Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
JMA, I think that one of the questions that is being asked is how frequently RLI Fire Force missions engaged ZIPRA/ZANLA forces armed almost solely with SKSs and AK47s, and how often a contact resulted in encounters with groups fielding (and using) anything heavier. I'm not thinking of missions outside Rhodesia (where presumably you ran into the occasional ZPU-2, etc), but the routine QRF-type missions inside the country.

Were there any cases of FF being lured into AA or LZ ambushes, or similar? Or did terrain and ZIPRA/ZANLA competence make that unlikely?

What was the comms status of ZIPRA/ZANLA units? Presumably, they didn't have advance warning of missions departing (which has sometimes been a problem in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it can be reasonably easy to put a spotter in communications eyes-on a FOB).

I'm not raising this because I think it makes the FF/QRF model untenable, but rather because we need a much better sense of the threat profile associated with a typical RLI contact, and what would be expected in other theatres.
We have one incident where it was assumed that a Lynx (Cessna 337) was lured into attacking a ground target running in parallel to a ridge line on which gooks were sitting and the aircraft was shot down. They have been given the benefit of the doubt on that one. Other problems we caused when one suddenly overflew a hitherto unknown camp and all hell broke out.

In bush where the vegetation is head height and above the RPG is less of a problem to low flying choppers than one at first thinks. There were quite a few RPGs around but thanks to the high kill rates achieved in fire force actions not too many of them survived long enough to be start to reach a level of proficiency where they were shooting down aircraft. RPDs and RPKs were coming in and when we heard one of them start firing we targeted them for special attention. AAA was there outside the country as was SAM7-Strela. The Rhodesians defeated the Strela risk with special paint and exhaust modifications after loosing two small piston engined recce aircraft early on there after it was never a problem other than they shot down two civilian aircraft.

As to ambushes. One has to learn to read the terrain. Pilots do because their lives depend upon it. Its where a contact has been staged ie vehicles ambushed where one needs to look for the bait and trap routine. While flying in look carefully at the maps and decided whether some threatening high ground needs to be cleared before the ambush business can be dealt with. You must remember that quite often the pilots would fly over a suspect area to try and draw fire. I was in the gunship one day when a chopper deliberately flew down a river line while we shadowed at 1,000 ft and when the opened up on him we returned the favour. So what I'm saying to you is that being fired on in an aircraft is not necessarily the end of the world. Not easy to hit aircraft on places that matter. At 1,000 ft when you see the tracer coming directly at you they will miss. Its when the tracer appears aimed in front of the chopper that its a different story. For example on Op Dingo there were 10 gunships up that day and every one was hit by small arms fire. These guys are trained to watch each others backs and deal with pockets of small arms and other fire. These guys also took out the AAA. No pilots resigned after that experience.

Of course where the initiative lies with you and the call-out is based on intel that the insurgents don't know you are on the way then no such problem exists. Again this stuff is why proper interrogation of ALL prisoners is so necessary. What is their training, what are their tactics, what are their weapons?

As to sign posting air activity as early warning. Yes one must consider deception if needed and vary the routes. We would also plan approach routes to each target based on hiding the sound of the approaching choppers for as long as possible. When your callsign on the ground says they can hear you then you assume the insurgents have too.

I would say that a lot of the concerns getting raised seem to be about air vulnerability. I suggest that pilot perspective must be brought in to respond to these issues as there is a natural fear among soldiers that they could be shot in an aircraft or have their air craft shot down. As I have said repeatedly now what are raised as serious concerns would be dealt with quite simply by any competent combat pilot who as a team work through these issues most everyday in training, discussions and on ops.

What do you mean by the threat profile?

I would suggest you apply the same risks to this form of helicopter usage as you would to CASEVAC / MEDEVAC / AIR RESCUE choppers. The risk of a ambush of an CASEVAC chopper is probably the biggest there is. I believe some LZs have been IED'd (don't know for the troops or the chopper though). So speack to the CASEVAC pilots and ask them what their daily concerns are and find out how many of these choppers have been shot down in Afghanistan.