South Africa's COIN war in SWA/Namibia/Angola

[Firn]

The following thesis was produced by (then) Major Michael F. Morris, USMC on CSC 2000

An extract from the executive summary:

Download here

Certainly the SADF knew the vital importance of massive firepower linked by radio to many watchful eyes against a greatly superior foe with a far stronger and (technically) advanced airforce. And the value of infantry and AA protection as well as of good camouflage, basic counter-counter-battery tactics and artful deception to keep that important firepower alive. The ammo supply obviously proved to be difficult.

What surprised me is the high survivability of the RPVs under those high-threat conditions. I really would like to know more about how they were employed. Flying usually low in close cooperation with all those ground-based assets, I guess:

Organic collection assets were limited to [various] recce teams augmented by forwardobservers and liaison personnel [UNITA], and electronic intelligence (ELINT).

That ELINT proved to be unvaluable doesn't surprise me that much. It is easy to be sloppy in that regard, and the enemy all too often listens and has also often the codes. At least WWII provides countless examples of that, and in the heat of battle people tend to throw even good rulebooks away. Sometimes, as this example shows it can even be completely unforced errors. Making the ELINT business harder for the enemy (and easier for yourself) should really be an important task for training and technology.

[text] is mine.

[JMA]

A mine and ambush protected school bus in northern SWA/Nambia during the border war.



If it is considered important... the money will be found.

[Ken White]

If it is considered important... the money will be found.

Always true -- the problem is who considers what important, isn't it...

Thanks for posting that picture. It will let many see how good and easy we in the US have had it for about 200 years.

[carl]

I hope this isn't too far off topic but didn't some of the old tanks, M-48s etc have rounded bottom hulls the intention of which was protection against anti-tank mines? I think Bradleys and Abrams have flat bottom hulls. Is this a case of forgetting?

[Ken White]

I hope this isn't too far off topic but didn't some of the old tanks, M-48s etc have rounded bottom hulls the intention of which was protection against anti-tank mines? I think Bradleys and Abrams have flat bottom hulls. Is this a case of forgetting?

Not forgetting as much as a different and better riding suspension system (Torsion bars that run across the hull) favored flat bottoms and -- foolishly -- it was decided that the improved suspension merited taking a chance that land mines would be less used in the future. That didn't work out too well...

There was also the factor of increased interior roominess, important in peacetime, not so much in wartime, favoring the flat bottoms. As did production and maintenance costs, also a peacetime concern...

Still newer hydropneumatic and hydraulic suspensions will allow a return to sloped or rounded bottoms. Today's shallow 'V's work better than the old rounded hulls. Everything goes in cycles...

[Firn]

Moderator's Note: the cited interview is not available in English and appeared in an Austrian military periodical. Now if anyone wants to volunteer and supply an English translation SWC will be indebted to you.

From the interview of Breytenbach in the ÖMZ 1/2009:

Jedenfalls gab es unter uns Obristen einige, die dafür plädierten, den Vormarsch auf dem Westufer des cuitos einfach fortzusetzen, um cuito cuanevale vom Westen her anzugreifen, d.h. in den Rücken des feindes zugelangen. Dadurch würde das vorgeschobene Logistikzentrum des Gegners und, vielleicht noch wichtiger, auch die einzige Brücke erobert werden.
Die südafrikanische Brigade wäre dann genau auf der Versorgungs-
und Rückzugslinie des Gegners platziert, und dieser wäre von seinem Nachschub abgeschnitten.

Die Brigaden selbst waren ja schon allein durch das 32. Bataillon am Lomba aufgehalten worden. Doch sie konnten dauerhaft dort verharren, solange der Nachschub floss oder sie sich auf cuito cuanevale zurückziehen konnten. Würden wir cuito cuanevale nehmen, wären sie auf der falschen flussseite
ohne Nachschub gestrandet, würde bald kein fahrzeug mehr fahren können, und die Truppe, ohne dass wir einen Schuss abfeuerten, würde liegen bleiben. Was nützt ein Panzer ohne Treibstoff? Er wird zur metallenen hülle, dessen Besatzung sich bei einem Ausbruch zu fuß einer Umgebung voller UNITAKämpfer aussetzen müsste, die ihnen mit Begeisterung, v.a. den
Kubanern, die Kehlen durchschneiden würden. So hätten fünf Brigaden restlos vernichtet werden können.

I always wondered why the SADF didn't try to cut off in earnest the enemy brigades which relied for practically all their needs on the very long and difficult support lines from western Angola. As this interview shows some of the SADF officers, among them Breytenbach wanted to do exactly that.

