Moving the Rhod. Fire Force concept to Afghanistan?

[JMA]

I've read about the "Fire Force" tactics again and again, but I simply don't get what's special about it.

Enemies on foot are detected, airborne encircles the enemy (or blocks at least some escape routes), slow-movers do some air/ground attacks, airborne keeps fighting.

So what's special? Didn't the same fail to meet the hopes thousands of times in VN?

Simple it was indeed. Find, encircle, attack, kill.

If you listen to those with VN experience that talk much about LZs because they were a problem there. There are those without Afghanistan experience who see to be greatly concerned about RPG7s. There are terrain concerns what for I not sure being more open than VN certainly assists the attacker.

[Rex Brynen]

If you listen to those with VN experience that talk much about LZs because they were a problem there. There are those without Afghanistan experience who see to be greatly concerned about RPG7s. There are terrain concerns what for I not sure being more open than VN certainly assists the attacker.

JMA, I think that one of the questions that is being asked is how frequently RLI Fire Force missions engaged ZIPRA/ZANLA forces armed almost solely with SKSs and AK47s, and how often a contact resulted in encounters with groups fielding (and using) anything heavier. I'm not thinking of missions outside Rhodesia (where presumably you ran into the occasional ZPU-2, etc), but the routine QRF-type missions inside the country.

Were there any cases of FF being lured into AA or LZ ambushes, or similar? Or did terrain and ZIPRA/ZANLA competence make that unlikely?

What was the comms status of ZIPRA/ZANLA units? Presumably, they didn't have advance warning of missions departing (which has sometimes been a problem in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it can be reasonably easy to put a spotter in communications eyes-on a FOB).

I'm not raising this because I think it makes the FF/QRF model untenable, but rather because we need a much better sense of the threat profile associated with a typical RLI contact, and what would be expected in other theatres.

[JMA]

JMA, I think that one of the questions that is being asked is how frequently RLI Fire Force missions engaged ZIPRA/ZANLA forces armed almost solely with SKSs and AK47s, and how often a contact resulted in encounters with groups fielding (and using) anything heavier. I'm not thinking of missions outside Rhodesia (where presumably you ran into the occasional ZPU-2, etc), but the routine QRF-type missions inside the country.

Were there any cases of FF being lured into AA or LZ ambushes, or similar? Or did terrain and ZIPRA/ZANLA competence make that unlikely?

What was the comms status of ZIPRA/ZANLA units? Presumably, they didn't have advance warning of missions departing (which has sometimes been a problem in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it can be reasonably easy to put a spotter in communications eyes-on a FOB).

I'm not raising this because I think it makes the FF/QRF model untenable, but rather because we need a much better sense of the threat profile associated with a typical RLI contact, and what would be expected in other theatres.

We have one incident where it was assumed that a Lynx (Cessna 337) was lured into attacking a ground target running in parallel to a ridge line on which gooks were sitting and the aircraft was shot down. They have been given the benefit of the doubt on that one. Other problems we caused when one suddenly overflew a hitherto unknown camp and all hell broke out.

In bush where the vegetation is head height and above the RPG is less of a problem to low flying choppers than one at first thinks. There were quite a few RPGs around but thanks to the high kill rates achieved in fire force actions not too many of them survived long enough to be start to reach a level of proficiency where they were shooting down aircraft. RPDs and RPKs were coming in and when we heard one of them start firing we targeted them for special attention. AAA was there outside the country as was SAM7-Strela. The Rhodesians defeated the Strela risk with special paint and exhaust modifications after loosing two small piston engined recce aircraft early on there after it was never a problem other than they shot down two civilian aircraft.

As to ambushes. One has to learn to read the terrain. Pilots do because their lives depend upon it. Its where a contact has been staged ie vehicles ambushed where one needs to look for the bait and trap routine. While flying in look carefully at the maps and decided whether some threatening high ground needs to be cleared before the ambush business can be dealt with. You must remember that quite often the pilots would fly over a suspect area to try and draw fire. I was in the gunship one day when a chopper deliberately flew down a river line while we shadowed at 1,000 ft and when the opened up on him we returned the favour. So what I'm saying to you is that being fired on in an aircraft is not necessarily the end of the world. Not easy to hit aircraft on places that matter. At 1,000 ft when you see the tracer coming directly at you they will miss. Its when the tracer appears aimed in front of the chopper that its a different story. For example on Op Dingo there were 10 gunships up that day and every one was hit by small arms fire. These guys are trained to watch each others backs and deal with pockets of small arms and other fire. These guys also took out the AAA. No pilots resigned after that experience.

