Ok, so you are telling what the role of infantry is not, now can you please tell me what you think the role of the infantry is?Originally Posted by Fuchs
You already quoted it:
The role of the infantry in land forces (which are composed of more than only infantry) combat is to do this:
It's general enough to do justice to the infantry's versatility (which is much more than only assaults) and still describes its specific relative strength and the demand for it that follows out of this relative strength.The infantry's tasks are therefore almost all of those (line-of-sight) combat missions which can better be accomplished dismounted than mounted.
Not sure about that.
I accept the 'closing with and ...' does not include defensive actions.
I would therefore go with the insertion of the word primary, as in:
Then one can add a number of tasks which the infantry may be called upon to carry out.The primary role of the infantry is to close with and kill the enemy.
Last edited by JMA; 12-11-2010 at 01:17 PM.
The infantry isn't primarily about offensive actions either. Your background may bias you.
Mechanised forces have superior speed, enough protection to accept a greater range of punishment by OPFOR and thus superior utility on the offence.
Infantry is more about defence than offence and that has been the case in most of history.
It has also much value beyond combat, especially exercising control and surveillance of terrain - something that even my description neglects because I focused on combat.
All valid points but I would just go with current Brit thinking that:
I had to look this up... so thanks for prompting me into doing that.INFANTRY
Roles. The Infantry’s mission is: ‘to close with and engage the enemy, in concert with other arms in all operational theatres and environments, in order to bring about his defeat’. The Infantry’s core capability is to conduct aggressive close combat in a combined arms context. All battalions, to a greater or lesser extent, and depending on the available mobility and firepower, are expected to perform the following tasks:
a. Close with and destroy the enemy.
b. Seize, control, and hold ground.
c. Breach and cross obstacles and establish bridgeheads.
d. Operations in built up areas, fighting in woods and forests (FIBUA and FIWAF).
e. Observe and patrol the battlefield especially in conditions of poor visibility and at night.
f. Destroy armoured vehicles.
g. Provide flank protection.
h. Provide integral direct and indirect fire support.
i. Protect vital installations, routes, and communication centres
Last edited by JMA; 12-11-2010 at 07:32 PM.
I could stand that, if it wasn't dumbed down to
on page 4 of the infantry company manual.The Infantry Mission is
to defeat the enemy through close combat.
The unhealthy emphasis on close combat is about as intelligent as the French belief in some supposed 'gallic furor close combat infantry superiority' that almost defeated them themselves in 1914.
Close combat is one of the less preferable infantry actions, it's not a role - to write role descriptions with such a slant leads predictably to simplifications that kill people. The wrong people.
Would you like to expand on that?
I see this "close in" overemphasis in a line with the 18th to 19th century faction of the pro-bayonet officers. These officers propagated that infantry is a shock force and should advance into close combat (with the bayonet) because this offensive behaviour would yield the best results. it did only so under certain conditions. The pro-bayonet extremists effectively reduced the 18th century musketeer to a 4th century BC hoplite without shield and armour - just a spear.
The pro-musket fire faction was prone to exaggerations as well; musket fire by itself rarely broke enemy ranks or killed whole battalions. It softened the enemy up, though. Especially quicker-loading musketeers such as the Prussian ones were able to quickly demoralize enemy infantry and THEN close in to turn them away.
Today's irregular infantry does not destroy or kill much even if it closes in with the enemy. A ambush/hit & fade tactic would be a much superior mantra than "close with and destroy".
Today's modern infantry has much more support than line-of-sight firepower. its small arms serve most of the time only one purpose; discourage the enemy enough to keep him from closing with you. The great support firepower can be exploited in the meantime - and the modern infantry itself can remain elusive, unseen.
Close combat is rarely desirable because casualties accumulate real quick in close combat between modern infantry forces. Send a battalion into a town or forest and soon thereafter two companies leave it. That's not sustainable. You cannot properly train your infantry quick enough to make up for such casualty rates. It was attempted very often and failed every time.
Close combat should be a niche activity, one that happens when it's being forced on you (when THEY close in or when you break out of an encirclement) or when the situation is very advantageous (demoralized OPFOR in pocket, close ambush or surprise effect available in a small & limited assault).
To tell infantry leaders that their role is to get into close combat turns high-casualty actions that happen in unfortunate conditions doctrine. That's stupid, for teaching this as doctrine means that some of the leaders will indeed seek such unfortunate actions instead of understanding that they're a mess which should usually be avoided.
I'm tracking what you're saying Fuchs, and agree to a large extent.
