It is curious that MG Scales recommendations for improving American light infantry are primarily technological.
Maybe light infantry effectiveness is more a matter of human qualities; training, motivation, organization, imagination, experience etc.
If we were to put the effort into recruiting and retaining light infantry leaders that we put into recruiting and retaining pilots, we would be better served.
I'm getting sick of the bad report cards.....
Agree, for years I was told that all the shiny whiz bang high tech weapons are great, but the core of our Army was that Soldier manning it. When did that change? Frankly, I'm getting to the point that I'm sick of hearing about this stuff. Imagine the Army we could have built by now if we invested the same amount of money in training and equipment for our conventional combat arms, SF and SOF units that we have dumped into FCS. And to top it off from the information I've been reading FCS is on life support, and now from lack of funds, so is the rest of the Army, hell I know it, I'm experiencing it myself! The more that Rumsfeld demands the Army transform itself into this high tech robotic Army, the less and less capable it seems that our Soldiers will be in the future for lack of training and equipment because the lions share of the budget is being spent on these high tech gadgets!
I'm sick! Just sick of the inept civilian leadership at the Pentagon! So sue me, Rumsfeld should tender his resignation and leave this to the Army, we were tracking just fine until he came along and upset the apple cart. Now look at us. It's a damn shame!
Last edited by SSG Rock; 08-15-2006 at 09:50 PM.
Don't taze me bro!
Rumsfeld isn't the only problem
Rock, your rant is good but not complete. The Army itself (or at least its higher leadership) was moving down the high-tech road before Rumsfeld came on the scene. It's a problem they've faced in one form or another since the Second World War and accelerated in Vietnam. Why Vietnam (again)? If you look at the track record there, the Army constantly turned to technology for answers instead of techniques (airmobility, ground sensors, night vision gear, etc., etc.). Technology became an end of its own instead of a tool. This, in my view, accelerated through the years of Active Defense and AirLand Battle. Often the answer to an operational problem was determined to lie with a new system or weapons system (the Abrams, which worked, and the Sgt. York, which didn't, are two examples). This tech bleed-over might come from the Air Force, which has traditionally relied on systems instead of personnel. It may also spring from low retention levels many of our current senior leaders experienced in their early days, leading them to want (at least on a subconscious level) systems that could be counted on to be in service for some years instead of people who may or may not decide to stick around.
Rumsfeld is a very handy lightning rod for discussions, but he's really not the main problem. He's more a symptom of the main issue. You have to remember - the civilian leadership comes and goes, but the military higher leadership remains longer and has a much greater impact (look at the behavior of the JCS and higher generals during Vietnam if you want historical examples of this).
And Jones, you've hit on one of my favorite "endless lessons learned." How many times do we have to relearn what a German study concluded in the mid- to -late 1800s (if memory serves): that any combat load over about 40 pounds degrades the ability of infantry to do their job. Or the ever-popular "troops in dry or hot areas of operations should carry more water."
I had to get that off my chest.
I spent lastnight regaining my composure.
Steve, it isn't the technology itself that I take issue with, certainly we need new systems and FCS is a great idea. But I don't think we need it in Iraq. So, I don't see the need for this big push, for spending huge sums of money on it right now. I'd rather see the Army address Iraq through training, and educating our Soldiers in counterinsurgency, technology isn't going to help us win the support of the Iraqi people. But Soldiers who understand their culture, are sensitive to their desires and their fears will.
It's frustrating Steve. The CBO has warned of a serious cost overrun in developing FCS and delayed fielding by about two years. FCS just doesn't seem to be the right place to be spending our money. I'd rather see our Soldiers be properly trained and equipped for counterinsurgency ops. We all know that COIN is up close and personal, and we are doing a miserable job in preparing our troops for it. Our DACs at Fort Leavenworth are losing their jobs left and right as money continues to be siphoned away to support the GWOT and while a realize that the GWOT is CSA's top priority as it should be, but I see signs that the Army is beginning to buckle, and it troubles me.
Rumsfeld might be a convenient target, but there is no denying that he has shown himself to be a stubborn, inflexible leader who seems loath to change his mind. This might be a personality flaw, or it might be because he actually beleives that sticking with the current TTP will win the fight (I don't beleive that, I think we need a dramatic change). At any rate, we have been in Iraq for five years. Do you see signs that we have turned the corner? I don't. How long should we wait? Afterall, considering the fact that we were told this would be over in short order, one has to start questioning the leadership at some point. When is the proper time? Personally, I've reached it.