Of course where the initiative lies with you and the call-out is based on intel that the insurgents don't know you are on the way then no such problem exists. Again this stuff is why proper interrogation of ALL prisoners is so necessary. What is their training, what are their tactics, what are their weapons?

As to sign posting air activity as early warning. Yes one must consider deception if needed and vary the routes. We would also plan approach routes to each target based on hiding the sound of the approaching choppers for as long as possible. When your callsign on the ground says they can hear you then you assume the insurgents have too.

I would say that a lot of the concerns getting raised seem to be about air vulnerability. I suggest that pilot perspective must be brought in to respond to these issues as there is a natural fear among soldiers that they could be shot in an aircraft or have their air craft shot down. As I have said repeatedly now what are raised as serious concerns would be dealt with quite simply by any competent combat pilot who as a team work through these issues most everyday in training, discussions and on ops.

What do you mean by the threat profile?

I would suggest you apply the same risks to this form of helicopter usage as you would to CASEVAC / MEDEVAC / AIR RESCUE choppers. The risk of a ambush of an CASEVAC chopper is probably the biggest there is. I believe some LZs have been IED'd (don't know for the troops or the chopper though). So speack to the CASEVAC pilots and ask them what their daily concerns are and find out how many of these choppers have been shot down in Afghanistan.

[Ken White]

If you listen to those with VN experience that talk much about LZs because they were a problem there.

Huh? not so -- I probably made somewhere betwen 40 and 60 combat assaults, only two were into hot LZs and only one was really bad. By far the vast majority of LZs were not hot, at a guess, I'd say 90+% were clean, a simple product of decent planning. More could've been with better planning and the trendline on hitting hot LZs was generally downward from 1962 until 1972 as we developed the process. Eagle Flights were often hot due to landing close to prevent an escape but they were opposing an enemy element that was generally trying to escape so LZ fire was usually not overpowering.

Hot LZs are a problem anywhere and there are degrees of hot; AKs don't do as much damage as RPGs and they in turn aren't as dangerous as a Dushka or two, much less a ZSU 23. The Talibs have all those less the ZSU 23 (so far...).

There are those without Afghanistan experience who see to be greatly concerned about RPG7s.

Probably because most of the US helicopters downed in Afghanistan by enemy action were hit with RPGs and the reports make the US newspapers...

There are terrain concerns what for I not sure being more open than VN certainly assists the attacker.

You aren't sure why the terrain in Afghanistan is a problem?

First, Viet Nam is mostly scrub and agricultural land, the real jungle isn't all that prevalent. It is generally open and the few mountains that exist are generally small, isolated and few in south topped 1,200 meters. Secondly, in Afghanistan, the vast open spaces aren't a problem, they're in the north and the southwest. The primary operational areas for most of ISAF is in the south and east -- dominated by the Hindu Kush where mountains typically run in the 3-6000 meter range and many ridges are 500 to 1,000 meters above their associated valleys. Look at the pictures below.

Picture 1 is typical operational area. Open space for the birds -- but it is dominated by the high ground which is where the bad guys will be...

Picture 2 is also typical, open area to land in but no sense in doing so because there's nothing there. The mountains are steep enough that few if any enemy will be there...

Picture 3 offers lower hills -- but still dominating the open ground. If you believe that landing a helicopter in any of that open ground against a known enemy "favors the attacker" you and I fought in very different wars.

Not to mention that if one landed far enough away to avoid being hit, one would have to walk or fight across a lot of open ground to get to the objective...

[JMA]

Huh? not so -- I probably made somewhere betwen 40 and 60 combat assaults, only two were into hot LZs and only one was really bad. By far the vast majority of LZs were not hot, at a guess, I'd say 90+% were clean, a simple product of decent planning. More could've been with better planning and the trendline on hitting hot LZs was generally downward from 1962 until 1972 as we developed the process. Eagle Flights were often hot due to landing close to prevent an escape but they were opposing an enemy element that was generally trying to escape so LZ fire was usually not overpowering.

