I hope this isn't too far off topic but didn't some of the old tanks, M-48s etc have rounded bottom hulls the intention of which was protection against anti-tank mines? I think Bradleys and Abrams have flat bottom hulls. Is this a case of forgetting?
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Not forgetting as much as a different and better riding suspension system (Torsion bars that run across the hull) favored flat bottoms and -- foolishly -- it was decided that the improved suspension merited taking a chance that land mines would be less used in the future. That didn't work out too well...
There was also the factor of increased interior roominess, important in peacetime, not so much in wartime, favoring the flat bottoms. As did production and maintenance costs, also a peacetime concern...
Still newer hydropneumatic and hydraulic suspensions will allow a return to sloped or rounded bottoms. Today's shallow 'V's work better than the old rounded hulls. Everything goes in cycles...
Moderator's Note: the cited interview is not available in English and appeared in an Austrian military periodical. Now if anyone wants to volunteer and supply an English translation SWC will be indebted to you.
From the interview of Breytenbach in the ÖMZ 1/2009:
I always wondered why the SADF didn't try to cut off in earnest the enemy brigades which relied for practically all their needs on the very long and difficult support lines from western Angola. As this interview shows some of the SADF officers, among them Breytenbach wanted to do exactly that.Jedenfalls gab es unter uns Obristen einige, die dafür plädierten, den Vormarsch auf dem Westufer des cuitos einfach fortzusetzen, um cuito cuanevale vom Westen her anzugreifen, d.h. in den Rücken des feindes zugelangen. Dadurch würde das vorgeschobene Logistikzentrum des Gegners und, vielleicht noch wichtiger, auch die einzige Brücke erobert werden.
Die südafrikanische Brigade wäre dann genau auf der Versorgungs-
und Rückzugslinie des Gegners platziert, und dieser wäre von seinem Nachschub abgeschnitten.
Die Brigaden selbst waren ja schon allein durch das 32. Bataillon am Lomba aufgehalten worden. Doch sie konnten dauerhaft dort verharren, solange der Nachschub floss oder sie sich auf cuito cuanevale zurückziehen konnten. Würden wir cuito cuanevale nehmen, wären sie auf der falschen flussseite
ohne Nachschub gestrandet, würde bald kein fahrzeug mehr fahren können, und die Truppe, ohne dass wir einen Schuss abfeuerten, würde liegen bleiben. Was nützt ein Panzer ohne Treibstoff? Er wird zur metallenen hülle, dessen Besatzung sich bei einem Ausbruch zu fuß einer Umgebung voller UNITAKämpfer aussetzen müsste, die ihnen mit Begeisterung, v.a. den
Kubanern, die Kehlen durchschneiden würden. So hätten fünf Brigaden restlos vernichtet werden können.
Basically he says that some SA politicians didn't want to humilate the enemy too heavily to enable a "win-win" diplomatic solution, crossing deeply into the military strategy and tactis of the campaign. So instead of annihilation they just wanted a push-back. (Breytenbach accepts the supremacy of politics, but that it should limit itself to the political strategy. Overall he sounds pretty Clausewitzian in many of his answers)ÖMZ: Was hinderte Sie daran, genau dies zu tun? Doch nicht etwa politische Intervention?
Breytenbach: Vernichtung der feindlichen Kräfte war leider nicht auf der Tagesordnung, v.a. nicht beim Außenminister. Die Brigaden sollte lediglich nach cuito cuanevale zurückgedrängt werden, der Ausgangsstellung ihrer Offensive. Man hielt es für politisch klug, der fAPLA die Demütigung zu ersparen, fast ihre ganze Armee durch eine einzige südafrikanische Brigade vernichtet zu sehen. hier kamen die „win win“-Parole und die diplomatische Schiene durch, die nun ins militärische Umfeld transplantiert werden musste, egal ob der militärische „Patient“ diese außergewöhnliche Behandlung annehmen wollte oder nicht.
Wie man so schön sagt: Der Rest ist Geschichte. Die Südafrikaner saßen mit dem handicap am Verhandlungstisch, dass die fAPLA-Kräfte durch unsere eigenen Politiker vor der endgültigen Niederlage gerettet wurden.
In the end this political choice backfired on the SA diplomacy, as the Cubans, FAPLA and SWAPO could claim victory, retain their military strenght and take over the country after sitting out the process in their secret bases which were of no interest to the UNO.
Of course I have no idea how feasible the destruction of the five brigades could have been and how things would have shaped up after a devastating outcome for FAPLA.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 07-21-2011 at 05:18 PM. Reason: Add Mod's Note & PM to author.
