Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
Infanteer,

I posted the cited paragraph a week ago (Post No.136), I expect JMA has seen it, although it did not attract any direct response from others - especially as it came from a Marine on the ground.

SWC debates on Afghanistan often follow a logic / pattern that puzzles me.
Yes David I did read that and was both chewing on a response and waiting to see what others would say.

I suppose the reason you posted that here was because of the following:

I ask one of my brother Marines what he would do were he given this problem to solve under the historical constraints normally faced by Marine commanders fighting a small war. He replied immediately ; Q-cars, fire force and pseudo operators. Which is exactly the same thing I would say as would all of my friends who are in the business.
I suggest that this sort of comment rises more from the frustration of current tactical approaches and RoEs in the area and the understanding of the need to adapt tactically to situation on the ground and not just carry out more of the same as in "mowing the grass" type sweep ops.

Very seldom do "brute force and ignorance" operations work against a wily and agile foe. So I interpret that as a soldier crying out to be allowed to innovate tactically so as to defeat the Taliban (if that is the mission).

The next point is that there is a perceived need to throw money at Nimroz Province (which is a very US approach). It will not take the locals long to figure out what intensity of Taliban activity is the right amount to loosen the purse strings to the maximum. And then when the money starts to flow the corruption will start in earnest and as such is almost self defeating.

Then this one:

The General sits on top of a massive military bureaucracy fighting a nasty insurgency with a coalition combat force and a dysfunctional host government. Despite this he has been able to turn his intent of getting off the FOB’s into action which is something his predecessors were unable or unwilling to do.
...and we shall all see how that works out in Helmand and especially in Sangin.

Then we learn the mission for the Nimroz Province (supposedly):

The Marines understand that the best way to accomplish reconstruction is not with large formations of combat troops and both the Governor and the other USG representatives who have surged in country with the Marines agree.
Is reconstruction the mission?

That brings me to a report of the Brit Paras activities in Nahr-e-Saraj (Helmand) from SkyTV last night. We were told that the Brit Paras (2 & 3) and 5 Scots cleared the Taliban out so that redevelopment can begin. A quote:

“The Tor Ghai community has embraced the Afghan government and is keen to receive the benefits.”
I'm sure they are and these "benefits" will come per kind favour of the US (and a little from the Brit) taxpayers. No battle for hearts and minds has been won, the locals have sold out to the highest bidder. This is a totally mercenary situation in Afghanistan... that (I must admit) is their culture.

Then he states the obvious with this gem:

We are spending billions of dollars we don’t have in order to accomplish a mission we can’t do because of self imposed constraints which do not reflect reality on the ground.
Followed by a plug for the use of "contractors" as a cost effective means of defeating the Taliban (along the lines of Executive Outcomes and I suppose Blackwater - now called Xe Services). He's right... its not going to happen no matter how much cheaper it will be.

I don't know how Free Range are operating there that they believe the Marines want to emulate them but I can assume that the Marines are frustrated at the constraints the RoEs place them under are long for the opportunity to innovate whether it is through the use of Q-cars, fire force and pseudo operators or something... anything else.

Does anyone know how Free Range are operating there... and is what they are doing degrading the Taliban?