Thanks for posting those.

Are there really insurgents out there (on terrain like the photos)? Where to the hide out? There is no cover. Thermal would pick them up at night, yes? If they are out there by day don't send the fire force send a shrink.

Not to mention that if one landed far enough away to avoid being hit, one would have to walk or fight across a lot of open ground to get to the objective...

As said elsewhere: Rule 3: Never sweep from open ground into cover. There is no chance in hell that I would land on the flat and then fight up the hill. And then Rule 1: Never 'sweep' uphill. Double no-no that.

[Ken White]

Would you find enemy in any of those three photos? Discard the two where there are no soldiers. If you catch the enenmy out in the open there you don't need troops your just send out a few gunships to wrap that up.

True on the gunships. Yes, you would find enemy in all three of the photos. The two without troops were taken by my son on one of many vehicle patrols in the area south of Kandahar to interdict Talib travel routes -- the enemy found in those two would be moving through the area to reach an objective elsewhere.

Are there really insurgents out there (on terrain like the photos)? Where to the hide out? There is no cover. Thermal would pick them up at night, yes? If they are out there by day don't send the fire force send a shrink.

By day they hole up, by night they move. Thermal cannot be everywhere at all times. There is a great deal of cover in small wadis which are the movement routes. All three pics were reduced significantly to be embedded in the post, at full size the folds in the ground are more evident. In the one with the Troops you can see the military crest of the hill about 400 meters in front of the sandbags; there's a drop down to a fair sized valley.

Below are two more showing a typical river valley and a vehicle parked in front of compound wall -- those walls are thick and around every inhabited area or dwelling. There's plenty of cover and concealment if one knows how to use it -- and the Talibs do...

[Steve Blair]

Huh? not so -- I probably made somewhere betwen 40 and 60 combat assaults, only two were into hot LZs and only one was really bad. By far the vast majority of LZs were not hot, at a guess, I'd say 90+% were clean, a simple product of decent planning. More could've been with better planning and the trendline on hitting hot LZs was generally downward from 1962 until 1972 as we developed the process. Eagle Flights were often hot due to landing close to prevent an escape but they were opposing an enemy element that was generally trying to escape so LZ fire was usually not overpowering.

First, Viet Nam is mostly scrub and agricultural land, the real jungle isn't all that prevalent. It is generally open and the few mountains that exist are generally small, isolated and few in south topped 1,200 meters. Secondly, in Afghanistan, the vast open spaces aren't a problem, they're in the north and the southwest. The primary operational areas for most of ISAF is in the south and east -- dominated by the Hindu Kush where mountains typically run in the 3-6000 meter range and many ridges are 500 to 1,000 meters above their associated valleys. Look at the pictures below.

LZs weren't much of an issue in the III Corps and IV Corps areas, but they did become problematic in some parts of II Corps (especially the Central Highlands) and I Corps (mainly as you got away from the coast). Eagle Flight type stuff worked really well in the first two CTZs, but not so well in II Corps or I Corps (at least away from the coast and much of the DMZ).

Not trying to quibble, but just pointing out how terrain can influence operational techniques.

[Ken White]

LZs weren't much of an issue in the III Corps and IV Corps areas, but they did become problematic in some parts of II Corps (especially the Central Highlands) and I Corps (mainly as you got away from the coast). Eagle Flight type stuff worked really well in the first two CTZs, but not so well in II Corps or I Corps (at least away from the coast and much of the DMZ).

the most Afghan-like. Both also offered far greater enemy force density than did the other two CTZs, mostly due to proximity to Laos and the narrowing of the country placing the Annamite Range of minor mountains into play and offering concealed route for movement of the NVA to the populated coastal areas. The generally rougher terrain also offered fewer hearts and minds for gathering and thus offered opposing forces more maneuver and fire capability for larger units. A lot of the I Corps problem CAs were incurred during the Khe Sanh and A Shau campaigns -- both of which were wars within a war...

Problems with Eagle Flight success in those areas were range / time and available concealment...

