Moving the Rhod. Fire Force concept to Afghanistan?

[Ken White]

Would you find enemy in any of those three photos? Discard the two where there are no soldiers. If you catch the enenmy out in the open there you don't need troops your just send out a few gunships to wrap that up.

True on the gunships. Yes, you would find enemy in all three of the photos. The two without troops were taken by my son on one of many vehicle patrols in the area south of Kandahar to interdict Talib travel routes -- the enemy found in those two would be moving through the area to reach an objective elsewhere.

Are there really insurgents out there (on terrain like the photos)? Where to the hide out? There is no cover. Thermal would pick them up at night, yes? If they are out there by day don't send the fire force send a shrink.

By day they hole up, by night they move. Thermal cannot be everywhere at all times. There is a great deal of cover in small wadis which are the movement routes. All three pics were reduced significantly to be embedded in the post, at full size the folds in the ground are more evident. In the one with the Troops you can see the military crest of the hill about 400 meters in front of the sandbags; there's a drop down to a fair sized valley.

Below are two more showing a typical river valley and a vehicle parked in front of compound wall -- those walls are thick and around every inhabited area or dwelling. There's plenty of cover and concealment if one knows how to use it -- and the Talibs do...

[Entropy]

Interesting discussion - I've certainly learned a lot. Just to give you a quick overview of my background, I supported rotary wing ops in Afghanistan and I currently work with UAV's in both theaters.

This, I think, says it all though:

On the arrival overhead of the fire force the insurgents would become disorientated by the noise and firing and be looking for a way out. Insurgent fire was then less about aimed shots and more about the actions of increasingly desperate men.

Well, that's a huge difference with Afghanistan. A lot of fighters in Afghanistan have a hard-on for bringing down helicopters. They've used IED's with the specific intent of luring medevac/qrf helos into a kill zone. They sometimes lurk near FOBs and try to take out helos that way. In short, for the most part (it's hard to generalize about Afghanistan -circumstances vary widely depending on location) these are not fighters who become disoriented and desperate when helicopters arrive.

Besides that, a combination of factors make employment of those tactics difficult in Afghanistan. Altitude and air density has already been mentioned, but there is also distance. Engagements are usually over long before a QRF would arrive. They've seen nine years of our CAS capabilities, they have a pretty good idea how long it takes for CAS to arrive on station, and they often (though not always) bug-out before it arrives.

We also don't have native "scouts" with intimate local knowledge to find targets for us. UAV's are a poor substitute.

As a result, it's pretty rare to find a group of insurgents loitering in a place where such tactics would work. Most fighters are part of the population and stay close to the population. The exceptions are in areas most hostile to helo operations - the mountainous border especially.

So, it doesn't make much sense (to me at least) to devote limited rotary-wing capability for the relatively rare circumstances where these specific tactics would work. And if we did, the enemy would soon adapt and set up ambushes for our helicopters as they have done before.

[JMA]

For those who may be interested in some stuff on the 1976 3 Command call-out where 30 kills were made for the first time in a FF op.

If comes from the RLI Association website and is followed by the actual wording of the written contact report and includes some relevant bits and pieces about other stuff.

Hill 31 - Honde Valley

Some translations:

Lynx: Cessna 337
K-Car: Alouette III gunship with side-mounted 20mm cannon
G-Car: Alouette III trooper (4 men) - twin .303 Browning side mounted MGs
A63: VHF radio carried by stick comdrs (1 in 4)
4th Bat: Reserve Battalion on call-ups (were doing 6 weeks on ops & 6 wks at their civvie jobs. Also known as 4RR - RR = Rhodesia Regiment)
Bailiff Acorn: Police Special Branch
Intaf: Internal Affairs.
CB: Confined to Barracks
Frantan: Rhodesian made naplam - for the Lynx came is 18 gallon version.
SNEB: 37mm rocket for the Lynz - (French: Societe Nouvelle des Etablissements Edgar Brandt)
20mm canon: French Matra MG151 with floor mount.

