Bolster Infantry Forces

[SWJED]

10 August Washington Times commentary - Bolster Infantry Forces by MG Robert Scales, US Army (ret.).

... The two images reflect the dilemma that the Israeli military faces in this war. They can fight the enemy on the ground, lose too many soldiers and suffer condemnation at home, or bomb from the air, kill civilians and suffer condemnation from the global community. The American military has been dealing with precisely the same dilemma for more than four years in Iraq and Afghanistan.

At first glance the aerial approach to solving the dilemma seems the lesser of two evils. But the tragic bombing in Qana highlights the increasingly unacceptable human costs of relying on precision killing from the air to achieve what are essentially human objectives inherent in wars such as these.

Plus the aerial solution is very expensive. Since the end of the Gulf War, we have spent almost $1.5 trillion dollars building aircraft, precision bombs, sensors, satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles in an effort to track and kill an ever more elusive and skillful enemy from the air. In spite of the cost, we still look first to solving military challenges with precision killing. It's in our cultural DNA.

Experience in Afghanistan, Iraq and now in Lebanon has taught al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah how to lessen the killing effects of Western weapons by choosing to fight in urban areas, where they can disperse and hide among the innocents. The race between precision-killing technologies and an elusive enemy is a contest that neither Israel nor the United States can win. How many more examples are needed to prove that an insurgent can find ways to adapt faster than we can develop the technologies to find and kill him from the air without harming innocent civilians?

... In this country almost four out of five dead suffered at the hands of the enemy since World War II have been light infantry, a force that comprises less than 4 percent of our military — to be sure, body armor, night-vision devices and superior supporting fires from aircraft and drones flying overhead have made today's light infantry more effective and have saved lives.

But these are differences in capabilities that a determined enemy can offset with its familiarity with the terrain and affinity with the local population. The bottom line is as simple as it is startling: Except for better training, morale and leadership, Israeli and American light infantry go into battle today with a cumulative advantage not much better than their grandfathers had in Vietnam or during the Six-Day War.

If we are to win the long war against radical Islamism we must fix this problem. During the past half century we have invested pennies on the defense dollar to keep light infantry alive in battle. That's why we know far less about the science of ground warfare than we know about the science of air warfare.

There are many areas that desperately need attention if we are to commit to keeping light infantry alive in battle. Just a few: Put precision small arms in the hands of infantry; give them better networks to connect them to the outside world and to each other; provide even better personal protection from small arms; and most importantly, find a technological breakthrough that will conceal light infantry as it rushes across the last 50 meters, the so-called "deadly zone" where most of them die.

Keeping our soldiers alive should be a national — not a service — effort. The Army and Marine Corps are too consumed with fighting today's battles to take on this task alone. If the nation would commit to an expansive long-term program done in a manner similar to the effort that gave us absolute dominance in the air, we might begin to find ways to destroy Hezbollah and its evil clones without losing too many more precious Israeli and American lives.

[Tom Odom]

On this issue,

MG Scales is on target but I would add looking at the issue of building experience into units. Hopefully we will get there...(I know hope is NOT an technique but it beats giving up).

Best
Tom

[Jones_RE]

I absolutely agree that light infantry forces should be our top national priority.

I disagree that we should look for all kinds of new capabilities for infantry forces. I also disagree with the idea that we can turn our infantry into bulletproof knights - walking tanks that can't be hurt by enemy fire.

What we should be working on is reducing the weight, bulk, complexity and cost of the capabilities we do have. We can't make infantry invisible across the last 50 meters. We can't whip up some magical super weapon that will clobber all of the enemy from thousands of feet away. What we can do is lighten the soldier's loads so that they can get across those meters in the shortest possible time. Infantry also lose disproportionately from plain bad judgment. Reducing their physical burden will reduce the number of times an exhausted LCpl or 2nd Lt says "go ahead" without giving it a good hard think first.

We can also train enough infantry that they can decisively win these close engagements. With more infantry, who are less burdened and better trained, we'll stack the deck in our favor.

New organization comes into play, too, I think. But that goes way beyond the scope of this

[SWJED]

We can also train enough infantry that they can decisively win these close engagements. With more infantry, who are less burdened and better trained, we'll stack the deck in our favor.

Also 'armed' with the capability to operate on all 3 blocks of the 3BW...

[carl]

It is curious that MG Scales recommendations for improving American light infantry are primarily technological.

Maybe light infantry effectiveness is more a matter of human qualities; training, motivation, organization, imagination, experience etc.

If we were to put the effort into recruiting and retaining light infantry leaders that we put into recruiting and retaining pilots, we would be better served.

[SSG Rock]

Agree, for years I was told that all the shiny whiz bang high tech weapons are great, but the core of our Army was that Soldier manning it. When did that change? Frankly, I'm getting to the point that I'm sick of hearing about this stuff. Imagine the Army we could have built by now if we invested the same amount of money in training and equipment for our conventional combat arms, SF and SOF units that we have dumped into FCS. And to top it off from the information I've been reading FCS is on life support, and now from lack of funds, so is the rest of the Army, hell I know it, I'm experiencing it myself! The more that Rumsfeld demands the Army transform itself into this high tech robotic Army, the less and less capable it seems that our Soldiers will be in the future for lack of training and equipment because the lions share of the budget is being spent on these high tech gadgets!

I'm sick! Just sick of the inept civilian leadership at the Pentagon! So sue me, Rumsfeld should tender his resignation and leave this to the Army, we were tracking just fine until he came along and upset the apple cart. Now look at us. It's a damn shame!

[Strickland]

It is curious that MG Scales recommendations for improving American light infantry are primarily technological.

Maybe light infantry effectiveness is more a matter of human qualities; training, motivation, organization, imagination, experience etc.

If we were to put the effort into recruiting and retaining light infantry leaders that we put into recruiting and retaining pilots, we would be better served.

I could not agree more with your comments. While we could start a healthy debate as to whether the nature and character of war have changed over the past 100 years; the one thing we could all agree on is that the one point of continuity over these 100 years is the human element in warfare. The human dimension has been and will always be the most important element in warfare, yet our infantry forces in no way receive the same attention that our pilots do concerning recruiting, training, and retention.

The Navy pays it submarine force HUGE bonuses to stay in service, so as much as $25,000 a year, but little thought is given to the retention of Infantry Officers with experience and highly developed critical thinking skills.