McCuen: a "missing" thread?

[Cavguy]

Moderator's Note

This is a new thread, started 15th June 2010.The work of McCuen has appeared many times before and two regular posters: JMA & jmm99 think he deserves his own thread. A search found some previous posts and some have been copied to here. Apologies if they appear alone here.

davidbfpo

Eden,

Excellent question which I won't be able to answer in detail because of my day job, so here's a stab.

I submit for an operational design I'll call option 4. I also drafted a commander’s intent for Afghanistan based on what should be done based on my article. Having been to Afghanistan, you can tell me if it is feasible or not.

1) You must secure your urban centers. I agree with John McCuen that you don't uncover your semi-secure urban base to chase insurgents in the wild. The enemy wants you to do that so he can infiltrate and begin building the political and operational cells in the now-undermanned cities while you chase his bands in the bush, and then look back to find your cities on fire. I think this is what the Taliban is doing now - political organization as a prelude to military organization in Kabul and Kandahar. If your capital(s) aren't secure, then nothing is. Identify the critical symbolic and economically important points and begin to secure them fully.

2) I sometimes relate the operational design used to secure Ramadi (which I think is transferrable) to a maneuver battle. We "fixed" the enemy by building combat outposts in "hot spots" downtown - fighting an attrition battle (reducing his force) but also limiting his ability to maneuver (hence the "fix"). We then "flanked" him in the permissive areas, focusing on securing them using clear, hold, build, and gaining local auxillaries capable of providing security. Once we built enough force, the auxiliaries were able to exert influence to clear the "hot spots".

Also like a maneuver battle, you have to look for the unexpected opportunities. In maneuver battles we would designate NAI's to identify enemy decision points and/or opportunities, and position forces to react accordingly. In COIN it is no different, but instead of terrain based NAI's, you are looking for human terrain based NAI's. Just like a maneuver battle, you have to be positioned to exploit the opening when it is identified, which allows you to truly get inside the enemy's rear and really unhinge him.

3) This brings me to a reserve. I would argue that it is always good to have a reserve, given enough troops to adequately "hold". The key is that you must have some forces able to respond to developing opportunities on short notice. I hate to cop-out, but METT-TC applies to the size and composition of the reserve. However, if not employed the reserve should be employed to tasks such as building local capacity. This could be a combination Airmoble and Cavalry-like striking force.

4) Finally, you need a victory - something to give people - local and international - hope. Tal Afar and Ramadi were those examples. We have to find someplace and make an example out of it. Note also that the Iraq narrative didn’t turn until violence was arrested in *Baghdad*. As long as daylight prision breaks occur in Kabul the population won’t believe in their government’s ability to protect them.


Immediate action: Afghanistan:

Without having been there, something along the following would be my immediate operational plan for Afghanistan given limited forces.

Purpose: Coalition and Afghan forces defeat insurgent political and military networks in major population centers to deny the Taliban access to the urban population.

Key Tasks:
- Implement population control measures to prevent insurgent freedom of movement and deny logistical supply. This includes identity cards, food rationing, biometrics, vehicle licensing, census registration, and possibly rationing of key goods as appropriate.
- Develop host nation institutions to counter enemy political mobilization.
- Develop competent national security forces augmented by local auxiliaries to prevent insurgent infiltration into population centers, backed up by on call coalition force QRF backup. Focus on a neighborhood by neighborhood security zone plan.
- Conduct operations to disrupt rural insurgent forces and organizations to prevent reinforcement of urban organizations.
- Creation of competent local administration and leadership.

Endstate:

Major cities of Afghanistan secured by local forces, capably administered by local leaders, and free of major insurgent activity. Coalition and ANA forces postured to expand into smaller towns and villages, to secure economic infrastructure to expand security. Taliban forces disrupted and unable to influence major population centers.

Once this phase is complete, fight moves to the rural areas.