Note that in this particular contact comment was made on near miss by RPG7, troops wounded in helo by ground fire and the general great deal of small arms fire throughout the day. and a helo was forced to land due to hits received from small arms fire. No need to panic though... the pilots were up and at again the next day with us as a captive audience in the passenger seats.

Enjoy!

[Ken White]

Well, that's a huge difference with Afghanistan. A lot of fighters in Afghanistan have a hard-on for bringing down helicopters.

They also wear dusty and dirty clothing that blends into the background and just lay low -- if a chopper flies over too fast, he won't spot 'em. If he flies too slow, he's subject to get an RPG launched at him. Speaking of RPGs:

...The remainder, continuing on to Mapai, suddenly overflew a big enemy camp spread over a large area, and one of the Pumas, Hotel Four, was hit by an RPG-7 as it headed for its dropping zone. The result was the worst single disaster of the Rhodesian war.

LINK -- they can hurt.

As a result, it's pretty rare to find a group of insurgents loitering in a place where such tactics would work. Most fighters are part of the population and stay close to the population. The exceptions are in areas most hostile to helo operations - the mountainous border especially.

And there are plenty of places to hide there. See the two mini 'caves' below.

The other picture below is the view from the top of mountain in Picture 2, Post 46 above. Note the greenery -- and the villages around and therein. The Talibs travel to get to the villages, they're vulnerable when traveling so they're very cautious in doing that. In the villages, they have protection in the form staying close to civilians where they are less likely to be attacked.

So, it doesn't make much sense (to me at least) to devote limited rotary-wing capability for the relatively rare circumstances where these specific tactics would work. And if we did, the enemy would soon adapt and set up ambushes for our helicopters as they have done before.

Very true. There's a time and place for it but in Afghanistan, broadly, there are not many...

[Steve Blair]

Well, that's a huge difference with Afghanistan. A lot of fighters in Afghanistan have a hard-on for bringing down helicopters. They've used IED's with the specific intent of luring medevac/qrf helos into a kill zone. They sometimes lurk near FOBs and try to take out helos that way. In short, for the most part (it's hard to generalize about Afghanistan -circumstances vary widely depending on location) these are not fighters who become disoriented and desperate when helicopters arrive.

They may have learned from (or simply come up with similar procedures to) the old NVA, then. The lads from the North got pretty good at "sucking in" birds, only to lob RPGs at them with great abandon. Tree-mounted booby traps (to include Chinese copies of the Claymore) were not uncommon, especially after 1968 or so. NVA (and many VC for that matter) were often noted for their lack of fear when helicopters arrived. They were also known for letting one or two birds land and then blowing the next one to close the LZ and trap a limited force on the ground.

[JMA]

Can this be said:

* Due to the ROE the Taliban when in close proximity to locals are effectively untouchable.

* When moving between areas of population the Taliban do so at night thus effectively neutralising the potential to be caught out in the open in daylight.

* Urgent need of Intel in respect of routes traveled by TB and location of most used day hides/LUPs.

[Pete]

If contact were to be made in these situations would the absence of civilians allow for a relative free-fire-Zone?

Just a brief clarification--the Free Fire Zone is a fire support coordination term that was warped far beyond its original meaning by news reporting in Vietnam and in some of the memoirs of that war. Its true meaning is an area where artillery or air ordnance can be fired or dropped without the requirement to coordinate the fires with any headquarters. Usually a Free Fire Area is a place out in the middle of nowhere. It is one of several fire support coordination measures established to prevent friendly fire casualties by regulating what fires can be delivered in an area of operations. During Vietnam it gained an "anything goes" connotation, a kind of hell-on-earth sort of place straight out of Dante devised by a nefarious U.S. military.

[Ken White]

JMA Re: your three questions. IMO:

No, just makes it slightly more difficult.

