Quote Originally Posted by IVIaedhros View Post
Summary: Our organization and doctrine plays into the enemy's hands. We can counter this by creating a force patterned after classical eastern forces, while still retaining many of our greatest advantages.
If you read the replies below you will note that some people fear change and new ideas more than they fear the Taliban. So be careful of using words which can be used as a means of distracting from the real meaning behind your post. This being the use of "eastern". Think of another more generic name to describe your concept.

***First of all, let me give a general disclaimer: while in the infantry, I am still only a newly minted 2LT with no prior service, waiting to go to Ranger School. I make no claims to being anything close to an expert. Now that that's out of the way...
A lot of us here were a 2LT at some point in time. Some just went with the flow while others put their hand up. I see a lot of myself (35 years ago) in your post and am happy to see there are still thinking 2LTs out there. For heavens sake don't let anyone pee on your battery.

Looking back at me at your stage I would say I needed to learn to sell my ideas better (they call it marketing these days). So learn from the responses both positive and negative and maybe even rewrite your piece to maintain your essential idea but deal with the questions and negatives so as to close those doors.

Now here is the killer. If you couldn't be bothered to rewrite and refine your idea then you have a problem. Anyone can throw bright ideas into the air and then walk away. If you are serious you will realise this piece of yours is merely version 0.1 of a number of versions to come. So take your piece you posted here and save it somewhere under FireWithFireV0.1. The journey has begun.

And remember too that 2LTs don't make the massive changes, they merely provide the spark that lights the fire. So this is only your first idea (of many to come) at the beginning of a long career so accept that some LtCol, Maj, Capt may actually run with this idea and just be happy that you were the spark.

It seems to me that, despite the fact that we routinely come out on top of direct engagements, we're playing into the enemy's game so far as kinetic operations are concerned. Simply put, the experienced insurgent's strategy and tactics put him at an inherent advantage to our classically western forces.
They are only at an advantage because we rotate troops through at a speed too rapid to allow them to understand METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available—Time available, Civilians) and thereby don't become ruthlessly efficient in killing the enemy.

The rotation issue and the use of semi-permanent troops has been discussed before here and it near frightened most of the contributors here to death. PTSD they screamed, burn-out etc etc. 101 reasons why the same failed rotation systems needed to be maintained. You will face the same response from many quarters. Be prepared for that.

The bottom line is that you either flood the battle field with your own troops at a ratio of 100:1 or you start to think and act smart.

I suggest that what is needed is to seize the initiative away from the Taliban and to achieve that the restrictions placed on ISAF forces need to be removed to set the military free. At the moment operations seem to be planned more on what they are not allowed to do than what options are available to be used. Its a desperate situation. You have identified it.

The Afghan's follow the general eastern model that's been around for thousands of years. This assumes you're outnumbered, you strike where it's advantageous, operate mostly at the small level, etc. Their TTP's and "unit" organization are geared towards the small unit fight, especially in regards towards the ambush and the defense. Their "unit" organization and training (almost all command power with TL/SL equivalents, doesn't train rigid battle drills, but most successful TTP's), etc. allow them to adapt the fastest when adaptation is key. In a straight fight, they have an immense advantage in maneuverability due to a lighter load.
Try Mao 101 : When the enemy advances, withdraw; when he stops, harass; when he tires, strike; when he retreats, pursue.

(And if you have more time read Mao's Basic Tactics)

My belief is that soldiers with the best basic training have the best ability to innovate tactically. Warfare does not come naturally you have to work at it constantly to keep your men alive.

Learn the basics well and apply METT-TC properly and you stand a chance of outsmarting the Taliban.

Our doctrine creates a large, concentrated force (especially with vehicles) that's easy to spot and hit (though admittedly very difficult to destroy), his heavily dependent on supporting fires and thus severely handicapped in fulfilling the light infantryman's job of closing with destroying the enemy. This creates several problems:

*We spend a massive amount of money to achieve relatively little effect, thus giving an already reluctant nation further incentive to back out
*We are more likely to cause civilian casualties
*It is much harder for us to fully pursue/destroy the enemy and hold the rugged terrain in which he operates.

The solution I propose is to create an eastern style kinetic force. Note that this is not SF. It is a bridge, of sorts. The ultimate goal would be a brigade size element that is capable of successfully conducting sustained ground combat operations in the squad/fire team level. While they could indeed engage in local training operations or SF/Ranger style raids, their primary task would be to act as hunter/killers in order to successfully clear and hold terrain.
A large force is easy to avoid.

Small forces or small teams would need to rely on fire support other wise they risk being taken out piecemeal. Remember if they see you operating in smaller groups they will tend to concentrate to take you out and then melt away into the mountains.

Point 1: Read McCuen. His applicable 'golden rule' here is:

Winning and maintaining support for the war on the home front(s) and in the international community. Doing so means maintaining legitimacy and avoiding losses through incompetence. McCuen covered somewhat under this thread.

Point 2: To avoid unnecessary civilian casualties one has to separate the enemy from the civilians. Easier said than done. Through correctly applying METT-TC a way should be found.

Point 3: Hold terrain? That's the biggest current error. McCuen has told them (but they don't seem to hear) that instead of "clear, hold and build" it should be “clear, control, and counter-organize the population”. Smart guy this McCuen.

(Carried over to second post to reduce length)