So in summary:

1) Main Effort: Focus on securing Kabul and Kandahar, and rooting out insurgent political and military cells. Establish population control to deny insurgent freedom of movement. Develop capable military and political organizations to maintain security and free coalition troops (clear, hold, build). Focused IO campaign to show improvement in the key cities.

2) Supporting Effort: Mobile strike force(s) "fix" the enemy in the rural areas, conducting targeted operations to keep them attritted and unable to mass to mobile formation status. Goal (at this point) is not to secure and win the populace, but to keep the enemy from influencing the city effort, and preventing establishment of "base areas" and sanctuary, keeping the enemy off balance and unable to expand effectively while the cities are secured. This may involve strongpoint/outpost operations to act as "fly bait" for insurgent forces. Units work to develop local and tribal security alliances as a secondary effort. (Kitson style intel driven operations)


As with all war-winning plans derived in 30 minutes or less – I stand by for the council to tell me why what I proposed is infeasible and what it is missing.

Niel

[Cavguy]

CavGuy:

For the ME and South Asia where cities and capitals are a recent phenomenon, the certainty is far less if it exists at all -- though there is no question that AQ, The Talib, et.al. are smart enough to use that parameter as a psyops tool even if they know better. Rural populations worldwide don't think nearly as highly of cities as urban dwellers do, nor do they care much for or have much respect for urban dwellers. That is particularly true among mountain folks.

Pakistan is indeed an example of the principle -- it has suffered such bombings in the cities since 1947. It's still there...

Added note: % of Population urban; Iraq > 70; Afghanistan ~ 24 , Pakistan ~ 34%

No disagreement it's different, but the principle is the same - your urban centers, where the government is, have to be relatively stable. 100% security is never possible, but you have to avoid what is happening now, which is the growing roots of Taleban cells sprouting in Kabul and Kandahar.

I highly recommend John McCuen's take on this from his 1963 book, Art of Counterinsurgency War - he talks in depth about "uncovering your base" while chasing enemy into his sanctuaries, thus allowing him to destabilize your base.

[Ken White]

Did in fact agree with him when I bought his book at the SF bookstore in 1966 -- until I tried apply that to Viet Nam and realized that a predominately rural nation with no particular concern for its cities doesn't react that way. Not at all. He is correct in this:

"...he talks in depth about "uncovering your base" while chasing enemy into his sanctuaries, thus allowing him to destabilize your base.

but that presumes there is such a base in the cities; in Afghanistan, unlike Iraq, there is none. Nor was there one in Viet Nam and only when we finally realized that and worked the rural areas did we start achieving any success in the COIN fight there.

He also said this in that book:
""To protect oneself against the methodical, crushing body blows of the revolutionaries and to be able to strike them in their most vital parts, it is necessary to fight them on their own battlefields-in their own media. It is necessary to parry the revolutionary weapons, adopt them, and then turn them against the revolutionaries."" (Emphasis added / kw).

I suggest that is more germane to Afghanistan and that what worked in Iraq will have limited -- not none, just limited -- applicability in Afghanistan.

No disagreement it's different, but the principle is the same - your urban centers, where the government is, have to be relatively stable. 100% security is never possible, but you have to avoid what is happening now, which is the growing roots of Taleban cells sprouting in Kabul and Kandahar.

They aren't sprouting in either city -- they never left. The Afghan intel and security guys can and will root 'em out (they're doing a pretty good job, BTW) but, unlike us, they aren't going to worry about the minor players, appearances, making a name for themselves or near term fixes; their concern is for long term stability and they'll get it in their own way. They will have to do it, we cannot (and should not even try, it'll merely set us up for failure) and they won't do it on our timetable -- nor should they.

Kabul and Kandahar have rarely been "relatively stable" over the centuries; the artificial domestic tranquility imposed by Saddam in Iraq or the Shah in Iran have never existed in Afghanistan and the cities have never had the pull they do in less harsh terrain. Add to that that mountain people would rather fight than eat and any attempt to concentrate effort on the cities in Afghanistan -- as was necessary in Iraq -- will create problems...

