Lesson id'd, lesson overlooked?
JMA,
A good catch and reading through it I found this - note written in 2000 by a USMC officer:See pgs.52-53.Given the proliferation of mines throughout the Third World, all future U.S. military vehicles should incorporate similar mine protection features as a priority force protection issue.
davidbfpo
Yes and what did they do? They ignored him... and the rest is history.Originally Posted by davidbfpo
Last edited by davidbfpo; 07-16-2011 at 05:08 PM. Reason: Fix quotes
The knowledge was there -- to no avail...
The US Army bought some CASSPIR Mk IIs in 1999 as a result of a Foreign Articles Test statute that had taken years to get through Congress (who are very much into a "Buy American" attitude regardless of the fact that other people make good or better stuff)...
IIRC, they had earlier -- in the early 80s -- bought a Nyala and wanted to buy some Buffels but the combination of Track-centric Armot Officers and Congressionally beloved and sponsored contractors defeated the idea of producing any here. Until...
The knowledge of need was there, it got sat upon.
You can't beat the procurement system. There are too many vested interests and...The US Army bought some CASSPIR Mk IIs in 1999 as a result of a Foreign Articles Test statute that had taken years to get through Congress (who are very much into a "Buy American" attitude regardless of the fact that other people make good or better stuff)...
IIRC, they had earlier -- in the early 80s -- bought a Nyala and wanted to buy some Buffels but the combination of Track-centric Armot Officers and Congressionally beloved and sponsored contractors defeated the idea of producing any here. Until...
The knowledge of need was there, it got sat upon.
I think we touched on this before. It should have been done at local (Afghanistan) level where a workshop could have been set up to do the work locally. Civvies or military who cares but what you need is some staff (foreman/welders/mechanics/etc) some armour plate (roqtuf or equivalent) and the appropriate chassis or drive train if you settle on a monocoque design) and some of that cash the US is throwing around all over Afghanistan and you are in business.
Had this started in 2006/7 then by now there would have been a improvements so lets say Mark 1 to say Mark 5. You set up a rotation to allow vehicles to be recalled for an upgrade to the latest Mark as improvements are signed off.
The ANA and ANP can be cut in on the deal and when ISAF force levels reduce the vehicle can be refurbished and then reissued to ANA/ANP.
It is easier than it appears. All you need to find one of those hard-charging officers who won't take no for an answer
Cabbages and Kings of the Road...
I certainly agree I'm pretty sure we could and would do that in an existential situation. As you probably know, it was done, ad hoc, and on a unit by unit thus small scale in both theaters to an extent much as was done on a far larger scale in Viet Nam (LINK). Though the buried IED problem existed in VN, it was not as pervasive, thus no significant mine protection. Not many urban areas nor even much Bush so not that much close-in and heavyside protection either.
Still, today, I'll have to defend the Troops by mentioning the overwhelming, cumbersome US Army bureaucracy -- most of which is Congressionally induced -- is too unwieldy to do that lacking more cause than was extant in Afghanistan or Iraq.Easier provided someone not risk averse has the authority to turn on the money spigot and fifty people are not looking over a shoulder to make sure it's spent 'properly.' This after all is the nation where a then sitting President, asked about a tax cut in a booming economy said "We'd give it back to you if we knew you'd spend it right..."It is easier than it appears. All you need to find one of those hard-charging officers who won't take no for an answer
As to the hard chargers. Hmmm. Worked for several of those. Often lot of flash and dash, brave to a fault, aggressive, forward thinkers, some good guys, some arrogant ar$#'oles...
Gotta watch 'em all though, the long and the short and the tall -- good, bad and those in between. If you do not, they tend to get a lot of people killed -- unnecessarily.
I feel I need to emphasise that this local solution (being the local construction of mine and ambush protected vehicles) is really pretty simple and does not require national existential circumstances.I certainly agree I'm pretty sure we could and would do that in an existential situation. As you probably know, it was done, ad hoc, and on a unit by unit thus small scale in both theaters to an extent much as was done on a far larger scale in Viet Nam (LINK). Though the buried IED problem existed in VN, it was not as pervasive, thus no significant mine protection. Not many urban areas nor even much Bush so not that much close-in and heavyside protection either.
Still, today, I'll have to defend the Troops by mentioning the overwhelming, cumbersome US Army bureaucracy -- most of which is Congressionally induced -- is too unwieldy to do that lacking more cause than was extant in Afghanistan or Iraq.Easier provided someone not risk averse has the authority to turn on the money spigot and fifty people are not looking over a shoulder to make sure it's spent 'properly.' This after all is the nation where a then sitting President, asked about a tax cut in a booming economy said "We'd give it back to you if we knew you'd spend it right..."
As to the hard chargers. Hmmm. Worked for several of those. Often lot of flash and dash, brave to a fault, aggressive, forward thinkers, some good guys, some arrogant ar$#'oles...
Gotta watch 'em all though, the long and the short and the tall -- good, bad and those in between. If you do not, they tend to get a lot of people killed -- unnecessarily.
Like with IEDs one needs to accept that they will learn and adapt to what you do and in turn you need to respond by modifying the vehicles in double quick time. Its a no brainer that Kabul or Kandahar are the places where this should be carried out. Modify/adapt/fix/improve/upgrade the vehicles fast. What other way can this be done other than in-country?
The solution is obvious given that these vehicles would be developed for local Afghan circumstances and not exported along with the troop draw-down (but rather handed over to the ANP/ANA).
The only problem (probably insurmountable) is how to side-step the formidable procurement machine the the commercial lobbyists who would see control and profits slipping through their fingers. The lives of soldiers have never been more important than "the process" or a juicy government procurement contract.
Ask not for whom the bell tolls...
And I obviously need to emphasize that you have not dealt with the ponderous, inflexible bureaucracy that is the US government of which the US Army is a heirarchial, excessively conformity oriented extension.I totally agree -- you don't have to convince me. You could probably work on convincing those members of the US Congress (and they are many...) who think the US should NOT be in Afghanistan at all and try to hobble efforts there in any way they can to include reinforcing that conformity thing...The solution is obvious given that these vehicles would be developed for local Afghan circumstances and not exported along with the troop draw-down (but rather handed over to the ANP/ANA).
You may also need to work on those members of the US Armed Forces (all ranks...) who are there but either do not want to be or do not agree with their mission and are not about to risk their 'careers' by being innovative in an organization that too often punishes innovation and initiative.
That kind of stuff is perfectly normal in most nations in peacetime. Only in an existential conflict do those chafing, foolish problems get significantly reduced -- they do not ever go away; they are human failings and we had them to a minor extent in WW II (which wasn't really existential for us though it was at least partly treated as such and thus was big enough to eliminate some of that idiocy...).Yes. You answered your own objections.The only problem (probably insurmountable) is how to side-step the formidable procurement machine the the commercial lobbyists who would see control and profits slipping through their fingers. The lives of soldiers have never been more important than "the process" or a juicy government procurement contract.
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