Moving the Rhod. Fire Force concept to Afghanistan?

[JMA]

FWIW, it's also not at all unlike the Viet Nam era air cavalry. When I say air cavalry, I don't mean airmobile infantry battalions but the cavalry squadrons made famous (infamous?) by Apocolype Now's portrayal of 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (1/9 Headhunters) of the 1st Cavalry Division.

Supposedly 1/9 was responsble for more kills than all the airmoble infantry battalions in the 1st Cavalry Division?

The squadron had three troops with each troop having a red, white, and blue platoon. I think red was aero-guns, white was aero-scouts, and blue was aero-rifles?

Does the Army still use that particular organization?

Ok, let just make a comment here.

What made fire force was not that the use of helicopters to carry the troops into battle and as a gun platform but rather how the the troops and the firepower were deployed. Airmoble does not mean fire force (in the Rhodesian sense). How to survive a fire force action was to either show incredible land speed ability and get out of the area before the troops could be placed in stop positions or crawl into a cave or something like that and lie low and hope not to be found.

Koevoet (the police reaction force) in SWA/Namibia used mainly vehicles as their mode of transport and had a different MO as they followed-up insurgents after an incident until contact as opposed to what we in Rhodesia did was react to a specific report of presence of insurgents probably without the insurgents knowing. Their trick was to leap-frog ahead to cut for spoor so as to speed up the whole follow-up process. How to survive a Koevoet follow-up was either to anti-track to such a high degree that the spoor was lost, get in front of a herd of cattle and let them walk all over their spoor or just plain find a hole somewhere and hide until the men and vehicles had gone.

It was a kind of natural selection, the fleet of foot and the cunning survived and those who wanted to make a fight of it had not chance of survival even if they did take some soldiers with them.

[Rifleman]

Ok, let just make a comment here.

What made fire force was not that the use of helicopters to carry the troops into battle and as a gun platform but rather how the the troops and the firepower were deployed.

Understood, I didn't mean to suggest that the air cav operated exactly like the fire force. I'm sure the tactical situations and operational requirments faced by each unit were unique to time and place.

It just stuck me that there was a similarity in that both deployed (and redeployed) rapidly, often making multiple combat assaults the same day.

Airmoble does not mean fire force (in the Rhodesian sense).

Understood again. I also tried to point out that in the U.S. sense the air cavalry squadrons were unique from the airmobile infantry battalions, even though the airmobile infantry battalions were also sometimes called air cavalry when they were part of the 1st Cavalry Division.

...what we in Rhodesia did was react to a specific report of presence of insurgents probably without the insurgents knowing.

The air cav sometimes reacted to information from LRRPs. Other times they found the enemy (picked a fight) themselves. If it developed into a big enough fight infantry took over. If infantry units lost contact they could request combat tracker teams to help them regain contact.

I've enjoyed your comments about the RLI and the fire force. I hope you don't mind a curiosity question: How many operational parachute jumps did you make?

[Fuchs]

Other times they found the enemy (picked a fight) themselves.

I'm in the mood to offer an anecdote:

According to a report I read years ago, some pilot with hunting experience was capable of hovering very low over paths and count the footprints per meter and their distance. He was then able to report the direction, guess the age, estimate the strength and speed of the group.

Me thinks this was worth to be mentioned in the age of Longbow radars and eight kilometer thermals.

[baboon6]

and only did CAS in an emergency. Of the two, the 0-1 was slower and thus able to do closer strikes. The OV-10 was a super aircraft, was also assigned as a FAC bird but had a useful load, was really maneuverable and was able to take care of many tasks with out calling in the big guys. Depending on the type rocket they had available, they could and would put some 2.75" warheads about 5 meters out.Was a good bird, yours were made by Reims in France under Cessna license. A few years later, when the US would not sell the Shah of Iran some O-2s for some obscure reason, he went to Reims and bought a dozen Lynx copies...

The OV-10 was used in the dedicated attack role by the US Navy squadron VAL-4 in the Mekong Delta:

http://www.blackpony.org/

[JMA]

I'm in the mood to offer an anecdote:

According to a report I read years ago, some pilot with hunting experience was capable of hovering very low over paths and count the footprints per meter and their distance. He was then able to report the direction, guess the age, estimate the strength and speed of the group.

Me thinks this was worth to be mentioned in the age of Longbow radars and eight kilometer thermals.

You want to work with indigenous people who have lived in the bush all their lives to see tracking skill at its best. I often wonder how much use of tracking is made of in wars these days and who does it.

