How Close is 'Close Combat'?

[Red Rat]

I think you muddle the tactical/operational and strategic levels (or at least don't differentiate between the aspect of 'war' and 'warfare').

I probably am muddled!

Tactically/operationally our Soldiers are engaged in close combat.

I agree.

I think what you are highlighting is the inherent problem with a conflict in which one side is engaging in limited war and the other in total war. We are tools of policy and that policy will dictate to what extent violence is applied.

I disagree. What is at issue is not the level or extent of violence brought to bear here, more how that violence is brought to bear and what that says about us. Warfare is a human endeavour involving passions and emotions, it is not merely a technical affair about what technical systems we use or not. It is not an issue of ROE, it is perhaps an issue of limited v unlimited (war) in how much political risk a government is prepared to accept vis a vis casualty rates. My gut feel remains that in small wars especially, there is a moral element where you have to demonstrate conclusively that it is impossible for the other side to win militarily. At the micro level that involves bringing the fight to the enemy in a way that the enemy recognises and respects; bringing the fight to the enemy and beating him.

It does link into limited versus unlimited warfare in that we are fighting a limited war where we are not only limiting the means we bring to bear, but also the risk we are prepared to take. I think there is a powerful message we are sending by not physically allowing our troops to close with the enemy(either because we weight them down with so much kit, constrain them with TTPs or make commanders casualty intolerant). IMHO we are saying that we are prepared to fight, but not fully. We are saying that we have a limited moral commitment, are prepared to take a limited risk with it. All the other side has to do is recognise that and match or better our limited commitment.

There are a myriad of reasons why ISAF are engaging in limited war,

in means yes, but also in terms of moral commitment. We do not seem to be in this to win.

but I would not have any reservation in stating that US forces are both willing and able to unleash violence of action if called upon to do so (you may have a different vantage from the UK).

As are UK forces, who are still routinely engaged in heavy combat. It is not the level of combat that takes place or the amount of force brought to bear, but how we go about doing so and what that says about us.

Nor should we abandon the necessity of close combat as it would be our ultimate undoing as a military profession and 'managers of violence.'

I violently agree!



I think that the character of any given conflict is the product of the societies involved in that conflict. In cases where the nature of the societies are so very different (such as AFG and the West) the 'how' we fight is important. If we are fighting 2 different types of war neither side may recognise or accept that the other is winning, possibly in a physical sense and certainly in a moral sense.

[JMA]

I disagree. What is at issue is not the level or extent of violence brought to bear here, more how that violence is brought to bear and what that says about us. Warfare is a human endeavour involving passions and emotions, it is not merely a technical affair about what technical systems we use or not. It is not an issue of ROE, it is perhaps an issue of limited v unlimited (war) in how much political risk a government is prepared to accept vis a vis casualty rates. My gut feel remains that in small wars especially, there is a moral element where you have to demonstrate conclusively that it is impossible for the other side to win militarily. At the micro level that involves bringing the fight to the enemy in a way that the enemy recognises and respects; bringing the fight to the enemy and beating him.

It does link into limited versus unlimited warfare in that we are fighting a limited war where we are not only limiting the means we bring to bear, but also the risk we are prepared to take. I think there is a powerful message we are sending by not physically allowing our troops to close with the enemy(either because we weight them down with so much kit, constrain them with TTPs or make commanders casualty intolerant). IMHO we are saying that we are prepared to fight, but not fully. We are saying that we have a limited moral commitment, are prepared to take a limited risk with it. All the other side has to do is recognise that and match or better our limited commitment.

I am a little concerned that concepts like limited and unlimited war are being applied to company, platoon and section level activities. How does one limit the violence of a company or a platoon attack?

Is it like what we saw in the TV series "Ross Kemp in Afghanistan" where contact is made, the troops pull back, wait for an air strike, return to base after the air strike claiming victory?

If you have not got the political will or the bottle for the war casualty risk then rather stay inside the FOBs and hardly ever venture out (much like the Germans are doing). If you keep pushing your troops out into harms way then at least don't tie their one hand behind their back.

It seems the Brit army has nothing to fear except their own politicians and general staff.

I often wonder whether it is appreciated how much harm has been done to the reputation of the British soldier and the British Army through the Basra debacle and the current goings on in Afghanistan? Its an absolute disgrace.

I think that the character of any given conflict is the product of the societies involved in that conflict. In cases where the nature of the societies are so very different (such as AFG and the West) the 'how' we fight is important. If we are fighting 2 different types of war neither side may recognise or accept that the other is winning, possibly in a physical sense and certainly in a moral sense.

There is one unequivocal answer to all this and that is the kill rate per contact. If for every 20 Taliban who take on ISAF only 3 or four survive then very soon they will run out of recruits other than the crazies who want to be suicide bombers or just plain commit suicide.

"How" ISAF fights must be based on what it will take to break the spirit and will of the Taliban and the population supplying their recruits. Get into their heads. I just don't think it will be possible given the current western mindset.

[Ken White]

Red Rat:

"What is at issue is not the level or extent of violence brought to bear here, more how that violence is brought to bear and what that says about us...At the micro level that involves bringing the fight to the enemy in a way that the enemy recognises and respects; bringing the fight to the enemy and beating him."

and:

"We are saying that we have a limited moral commitment, are prepared to take a limited risk with it. All the other side has to do is recognise that and match or better our limited commitment."

Yes...

JMA

"...I agree, but believe it is more due to the fact that the West does not know how to fight the sort of warfare needed to inflict a comprehensive defeat on the Taliban (for whatever reason)."

Possibly correct, However, I'm inclined to believe that the west knows how, it is simply unwilling to do what is necessary for various reasons -- most of which I believe to be misguided...

