Also, this would be distinct from any SF that I know of simply because it'll be using more men and it's not relying so heavily on extremely experienced NCO's to provide the bulk of the manpower.
Also, this would be distinct from any SF that I know of simply because it'll be using more men and it's not relying so heavily on extremely experienced NCO's to provide the bulk of the manpower.
Is this ....
self-conflicting ?from IVI
While they could indeed engage in local training operations or SF/Ranger style raids, their primary task would be to act as hunter/killers in order to successfully clear and hold terrain.
It would seem that the emphasis for hunter/killers would be to "clear" enemy personnel (esp. military and political cadre infrastructure), and "hold" local population groups ("holding" in the sense of exercising indirect control via popular mobilization). Holding terrain seems contrary to your basic concept.
You may find the discussion in this thread, Is it time for psuedo operations in A-Stan?... (started by who else than Jon Custis), useful in developing your hunter/killer concept (whether "Eastern", "Western" or whatever works in the end).
Be forewarned that when you get into unconventional direct action operations, the legal intensity increases. So, you had best plan on learning some applicable operational law along the way. There are legal pitfalls in these operations (and what clothes you wear is only one of them). A risk-averse SJA will kill your plan in a hurry.
Regards
Mike
I sent a PM about Poole.
About Jagdkommandos:
The German army had a successful recipe against Eastern European partisans, but it usually lacked the right (young) men for it.
The concept included area sweeps (such as 3 divisions sweeping a 30x50km area, with all men in units of less than 80 men each (combat troops and support troops) if the area was too infested with partisans. No heavy weapons (apparently not even 81mm mortars).
The more regular concept for average partisan problems included - besides security troops for infrastructure protection - two components:
1) Patrols on horse or off-road vehicles
2) Jagdkommandos
The latter were meant to be 40-60 men strong and supposed to live, hunt, ambush, recce and destroy the enemy like partisans.
The leaders had to meet special requirements. The most successful ones were so-called "outsiders", soldiers whose personnel files included remarks such as "difficult subordinate".
The focus wasn't on combined arms, but on "nature people" instinct - preferred were apparently civilian hunters, forest workers and such.
The equipment was limited to (assault) rifles, submachineguns, hand grenades, food for several days, backpacks. Machine guns and mortars were usually not necessary. Light radios and recce riders were the means of communication.
The patrols (Jagdstreife) were meant to find the enemy, then the hunting teams (Jagdkommando) were supposed to intercept the hostiles and ambush them.
The effect was that their combined employment took away the freedom of action from partisans and turn them into hunted ones.
This all is from one book published in the mid-50's by an ex-officer (with help of others) who was responsible for German Army tactical lessons learned in the general staff (OKH); Eike Middeldorf.
The problem with this Jagdkommando concept was of course that suitable personnel was short in '42-'45 even in front-line units, and rear area security units were typically manned with old (35+ years) or foreign soldiers, often with captured equipment.
The only infantry divisions available for sweeps were typically second-rate allied divisions.
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