South Africa's COIN war in SWA/Namibia/Angola

[Mark O'Neill]

I guess you follow the ROE and then the restrictions on air support. But here's a group that good work on flat dessert like terrain.

Koevoet Tactics

Koevoet operations were devoted to tracking groups of SWAPO fighters who were on foot. Their tracks were picked up in various ways, but most often from:
Patrols of areas favoured for crossing by SWAPO fighters.
Information from local inhabitants.
From areas surrounding a recent attack.
Once a suspicious track was found, a vehicle would leap-frog ahead a few kilometres to check for the same tracks, and once found, the other vehicles would race up to join them. Using this technique they could make quickly catch up with the guerillas who were travelling on foot. The technique borrows strongly from experience gained during the Rhodesian Bush War.
The trackers were so skilled at their art that they could provide very accurate estimates on the distance to the enemy, the speed at which they were travelling and their states of mind. They were able to do this by "reading" factors such as abandoned equipment, changes from walking to running speed, reduced attempts at anti-tracking or splintering into smaller groups taking different directions ("bomb shelling").
Once the trackers sensed that the SWAPO fighters were close, they would often retreat to the safety of the Casspir armoured personnel carriers to face an enemy typically armed with RPG-7 rocket launchers, rifle grenades, AK-47s, SKS carbines and RPK and PKM machine guns.
Koevoet members were financially rewarded through bounty system, which paid them for kills, prisoners and equipment they captured. This practice allowed many of the members to earn significantly more than their normal salary, and resulted in competition between units.[6]

Whilst Koevoet were a SAP unit, the trackers, and a lot of the troops, were not White South African. They were either indigenous SW Africans recruited directly, or captured and turned terrorists / insurgents. For this 'idea' to ahve any utility for AFG one needs to explain :

1. What 'police force' ISAF are to use; and'
2. How and why indigenous people will join and be effective in this initiative, given ISAF is having enough difficulties getting them to participate effectively as 'normal' police.

I am reminded of Sir Michael Howard's description of the use of military history without context as being akin to pornography... I believe that selective cherry picking of 'examples' is just as gratuitous and possibly even less useful.

[JMA]

Whilst Koevoet were a SAP unit, the trackers, and a lot of the troops, were not White South African. They were either indigenous SW Africans recruited directly, or captured and turned terrorists / insurgents. For this 'idea' to ahve any utility for AFG one needs to explain :

1. What 'police force' ISAF are to use; and'
2. How and why indigenous people will join and be effective in this initiative, given ISAF is having enough difficulties getting them to participate effectively as 'normal' police.

I am reminded of Sir Michael Howard's description of the use of military history without context as being akin to pornography... I believe that selective cherry picking of 'examples' is just as gratuitous and possibly even less useful.

Not at all.

The Koevoet style of operation was a classic intelligent application of what Hans Dreyer saw the Portuguese and the Rhodesians were doing. He was operating on largely flat ground so he used vehicles for greater mobility. He needed to track the insurgents so he used the best he could find among the Ovambo and Koi San (Bushmen). And the rest is history. Absolutely outstanding from a military point of view and coming from a policeman too.

Why introduce the race angle?

In Rhodesia 80% of the government troops were black. And the RAR (Rhodesian African Rifles) did well by any standard.

In South West Africa (Namibia) the South Africans raised battalions from each of the ethnic groups and obviously the police recruited locals for their station areas for language, cultural awareness etc etc. Koevoet was about 25% white and together they fought against SWAPO / PLAN. That mix of black and white policemen achieved the best results of all forces in SWA/Namibia.

So if there is anything to take out of the Southern African wars that is worthy of study it is the Rhodesian Fire Force and the South West African Koetvoet operations.

And for either of these concepts to have any potential value for Afghanistan it needs some like a Hans Dreyer (who knows Afghanistan) to study both concepts in detail and come up some hybrid that would be useful in Afghanistan.