Just a point on this you do realise that the downdraft of the the rotors would obliterate any tracks or sign on the ground?

There was a problem we faced in Rhodesia. First use was made of indigenous trackers from the Game Department who did an outstanding job. With time it became apparent that spoor seemed to get lost just when it seemed contact was imminent. Obviously the Game Department trackers did not want to die in the war. The Rhodesians over reacted and started training (black and white) soldiers as trackers with some success but never to reach the skills level of the real born and bread trackers. The solution in my opinion would have been IMHO to integrate the military and Game Department trackers on the basis that the game department guys did the real tracking with the soldiers out on the flanks until they assessed that the quarry was very close then the Game Department trackers would pull back and the soldiers would take over fully together with the follow up troops. As the Selous Scouts were getting a bounty for kills we made on their call outs they could have offered the same to these trackers.

I always remember from the movie Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid when they couldn't shake off the posse and kept asking each other "Who are those guys?". That's the way it should be. Run them down.

[Fuchs]

Just a point on this you do realise that the downdraft of the the rotors would obliterate any tracks or sign on the ground?

It depends. he had a small helicopter and some people have amazing eyesight.

My father is still able to read highway signs at a distance where I barely notice them. Sadly, i got the eyes from my mother; nothing special except that many optical tricks (some 3D tricks and such tricks as exploited by certain weapon sights) do not work on me.
My father could easily have read footsteps in mud while hovering in a Bell 47 at 50m.

[Ken White]

The OV-10 was used in the dedicated attack role by the US Navy squadron VAL-4 in the Mekong Delta:

However, IIRC, they lost almost half the Squadron's birds to ground fire or accidents and had to buy replacements. Plus that was only one Squadron, 18 birds IIRC.. The Marines were the first to buy and they had two Squadrons, half OV-10A, half OV-10D, a dedicated night 'observation' variant with a 20mm M61 turret slaved to the FLIR. The Marines split the difference and used the OV-10A as a FAC bird that could do light strike and the 10D as a night attack plane.

The Air Force bought almost 200 and initially used the Bronc solely as a FAC Bird. Some FACs were more aggressive than others and those guys convinced a reluctant AF to let them to CAS missions. I think they ran a test of a dedicated squadron but ended up with most assigned as FAC aircraft. The hard charger FACs did more. People thing...

[jcustis]

I often wonder how much use of tracking is made of in wars these days and who does it.

We absolutely do use tracking techniques today, and in fact we took three knuckleheads in after tracking them across about six klicks from the point where they ditched their pickup truck carrying a metric buttload of opium. Now, it wasn't a fair track, as they were on foot, high on dope, and dehydrated, and our boys were in LAV-25s and dashing across open desert where the tracks were fresh and easier to follow, but the fact that the intel summary referred to the track as "spoor" warmed me a bit.

The Marine Corps has embraced mantracking concepts in its Combat Hunter program, and although it is not a overly detailed or wholly comprehensive approach to the business of tracking, it does the task enough justice to get the boys to thinking and acting in the right direction.

Basic tracking TTPs were taught when I was attending basic infantryman training as a PFC 18 years ago, and at some point it died out. Iraq and Afghanistan brought that back into vogue.

[JMA]

However, IIRC, they lost almost half the Squadron's birds to ground fire or accidents and had to buy replacements. Plus that was only one Squadron, 18 birds IIRC.. The Marines were the first to buy and they had two Squadrons, half OV-10A, half OV-10D, a dedicated night 'observation' variant with a 20mm M61 turret slaved to the FLIR. The Marines split the difference and used the OV-10A as a FAC bird that could do light strike and the 10D as a night attack plane.

The Air Force bought almost 200 and initially used the Bronc solely as a FAC Bird. Some FACs were more aggressive than others and those guys convinced a reluctant AF to let them to CAS missions. I think they ran a test of a dedicated squadron but ended up with most assigned as FAC aircraft. The hard charger FACs did more. People thing...

What makes for a "hard charger" pilot? Those are the boys you need.

[JMA]

We absolutely do use tracking techniques today, and in fact we took three knuckleheads in after tracking them across about six klicks from the point where they ditched their pickup truck carrying a metric buttload of opium. Now, it wasn't a fair track, as they were on foot, high on dope, and dehydrated, and our boys were in LAV-25s and dashing across open desert where the tracks were fresh and easier to follow, but the fact that the intel summary referred to the track as "spoor" warmed me a bit.

The Marine Corps has embraced mantracking concepts in its Combat Hunter program, and although it is not a overly detailed or wholly comprehensive approach to the business of tracking, it does the task enough justice to get the boys to thinking and acting in the right direction.