The main reason "close with and destroy the enemy" sounds silly is because tanks do it too - drive towards the bad guy and shoot him. Some say only infantry hold ground; if I park a tank on a hill, am I going to be any less effective than a section of riflemen?
Your idea of "a maneuver force suited for dismounted tasks" is a good one and serves as the opposite to Armoured Forces which are "a maneuver force suited for mounted tasks". Both are combat maneuver forces in that their primary purpose is to shoot and move at the enemy in some fashion.
As well, we eventually have to "close with" the enemy to win; we just need to be smart about it and close with him after he's dead. Perhaps "destroy the enemy and close with him" is better....
Beat me to it.
Yes to both of ya...
You really need to study your doctrine. (should be similar to the Brits - see below)I'm tracking what you're saying Fuchs, and agree to a large extent.
The main reason "close with and destroy the enemy" sounds silly is because tanks do it too - drive towards the bad guy and shoot him. Some say only infantry hold ground; if I park a tank on a hill, am I going to be any less effective than a section of riflemen?
Your idea of "a maneuver force suited for dismounted tasks" is a good one and serves as the opposite to Armoured Forces which are "a maneuver force suited for mounted tasks". Both are combat maneuver forces in that their primary purpose is to shoot and move at the enemy in some fashion.
As well, we eventually have to "close with" the enemy to win; we just need to be smart about it and close with him after he's dead. Perhaps "destroy the enemy and close with him" is better....
Infantry is infantry, armour is armour they each have specific and separate roles and tasks.
Brit doctrine as follows:
Armour
4. Roles. The characteristics of armour demand that it be used aggressively if its full potential is to be exploited. Generally, it should be used in the greatest numbers possible, and employed on consecutive rather than concurrent tasks. Even in defensive operations, the tank will be used offensively to defeat an attacker. In offensive all arms operations, it will normally be armour that takes the lead in the break-in and exploitation of initial success.
The roles of armour are therefore:
a. Shock Action. Shock action is the effect of unexpected and concentrated fire on an enemy force at an unexpected place and from an unexpected direction. Armour’s ability to manoeuvre potent and protected direct fire weapons systems is of paramount importance in achieving this. The morale of the enemy is affected as much as his material well-being. Other arms contribute to shock action, but it is the primary role of armour in all phases of war.
b. Aggressive Mobile Action to Destroy Enemy Armour. The tank’s mobility, survivability, durability and flexibility combined with the firepower to destroy enemy armour accurately whilst on the move, gives it the leading role in the destruction of enemy AFVs during the advance and withdrawal at Bde level. Above this level it should be noted that increasingly armour is being supplemented by armed/attack helicopters. Tanks provide the mobile element of the anti-armour plan in defence and should be concentrated and used offensively in the support of the positional element.
c. Close Combat in Conjunction with Infantry. The presence of tanks in an infantry assault adds momentum and significantly enhances direct firepower. It is also an important factor in morale.
d. Exploitation. Increasingly in the Manoeuvrist Approach, exploitation is also considered a role in its own right rather than a task (see Paragraph 5c below).
5. Tasks. Specific tasks in conjunction with other arms are:
a. Advance in Contact. Once contact has been made with a static or mobile enemy (normally by reconnaissance), armour may be used to dislodge or destroy him. An envelopment or turning movement may negate the need for direct assault on a prepared position.
b. The Assault and Fight Through. An enemy that cannot be dislodged by fire or manoeuvred out of position must be removed by infantry assault if able to impede the successful outcome of operations. Armour will co-operate with the infantry providing supporting fire for the assault and intimate support to infantry fighting through the objective.
c. Exploitation. Once an enemy has been dislodged or is forced into a withdrawal, armour will normally be used to exploit the success by rapid follow up to prevent him regaining balance. Exploitation may develop into a pursuit when armour penetrates deep into enemy held territory, destroying his reserves, headquarters and logistic installations.
d. Ambush. An ambush involves the occupation of pre-selected, concealed fire positions before an enemy has reached the area. The purpose is to destroy enemy AFVs by bringing fire to bear on them unexpectedly, from a flank.
e. Blocking. This counter move is designed to block an enemy axis of movement, or to direct it into an area of our choosing. The destruction of the enemy is of secondary importance.
f. Counter Attack. Counter-attacks regain the initiative from an attacking enemy by attacking him in turn with reserve or echeloned forces. They will be conducted in close co-operation with infantry and artillery. Counter-attacks can be either immediate or deliberate, but in any event should be mounted before an enemy has consolidated his gains. Options will often be pre-planned to save time.
g. Sniping. Exceptionally, a few tanks may be sited in fire positions within or forward of a defended area to cause delay or attrition, or to deceive an approaching enemy
Last edited by JMA; 12-12-2010 at 09:53 PM.