Not universally at night, it's a very large country and the decision has been made to try to not interfere with civilian traffic so a bunch of Talibs on motorcycles and in pickup trucks away from coalition forces can and do travel in daylight. By using scouts and watchers, they can usually avoid Checkpoints. Sometimes they get spotted, sometimes not. That applies day and night.

Many routes and hides are known and interdicted or watched. That number is growing constantly. However, many more are not known due to difficult terrain, a long poorly marked, even disputed, border in a very large country and inadequate troop strength and density for saturation.

Pete True, 'free fire' as a term got totally confused with all sorts of things. The use of H&I in Viet Nam was dumb and counterproductive and it at least partially led to that (deliberate?) misunderstanding. H&I was also used in Afghanistan and Iraq for a while but I heard that it was -- wisely -- stopped. Hopefully, that's correct.

[Infanteer]

This certainly is an interesting conversation. I'll add my two bits.

A disclaimer - my view comes from campaigning in the south - where the battle largely revolves around the greenspaces that border the Arghandab and Helmand River systems. This is where the southern insurgency is rooted and where almost all the people of Southern Afghanistan live. There is pretty rugged ground to the north and south of these areas with obvious insurgent presence, but these areas are not where a majority of the stuff goes on. This is completely different from the East. The Eastern Pashtun are, largely, a separate insurgency and mountainous terrain of the East (and the mountain villages) offer a much different scenario. I will not offer any comment on this area as I have not been there.

Point 1.
The biggest thing to remember is that, relatively speaking, the areas where fighting in the Greenzones takes place are actually quite limited. You can get the whole Kandahar Greenzone - From the Dhala Dam in the north, through Arghandab, Zharei, Panjwayi and Maywand districts in the southwest with Kandahar City in the southeast - pretty much on a single workable 1:50,000 map. We have training areas in Canada that have maps larger then the Kandahar AO. Things are a little more stretched in Helmand, but not by much. Most of the area in the south is either very sparsely inhabited mountains or uninhabited desert (the Reg).

So any airmobile force doesn't have far too travel. If it's prowling for TICs, it ain't going to go very far before it turns around and heads the other way.

Point 2.

They've seen nine years of our CAS capabilities, they have a pretty good idea how long it takes for CAS to arrive on station, and they often (though not always) bug-out before it arrives.

This is a huge one and, in my view, decisive. The insurgents do know CAS times and will bug out when aviation/air gets on station. Bugging out is quite easy for them. As well, there is usually something always overhead. Near permanent air coverage is largely a reality and the enemy is used to it. One only has to look up to figure that one out. He is adept at hiding as highlighted by this:

As a result, it's pretty rare to find a group of insurgents loitering in a place where such tactics would work. Most fighters are part of the population and stay close to the population.

You don't really see armed bands of Taliban just roaming around in the south. If there was, they'd be dead fast. Cache, hit, run, cache, blend is usually how things work. Afghan insurgents will only fight if they have an advantage or they are caught off-guard. Any shift in that and they usually just cache and farm. Anyone in the south expecting to mount a helo to roam around looking for bands of 50 insurgents to pin down and destroy will, unless he has a time machine to 2006, likely cruise around waving at farmer-insurgents in their fields.

Point 3.
Someone else mentioned local forces "beating the bushes" to push insurgents out of inhabited areas. This is hard to do largely due to cultural reasons. Unlike Africa, every Afghan's home is, quite literally, a castle. Access behind the high walls is limited. Afghan soldiers and police are usually not very comfortable going into the compounds of locals (they usually make searches as brief as possible) and everybody goes bananas if Westerners move in (Karzai has forbidden it unless absolutely necessary). Compounds usually have 20-30 people occupying them, so finding 5 fighting age males isn't going to do much for your cause anyways. Not discounting the value of local intelligence, just saying the "beating the bush" technique in the unique environment of Afghanistan would be hard (I know this from personal experience).