Glad you dispelled the myth that many believe about LZs in VN being a massive problem. I hope due note is taken.

The fire force was very like how you explain Eagle Flights in the last four lines. On the arrival overhead of the fire force the insurgents would become disorientated by the noise and firing and be looking for a way out. Insurgent fire was then less about aimed shots and more about the actions of increasingly desperate men.

Hot LZs are a problem anywhere and there are degrees of hot; AKs don't do as much damage as RPGs and they in turn aren't as dangerous as a Dushka or two, much less a ZSU 23. The Talibs have all those less the ZSU 23 (so far...).Probably because most of the US helicopters downed in Afghanistan by enemy action were hit with RPGs and the reports make the US newspapers...You aren't sure why the terrain in Afghanistan is a problem?

Would you find enemy in any of those three photos? Discard the two where there are no soldiers. If you catch the enenmy out in the open there you don't need troops your just send out a few gunships to wrap that up.

On the third photo I assume there would only be day sniping or night attacks, yes? Rule 1: never seep uphill. So if the enemy are on the slopes of the hills and they survive the bombing runs then you drop troops on top and they work their way down. as maybe required.

First, Viet Nam is mostly scrub and agricultural land, the real jungle isn't all that prevalent. It is generally open and the few mountains that exist are generally small, isolated and few in south topped 1,200 meters. Secondly, in Afghanistan, the vast open spaces aren't a problem, they're in the north and the southwest. The primary operational areas for most of ISAF is in the south and east -- dominated by the Hindu Kush where mountains typically run in the 3-6000 meter range and many ridges are 500 to 1,000 meters above their associated valleys. Look at the pictures below.

Thanks for posting those.

Are there really insurgents out there (on terrain like the photos)? Where to the hide out? There is no cover. Thermal would pick them up at night, yes? If they are out there by day don't send the fire force send a shrink.

Not to mention that if one landed far enough away to avoid being hit, one would have to walk or fight across a lot of open ground to get to the objective...

As said elsewhere: Rule 3: Never sweep from open ground into cover. There is no chance in hell that I would land on the flat and then fight up the hill. And then Rule 1: Never 'sweep' uphill. Double no-no that.

[Ken White]

Would you find enemy in any of those three photos? Discard the two where there are no soldiers. If you catch the enenmy out in the open there you don't need troops your just send out a few gunships to wrap that up.

True on the gunships. Yes, you would find enemy in all three of the photos. The two without troops were taken by my son on one of many vehicle patrols in the area south of Kandahar to interdict Talib travel routes -- the enemy found in those two would be moving through the area to reach an objective elsewhere.

Are there really insurgents out there (on terrain like the photos)? Where to the hide out? There is no cover. Thermal would pick them up at night, yes? If they are out there by day don't send the fire force send a shrink.

By day they hole up, by night they move. Thermal cannot be everywhere at all times. There is a great deal of cover in small wadis which are the movement routes. All three pics were reduced significantly to be embedded in the post, at full size the folds in the ground are more evident. In the one with the Troops you can see the military crest of the hill about 400 meters in front of the sandbags; there's a drop down to a fair sized valley.

Below are two more showing a typical river valley and a vehicle parked in front of compound wall -- those walls are thick and around every inhabited area or dwelling. There's plenty of cover and concealment if one knows how to use it -- and the Talibs do...

[Steve Blair]

Huh? not so -- I probably made somewhere betwen 40 and 60 combat assaults, only two were into hot LZs and only one was really bad. By far the vast majority of LZs were not hot, at a guess, I'd say 90+% were clean, a simple product of decent planning. More could've been with better planning and the trendline on hitting hot LZs was generally downward from 1962 until 1972 as we developed the process. Eagle Flights were often hot due to landing close to prevent an escape but they were opposing an enemy element that was generally trying to escape so LZ fire was usually not overpowering.

