South Africa's COIN war in SWA/Namibia/Angola

[JMA]

Moderator's Note: the cited interview is not available in English and appeared in an Austrian military periodical. Now if anyone wants to volunteer and supply an English translation SWC will be indebted to you.

A simple Google Translation gives the gist of what is being said.

I always wondered why the SADF didn't try to cut off in earnest the enemy brigades which relied for practically all their needs on the very long and difficult support lines from western Angola. As this interview shows some of the SADF officers, among them Breytenbach wanted to do exactly that.

Basically he says that some SA politicians didn't want to humilate the enemy too heavily to enable a "win-win" diplomatic solution, crossing deeply into the military strategy and tactis of the campaign. So instead of annihilation they just wanted a push-back. (Breytenbach accepts the supremacy of politics, but that it should limit itself to the political strategy. Overall he sounds pretty Clausewitzian in many of his answers)

In the end this political choice backfired on the SA diplomacy, as the Cubans, FAPLA and SWAPO could claim victory, retain their military strenght and take over the country after sitting out the process in their secret bases which were of no interest to the UNO.

Of course I have no idea how feasible the destruction of the five brigades could have been and how things would have shaped up after a devastating outcome for FAPLA.

The aim was to send in a brigade (never numbering more than 3,000) to stop an Angolan division overrunning UNITA. This was achieved at the Lomba river where the Angolan (FAPLA) 47 Brigade was destroyed and their 59 and 21 Brigades badly mauled. The mission as given by the politicians had been achieved. (You probably need to read the then Chief of the Defence Force Gen Jannie Geldenhuys' book "At the Front" where he explains it simply.

Of course at colonel level (and below) there were those who saw only the military opportunity on offer to annihilate the Angolan division and to hell with any "limit of exploitation" and not what the politicians refer to as seeing "the big picture".

As to the propaganda potential of South Africa not pressing home an attack on Cuito Cuanavale to the Russians/Cubans/Angolans yes, it was always there and remember that in every operation before and after the "world" media happily repeated the line fed them that South Africa was the aggressor and the UN always demanded they withdraw their forces from Angola immediately.

So the fact is that the mission was accomplished in that the Angolan advance was halted with significant loses. That the "colonels" were not allowed to exploit the opportunity to annihilate what remained of the Angolan division does not constitute a defeat. Whether the soldiers like it or not the politicians make those decisions, right or wrong.

Note: a good lesson learned here was that in the absence of air superiority maximum use of artillery is required and was use to devastating effect.