So, in my view a "Fire Force" concept would be handy if it could be used to provide rapid cut-off insurgents in the two situations mentioned above (advantage/off-guard) but I'm unsure of whether this tactical advantage would justify the expenditure of resources for a "Fire Force". I find myself largely agreeing with Entropy on this one

So, it doesn't make much sense (to me at least) to devote limited rotary-wing capability for the relatively rare circumstances where these specific tactics would work. And if we did, the enemy would soon adapt and set up ambushes for our helicopters as they have done before.

That being said, if they asked for volunteers, I'd be the first to stick my hand up....

My 2 Cents,

Infanteer

PS - Much of the discussion seems focused on the terrain. Here are pictures of the greenspace of Southern Afghanistan where most of the fighting takes place for those unfamiliar with the area to get a perspective.

[William F. Owen]

How long are you going to make me drive around in a snatch landrover, or patrol with no expectation of an air-strike within 45 minutes, nor have any chance of a quick uplift in the event that I get hurt?

Not sure of the question here. CAS was on call until the ROE change and my current understanding is different ROE may apply in different areas. CASEVAC is very likely to be very prompt - heard no complaints

When can I expect to be able to direct 20mm canon fire to within 5 meters of my own position if needed and on very short notice?

You can 30mm cannon as close as required in the Army Air Corps or a similar organisation is flying in support.

When will I be able to call in an air-strike from a light aircraft that goes everywhere I go, buzzes around for hours, and attacks within minutes of my request being made?

Depends on ROE. Light Aircraft are actually very poor close air support platforms compared to other means around today. A-10 and AH-64 are vastly more capble than on old Cessna 337.

When can we expect Terrence to discover that fighting aggressively merely gives his position away, and that he will be quickly surrounded and so severely smacked from all directions that he thinks twice about being naughty again?

Dunno. I guess it depends on him. Less ambushes, more IEDs?

When, God forbid, can I expect to be Medevacked (Casevacked) and flown off to see a pretty nurse within 7 minutes of receiving my injury?

Again, not aware that CASEVAC is an issue. Today, with the RAF, chances are the Pretty nurse may well be in the helicopter keeping you alive. I recently met one who got a gallantry award for jumping 4m off the ramp of Chinook to render assistance to troops in contact. Not bad for 5'3 24 year-old girl.

And when will some of the Big Ants accept that Rhodesians fixed many of YOUR obvious problems just with what they had, without over-engineering the solution, without fancy kit, and all of this well over 30 years ago?

That's simplistic. The Rhodesian Army was operating in isolation within its own country, with a mostly joined up CIV-MIL command structure, from logistically internal lines of communication.
ISAF has none of those substantial advantages. This is the problem in trying to create read across from conflicts with little operational similarity. A great deal (not all) is irrelevant. Context, context and context.
Always good to hear about the old days though.

[Rhodesian]

Thank you for the replies.

Arrogant? Yes, came with the territory, an absolute must in the RLI, we know who we are, and our limits, and we fight accordingly.

30mm? Yes very nice, but I need close support on a cheap aircraft that won't kill me too. And anything closer than 5 meters and I presume the Techie is now shooting at me . . . I don't like the quad on a K-car, its a great shredder, it mows everything, very nice when mowing is required, otherwise a pin point 20mm shell will do.


A10? A fabulous aircraft, lovely canon. My point though is this: Too high tech, requiring too much support, and too expensive. Budget limits mean we cant get enough of them up in the air at any one time. Old 337 (not my suggestion) cheap, does the job, doesn't need the high tech support (relatively speaking), lurks for hours. Find something “new” and cheap that does the job without requiring all the high tech back up, and put lots and lots of them up there.


And I still want my K-car, with someone in it who knows what he's doing. I get twitchy if a pilot runs the show . . . Pilots have been known to order me to do things they never do themselves. I wasn't happy, my OC might have been a prig sometimes but I know he's walked through the grass himself.


Casevac: No complaints about casevac times? . . mmmmm . . . probably because the comparison has never been made. I still go for 7 minutes and out, with a fully trained combat medic from my own Stick (but bring the nurse too if I need kissing better)


I think we've already highlighted a problem: A tendency to want “tools” that go far beyond our requirements – too expensive, to costly to run, too high maintenance, over-kill. Keep it simple.

