Fire with Fire

[Xenophon]

It seems to me that, despite the fact that we routinely come out on top of direct engagements, we're playing into the enemy's game so far as kinetic operations are concerned. Simply put, the experienced insurgent's strategy and tactics put him at an inherent advantage to our classically western forces.

Absolutely correct.

Our doctrine creates a large, concentrated force (especially with vehicles) that's easy to spot and hit (though admittedly very difficult to destroy), his heavily dependent on supporting fires and thus severely handicapped in fulfilling the light infantryman's job of closing with destroying the enemy. This creates several problems:

*We spend a massive amount of money to achieve relatively little effect, thus giving an already reluctant nation further incentive to back out
*We are more likely to cause civilian casualties
*It is much harder for us to fully pursue/destroy the enemy and hold the rugged terrain in which he operates.

The solution I propose is to create an eastern style kinetic force.

Also correct. However, I would submit that we CAN'T create an "eastern" style force due to the simple fact that we are not eastern. Militaries reflect the culture from which they arise. Our military reflects our culture, theirs reflects theirs. We can learn their lesson, but we can't be them.


Two things about your proposed force. One good thing, one bad thing.

The good thing: It's a fantastic idea. We need a force like that.

The bad thing: You're almost 235 years too late. You have heard of the Marine Corps, right? That's exactly how we're supposed to be operating, and have operated in the past. Lately, we've just forgotten it.

[Ken White]

I'm the Official Rainer Upon Parades...

However, good news -- the forecast is for only light and scattered showers. As Xenophon said, you have a great idea. Not only the Marines but the Army used to operate in that mode. We all forgot how in the relentless pursuit of safety and mediocrity...

I see some problems with your good idea. Cued to "How to raise the force:"

(1) Get a LTC. COLs are the guardians of the Institution that is the Army. Most -- not all -- are able to think outside the box but know better than to do it out loud. LTCs will throw over the traces now and then.

(2) Good on the size but don't get OCs (they may act as insurgents but it's scripted...). Get people from the 10th, 82d and 101st -- they're used to operating on foot. Why Field Grades? Makes no sense. I understand the Cadre aspect but many -- not all -- Field Grades will believe your effort is beneath their dignity. Cap your NCOs at SFC / PSG. There are MSGs and above that can and would do that but HRC will not let you pick and choose, they will force you to take what the pipeline offers, period. With SFCs and below, you've got a larger population and more flexibility. HRC might be told by someone at Vice Chief level or higher to especially man your unit on a trail basis but when that Godfather leaves, you'll be forced to revert to the pipeline for fills. I've seen almost a dozen 'special' fill units over the years -- only two or three have lasted more than two fill cycles (and they are constantly under threat). Makes HRC's job harder...

(3) Good idea.

(4) Why Rangers? Ranger school graduates prove they can tough out things and survive mind games, be good M240 gunners and not a lot more. Combat experience is good -- provided it's mostly Infantry experience (that foot mobile thing again...). You're right on the age aspect. You want motivated folks regardless of 'qualifications.' Those are often a promise that goes unfulfilled. Motivated people OTOH will keep going. You can train most anyone who's motivated -- sometimes it is impossible to motivate the most highly trained or qualified individuals...

Your Tactics are okay. Careful with the civilian clothes bit, you might have a PR problem there and it's not really necessary. Caches will work. Firepower is adequate. Maturity is vastly overrated as a direct combat attribute. For SF and some jobs / units it has merit, for what you propose, combat go-getters, not so much. The immortality of 19-20 year olds is a better combat multiplier than the maturity of old married guys who want to go home to Momma.

What you have suggested is what ALL the maneuver battalions should be doing.

They are precluded from doing that due to excessive concern for casualties (all types, both sides), inadequate number of Troops for the area to be covered (hence the excessive use of vehicles in a typical US Army effort to substitute 'technology' for training and manpower), Marginally trained elements that knowledgeable commanders are afraid to trust out on their own. Plus a lot of other little things along that line. Most have some validity but are overdone due to excessive caution. Essentially, the ability to train and do what you suggest and I have written here and to do those things reasonably well exists in every BCT in the Army -- so the capability is there. The will to do it is an entirely different issue.

That's the sort of thing maneuver units were doing in Viet Nam for the first couple of years, after that, excessive caution took over. After Viet Nam, those really elementary skills you cite that should be prevalent in any decent Infantry Battalion -- any competent Infantryman -- migrated, in the US Army, to the Special Warfare community (it's a long, sad and not pretty story ) and, as Xenophon said, we forgot how to what we get paid to do...

Good thinking. Don't stop!