I have, thank you.
Instead of telling me I'm wrong and simply cutting and pasting something you read on the internet, why don't you point out how I am weak in understanding doctrine.
By the way, you do realize that those 4 Roles and 7 tasks you posted as "armour's specific and separate roles and tasks" are all things that the Infantry do as well?
Are we entering the area of risk aversion here? Elsewhere we have spoken about the need for preparatory bombardment and supporting fire as part of any attack.
Having spent my time either having flown directly into battle to close with and kill the enemy or out patrolling with the intention of finding insurgents and then closing with and killing them I guess I am biased (or conditioned) to some extent.
In this I am fully aware of the risk of expending/wasting infantry on pointless assaults on defended positions without adequate prep and supporting fire. Remember too that I soldiered in an environment where we could not afford casualties but... somehow we managed to reduce the risk of casualties through good (often outstanding) ops planning (where with the right quantity and type of prep and supporting fire we were able to take on multiples of insurgents with fractions of own forces).
So really the infantry should ideally just mop up (but often there is a requirement to fight through the objective to a greater or lesser degree). It occupies the ground either to hold it or to account for insurgents/enemy and capture or destroy their war materials.
Most of the close with and kill the enemy activity is really merely minor tactics. But selecting and training the required aggressive men for this work is a massive task which means that they can never be squandered by reckless commanders. So these 1st tier infantry need to used with care and applied tactically astutely by competent commanders.
So I suggest the trick is that you avoid having to fight a losing battle by having to train up reinforcements by selecting and training the officers with care and diligence. And because your commanders will not be idiots they will understand exactly what is meant by close with and kill the enemy and when and how this should be attempted and achieved.
Elsewhere I raised the issue of old German structures catering for fewer officers at company level (sgts commanding some platoons) and also to get rid of poor performing company commanders and let the skilled commanders command 6 platoon companies.
Oh yes... and where there are crappy tasks requiring infantry troops then use 2nd tier troops (or as the Brits call them " fish and chip units").
Let me end by saying that one should never do anything that will blunt the end of your spear. When you need to close with and kill the enemy you need to be sure you have the men and units who are up to the task.
To be frank with you your original post was disjointed to the extent that a return to the basics was called for.
May I suggest that you read through the doctrine again and reassess your position on this matter.
Who said total picture? Air observation is a massive advantage which even the fire team should be able to use to its advantage.
Well CAS needs to be available and response times better than an hour or so. There are many circumstances when CAS may not be "usable" I accept. Where safety is the issue I learned that the more one trains with the CAS pilots (more needed if they do short tours) the closer and more accurate you or your corporals can bring in an air strike with less chance of a blue on blue. I'm just wondering how much of this training is actually done out in Afghanistan involving the troops on the ground and the actual CAS pilots?
What I can share with you is that I have found out that in the last month or so that the "Brits" accept just about everything I have said here but they believe that for one reason or another it can't be implemented.If everyone just had your magic wand and all the answers, life and combat would be simple...
The one issue they are yet to accept as being a problem is the short length of tours. Give them time.
The weakness therefore is a sorry characteristic which has been identified where battalion level officers seem willing to take no for an answer. Worse still it is only once these officers leave the service that they find their voice.
The British soldier deserves better leadership. The penny is starting to drop in this regard but how does the officer corps reform itself?
Last edited by davidbfpo; 12-13-2010 at 08:04 AM. Reason: Edit sentence as author rquested
It goes that officers should get the facts correct, do the planning and then not take no for an answer (especially when soldiers lives are at risk.)
Last edited by davidbfpo; 12-13-2010 at 08:04 AM. Reason: Reduce to one sentence, after editing earlier post
JMA, here's a chew toy for you - Nimroz has been largely ignored in favor for the more populous greenspace provinces of Helmand and Kandahar.
Note the last para:
http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=3805
Fri
Infanteer,
I posted the cited paragraph a week ago (Post No.136), I expect JMA has seen it, although it did not attract any direct response from others - especially as it came from a Marine on the ground.
SWC debates on Afghanistan often follow a logic / pattern that puzzles me.
davidbfpo
Which is understandable, because at times both logic and pattern are missing...
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Damn - I owe you a pint.
Well, despite that, having been part of more than 1 mil/conflict forum, this ranks amongst the best.Which is understandable, because at times both logic and pattern are missing...
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