[baboon6]

Thank you for the replies.


30mm? Yes very nice, but I need close support on a cheap aircraft that won't kill me too. And anything closer than 5 meters and I presume the Techie is now shooting at me . . . I don't like the quad on a K-car, its a great shredder, it mows everything, very nice when mowing is required, otherwise a pin point 20mm shell will do.

He means the 30mm cannon on the Apache not that on the A-10. Which I would think is more accurate than the hand-aimed 20mm on an Alouette. They do apparently though often have problems penetrating compound walls.

Casevac: No complaints about casevac times? . . mmmmm . . . probably because the comparison has never been made. I still go for 7 minutes and out, with a fully trained combat medic from my own Stick (but bring the nurse too if I need kissing better)

AFAIK all or at least most ISAF ground patrols have a medic with them. Casevac is (in Helmand at least) typically by RAF Chinook or USAF HH-60, both of which when used in that role carry very highly-trained medical teams with them. As for times I couldn't comment.

I think we've already highlighted a problem: A tendency to want “tools” that go far beyond our requirements – too expensive, to costly to run, too high maintenance, over-kill. Keep it simple.

Yes there is certainly a tendency to unnecessarily "gold-plate" kit these days. There has been talk of the USAF acquiring a turboprop light attack aircraft, possibly the Super Tucano. I believe it has gotten as far as suppliers being asked to submit proposals. There have been various arguments for and against this idea...it remains to be seen whether it happens or not.

[Rhodesian]

AFAIK all or at least most ISAF ground patrols have a medic with them. Casevac is (in Helmand at least) typically by RAF Chinook or USAF HH-60, both of which when used in that role carry very highly-trained medical teams with them. As for times I couldn't comment.

Understood on the Apache, I was thinking more of schrapnel coverage if the shell strike is in trees etc, or what the coverage is for a single modern 30mm striking hard or soft ground? Our quad was good for wooded areas where pin-pointing a target wasn't possible anyway.

We had one medic per four man stick, but actually it would interesting to hear how the Chinooks or whatever are kitted out and what they can do for someone with say a gun-shot wound, while still airbourne and RTB?

[Ken White]

Arrogant? Yes, came with the territory, an absolute must in the RLI, we know who we are, and our limits, and we fight accordingly.

That trait is IMO a must for anyone who's going to fight halfway well, so I've no problem with arrogance. Indulge in it myself -- and often. Got no problem with ignorance either, it happens, one tries to correct it. Willful ignorance OTOH -- like ignoring the political realities we and the British have to cope with is another thing...

Casevac: No complaints about casevac times? . . mmmmm . . . probably because the comparison has never been made. I still go for 7 minutes and out, with a fully trained combat medic from my own Stick...

Did that time apply just to the Fire Force folks or to the entire Police and Military effort? If the former, most of our SOF raids can match or beat it; if to the total force involved, obviously we can't match it. Question of numbers, I suspect. As for Medics, we got bunches of 'em -- and we have the Combat Lifesaver program wherein Joe (your Johnny Bravo) gets to learn how to do IVs and other neat stuff -- stuff that 30 years ago, Medics weren't even doing. He gets the gear to go with the knowledge as well. That's not just SOF or hotshot units, that's everyone.

I think we've already highlighted a problem: A tendency to want “tools” that go far beyond our requirements – too expensive, to costly to run, too high maintenance, over-kill. Keep it simple.

Wise words. I agree. However, while the guys out there doing the job would really like to keep it simple (and would really like different ROE...), they don't get the simple reliable tools they want, they get the overly expensive and not always reliable tools Congress buys. In the US, the Army doesn't get to buy what it wants, it gets to buy what Congress tells it to. Dumb system but it's reality.