Basic tracking TTPs were taught when I was attending basic infantryman training as a PFC 18 years ago, and at some point it died out. Iraq and Afghanistan brought that back into vogue.

Good to hear some guys out there are hungry to "close and kill". Well I hope it does not take long before the USMC at least has a healthy combat tracking ability up and running (their moto should be "who are those guys?"

And yes "sign" and "spoor" is what tracking is all about.

Heres some (very) old stuff on RURAL TRACKING OPERATIONS with some formations at the Appendices

Note: The referred 32Z was a rifle grenade. The idea of the trackers and their flank guards loading these fell away with time.

And some general stuff on combat tracking

[JMA]

Understood, I didn't mean to suggest that the air cav operated exactly like the fire force. I'm sure the tactical situations and operational requirments faced by each unit were unique to time and place.

It just stuck me that there was a similarity in that both deployed (and redeployed) rapidly, often making multiple combat assaults the same day.

Understood again. I also tried to point out that in the U.S. sense the air cavalry squadrons were unique from the airmobile infantry battalions, even though the airmobile infantry battalions were also sometimes called air cavalry when they were part of the 1st Cavalry Division.

The air cav sometimes reacted to information from LRRPs. Other times they found the enemy (picked a fight) themselves. If it developed into a big enough fight infantry took over. If infantry units lost contact they could request combat tracker teams to help them regain contact.

I've enjoyed your comments about the RLI and the fire force. I hope you don't mind a curiosity question: How many operational parachute jumps did you make?

No offence meant. Just wanted to make sure that we were all aware of the difference. I would also say that the fire force worked on irregular troops of about up to 30 odd. Where we knew they were in prepared positions we took a more convention approach.

Don't have my Rhodesian log book anymore. It was 8 or 9 so lets say 8. Add to that one into Angola when with the South African paras. We had a Corporal (Des Archer) who did a staggering 73 Op jumps (a world record I believe). Also had a youngster in my troop who had only ever flown in a Dak. By the end of his service had taken off 30 odd times but never landed in an aircraft.

Archer and some guys from 1 Commando did 3 Op jumps in one day. We had a problem with parachutes. We had to recover them and send them back for repacking in Salisbury. If we had chutes that had be fitted a few times but not used we used to jump them anyway as a safety precaution using guys who hadn't jumped for a while.

[Ken White]

What makes for a "hard charger" pilot? Those are the boys you need.

one Air force and one old Marine Aviator -- both fighter pilots -- agree that selection can only tell part of it; that combat experience (good or bad) can have impacts that are difficult to foretell; current in which one is serving Squadron leadership can make a difference either way; the aircraft being flown is important (the OV-10, for example was woefully underpowered and thus couldn't get out of trouble as easily as the O2/Cessna 337; and that the type of airplane one first flew operationally has a big impact. The Marine thinks that last two are by far the most significant, he contends there was a major difference in attitude (as opposed to capability, which was pretty much a wash) between Navy F8 and F4 pilots and between Marine F8 or A4 pilots and their F4 counterparts.

He also contended it was hilarious to watch an ex A4 pilot get the stick of a big fat F4 for the first time...

An even older Marine Aviator agreed and said he'd noticed a slight difference in attitudes and aggressiveness between Marine F4U Corsair pilots and AD Skyraider pilots during the Corps brief possession of a single Squadron of the latter in Korea. Both were great aircraft and really good for CAS but they had very different flying characteristics.

Today, there are significant political constraints in the US. Our Congress, to avoid having to respond to complaints about process, is insistent that all military selection processes be 'objective' and 'fair' -- both to the point of overruling operational capability if of not sheer idiocy. Aggressiveness today as a characteristic is more likely to be frowned upon than to find favor (We're in one of our 'nice guy' phases -- those come and go ). It will stay that way unless we get in a big war, then it'll go away totally until peace returns...

Probably one of the Board's airplane driver types can add more (certainly more current than the views of four ORFs, one of whom is dumb grunt ) and far better info.

[JMA]

one Air force and one old Marine Aviator -- both fighter pilots -- agree that selection can only tell part of it; that combat experience (good or bad) can have impacts that are difficult to foretell; current in which one is serving Squadron leadership can make a difference either way; the aircraft being flown is important (the OV-10, for example was woefully underpowered and thus couldn't get out of trouble as easily as the O2/Cessna 337; and that the type of airplane one first flew operationally has a big impact. The Marine thinks that last two are by far the most significant, he contends there was a major difference in attitude (as opposed to capability, which was pretty much a wash) between Navy F8 and F4 pilots and between Marine F8 or A4 pilots and their F4 counterparts.