[Jim Hooper]

In South West Africa (Namibia) the South Africans raised battalions from each of the ethnic groups and obviously the police recruited locals for their station areas for language, cultural awareness etc etc. Koevoet was about 25% white and together they fought against SWAPO / PLAN. That mix of black and white policemen achieved the best results of all forces in SWA/Namibia.

So if there is anything to take out of the Southern African wars that is worthy of study it is the Rhodesian Fire Force and the South West African Koetvoet operations.

And for either of these concepts to have any potential value for Afghanistan it needs some like a Hans Dreyer (who knows Afghanistan) to study both concepts in detail and come up some hybrid that would be useful in Afghanistan.

In the last few years I have been approached by a number of Ph.D. candidates whose theses centre on the use of private military companies (PMCs). I confess that they eventually come to me because their first choices succumbed to interviewee fatigue long ago and now decline such requests. My supposed expertise is limited to having written the first books on both Koevoet and Executive Outcomes, the former police unit comprising an important element of the latter company. The success of both has led some academics to believe they could be equally effective anywhere in the world. However, a critical analysis of what made them so successful suggests otherwise. The latest PH.D. student is convinced that EO-like PMCs are the answer to a First World country’s internal political divisions over involvement in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. In hope of generating debate, I’m sharing part of my latest email to him:

************************************************** ******************

Dear Mr ……, I believe your thesis on the role of PMCs is fatally flawed. First, Executive Outcomes was an anomaly, a phenomenon that is unlikely ever to be repeated. Its success was the result of black and white Africans - professional soldiers and airmen who had already worked together for 15 to 30 years - in Africa. They understood the culture and spoke the lingua franca - Portuguese in Angola, English in Sierra Leone. Were EO still in existence today and operating in Iraq or Afghanistan, they would not enjoy the same success; their military skills would be the same, but the local culture would be incomprehensible to them and they could not function without interpreters (who, due to tribal loyalties and various cultural imperatives, can never be relied on completely, especially in the chaos of combat); and without supporting arms such as artillery, fighter bombers and intelligence-gathering, their effectiveness in an offensive role would be close to zero in comparison to well-integrated state armies.

[Break-break for SWC readers: Michael F’s question in the COIN case: LRA thread, and Tom Odom’s eminently sensible answer lead to the perfect role for the now-retired EO.]

Second, your focus on jus in bello suggests to me that you see PMC employees as less ethical and less sensitive than state armies to their own losses and civilian deaths. From my experience, this perception is profoundly wrong. Remember that they learned their professions as members of Western military/police structures imbued with Judeo-Christian values and working in accordance with national and international law. To think that they will abandon those values when they exchange a state uniform for a PMC uniform is illogical. Equally illogical is to think that war can ever - or should - be risk free. War is defined by the possibility of death, and taking that risk is one of the greatest psychological motivations for young men who volunteer for military service.

No modern state is going to hire PMCs to conduct offensive operations in order to minimise own-force casualties. Doing so would call into question the state's investment in training, command and control, combat and logistics capabilities, and ethics. Nor will it dedicate artillery, close air support, precision guided munitions, aerial surveillance, sigint and a multitude of necessary specialists for the benefit of PMCs. The cost of providing those assets for both its own forces and PMCs (already better paid than its own personnel) would be astronomical. Do you really believe the US Congress, British Parliament, German Bundestag, French Assemblée Nationale, or Israeli Knesset - all legislatures representing countries that admire their nations' military prowess - would authorise such a radical departure from convention? It would be a damning self-indictment with huge political implications, both domestically and internationally. A comparison to 3rd and 4th Century Rome would be inescapable.

The only politically acceptable offensive role for PMCs is anti-piracy operations. Pirates are themselves mercenaries operating outside international law. They are universally seen as dangerous criminals who represent a clear and present danger to a law-abiding merchant fleet on which a large part of the world's economy is dependent. Compared to the manpower and materiel requirements for effective ground operations, the necessary assets to counter pirates are minimal and not financially burdensome: a few fastboats with radar, secure communications, automatic weapons no heavier than 20mm, a few relatively inexpensive UAVs data-linked to the boats and central command post, and a long-range helicopter capability for medical evacuation. And there are ample historical precedents for issuing letters of marque giving maritime PMCs a legal basis for their actions.