If we cut down to essentials and keep it simple, it will cost US jobs -- our Congress doesn't like that idea. They never found a piece of exotic hardware they wouldn't buy, particularly if it's big and expensive enough to have parts made in multiple electoral districts. You folks in Rhodesia had to use what you had. We have to do the same thing, it's just bass ackwards.

Baboon 6 mentioned the USAF might buy a low cost turboprop. Likely won't be the Brazilian Tucano in other than 'trial' quantities. IF we buy one, it'll be made in the US (even if it's less capable) and that's a big 'if.' Buying it will cut into other 'more important' (Congressionally liked) programs...

Everyone has problems of one kind or another. Your Johnny, their Tommy and our Joe just suck it up and keep on going...

[baboon6]

Understood on the Apache, I was thinking more of schrapnel coverage if the shell strike is in trees etc, or what the coverage is for a single modern 30mm striking hard or soft ground? Our quad was good for wooded areas where pin-pointing a target wasn't possible anyway.

Afraid I don't know much about that. Suppose it depends on the ammo being used. Some basic info here:

http://www.wk2ammo.com/showthread.php?p=20484

We had one medic per four man stick, but actually it would interesting to hear how the Chinooks or whatever are kitted out and what they can do for someone with say a gun-shot wound, while still airbourne and RTB?

Some articles here:

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/mosl...borne-A-E.html

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle6807058.ece

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009...emts_in_astan/

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/pedros.htm

[Ken White]

... actually it would interesting to hear how the Chinooks or whatever are kitted out and what they can do for someone with say a gun-shot wound, while still airbourne and RTB?

LINK.

The Air Force MH 60 birds are equipped somewhat similarly, the Chinook with the Med treatment load has more, the pure Medevac a little less.

[Ken White]

Understood on the Apache, I was thinking more of schrapnel coverage if the shell strike is in trees etc, or what the coverage is for a single modern 30mm striking hard or soft ground?

LINK. They look less far away from the Apache in some parts of the video than they actually are due to the magnification of the stabilized sight.

[SethB]

4M against soft targets.

[Entropy]

I can speak to the USAF HH-60's. Typically they carry 2-3 PJ's (Pararescuemen) who are, at a minimum, qualified advanced trauma paramedics. They carry a variety of medical and other equipment depending on theater, likely mission, etc. The HH-60 isn't as roomy as the UH-60, mainly because they usually carry an extra gas tank in the cargo area for extended range. They also have a lot of armor, weapons and gizmos because they were originally created to penetrate air defenses to rescue personnel in the enemy's rear. In some cases they've been opcon'd to the ground force and carry medics instead of PJ's. I'm not sure if that happens anymore.

[William F. Owen]

A10? A fabulous aircraft, lovely canon. My point though is this: Too high tech, requiring too much support, and too expensive. Budget limits mean we cant get enough of them up in the air at any one time.

Really? An A-10 costs less in maintenance than a lot of business jets.

Old 337 (not my suggestion) cheap, does the job, doesn't need the high tech support (relatively speaking), lurks for hours. Find something “new” and cheap that does the job without requiring all the high tech back up, and put lots and lots of them up there.

The problem with something cheap and low-tech is a very limited capability.
I fully concur there are issues with overly capable "gold plated solutions," but that isn't a call the men on the ground get to make.

Casevac: No complaints about casevac times? . . mmmmm . . . probably because the comparison has never been made. I still go for 7 minutes and out, with a fully trained combat medic from my own Stick (but bring the nurse too if I need kissing better)

But the comparison has to be put in context. You cannot compare the two conflicts in any useful way. Just time span wise, how could you compare the Spanish Civil War with Vietnam - 30 years later???

I think we've already highlighted a problem: A tendency to want “tools” that go far beyond our requirements – too expensive, to costly to run, too high maintenance, over-kill. Keep it simple.

Agreed, but you have to turn that into an argument and a solution. A lot of modern military kit is vastly more capable and actually cheaper to run. Yes we do suffer from Voodoo economics but again comparison has got to me made in context.