Proving that clean living pays, I spent most of '66 in II Corps, '68 in I Corps.

[JMA]

I hate to sound like a broken record with this, but the current ROE cannot facilitate the employment of firepower and supporting arms that made FF ops successful. Everything else is totally feasible, save that one issue. In fact, it isn't even so much a question about the ROE in total, but the element of positive identification (PID) that is required. We are fighting a population-centric fight, and I'll go out on a limb in doing so, but I think I can state unequivocally that the RSF were fighting a counterinsurgent fight. Means to the ends then would not nest with the options we are employing today. Unfortunately, FF was born out of that counterinsurgent strategy, and would have limited applicability if used by main force units.

Hi John perhaps you have pared the issue down to the basics.

It seems that the ROE as applied in terms of the pop-centric approach to operations in Afghanistan serves to prevent a quick, short, sharp military action being carried out. My assumption is that the restrictions are out of fear of the potential for civilian collateral damage, yes?

The assumption further then is that the efforts to separate the Taliban from the local population has not been a success as they remain intermingled and it is the ISAF forces who are then effectively separated from the local population, yes?

That all said are there any situations when the Taliban operate outside the protective cocoon of the local population footprint? If contact were to be made in these situations would the absence of civilians allow for a relative free-fire-Zone?

The example of an ambush of ISAF troops or vehicles is worth consideration. If gunship support was immediately available would their use be restricted? Restricted but able to be effective or restricted to the point of not being worth calling? The bottom line I guess is that would the air strikes be able to cause the Taliban to break off the ambush and attempt to withdraw from the scene?

Can we get to this point please.

[Pete]

If contact were to be made in these situations would the absence of civilians allow for a relative free-fire-Zone?

Just a brief clarification--the Free Fire Zone is a fire support coordination term that was warped far beyond its original meaning by news reporting in Vietnam and in some of the memoirs of that war. Its true meaning is an area where artillery or air ordnance can be fired or dropped without the requirement to coordinate the fires with any headquarters. Usually a Free Fire Area is a place out in the middle of nowhere. It is one of several fire support coordination measures established to prevent friendly fire casualties by regulating what fires can be delivered in an area of operations. During Vietnam it gained an "anything goes" connotation, a kind of hell-on-earth sort of place straight out of Dante devised by a nefarious U.S. military.

[Ken White]

JMA Re: your three questions. IMO:

No, just makes it slightly more difficult.

Not universally at night, it's a very large country and the decision has been made to try to not interfere with civilian traffic so a bunch of Talibs on motorcycles and in pickup trucks away from coalition forces can and do travel in daylight. By using scouts and watchers, they can usually avoid Checkpoints. Sometimes they get spotted, sometimes not. That applies day and night.

Many routes and hides are known and interdicted or watched. That number is growing constantly. However, many more are not known due to difficult terrain, a long poorly marked, even disputed, border in a very large country and inadequate troop strength and density for saturation.

Pete True, 'free fire' as a term got totally confused with all sorts of things. The use of H&I in Viet Nam was dumb and counterproductive and it at least partially led to that (deliberate?) misunderstanding. H&I was also used in Afghanistan and Iraq for a while but I heard that it was -- wisely -- stopped. Hopefully, that's correct.

[JMA]

I hate to sound like a broken record with this, but the current ROE cannot facilitate the employment of firepower and supporting arms that made FF ops successful. Everything else is totally feasible, save that one issue. In fact, it isn't even so much a question about the ROE in total, but the element of positive identification (PID) that is required. We are fighting a population-centric fight, and I'll go out on a limb in doing so, but I think I can state unequivocally that the RSF were fighting a counterinsurgent fight. Means to the ends then would not nest with the options we are employing today. Unfortunately, FF was born out of that counterinsurgent strategy, and would have limited applicability if used by main force units.

John as a matter of interest if you had for example a downed helo with life on board in the middle of Indian Territory what ROE apply to rescue ops on their behalf?