Radical Ideas for Iraq

[SWJED]

9 August Los Angeles Times commentary - Radical Ideas for Iraq by Max Boot.

... The security situation in Baghdad has been in free fall since the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra on Feb. 22. In retrospect, that attack appears to be a turning point when the chief problem in Iraq went from being a Sunni-dominated insurgency to a civil war in which Shiite and Sunni militias are equally culpable. The result has been a horrifying surge in violence, with about 100 Iraqis dying every day, the bulk of them in Baghdad.

To restore order in the capital, I suggested adding at least 35,000 U.S. troops — in line with Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez's comment in 2004 that he needed two divisions to control Baghdad. But that's not what Bush is sending. To bolster the 9,000 U.S. troops already in the capital, he is sending another brigade from northern Iraq, for a total of 13,000 U.S. troops, or less than one division. There will be an equal number of Iraqi troops — along with 35,000 Iraqi police officers, who are so sectarian and corrupt that they are more part of the problem than the solution.

If Bush thinks that a force this size can secure a city of more than 6 million people, he's not listening to the best professional military advice. An additional problem is that moving troops around Iraq, instead of sending extra units, may improve the situation in one spot but worsen the environment elsewhere. As a "senior American military official" in Iraq told McClatchy News Service, "You can't do clear-and-hold with the force structure we have."

If the present strategy doesn't work, what's the alternative? The most radical course would be a total U.S. withdrawal. The likely result would be an all-out civil war in which Iraqi casualties could easily soar to 1,000 a day and the price of oil could go above $100 a barrel. Proposals to carve up Iraq into three separate states — Sunni, Shiite and Kurd — would not ameliorate the violence because major cities such as Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk are full of different religious and ethnic groups that would fight for control...

But there's another course short of withdrawal: reducing U.S. forces from today's level of 130,000 to under 50,000 and changing their focus from conducting combat operations to assisting Iraqi forces. The money saved from downsizing the U.S. presence could be used to better train and equip more Iraqi units. A smaller U.S. commitment also would be more sustainable over the long term. This is the option favored within the U.S. Special Forces community, in which the dominant view is that most American soldiers in Iraq, with their scant knowledge of the local language and customs, are more of a hindrance than a help to the counterinsurgency effort.

Make no mistake: This is a high-risk strategy. The drawdown of U.S. troops could catalyze the Iraqis into getting their own house in order, or it could lead to a more rapid and violent disintegration of the rickety structure that now exists.

Which path should we take? My preference remains deploying more soldiers, not fewer. A couple of divisions in Baghdad, if skillfully led, might be able to replicate the success that Col. H.R. McMaster's 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment had in pacifying the western city of Tall Afar, where the troops-to-civilians ratio was 10 times higher than in Baghdad today. But at this point, I am also open to a substantial reduction in troop numbers because the current strategy just isn't working...

[Stu-6]

I tend to think something like this is worth a try. I guess I am at the point where I think almost anything is worth a try. Our current plan doesn’t seem to be working. Since we are obviously unwilling to raise the number of troops why not try cutting them? Maybe we have created a goldilocks situation for the guerillas? Staying the course may sound good as a political slogan but if we don't know when to change tacit we are sure to run aground.

[Jones_RE]

The "Iraqis will solve all their own (and therefore our) problems" bugaboo needs to die a swift and brutal death. Since 2003, US forces have relied on a strategy of stabilizing the situation just long enough for Iraqis to do the actual work of enforcing law and order in their country. If you think that's worked great so far you can stop reading now.

Iraqi troops and police are:
-Poorly trained
-Undisciplined
-Cowardly
-Corrupt
-Affiliated with sectarian militias/criminals/sunni nationalists/al Qaeda
-Poorly equipped
and
-underfunded

Giving Iraqi troops more training, weapons, equipment, new uniforms, higher pay or ice cream sundaes will not quell the insurgency, disarm shi'ite or kurdish militias or produce safe streets for Baghdad or any other city or province. This is because we are ignoring the reasons for those problems listed above.

A major part of the problem is that many Iraqis have an axe to grind and they smart enough not to tell us about it. Thus, we get Interior Ministry death squads, cops on the take and soldiers who will happily look the other way while insurgents bury an artillery shell to blow up the next American they see walking past.

Another problem is that the insurgents are more than willing to commit the most heinous, barbaric acts upon the families of collaborators with the Americans - not to mention what they do to the collaborators, themselves. The most highly trained and best equipped Iraqi commando can still be turned by kidnapping his sister or his wife or his mother - who has no training or weapons.

This war will not be won by handing it off to such folk as currently fill the ranks of the Iraqi Army and Police. Nor are the problems there solvable until the long term political and social issues involved are worked out.

I'm not saying that this war cannot be won and that a shining beacon of democracy and goodness will never take root in Iraq. I am saying that holding on until the Iraqis take over is NOT a realistic outcome. The Iraqis will NEVER be ready, given the current political situation and current insurgent tactics. Iraqi government forces which are not blatantly sectarian will continually fail for reasons of cowardice, graft, ideology and (most importantly) family honor and self preservation.

[Stu-6]

I agree with your assessment of the capabilities of Iraqi forces however I wonder if forcing more responsibility on them maybe the only solution. I don’t know about organizations but I have seen people who were low performers rise to the occasion when placed under pressure; maybe an army could do the same. It sort of thrown them in the river and they will learn to swim; or maybe more like thrown them of a cliff and they will learn to fly. It is certainly not ideal but things haven’t been ideal there for sometime.

[Jones_RE]

Letting the Iraqi forces do the whole "sink or swim" thing is a political non starter for the administration - the resulting chaos would look like failure and increase pressures to accelerate the drawdown of remaining troops.

Likewise, an increase in the US commitment is also a political nonstarter.

A complete withdrawal from Baghdad and Anbar province (which I would favor) is obviously off the table.

A realignment - away from Anbar province and Baghdad toward quieter southern areas - might have some effect. It would allow US troops to seal and clear sectors that aren't as volatile and thereby build some lasting institutions. Baghdad, especially Sadr City, and Anbar province will have to wait. We can rescue the south (the north doesn't need it). Once a durable coalition of Kurds and Shiites forms on the ground, with democratic institutions and competent military and police, you can begin making inroads into the toughest towns - with or without the presence of US forces.

[Culpeper]

Why would you support a withdrawal from Anbar?

[Stu-6]

Jones_RE,

I think you have identified the one of the fundamental problems precisely. Anything that may make it appear as if everything is not going to plan is a non-starter. Some sort of structural flaw with in our modern society/government is ensuring that most politicians will never risk the appearance of failure, even though this zero defects attitude ensures failure.