First, Viet Nam is mostly scrub and agricultural land, the real jungle isn't all that prevalent. It is generally open and the few mountains that exist are generally small, isolated and few in south topped 1,200 meters. Secondly, in Afghanistan, the vast open spaces aren't a problem, they're in the north and the southwest. The primary operational areas for most of ISAF is in the south and east -- dominated by the Hindu Kush where mountains typically run in the 3-6000 meter range and many ridges are 500 to 1,000 meters above their associated valleys. Look at the pictures below.

LZs weren't much of an issue in the III Corps and IV Corps areas, but they did become problematic in some parts of II Corps (especially the Central Highlands) and I Corps (mainly as you got away from the coast). Eagle Flight type stuff worked really well in the first two CTZs, but not so well in II Corps or I Corps (at least away from the coast and much of the DMZ).

Not trying to quibble, but just pointing out how terrain can influence operational techniques.

[Ken White]

LZs weren't much of an issue in the III Corps and IV Corps areas, but they did become problematic in some parts of II Corps (especially the Central Highlands) and I Corps (mainly as you got away from the coast). Eagle Flight type stuff worked really well in the first two CTZs, but not so well in II Corps or I Corps (at least away from the coast and much of the DMZ).

the most Afghan-like. Both also offered far greater enemy force density than did the other two CTZs, mostly due to proximity to Laos and the narrowing of the country placing the Annamite Range of minor mountains into play and offering concealed route for movement of the NVA to the populated coastal areas. The generally rougher terrain also offered fewer hearts and minds for gathering and thus offered opposing forces more maneuver and fire capability for larger units. A lot of the I Corps problem CAs were incurred during the Khe Sanh and A Shau campaigns -- both of which were wars within a war...

Problems with Eagle Flight success in those areas were range / time and available concealment...

Proving that clean living pays, I spent most of '66 in II Corps, '68 in I Corps.

[Steve Blair]

the most Afghan-like. Both also offered far greater enemy force density than did the other two CTZs, mostly due to proximity to Laos and the narrowing of the country placing the Annamite Range of minor mountains into play and offering concealed route for movement of the NVA to the populated coastal areas. The generally rougher terrain also offered fewer hearts and minds for gathering and thus offered opposing forces more maneuver and fire capability for larger units. A lot of the I Corps problem CAs were incurred during the Khe Sanh and A Shau campaigns -- both of which were wars within a war...

Problems with Eagle Flight success in those areas were range / time and available concealment...

Proving that clean living pays, I spent most of '66 in II Corps, '68 in I Corps.

Good tour placement....

That was why I pointed out the differences. The 101st had a fair amount of trouble finding good LZs when they hit I Corps, and the lack of suitable LZs also allowed the NVA to make good plans for dealing with any airmobile assault. II Corps had the same problems, coupled with a lack of organic lift on the part of the 4th ID (although in fairness they were better off that the Marines before 1969 and the 23rd ID/Americal in that regard). The 173rd had adequate lift, but still had trouble overcoming the lack of good LZs and ran into the same sort of ambushes that the 101st faced later on.

And before anyone points out the 1st CD, I know the Cav operated in both CTZs, but there were important differences. The Cav's time in I Corps was relatively limited, and they conducted mostly raid-type operations as opposed to the sustained campaigns of the 101st during 1969. And their time in II CTZ was also somewhat limited and didn't face the level of NVA opposition that the 4th ID or 173rd Abn Bde did operating closer to the Cambodian border. And even with that said the Cav did have issues operating here. They were at their best in III Corps, where the terrain really favored their style of operations.

[Entropy]

Interesting discussion - I've certainly learned a lot. Just to give you a quick overview of my background, I supported rotary wing ops in Afghanistan and I currently work with UAV's in both theaters.

This, I think, says it all though:

On the arrival overhead of the fire force the insurgents would become disorientated by the noise and firing and be looking for a way out. Insurgent fire was then less about aimed shots and more about the actions of increasingly desperate men.

Well, that's a huge difference with Afghanistan. A lot of fighters in Afghanistan have a hard-on for bringing down helicopters. They've used IED's with the specific intent of luring medevac/qrf helos into a kill zone. They sometimes lurk near FOBs and try to take out helos that way. In short, for the most part (it's hard to generalize about Afghanistan -circumstances vary widely depending on location) these are not fighters who become disoriented and desperate when helicopters arrive.