ÖMZ: Was hinderte Sie daran, genau dies zu tun? Doch nicht etwa politische Intervention?
Breytenbach: Vernichtung der feindlichen Kräfte war leider nicht auf der Tagesordnung, v.a. nicht beim Außenminister. Die Brigaden sollte lediglich nach cuito cuanevale zurückgedrängt werden, der Ausgangsstellung ihrer Offensive. Man hielt es für politisch klug, der fAPLA die Demütigung zu ersparen, fast ihre ganze Armee durch eine einzige südafrikanische Brigade vernichtet zu sehen. hier kamen die „win win“-Parole und die diplomatische Schiene durch, die nun ins militärische Umfeld transplantiert werden musste, egal ob der militärische „Patient“ diese außergewöhnliche Behandlung annehmen wollte oder nicht.

Wie man so schön sagt: Der Rest ist Geschichte. Die Südafrikaner saßen mit dem handicap am Verhandlungstisch, dass die fAPLA-Kräfte durch unsere eigenen Politiker vor der endgültigen Niederlage gerettet wurden.

Basically he says that some SA politicians didn't want to humilate the enemy too heavily to enable a "win-win" diplomatic solution, crossing deeply into the military strategy and tactis of the campaign. So instead of annihilation they just wanted a push-back. (Breytenbach accepts the supremacy of politics, but that it should limit itself to the political strategy. Overall he sounds pretty Clausewitzian in many of his answers)

In the end this political choice backfired on the SA diplomacy, as the Cubans, FAPLA and SWAPO could claim victory, retain their military strenght and take over the country after sitting out the process in their secret bases which were of no interest to the UNO.


Of course I have no idea how feasible the destruction of the five brigades could have been and how things would have shaped up after a devastating outcome for FAPLA.

[ganulv]

Basically he says that some SA politicians didn't want to humilate the enemy too heavily to enable a "win-win" diplomatic solution, crossing deeply into the military strategy and tactis of the campaign. So instead of annihilation they just wanted a push-back. (Breytenbach accepts the supremacy of politics, but that it should limit itself to the political strategy. Overall he sounds pretty Clausewitzian in many of his answers)

In the end this political choice backfired on the SA diplomacy, as the Cubans, FAPLA and SWAPO could claim victory, retain their military strenght and take over the country after sitting out the process in their secret bases which were of no interest to the UNO.

From my readings on this forum and elsewhere I am lead to believe that many foreign policy and military professionals seem to conceptualize the political and the military as separate and separable domains. In reading recently about the Angolan Civil War I came upon Chester Crocker’s quote that

[r]eading the Cubans is yet another art form. They are prepared for both war and peace.

I was gobsmacked that this should be considered unusual.

[Fuchs]

Jedenfalls gab es unter uns Obristen einige, die dafür plädierten, den Vormarsch auf dem Westufer des cuitos einfach fortzusetzen, um cuito cuanevale vom Westen her anzugreifen, d.h. in den Rücken des feindes zugelangen. Dadurch würde das vorgeschobene Logistikzentrum des Gegners und, vielleicht noch wichtiger, auch die einzige Brücke erobert werden.
Die südafrikanische Brigade wäre dann genau auf der Versorgungs-
und Rückzugslinie des Gegners platziert, und dieser wäre von seinem Nachschub abgeschnitten.

In English:Some among the colonels argued for continuing the advance on the west riverside of the cuitos, to attack cuito cuanevale. This would capture the forward logistical node and -probably more important- also the only bridge.
The South African brigade would then be cituated on the supply and withdrawal route of the opponent, and this one would be cut off from supply.

(Wow, their locations sound dirty!)

Die Brigaden selbst waren ja schon allein durch das 32. Bataillon am Lomba aufgehalten worden. Doch sie konnten dauerhaft dort verharren, solange der Nachschub floss oder sie sich auf cuito cuanevale zurückziehen konnten.

Würden wir cuito cuanevale nehmen, wären sie auf der falschen flussseite ohne Nachschub gestrandet, würde bald kein fahrzeug mehr fahren können, und die Truppe, ohne dass wir einen Schuss abfeuerten, würde liegen bleiben.

Was nützt ein Panzer ohne Treibstoff? Er wird zur metallenen hülle, dessen Besatzung sich bei einem Ausbruch zu fuß einer Umgebung voller UNITAKämpfer aussetzen müsste, die ihnen mit Begeisterung, v.a. den
Kubanern, die Kehlen durchschneiden würden. So hätten fünf Brigaden restlos vernichtet werden können.

In EnglishThe brigades themselves are already stopped by the 32. Bn at the Lomba. But they could stay there permanently, as long as they received supply and were able to withdraw to cuito cuanevale.