ENDS

[JMA]

For those interested the book IGOR ZHDARKIN - WE DID NOT SEE IT EVEN IN AFGHANISTAN is worth a read to see events through the eyes of a Russian translator/advisor during the Angolan war. (Above the photo of the book cover is a link to a word doc - We did not see it even in Afghanistan.doc - website is in Russian.)

There is a review to be found here

Two quotes from the review:

"As the author relates, even the Russians who had served in Afghanistan had never experienced such “horrors” as the barrage of SADF artillery across the Lomba River. Under fire from the G-6 guns and the Mirage and Buccaneer aircraft, FAPLA brigades panicked and deserted the field in flight, leaving behind their Soviet equipment in a graveyard of tanks, trucks, ammunition, and other materiel. "

and

"As for the Angolan soldiers, they were “unsuitable for war.” Not only were they “afraid to take part in combat actions,” they were also unwilling to follow the “reasonable advice” of their Soviet advisors (p. 341). Consequently, it was necessary for the advisors to tell the Angolans that they were wrong and beat them up accordingly."

Fabulous stuff... the Keystone Cops in Africa.

Note: The G-6 is a 155mm SELF-PROPELLED GUN-HOWITZER

[JMA]

The following thesis was produced by (then) Major Michael F. Morris, USMC on CSC 2000

An extract from the executive summary:

The study also illustrates the utility of battalion and brigade level MAGTFs at the operational level by analyzing a case study, Operation Modular. In 1987 in southeastern Angola the South African Defense Force employed a three thousand man mobile strike force to defeat a combined Angolan / Cuban division size force intent on destroying the UNITA resistance movement. The campaign's military outcome convinced the Soviets and Cubans to settle the twenty-three year Angolan border war and the political future of Namibia in a diplomatic venue rather than by force of arms. Operation Modular highlights the potential of small, mobile, hard-hitting fighting columns in a small war environment.

Download here

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

A good catch and reading through it I found this - note written in 2000 by a USMC officer:

Given the proliferation of mines throughout the Third World, all future U.S. military vehicles should incorporate similar mine protection features as a priority force protection issue.

See pgs.52-53.

[JMA]

JMA,

A good catch and reading through it I found this - note written in 2000 by a USMC officer:

See pgs.52-53.Given the proliferation of mines throughout the Third World, all future U.S. military vehicles should incorporate similar mine protection features as a priority force protection issue.

Yes and what did they do? They ignored him... and the rest is history.

[Firn]

The following thesis was produced by (then) Major Michael F. Morris, USMC on CSC 2000

An extract from the executive summary:

Download here

Certainly the SADF knew the vital importance of massive firepower linked by radio to many watchful eyes against a greatly superior foe with a far stronger and (technically) advanced airforce. And the value of infantry and AA protection as well as of good camouflage, basic counter-counter-battery tactics and artful deception to keep that important firepower alive. The ammo supply obviously proved to be difficult.

What surprised me is the high survivability of the RPVs under those high-threat conditions. I really would like to know more about how they were employed. Flying usually low in close cooperation with all those ground-based assets, I guess:

Organic collection assets were limited to [various] recce teams augmented by forwardobservers and liaison personnel [UNITA], and electronic intelligence (ELINT).

That ELINT proved to be unvaluable doesn't surprise me that much. It is easy to be sloppy in that regard, and the enemy all too often listens and has also often the codes. At least WWII provides countless examples of that, and in the heat of battle people tend to throw even good rulebooks away. Sometimes, as this example shows it can even be completely unforced errors. Making the ELINT business harder for the enemy (and easier for yourself) should really be an important task for training and technology.

[text] is mine.

[JMA]

A mine and ambush protected school bus in northern SWA/Nambia during the border war.



If it is considered important... the money will be found.