Putting the D in METT-TC

[MikeF]

Putting the D in METT-TC.

I describe the D as decentralization. Specifically,

Train your subordinates, give them specific guidance and clear mission, hold them to a standard, and then let them do their thing with your support. If they cross the line, then replace them, but DO NOT ever hamper them from completing the mission that you asked them to do. This involves trust both up and down, left and right along the line. Unfortunately, trust and truth are all so elusive in the natural state of man.

Or as David Kilcullen suggests,

Train the squad leaders — then trust them’

Why do we hand wave this, and then wish that we could be squad leaders as we progress through the ranks?

Within the last decade in my direct experience, decentralization is not done.

Where did we fail?

[Ken White]

Where did we fail?

We don't do this right:

..."Train the squad leaders — then trust them’ "...

We can't do the second part because we don 't do the first part as well as we could or should. Platoon Leaders don't fare much better. We also do not cull and remove the dregs of leaders as well as we should...

Can't trust folks in combat unless you're reasonably sure they'll try to do the right thing...

[MikeF]

We don't do this right:We can't do the second part because we don 't do the first part as well as we could or should. Platoon Leaders don't fare much better. We also do not cull and remove the dregs of leaders as well as we should...

Can't trust folks in combat unless you're reasonably sure they'll try to do the right thing...

For a regular army unit, I'd suggest that no patrol base should be no smaller than company size. It simply needs a Co CDR and 1SGT there. That's for the fixed position not withstanding roving partrols and continual presence.

That's why I started this thread- to discuss towards getting it right.

[Ken White]

all Co Cdrs and / or 1SGs are not bad habit free. Not by a long shot. I've seen more than one PL carry a poor Co Cdr and more than one PSG carry a mediocre 1SG...

I could also point out that you are perhaps dismissing your own call for a more decentralized approach -- down to your level but not lower?

Seriously though, I generally agree with you given today's state of training and that intangible thing, trust in subordinates or lack thereof.

However, I strongly believe that should not and need not be correct. What should be able to be done is to put a properly mission sized element in place where it needs to be placed without resorting to the artificiality of 'senior' leadership. And that is an artificial, 'discipline' and 'care for the troops' (or comfort level of the Bn Cdr and Staff. Or the Bde ditto) related issue and not a mission driven constraint.

Of course, I do not agree with the concept of FOBs at all, any size below Bde Base Camps. I think FOBs are a really bad mistake and are quite wasteful of personnel and resources. We should be able to send platoons and even squads out and about on extended patrols -- though frankly I doubt we'll in the near term be allowed to become that well trained or capable of truly distributed operation for a number of reasons, not least risk avoidance.

In most US FID efforts, the other guy initiates the majority of the contacts. That's due to over caution and under training on our part. That's just wrong and shouldn't be allowed. The FOB concept (or Firebase as they were in VN) contributes to that, it is a rare setup that isn't under constant observation by the bad guys and thus departure of patrols, changing of sentries, arrival of resupply and all that are meticulously plotted and are known. OTOH, A unit that stays out and moves in a truly well planned but apparently random and absolutely non-repetitive manner frequently * and is resupplied at random times and places will rarely be hit because the opponent doesn't have time to get set up.

* < 24 hours for a Bn or Co, < 12 hours for a Platoon and < 6 hours for a squad. Agility and flexibility will ALWAYS beat stasis and schlerosis.

The terrible thing is that we used to do that and it worked well. In 1950 and 52 as a flipping Corporal I wandered about with a Squad in various parts of The Land of the Morning Calm for days on end to include in back of the Chinese MLR. Later, had Squads that worked for me do it constantly in in the SEA War Games of 1966, five to seven day patrols were the norm.

By 1968 in Viet Nam, one could not (legally -- but pretty much ignored by good units) move outside a US Artillery fan or move in less than Platoon sized elements -- and that was discouraged. Believe it or not, one of the drivers of that last dictum was the Loggie complaint that such elements were too much work to resupply. Been downhill ever since.

Occasional bright spots. 1-504 in OEF 1.5 in early 2002 in Afghanistan was patrolling in Co and Platoon sized elements intially and very successfully but then as the Bagram bureaucracy built up, they were converted to FOB manning.