Not only is it necessary to close with and kill the enemy but also critical to pursue those who escape with single minded intent. The kill rate is critical...So yes half of the trick in this type of warfare is to close with and kill the enemy while the other half is to hunt down and kill the survivors. Soldiers who don't have the stomach for this type of work should rather join the police force...

Agree totally with the first statement.

On the second statement, I know there are some Soldiers (of all ranks) who do not wish for various reasons to do just that, not all stomach related. However, it has been my observation that most western soldiers are more than willing to do that -- they are simply not allowed to do so.

I couched that above as "risk aversion" -- which is present in excessive quantities. However, the reluctance seen today to engage in close combat in the harshest sense of the word is more complex than that alone. It is part tactical desire to restrain own casualties and part a "lack of stomach" on the part of some senior leaders and policy makers who wish to be seen as 'civilized.' A vastly overrated trait IMO...

The relative morality of 'turn the other cheek' and 'proportionality' may be generally acknowledged in the west. Others think them foolish constructs and see weakness and an invitation . I believe the numbers accrue to the latter group...

So while I think Patrick R. Jennings has a point:

"Thus I don't think western powers have shifted away from close combat rather they have never really embraced it. Soldiers in a democracy are expensive and the bill for close combat is too high so naturally we lean toward other means."

I also believe that the bill is seen as high -- no sense in placing a platoon at a roadblock when it can be covered by fire from several hundred meters away -- but perhaps more pointedly, western society today is, by some, seen as repelled by the nominal 'brutality' necessary to do as JMA suggests. I believe that (badly mistaken IMO) view is more responsible for restrictive ROE than is the bill for own casualties or the tactical advantage of avoidance of close combat.

This allows me to employ my favorite quote:

"War means fighting. The business of the soldier is to fight. Armies are not called out to dig trenches, to live in camps, but to find the enemy and strike him; to invade his country, and do him all possible damage in the shortest possible time. This will involve great destruction of life and property while it lasts; but such a war will of necessity be of brief continuance, and so would be an economy of life and property in the end."

Thomas J. Jackson quoted by G. F. R. Henderson

Failure to engage closely may provide a false sense of civilized behavior but it is just that -- false. War is not civilized and nothing is going to make it so. As old Curtis LeMay said, in war to do less than your very best is immoral. I'd paraphrase that by saying that in small wars to do less than your best for any reason is immoral -- and provides tacit encourgement to the opponent to keep slogging. Practically speaking, avoiding close combat lengthens any war, causes more casualties of all types and more damage in the end than would short sharp engagements. Creating a perception, however false, that one is avoiding or just lackadaisical in seeking out and destroying enemy fighters is an invitation to lengthy nickel and dime casualty accrual. Nickels can really add up over time, better to spend a few dollars and get it over with...

It is also wise to recall that just as a drop of water into a bucket of it can cause ripples, so can and will tactical actions affect strategic issues...

[Pete]

I believe risk aversion is another legacy of the Vietnam war, based upon the belief that public support in America for involvement in optional conflicts would rapidly decline once the casualties begin piling up. It mystifies me how infantrymen can do their job wearing all that body armor, but the decision not to wear it would also have its consequences, and someone would be keeping score.

[CloseDanger]

After a fight, if your counts are up and you have time and you have hot shots on the beat, and you have support, it may be a good idea to let them persue the last standing.
Proximity is not an issue.

Mix it up a little and you will find much more deterrence.

[Pete]

Good Lord, we've even got Field Manual 100-14, Risk Management, to guide us in our decision-making process. If we had had that manual 60 years ago this week when the North Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel I wonder whether Harry Truman would have done an assessment before we got involved.

[Pete]

... 60 years ago this week when the North Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel ...

Whoops, it was on 25 June 1950, not 25 July of that year, when the Korean War began. Oh well, when I was in the artillery they taught us to run out of the FDC shouting, "Stop those rounds" when we realized we'd made a mistake.

[JMA]

After a fight, if your counts are up and you have time and you have hot shots on the beat, and you have support, it may be a good idea to let them persue the last standing.
Proximity is not an issue.

Mix it up a little and you will find much more deterrence.

I'm not sure I follow the terminology here. What does "if your counts are up" mean?

Why allow them to break contact and melt away (only to attack you another day)?

So proximity is an issue. One should strive to maintain contact and pursue the enemy killing as many as you can along the way. After all that is why you are there, yes?

The support and reserves should come from a QRF and be led by tenacious officers who will not just give up the chase so that the troops can return to base for a hot meal and a cold drink.

Why you should aggressively seek to maximise the kill rate per contact is to do what you should be doing anyway and that is to close with and destroy the enemy and secondly to prevent the enemy from building up their combat experience.

What could be mixed up a little is not whether to pursue the enemy but variations on how that pursuit would take place.

[John M]

Red Rat,

To clarify, by limited war I am refering to "a war whose objective is less than the total defeat of the enemy" and not a definition linked to resources applied. So I agree with your assesment that risk aversion plays a critical role in how today's conflict are being waged.

Red Rat:

I think that the character of any given conflict is the product of the societies involved in that conflict.

Agree; as Clausewitz stated:

...the aims a beligerant adopts, and the resources he employs, must be governed by the particular characteristics of his own position; but they will also confrom to the spirit ofthe age and to its general character.

JMA:

I am a little concerned that concepts like limited and unlimited war are being applied to company, platoon and section level activities. How does one limit the violence of a company or a platoon attack?

Again, we need to differentiate between war and warfare. A limited war will have an impact on military operations and actions at the tactical level. One needs to look no further than the current conflict.