Besides that, a combination of factors make employment of those tactics difficult in Afghanistan. Altitude and air density has already been mentioned, but there is also distance. Engagements are usually over long before a QRF would arrive. They've seen nine years of our CAS capabilities, they have a pretty good idea how long it takes for CAS to arrive on station, and they often (though not always) bug-out before it arrives.

We also don't have native "scouts" with intimate local knowledge to find targets for us. UAV's are a poor substitute.

As a result, it's pretty rare to find a group of insurgents loitering in a place where such tactics would work. Most fighters are part of the population and stay close to the population. The exceptions are in areas most hostile to helo operations - the mountainous border especially.

So, it doesn't make much sense (to me at least) to devote limited rotary-wing capability for the relatively rare circumstances where these specific tactics would work. And if we did, the enemy would soon adapt and set up ambushes for our helicopters as they have done before.

[Ken White]

Well, that's a huge difference with Afghanistan. A lot of fighters in Afghanistan have a hard-on for bringing down helicopters.

They also wear dusty and dirty clothing that blends into the background and just lay low -- if a chopper flies over too fast, he won't spot 'em. If he flies too slow, he's subject to get an RPG launched at him. Speaking of RPGs:

...The remainder, continuing on to Mapai, suddenly overflew a big enemy camp spread over a large area, and one of the Pumas, Hotel Four, was hit by an RPG-7 as it headed for its dropping zone. The result was the worst single disaster of the Rhodesian war.

LINK -- they can hurt.

As a result, it's pretty rare to find a group of insurgents loitering in a place where such tactics would work. Most fighters are part of the population and stay close to the population. The exceptions are in areas most hostile to helo operations - the mountainous border especially.

And there are plenty of places to hide there. See the two mini 'caves' below.

The other picture below is the view from the top of mountain in Picture 2, Post 46 above. Note the greenery -- and the villages around and therein. The Talibs travel to get to the villages, they're vulnerable when traveling so they're very cautious in doing that. In the villages, they have protection in the form staying close to civilians where they are less likely to be attacked.

So, it doesn't make much sense (to me at least) to devote limited rotary-wing capability for the relatively rare circumstances where these specific tactics would work. And if we did, the enemy would soon adapt and set up ambushes for our helicopters as they have done before.

Very true. There's a time and place for it but in Afghanistan, broadly, there are not many...

[Steve Blair]

Well, that's a huge difference with Afghanistan. A lot of fighters in Afghanistan have a hard-on for bringing down helicopters. They've used IED's with the specific intent of luring medevac/qrf helos into a kill zone. They sometimes lurk near FOBs and try to take out helos that way. In short, for the most part (it's hard to generalize about Afghanistan -circumstances vary widely depending on location) these are not fighters who become disoriented and desperate when helicopters arrive.

They may have learned from (or simply come up with similar procedures to) the old NVA, then. The lads from the North got pretty good at "sucking in" birds, only to lob RPGs at them with great abandon. Tree-mounted booby traps (to include Chinese copies of the Claymore) were not uncommon, especially after 1968 or so. NVA (and many VC for that matter) were often noted for their lack of fear when helicopters arrived. They were also known for letting one or two birds land and then blowing the next one to close the LZ and trap a limited force on the ground.

[Infanteer]

This certainly is an interesting conversation. I'll add my two bits.

A disclaimer - my view comes from campaigning in the south - where the battle largely revolves around the greenspaces that border the Arghandab and Helmand River systems. This is where the southern insurgency is rooted and where almost all the people of Southern Afghanistan live. There is pretty rugged ground to the north and south of these areas with obvious insurgent presence, but these areas are not where a majority of the stuff goes on. This is completely different from the East. The Eastern Pashtun are, largely, a separate insurgency and mountainous terrain of the East (and the mountain villages) offer a much different scenario. I will not offer any comment on this area as I have not been there.

Point 1.
The biggest thing to remember is that, relatively speaking, the areas where fighting in the Greenzones takes place are actually quite limited. You can get the whole Kandahar Greenzone - From the Dhala Dam in the north, through Arghandab, Zharei, Panjwayi and Maywand districts in the southwest with Kandahar City in the southeast - pretty much on a single workable 1:50,000 map. We have training areas in Canada that have maps larger then the Kandahar AO. Things are a little more stretched in Helmand, but not by much. Most of the area in the south is either very sparsely inhabited mountains or uninhabited desert (the Reg).