From my readings on this forum and elsewhere I am lead to believe that many foreign policy and military professionals seem to conceptualize the political and the military as separate and separable domains. In reading recently about the Angolan Civil War I came upon Chester Crocker’s quote thatI was gobsmacked that this should be considered unusual.[r]eading the Cubans is yet another art form. They are prepared for both war and peace.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 07-21-2011 at 06:10 PM. Reason: Crocker quote in quote marks
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
If I read Breytenbach correctly he didn't agree how deeply the political interventions went and he wasn't sure if the politicians grasped the effects of their choosen military means. Personally I do think that there will be never a "solution" for handling the interplay of both spheres "correctly".
He seems to agree of course on the supremacy of political realm, and behaved accordingly if they demanded thus. Of course when he had leeway and no direct orders, which happened quite often, he did what he thought best for the SA effort.
Last edited by Firn; 07-21-2011 at 05:58 PM.
In English:Some among the colonels argued for continuing the advance on the west riverside of the cuitos, to attack cuito cuanevale. This would capture the forward logistical node and -probably more important- also the only bridge.Jedenfalls gab es unter uns Obristen einige, die dafür plädierten, den Vormarsch auf dem Westufer des cuitos einfach fortzusetzen, um cuito cuanevale vom Westen her anzugreifen, d.h. in den Rücken des feindes zugelangen. Dadurch würde das vorgeschobene Logistikzentrum des Gegners und, vielleicht noch wichtiger, auch die einzige Brücke erobert werden.
Die südafrikanische Brigade wäre dann genau auf der Versorgungs-
und Rückzugslinie des Gegners platziert, und dieser wäre von seinem Nachschub abgeschnitten.
The South African brigade would then be cituated on the supply and withdrawal route of the opponent, and this one would be cut off from supply.
(Wow, their locations sound dirty!)
In EnglishThe brigades themselves are already stopped by the 32. Bn at the Lomba. But they could stay there permanently, as long as they received supply and were able to withdraw to cuito cuanevale.Die Brigaden selbst waren ja schon allein durch das 32. Bataillon am Lomba aufgehalten worden. Doch sie konnten dauerhaft dort verharren, solange der Nachschub floss oder sie sich auf cuito cuanevale zurückziehen konnten.
Würden wir cuito cuanevale nehmen, wären sie auf der falschen flussseite ohne Nachschub gestrandet, würde bald kein fahrzeug mehr fahren können, und die Truppe, ohne dass wir einen Schuss abfeuerten, würde liegen bleiben.
Was nützt ein Panzer ohne Treibstoff? Er wird zur metallenen hülle, dessen Besatzung sich bei einem Ausbruch zu fuß einer Umgebung voller UNITAKämpfer aussetzen müsste, die ihnen mit Begeisterung, v.a. den
Kubanern, die Kehlen durchschneiden würden. So hätten fünf Brigaden restlos vernichtet werden können.
If we would capture cuito cuanevale, they would be stranded on the wrong side of the river without supply, soon no vehicle would be able to drive any more, and the troops would - without us firing a single shot - be stuck.
Of what use is a tank without fuel? It becomes a metallic hull, whose crew would in a breakout exposed to an environment full of UNITA fighters who would with enthusiasm cut their throats (especially of Cubans). This way five brigades could have been annihilated entirely.
In English:ÖMZ: What did them keep from doing exactly this? Was it political intervention?ÖMZ: Was hinderte Sie daran, genau dies zu tun? Doch nicht etwa politische Intervention?
Breytenbach: Vernichtung der feindlichen Kräfte war leider nicht auf der Tagesordnung, v.a. nicht beim Außenminister. Die Brigaden sollte lediglich nach cuito cuanevale zurückgedrängt werden, der Ausgangsstellung ihrer Offensive. Man hielt es für politisch klug, der fAPLA die Demütigung zu ersparen, fast ihre ganze Armee durch eine einzige südafrikanische Brigade vernichtet zu sehen. hier kamen die „win win“-Parole und die diplomatische Schiene durch, die nun ins militärische Umfeld transplantiert werden musste, egal ob der militärische „Patient“ diese außergewöhnliche Behandlung annehmen wollte oder nicht.
Wie man so schön sagt: Der Rest ist Geschichte. Die Südafrikaner saßen mit dem handicap am Verhandlungstisch, dass die fAPLA-Kräfte durch unsere eigenen Politiker vor der endgültigen Niederlage gerettet wurden.
Breytenbach: Destruction of enemy forces was not on the agenda, especially not for the foreign secretary. The brigades were only to be pushed back to cuito cuanevale, the starting point of their offensive. They considered it politically wise to spare the FAPLA the humiliation of having almost their entire army being destroyed by a single South African brigade.