[SWJ Blog]

Secure the cities first?

Entry Excerpt:

Taking inspiration from Dave’s “Back Off” post, I was disturbed to read this Huffington Post commentary highlighted at the always readable Abu Muqawama. The assessment comes from a human rights researcher in Kabul asserting the Taliban effectively control Kandahar outside the gates of our bases. It would be presumptuous to rule on the accuracy of the claim, but the assessment (echoed elsewhere) sparks an interesting set of questions about our potential courses of action in Afghanistan.

Noted classical counterinsurgency author and Vietnam War veteran Jack McCuen argued in his excellent book The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War that chasing guerrillas around the countryside while leaving the critical provincial and national population centers uncovered played into the hands of the insurgent. McCuen argued allowing the insurgent to establish networks, shadow governments, recruitment cells, and support networks in the cities created a far greater risk than the loss of rural hamlets. Motivated by McCuen’s book and some other reads, I suggested consideration of a city based approach in a Small Wars Council thread about a year ago. COIN savant David Kilcullen suggested the same strategy in a New Yorker interview not long thereafter. Kilcullen articulated the problem far better than I:

“Meanwhile, the population in major towns and villages is vulnerable because we are off elsewhere chasing the enemy main-force guerrillas, allowing terrorist and insurgent cells based in the populated areas to intimidate people where they live. As an example, eighty per cent of people in the southern half of Afghanistan live in one of two places: Kandahar city, or Lashkar Gah city. If we were to focus on living amongst these people and protecting them, on an intimate basis 24/7, just in those two areas, we would not need markedly more ground troops than we have now (in fact, we could probably do it with current force levels). We could use Afghan National Army and police, with mentors and support from us, as well as Special Forces teams, to secure the other major population centers. That, rather than chasing the enemy, is the key.”

Although some have disputed his eighty percent figure, the question remains – should the bulk of our forces conducting “clear, hold, build” efforts be spread among outposts in the Korengal Valley and Helmand province, or focused on securing the cities while conducting precision raids on the outside?

The disruption of security in the capital and major cities is a major information narrative victory for those who oppose the government. After all, if a government cannot secure its own provincial capitals and government officials, can it reasonably be expected to gain the allegiance and confidence of its citizens? We saw a major confidence setback in the infamous daylight Kandahar prison break last year, which shook the confidence of the entire nation. The Taliban have increasingly mounted multiple suicide attacks in the major cities to undermine confidence in the government. When combined with the rampant corruption alleged in Kandahar, is it any wonder the Taliban are gaining ground?

On the flip side, one can argue that a defensive orientation doesn’t win wars. Such a discussion is beyond this blog post, but I was impressed with the statement from Lieutenant Colonel Chris Cavoli in Chapter 2 of the Accidental Guerrilla that “defensive” COIN operations were the best way of seizing the initiative from the enemy. (p. 96) Would we better off with a “cities first” COIN strategy, or does the rural character of Afghanistan demand our main effort focus in the rural areas? Sound off in the comments or at the Council.

Image credit and background - U.S. Army Sgt. Robert Newman, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, U.S. Army Europe, watches the sunrise after a dismounted patrol mission near Forward Operating Base Baylough, Zabul, Afghanistan, March 19, 2009. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Adam Mancini/Released)



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[jmm99]

I suggest going back a few decades and have a look at John McCuen's The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (available as a reprint from Hailer Publishing at $29.95). The blurb does not convey the point I want to make.

In any event, one of McCuen's major points, which runs through the book, is the necessity for the incumbant to secure its strategic base areas, even at the cost of giving up large areas of the country. McCuen saw one of the greatest failings of incumbants as being reaction to the brushfires, without having first secured its own bases - whatever geography they might happen to be in the context. In short, trying to be strong everywhere results in not being strong anywhere.

[SteveMetz]

By the way, Jack passed away over the weekend.

Obituary