So any airmobile force doesn't have far too travel. If it's prowling for TICs, it ain't going to go very far before it turns around and heads the other way.

Point 2.

They've seen nine years of our CAS capabilities, they have a pretty good idea how long it takes for CAS to arrive on station, and they often (though not always) bug-out before it arrives.

This is a huge one and, in my view, decisive. The insurgents do know CAS times and will bug out when aviation/air gets on station. Bugging out is quite easy for them. As well, there is usually something always overhead. Near permanent air coverage is largely a reality and the enemy is used to it. One only has to look up to figure that one out. He is adept at hiding as highlighted by this:

As a result, it's pretty rare to find a group of insurgents loitering in a place where such tactics would work. Most fighters are part of the population and stay close to the population.

You don't really see armed bands of Taliban just roaming around in the south. If there was, they'd be dead fast. Cache, hit, run, cache, blend is usually how things work. Afghan insurgents will only fight if they have an advantage or they are caught off-guard. Any shift in that and they usually just cache and farm. Anyone in the south expecting to mount a helo to roam around looking for bands of 50 insurgents to pin down and destroy will, unless he has a time machine to 2006, likely cruise around waving at farmer-insurgents in their fields.

Point 3.
Someone else mentioned local forces "beating the bushes" to push insurgents out of inhabited areas. This is hard to do largely due to cultural reasons. Unlike Africa, every Afghan's home is, quite literally, a castle. Access behind the high walls is limited. Afghan soldiers and police are usually not very comfortable going into the compounds of locals (they usually make searches as brief as possible) and everybody goes bananas if Westerners move in (Karzai has forbidden it unless absolutely necessary). Compounds usually have 20-30 people occupying them, so finding 5 fighting age males isn't going to do much for your cause anyways. Not discounting the value of local intelligence, just saying the "beating the bush" technique in the unique environment of Afghanistan would be hard (I know this from personal experience).

So, in my view a "Fire Force" concept would be handy if it could be used to provide rapid cut-off insurgents in the two situations mentioned above (advantage/off-guard) but I'm unsure of whether this tactical advantage would justify the expenditure of resources for a "Fire Force". I find myself largely agreeing with Entropy on this one

So, it doesn't make much sense (to me at least) to devote limited rotary-wing capability for the relatively rare circumstances where these specific tactics would work. And if we did, the enemy would soon adapt and set up ambushes for our helicopters as they have done before.

That being said, if they asked for volunteers, I'd be the first to stick my hand up....

My 2 Cents,

Infanteer

PS - Much of the discussion seems focused on the terrain. Here are pictures of the greenspace of Southern Afghanistan where most of the fighting takes place for those unfamiliar with the area to get a perspective.

[JMA]

For those who may be interested in some stuff on the 1976 3 Command call-out where 30 kills were made for the first time in a FF op.

If comes from the RLI Association website and is followed by the actual wording of the written contact report and includes some relevant bits and pieces about other stuff.

Hill 31 - Honde Valley

Some translations:

Lynx: Cessna 337
K-Car: Alouette III gunship with side-mounted 20mm cannon
G-Car: Alouette III trooper (4 men) - twin .303 Browning side mounted MGs
A63: VHF radio carried by stick comdrs (1 in 4)
4th Bat: Reserve Battalion on call-ups (were doing 6 weeks on ops & 6 wks at their civvie jobs. Also known as 4RR - RR = Rhodesia Regiment)
Bailiff Acorn: Police Special Branch
Intaf: Internal Affairs.
CB: Confined to Barracks
Frantan: Rhodesian made naplam - for the Lynx came is 18 gallon version.
SNEB: 37mm rocket for the Lynz - (French: Societe Nouvelle des Etablissements Edgar Brandt)
20mm canon: French Matra MG151 with floor mount.

Note that in this particular contact comment was made on near miss by RPG7, troops wounded in helo by ground fire and the general great deal of small arms fire throughout the day. and a helo was forced to land due to hits received from small arms fire. No need to panic though... the pilots were up and at again the next day with us as a captive audience in the passenger seats.

Enjoy!