I'm not terribly worried by the decline in competence and capability in those aspects because given a big war that foolishness will have to go by the wayside very quickly...

[Ken White]

That's why I started this thread- to discuss towards getting it right.

I'll give a more detailed answer than my initial attempt.

We started failing when we adopted European practices in the nascent US Army. We adopted and excessively -- for American mores and tastes -- heirarchial model. (That's not going away)

We exacerbated that over the years by having Congress force numerous arcane rules on personnel management and training practices driven by domestic politics, the Mothers of America, obtaining votes and fiscal concerns as opposed to mission requirements. (That's not going away)

Fast forward to Viet Nam. The average Bn Cdr in 1968-72 found he had few to no field grades, CPTs or senior NCO but had instead a host of LTs and NCOC Graduate SGTs. He discovered they were all great kids who would do anything you asked of them -- but they didn't know much so they needed constant watching. Thus the micro-managing Generals of the 80s and 90s were born. Old habits die hard. (That CAN be changed!)

Then came adoption of a training system that is designed to produce mediocrity. It was instituted to handle the poor intake that was McNamara;s Project 100,000 and was not changed when the Draft went away and the 100K guys got assimilated and some good fresh blood was obtained.The Task, condition and Standard foolishness is mind numbing and attempts to trash it are routinely defeated because the system makes it easy on the 'Trainers.' (That can be changed)

Add societal changes -- we are a terribly risk averse society -- and political changes and you have an Army that is risk averse. (That may be changeable...)

Just add all that to my first response and that's where we went wrong.

How to fix it? My subversive suggestions will not be provided; You guys will have to fix it. I will offer four non-subversive thoughts: Things that cannot be changed can be worked around. Things that can be changed will have to start at the bottom and work up -- top down does not work in a heirarchial model because even if you have a really sharp charismatic person at the top trying to change the direction the elephant is committed to, the mid level work avoiders will just wait him or her out (See Meyer, E.C). OBTE is not perfect but it is a big step forward. Do not let the system co opt the good guys until they become part of and continue the risk averse and micro management syndromes.

Good cess...

[Kiwigrunt]

I totally agree with Ken that a corporal should be able to operate a section/squad during a multiple day patrol. The Yanks did it, and the Anzacs did it. It was not uncommon to kick out sections or half platoons over a wide area. And battalion should know where they are, so if they are likely to lose radio contact you put out relay stations/posts/patrols. So the DO ‘new warfare concept’ isn’t that new. Where it may differ somewhat is in the fact that we have better technology to further capitalise on the concept.

I also don’t think that rank inflation has helped. Having a high percentage of sergeants and above in a platoon is no different from having corporals, provided they have the same training. In the long run, rank inflation in itself will just shift the problem up the horizontal ladder.


Now with regards to earlier points raised, training and trust, I don’t think these issues are limited to the military. I think they are systemic in today’s western social fabric. Ken often mentions mediocrity, so does Barry Schwartz in this 20 minute TED talk.

[MikeF]

I totally agree with Ken that a corporal should be able to operate a section/squad during a multiple day patrol.

Duh.

Now with regards to earlier points raised, training and trust, I don’t think these issues are limited to the military. I think they are systemic in today’s western social fabric. Ken often mentions mediocrity, so does Barry Schwartz in this 20 minute TED talk.

Back to the thread. Truth and trust are elusive. It is simply easier not to trust.

I would suggest that is the easier wrong.

[slapout9]

Fast forward to Viet Nam. The average Bn Cdr in 1968-72 found he had few to no field grades, CPTs or senior NCO but had instead a host of LTs and NCOC Graduate SGTs. He discovered they were all great kids who would do anything you asked of them -- but they didn't know much so they needed constant watching. Thus the micro-managing Generals of the 80s and 90s were born. Old habits die hard. (That CAN be changed!)

I come from that Army period roughly (72-75) and you hit it right on the head, we were short LTs the whole time I was in,E-6's were Plt. Sgt. often E-7's were the Plt. Leaders.

[COMMAR]

Within the last decade in my direct experience, decentralization is not done.