He also contended it was hilarious to watch an ex A4 pilot get the stick of a big fat F4 for the first time...

An even older Marine Aviator agreed and said he'd noticed a slight difference in attitudes and aggressiveness between Marine F4U Corsair pilots and AD Skyraider pilots during the Corps brief possession of a single Squadron of the latter in Korea. Both were great aircraft and really good for CAS but they had very different flying characteristics.

Today, there are significant political constraints in the US. Our Congress, to avoid having to respond to complaints about process, is insistent that all military selection processes be 'objective' and 'fair' -- both to the point of overruling operational capability if of not sheer idiocy. Aggressiveness today as a characteristic is more likely to be frowned upon than to find favor (We're in one of our 'nice guy' phases -- those come and go ). It will stay that way unless we get in a big war, then it'll go away totally until peace returns...

Probably one of the Board's airplane driver types can add more (certainly more current than the views of four ORFs, one of whom is dumb grunt ) and far better info.

Thanks for the reply. I would have thought that they could somehow devise an assessment of the actual pilots to see how they measure against actual performance. meaning you know who the "hard chargers" are and now are looking for common characteristics. Once in possession of these they could be applied to selecting pilots to fly certain aircraft types. Don't need a "hard charger" to fly an air refueling tanker, for example, but sure need them for CAS aircraft and gunships.

[Rifleman]

This is a little bit of a thread hijack but I think most people will enjoy this:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8r9EO...eature=related

It's not about applying the Rhodesian fire force concept to Afgahnistan but it is about a "fire force" of sorts, and it relates to some of the things brought up in this thread.

[Ken White]

...they could somehow devise an assessment of the actual pilots to see how they measure against actual performance. meaning you know who the "hard chargers" are and now are looking for common characteristics.

However, two things intrude:

Number of type pilots needed and desires of would be (and serving) pilots. Sometimes people have to do things they do not want to do and they get annoyed and leave as soon as they can legally do so -- and while they're in that job they didn't want, they will not do as good a job as might otherwise be possible.

The previously mentioned statutory requirement for 'fairness' in all things means that occasionally a marginal type must be allowed to do a job he or she may not be totally suited for. Don't read that as a slam on female pilots, some of them are more Tiger like than a lot of guys.

Add the fact that a bad combat experience can breed excessive caution, a risk averse Commander can insist on strict obedience to the 'rules.' All sorts of thing intrude during and after a really effective selection process. Selection for a specific quality is easy, maintaining that in the face of diverse requirements and situations is less so. In this case, there is an easy answer -- but the solution is not so easy. Happens when you deal with people, the pesky creatures will not always stay the way you wish them to.....

[slapout9]

This is a little bit of a thread hijack but I think most people will enjoy this:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8r9EO...eature=related

It's not about applying the Rhodesian fire force concept to Afgahnistan but it is about a "fire force" of sorts, and it relates to some of the things brought up in this thread.

Wow, that's good stuff. Much closer to General Gavin's concept of "Sky Cavalry" and what they should do......"Shoot...Move....and Communicate" damn all this walking everywhere carrying 200 pounds on your back.

[Rhodesian]

Sirs, Corporals, Privates and whatever. Hopefully that covers everyone

Sorry the slow reply.

Wilful ignorance OTOH -- like ignoring the political realities we and the British have to cope with is another thing.

lol! Oh goody, a roasting. Er . . . I'm Rhodesian, yes we're rebellious and proud, and frequently we upset a lot of folks generally - especially the British who are my kith and kin. As it goes, our own political realities were ignored decades ago when we were invaded by Russian and Chinese proxies - Have a look at my country now, the population hasn't grown in 20 years, 20 000 Matabeles are "missing," and Bob The Terrible will burn the place to the ground if he thinks it will aid his own personal cause. No offence intended.

(Casevac uplift in 7 minutes) Did that time apply just to the Fire Force folks or to the entire Police and Military effort?

Hell no, IN CONTEXT, FF only! - Just trying to impress Wilf even further One of the many complaints from other Rhodesian units was that the RLI had “stolen” all of their air support. On the other hand when reacting to calls for assistance from the same units, they then had it back in a big way, but this was certainly not the norm. My father, a member of PATU, hated the fact that while he patrolled one area with nothing, the RLI was next door busy putting on an air show. He knew of course that they were pushing the naughty ones in his direction, and that if he screamed loud enough someone would jolly over and help him out too, but that wasn't a granted. In talking to Johnny and Joe, I've often found them complaining of the same things in Afghanistan, in the sense of a lack of air support in a time frame that renders it really effective, and they frequently have to withdraw from contact as a consequence of its absence, or because what eventually shows up is dropping stuff too big for them to hang around and maintain the pressure. Are we bombing empty cover?

