Radical Ideas for Iraq

[Culpeper]

Stu,

The structural flaw in our society is bad, but not unbeatable. However, the current administration is famous for its inability to admit mistakes, its message discipline, and intolerance of debate (not dissent, debate). This is partly due to the character of the commander in chief and partly due to a conscious decision to have the un-Clinton administration. While this attitude may (does) run a more efficient White House, it makes for shoddy staff work down in the administrative agencies (like the Pentagon).

Culpeper-

I don't support pulling out of Anbar. I do support moving the bulk of our regular troops elsewhere. The special operations types can have Anbar to themselves, with a couple of heavy armor QRFs to back them up. I do support concentrating our efforts on southern and northern Iraq for a couple of reasons. The main one is this: in counter insurgency warfare, one should start with small and easy operations. Secure a small village, not a city. Work on an area that is somewhat friendly, or at least neutral, not the heartland of the enemy's strongest supporters. A small operation is more likely to be successful. The odds tilt even more in your favor if the enemy is weak in that area. It gives you a chance to show that the government is capable stating a rational course of action and then actually executing it.

Small operations have other benefits. They're more tolerant of slight mistakes in execution and technique, for example. Your men may not have all the right cultural training. Maybe they're IED search procedures aren't as good as they ought to be or something. Better to find that out in a small village where there will only be a few IEDs than in Fallujah where there will be 50 or 100 of them. Reconstruction and civil development are easier in a small operation, too.

In a nutshell, I feel that we could secure real peace and a functioning economy for most of Iraq in a surprisingly short time. We simply have to be cold blooded enough to write off the Sunnis for now. Moqtada al Sadr's power base is in Baghdad, so he's largely a non-factor. That leaves SCIRI (whom we're working with) and its Badr Brigades. Once a proper COIN census is performed and police in the area receive reasonable training and supervision it'll be a snap to keep Sunni terrorists out of the area of operations (like asking Mississippians to spot a New Yorker). A few will get in, but not enough to murder every last cop that works with us like they manage in Ramadi or something. Sadrists from up north will be slightly trickier, but not impossible. They have less call for murdering Shiites anyway.

If we can get an economy moving and a functional government in southern Iraq then we can use those areas as a base to begin recruiting and training a very strong local (provincial and city) police presence. That'll provide continuing defense against Sunni insurgents. The whole area will serve to provide a source of army recruits (who will be less afraid for their families and themselves on leave) who will be more effective.

Sunnis will probably leave government. Baghdad will become a battleground like no other. Americans will not be dying there, so it's not our problem. When we eventually pull out all our remaining troops, the Shiites and Kurds will have a functioning democracy (tinged with Islam) and plenty of oil revenues to keep their economy afloat. They'll have halfway honest cops and halfway decent soldiers, enough to keep the worst attacks out although there will be civil war for many years to come. Eventually the country may split or there may be a political deal that saves everyone.

Basically, I think that COIN techniques practiced by the US Army cannot save Anbar province from the insurgents on the current commitment. No other troops are coming. But a broken dish is better than no plate at all. And if America and the world can see some progress coming out of Iraq then our reputation is arguably saved as well. Maybe with a couple years of lower death tolls for US troops and more smiling, friendly Iraqis (as opposed to the corpse dragging, shouting kind) popular support for the war will rise enough to finish the job.

Thank you for the clarification. You originally posted that you were in favor of a complete withdrawal from Anbar and I couldn't understand that. Nevertheless, your retort makes more sense. However, we tried giving entire areas of operations to Special Forces (SOG) with QRFs (Hatchet Forces) at the cost of losing a lot of the most best trained fighting soldiers and airmen. Special Forces are good at training indigenous troops and gathering intelligence but they can't control an entire region the size of Anbar with small teams going in and out of garrison. The Recon teams become the hunted and the entire area remains "Chairlie's Point". We have a lot of Green Berets and supporting aircrew that just went missing/killed in Laos and Cambodia for the exact same reasons you support the same idea for Anbar with no great success in stopping the flow up and down the trail. Also, we really don't need to start at the village level in the North and South because those areas aren't the problem to begin with. But you do have a point. The USMC had a great program in Vietnam by putting a small team in a small village and have them stay there to help the community. One of the few civil affairs successes of that conflict that I can think of. I also agree that we can always lose the Sunnis by writing them off. But more of a permanent nature. I'm sure there are plenty of Kurds and Shiites that would be more than happy to help out. Realistically, since the enemy is right there in Anbar is the current policy of slowly bleeding him to death all that bad?