There is no question that most Western forces are more than willing to engage in close combat and are doing so quite successfully on a daily basis. However, there is a question of whether or not Western policies are contributing to a perception by some that the foregoing statement is untrue...

The ability or desire to close with and kill the enemy is in one sense a macho myth -- it is far better strategically, operationally and tactically to kill more from afar than to have to close and possibly sustain greater own casualties. Most western forces subscribe to this view. Not everyone does so.

The counterpoint is that the perception of unwillingness, apparent or real, to engage in close combat can lead the opponent to believe or profess to believe that said opponent is 'superior' due to greater willingness to close and thus sacrifice. While actually quite specious it is believed by those who wish to think it so -- at least until they find out the hard way that it is in fact untrue. Regrettably, that will only apply to the spear throwers in the front -- the directing staff in the rear will ignore the reality.

That factor, while most obvious tactically can have operational and strategic impacts:
"...However, when tens of your solders were killed in minor battles and one American Pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu you left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you.
LINK.

Most wars in which the US has been involved -- including the current set -- were at least in part triggered by a belief on the part of opponents that the US would not or could not fight. Stronger and better reactions to probes from the Mideast since 1972 by the west and by the US in particular almost certainly would have obviated our current wars. Thus there is a strategic quotient that derives from tactical actions and the perception of those actions.

Excessive bellicosity sends a bad message. Inadequate bellicosity sends a dangerous message. Risk aversion can be seen as wise, it can also be exploited as being cowardly -- and is being so exploited today.

The fact is that most current contacts seem to be initiated by the opponents here and there because of their belief that western forces do not wish to fight. That is not true but the perception strongly fostered by our opponents is that it is so. Our risk averse policies tend to feed that. So does our poor Information Operations effort -- partly a policy problem; the two factors combine to provide a an operational problem and also likely more potential or future strategic problems.

Warfare is complex, there are no easy answers. To every decision there is a cost. In the case of excessive risk aversion as a deliberate policy, "Penny wise and Pound foolish" comes to mind..