Baboon6 et al, thank you for the excellent Links, much appreciated, and very interesting! Also, nice toy that Apache has! I presume that the Apache 30mm can be set to fire just one shell as well?

Really? An A-10 costs less in maintenance than a lot of business jets.

Yes, but why think "Jets" or anything more expensive than it needs to be? We all know the UK, for example, can't afford the ideals, and in the vacuum that this has created we have provided little else to take their place. Why not provide tools that can do a relatively good job, are cheaper to buy and maintain, can hang around for long periods of time overhead, and then have lots more of them? If it's not called on, it loiters for whoever needs it. Less capability absolutely, but more availability for Johnny Bravo and GI Joe?

In one contact over open ground, for example, 20 (24?) Brits, without any provided real-time air-support, bumped into a large number of Taliban (estimated at 100). The Brits believe 20 of these were killed, but the bodies were removed by the others, so presumably “80” got away, no doubt with many wounded. The Brits knew from intel intercepts they were going to get hit imminently, and the civvies had bugged out as well because they knew it too. So why not provide these men not only with a system that transports even more of their mates “behind/around/wherever” the Taliban so that the 80 can't just run off, but also some sort of cheap real-time air support that gets put up and is in position BEFORE the attack? 20 percent in any fire-fight is excellent, Rhodesia averaged less against an apparently less capable enemy, but it increased to 80 percent plus with FF. Find a means of increasing our patrols damage capability to 80 percent (or whatever) too, in a way that fits current ROE, and which we can easily apply and afford. The UK is now broke, but then so were we in Rhodesia, we thought outside the box and with trial and error, FF was one of the answers. “We” in the UK can't seem to re-engineer a Snatch Landrover for use in mine country after years of use, deaths and debate - I'm not really hopeful of anything as cute as FF. And dare I even suggest a look at what Rhodesia did with our Landrovers, in context, “in the good old days”?

I think we've already highlighted a problem: A tendency to want “tools” that go far beyond our requirements – too expensive, to costly to run, too high maintenance, over-kill. Keep it simple.

Agreed, but you have to turn that into an argument and a solution.

An Academic designs a Race Horse, its a fabulous Race Horse, and the board of Academics agree to fund it, but Jonny really only needed a Donkey. Instead of buying lots of cheaper Donkeys, we start tinkering with the Race Horse and it turns into a very expensive Camel. Johnny still just needs a Donkey, but no one asked Johnny, or respected his opinion, and no one listened because the Academics really love their Race Horses. That one Horse has prevented many other Johnnies from getting their Donkeys too. How many light strike aircraft can one Jump Jet/Hornet buy, yes the capabilities are limited, but we're not trying to shoot down Russian Migs, or obliterate squadrons of T72 tanks . . . just yet. The Race Horse is the wrong animal, on the wrong race track, but until someone listens to Johnny and finds out what he needs, then we'll keep trying to apply conventional kit, to a coin problem.

[William F. Owen]

An Academic designs a Race Horse, its a fabulous Race Horse, and the board of Academics agree to fund it, but Jonny really only needed a Donkey. Instead of buying lots of cheaper Donkeys, we start tinkering with the Race Horse and it turns into a very expensive Camel.

Well that's why most of us here come from the Donkey doctrine, and have no interest in race horses. I actually spend most of my time killing sacred cows.

One sacred cow is the myth of the bug-basher COIN aircraft. Sorry, but the Lynx was incredibly limited. The UK has Apache, so we should use Apache. IMO, fighting men in sandals is pretty much what the Apache should do. It's the weapon on target, not the platform that got it there.

[Rhodesian]

but the Lynx was incredibly limited. The UK has Apache

Yes, but someone in trouble who gets only a snatch, or worse, nothing, would settle for a crappy Lynx, or even a Mad Max Cessna float plane with an GPMG in the back. We haven't remotely got enough Apaches. That's the problem, and the point.

I.R

[William F. Owen]

We haven't remotely got enough Apaches. That's the problem, and the point.

Sorry, but the UK has over 50 Apaches available. They can only deploy 8-12, because they have no money and a man-power ceiling.
Given more money, and manpower, I suggest deploying the available existing Apache and not investing in a new type of A/C that is less capable.