Its not done presently but its something the Marine Corps been putting a large amount of their effort in since 2004 with "Distributed Operations". Fielding an effective DO Platoon in Afghanistan '06 that attached to the US Army's 10th MtnDiv.

But truly began working on the Idea in the early to mid '90s with the "Hunter-Warrior Program".

Excerpts from that 2006 Deployment to Afghanistan:

Nowhere to Hide

Experimental distributed ops unit proves its worth in Afghanistan

By Christian Lowe Times staff writer
May 22, 2006

They were about seven miles away, nestled deep within Afghanistan’s high mountain ridges that soak up radio transmissions like rounds into body armor. It was the kind of terrain that lends itself more to communicating via smoke signal than high-tech radios.

The convoy was cut off from its base. A Marine was down, and the convoy was taking fire from Afghan fighters on a peak high above.

That’s when 1st Lt. Carlo DeSantis stepped in.

Just below another ridge to the west, DeSantis heard the desperate calls from his fellow Marine, 1st Lt. Phuong Phan, who was leading a convoy out of their forward operating base, Camp Blessing, when it was hit by a roadside bomb and ambushed by Afghan fighters firing rocket-propelled grenades and heavy machine guns.

Phan’s calls for help couldn’t get through the mountainous terrain to Camp Blessing.

So, using sophisticated communications gear normally found with commanders above his grade and using training previously bestowed solely to aviators, DeSantis fired up his satellite radio to relay Phan’s reports to Camp Blessing, redirected aircraft trolling the Afghan skies for close-air support and coordinated a helo-borne casualty evacuation — all well beyond visual range of the convoy he stepped in to help.

“At the time, I was the only qualified person in the vicinity to control the aircraft,” said DeSantis, whose infantry platoon has been trained as an experimental “distributed operations” unit, during a May 10 telephone interview from his base camp in Afghanistan.

“I could see the aircraft, but I couldn’t see Lt. Phan’s convoy. So it got a little tricky.”

A top Corps initiative that officials claim will change how the service trains and equips its infantrymen, distributed operations envisions a rifle platoon equipped with sophisticated, long-range communications gear using special training and tactics that make it capable of dividing into smaller units and operating far from support or higher command.

The exploits of DeSantis’ platoon — 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines — have garnered the attention of top Marine Corps brass, who describe the unit’s special capabilities as the wave of the Corps’ future.

Even the Pentagon’s 20-year strategy, detailed in this year’s Quadrennial Defense Review, said the Corps’ distributed operations concept provides “commanders with an expeditionary force able to conduct ‘low-end’ [special operations forces] missions as well as traditional operations.”

The training and equipment is meant to give Marines at lower levels the capabilities normally found in company or battalion staffs. But after years of lofty talk, the DO concept was put to the ultimate test in a combat environment with the deployment of DeSantis’ platoon to Afghanistan.

By all accounts the experiment was a success. But it certainly didn’t end with the dramatic rescue of Phan’s Jan. 25 ambush...

• http://www.leatherneck.com/forums/sh...ad.php?t=29960

Onto the Battlefield

The Marines Corps’ new warfare concept gets a field test

By MATT HILBURN, Associate Editor
SEAPOWER Magazine August 2006

When 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines deployed to Afghanistan last spring, its 44 members moved the Marine Corps’ new concept of warfare off the Power Point slides and onto the battlefield.

The concept, called Distributed Operations (DO), hinges on empowering small teams, typically the size of a rifle squad or 12-13 Marines, to operate independently and miles apart within the battle space. These dispersed, fast-moving teams would perform many of the tactical missions normally assigned to companies or even battalions, with younger, lower-ranking Marines making decisions entrusted only to the higher ranks in larger, conventional Marine units.

Yet the DO units would make only a small footprint, presenting today’s adversaries with a confusing, rapidly changing picture of U.S. strength and intentions.

DO was developed in response to the rising threat of terrorists and insurgent forces — the kind of enemy that does not attack in a conventional, centralized manner...

• http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/aug06-44.php

There are alot of moving parts to this & Cmdrs are obviously risk adverse.. Before you can move towards it you have to be sure to cover all sectors.

Mother's of America & your local Congressman can shut down any good idea Permanently if there's bad execution w/out well documented evidence that it could be relatively effective.