If we would capture cuito cuanevale, they would be stranded on the wrong side of the river without supply, soon no vehicle would be able to drive any more, and the troops would - without us firing a single shot - be stuck.

Of what use is a tank without fuel? It becomes a metallic hull, whose crew would in a breakout exposed to an environment full of UNITA fighters who would with enthusiasm cut their throats (especially of Cubans). This way five brigades could have been annihilated entirely.

ÖMZ: Was hinderte Sie daran, genau dies zu tun? Doch nicht etwa politische Intervention?
Breytenbach: Vernichtung der feindlichen Kräfte war leider nicht auf der Tagesordnung, v.a. nicht beim Außenminister. Die Brigaden sollte lediglich nach cuito cuanevale zurückgedrängt werden, der Ausgangsstellung ihrer Offensive. Man hielt es für politisch klug, der fAPLA die Demütigung zu ersparen, fast ihre ganze Armee durch eine einzige südafrikanische Brigade vernichtet zu sehen. hier kamen die „win win“-Parole und die diplomatische Schiene durch, die nun ins militärische Umfeld transplantiert werden musste, egal ob der militärische „Patient“ diese außergewöhnliche Behandlung annehmen wollte oder nicht.

Wie man so schön sagt: Der Rest ist Geschichte. Die Südafrikaner saßen mit dem handicap am Verhandlungstisch, dass die fAPLA-Kräfte durch unsere eigenen Politiker vor der endgültigen Niederlage gerettet wurden.

In English:ÖMZ: What did them keep from doing exactly this? Was it political intervention?
Breytenbach: Destruction of enemy forces was not on the agenda, especially not for the foreign secretary. The brigades were only to be pushed back to cuito cuanevale, the starting point of their offensive. They considered it politically wise to spare the FAPLA the humiliation of having almost their entire army being destroyed by a single South African brigade.

Here came the "win win" rallying cry and the diplomatic venue into effect, which now had to be transplanted into the military environment - no matter whether this military "patient" was willing to accept this unusual treatment or not.

The rest is history. The South Africans sat at the negotiating table with the handicap that the FAPLA forces had been rescued by our own politicians.End of English


(Yes, the guy really talks this weird!)

[JMA]

Moderator's Note: the cited interview is not available in English and appeared in an Austrian military periodical. Now if anyone wants to volunteer and supply an English translation SWC will be indebted to you.

A simple Google Translation gives the gist of what is being said.

I always wondered why the SADF didn't try to cut off in earnest the enemy brigades which relied for practically all their needs on the very long and difficult support lines from western Angola. As this interview shows some of the SADF officers, among them Breytenbach wanted to do exactly that.

Basically he says that some SA politicians didn't want to humilate the enemy too heavily to enable a "win-win" diplomatic solution, crossing deeply into the military strategy and tactis of the campaign. So instead of annihilation they just wanted a push-back. (Breytenbach accepts the supremacy of politics, but that it should limit itself to the political strategy. Overall he sounds pretty Clausewitzian in many of his answers)

In the end this political choice backfired on the SA diplomacy, as the Cubans, FAPLA and SWAPO could claim victory, retain their military strenght and take over the country after sitting out the process in their secret bases which were of no interest to the UNO.

Of course I have no idea how feasible the destruction of the five brigades could have been and how things would have shaped up after a devastating outcome for FAPLA.

The aim was to send in a brigade (never numbering more than 3,000) to stop an Angolan division overrunning UNITA. This was achieved at the Lomba river where the Angolan (FAPLA) 47 Brigade was destroyed and their 59 and 21 Brigades badly mauled. The mission as given by the politicians had been achieved. (You probably need to read the then Chief of the Defence Force Gen Jannie Geldenhuys' book "At the Front" where he explains it simply.

Of course at colonel level (and below) there were those who saw only the military opportunity on offer to annihilate the Angolan division and to hell with any "limit of exploitation" and not what the politicians refer to as seeing "the big picture".

As to the propaganda potential of South Africa not pressing home an attack on Cuito Cuanavale to the Russians/Cubans/Angolans yes, it was always there and remember that in every operation before and after the "world" media happily repeated the line fed them that South Africa was the aggressor and the UN always demanded they withdraw their forces from Angola immediately.

So the fact is that the mission was accomplished in that the Angolan advance was halted with significant loses. That the "colonels" were not allowed to exploit the opportunity to annihilate what remained of the Angolan division does not constitute a defeat. Whether the soldiers like it or not the politicians make those decisions, right or wrong.

Note: a good lesson learned here was that in the absence of air superiority maximum use of artillery is required and was use to devastating effect.