Here came the "win win" rallying cry and the diplomatic venue into effect, which now had to be transplanted into the military environment - no matter whether this military "patient" was willing to accept this unusual treatment or not.
The rest is history. The South Africans sat at the negotiating table with the handicap that the FAPLA forces had been rescued by our own politicians.End of English
(Yes, the guy really talks this weird!)
Last edited by davidbfpo; 07-21-2011 at 06:51 PM. Reason: Text in italics to show clearly the helpful translation
Shadows in the Sand
This is the story of a Kavango tracker who served for six years with Koevoet
(‘Crowbar’), the elite South African Police anti-terrorist unit, during the South West
African–Angolan bush war of the ’80s. Most white team leaders lasted only two years;
the black trackers walked the tracks for years. Sisingi Kamongo tells the story of the
50 or so firefights he was involved in; he survived five anti-personnel mine and POMZ
explosions and an RPG rocket on his Casspir APC vehicle; he was wounded three
times; he tells of the trackers looking for the shadows on the ground, facing ambush
and AP mines at every turn; he tells of the art of tracking ... where dust can tell
time. Kamongo’s story is supported by two accounts from renowned Koevoet team
leaders, Herman Grobler and Francois du Toit—a powerful collection of experiences
from South Africa’s most successful counter-insurgency unit.
• The first-ever account of the bush war by a non-white member of the South
African security forces
• A unique, previously untold perspective of the bush war, by an on-the-ground
tracker
• A powerful, harrowing read; the tension is palpable
A simple Google Translation gives the gist of what is being said.
The aim was to send in a brigade (never numbering more than 3,000) to stop an Angolan division overrunning UNITA. This was achieved at the Lomba river where the Angolan (FAPLA) 47 Brigade was destroyed and their 59 and 21 Brigades badly mauled. The mission as given by the politicians had been achieved. (You probably need to read the then Chief of the Defence Force Gen Jannie Geldenhuys' book "At the Front" where he explains it simply.I always wondered why the SADF didn't try to cut off in earnest the enemy brigades which relied for practically all their needs on the very long and difficult support lines from western Angola. As this interview shows some of the SADF officers, among them Breytenbach wanted to do exactly that.
Basically he says that some SA politicians didn't want to humilate the enemy too heavily to enable a "win-win" diplomatic solution, crossing deeply into the military strategy and tactis of the campaign. So instead of annihilation they just wanted a push-back. (Breytenbach accepts the supremacy of politics, but that it should limit itself to the political strategy. Overall he sounds pretty Clausewitzian in many of his answers)
In the end this political choice backfired on the SA diplomacy, as the Cubans, FAPLA and SWAPO could claim victory, retain their military strenght and take over the country after sitting out the process in their secret bases which were of no interest to the UNO.
Of course I have no idea how feasible the destruction of the five brigades could have been and how things would have shaped up after a devastating outcome for FAPLA.
Of course at colonel level (and below) there were those who saw only the military opportunity on offer to annihilate the Angolan division and to hell with any "limit of exploitation" and not what the politicians refer to as seeing "the big picture".
As to the propaganda potential of South Africa not pressing home an attack on Cuito Cuanavale to the Russians/Cubans/Angolans yes, it was always there and remember that in every operation before and after the "world" media happily repeated the line fed them that South Africa was the aggressor and the UN always demanded they withdraw their forces from Angola immediately.
So the fact is that the mission was accomplished in that the Angolan advance was halted with significant loses. That the "colonels" were not allowed to exploit the opportunity to annihilate what remained of the Angolan division does not constitute a defeat. Whether the soldiers like it or not the politicians make those decisions, right or wrong.
Note: a good lesson learned here was that in the absence of air superiority maximum use of artillery is required and was use to devastating effect.
Last edited by JMA; 07-21-2011 at 09:43 PM.
It would be interesting to learn how they believed to be able to supply the brigade behind the OPFOR better than OPFOR would be able to supply its spearhead?
This is the classic problem of encirclements.
Yes, and also a question of time.
South Africa was restricted to reasonably quick in-and-out forays into Angola where battle-groups or brigades were used (while smaller stuff was in there all of the time). It was necessary to get in, do the business and be out or on the way out by the time an international political row blew up.
There was no way that a South African force would be allowed (by the politicians) to sit astride the Angolan/Cuban supply route for any length of time as it would then be portrayed as an occupation rather than a raid.
Last edited by JMA; 07-21-2011 at 10:00 PM.
Further to the Cuito Cuanavale debate here is a view from opposition elements within Namibia - “THE DECISIVE BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALE” IS A HOAX
As they say it all comes out in the wash...
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
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