Don't taze me bro!
I'm not disagreeing with you, Rock
I do, however, think that there's more than enough blame to go around for the mindset you're seeing right now. Rumsfeld is stubborn and inflexible, but there have also been several failures of higher Army (and other services) leadership to focus on the current situation and what's needed to deal with it.
Vietnam had Westmoreland, we had Franks. Since World War II, the Army has been very reluctant to focus on LIC/MOOTW/whatever your favorite acronym is. Maybe it's because senior leadership saw retention as a problem and focused on technological solutions instead of manpower. Maybe it's because they saw the technology focus work for the Air Force (which it really hasn't in practice, but it did get them large chunks of the defense budget for many years), or maybe it's because the promotion system for officers keeps them moving around so much they never really get a good feel for the problems the troops face. Or (most likely) it's a combination of these factors and a few more.
There's also the institutional denial factor. Since Korea, the Army has shown a very distinct reluctance to prepare for smaller-scale conflicts. This trend accelerated after Vietnam. There are other historical/institutional factors that could play into it, such as the American reliance (before WW 2) on a small standing army to be augmented by draftees in time of trouble. It's a complex question. I see many parallels between the Army's behavior today and its behavior in the early 1960s. Does that mean Iraq is Vietnam? No. But it does indicate that some of the same institutional blindspots and behaviors may still be functioning. McNamara was also stubborn, inflexible, and focused on one way of doing things. Many generals responded to him the same way they are now responding to Rumsfeld.
Too true Steve.
You are correct Steve. It isn't just Rumsfeld, but he is in charge so....
I must be fair. Yesterday, what set me off was a report I read that the CBO had warned that the FCS was going to cost alot more than planned and that there would likely be a two year delay in fielding. Just moments ago I read a story on Reuters that stated the Program Manager at Boeing that Army modernization is right on track. http://today.reuters.com/news/articl...c=66&type=qcna
Me confused!
Don't taze me bro!
Sometimes the Army does get it right
Think about the massive investment in new doctrine and soldier training in the 1970's. In the middle of Vietnam it wasn't possible to take those new concepts and put them into action. It was only in the war's disastrous aftermath that lessons could be learned and programs fixed.
The leadership is fixated on the wrong issues because the military is working for them at this moment. Their replacement will come eventually.
And technology doesn't always develop on schedule, either. Eugene Stoner's AR-10 was a high tech failure in 1957. In 1964 it morphed into the M-16 which is still with us 42 years later. My guess is that the Future Combat System will be quietly shelved, and in a few years a newer (and more modest) set of requirements will come about, the old research dusted off and new systems fielded. Of course, they could still blow billions on it in the meantime that would be better spent training soldiers who are about to be stepping into a lethal and politically charged warzone . . . .
I could not agree more with your comments. While we could start a healthy debate as to whether the nature and character of war have changed over the past 100 years; the one thing we could all agree on is that the one point of continuity over these 100 years is the human element in warfare. The human dimension has been and will always be the most important element in warfare, yet our infantry forces in no way receive the same attention that our pilots do concerning recruiting, training, and retention.Originally Posted by carl
The Navy pays it submarine force HUGE bonuses to stay in service, so as much as $25,000 a year, but little thought is given to the retention of Infantry Officers with experience and highly developed critical thinking skills.
I'm starting to fear that we're going to see the Vietnam cycle with the Army (and other services) all over again. Senior leadership that's out of touch with what's needed. Lowering standards to get bodies in the field. A focus on technology (since it's easy) and not personnel needs (which may require major changes in how the force does business). Doctrine that is radically out of touch with what's needed in the field.
In Vietnam we saw dry rot set in within the middle ranks. What I fear is that we'll see the same thing happen again.
When reviewing all of the incidents of abuse and criminal conduct in Iraq, you will notice one common denominator, almost all the individuals came into service after 9/11, with the majority accepted to service during the past several very lean years of recruiting.
Good point Strickland.....
I don't want to turn this into bashing the young generation but, as unfortunate as it is, it is a true statement, our kids have had it pretty good. The Army ought NOT to lower it's standards to fill recruiting goals. I'd rather have quality over quantity. But the quantity mentality has taken hold over the past ten or fifteen years. I once had a Soldier who had nothing to offer the Army, he was a complete waste of time. I carefully mentored him and spent countless extra time and effort on him trying to instill the warrior spirit, trying to turn him around. When I'd finally had enough I approached my SGM and asked for his support in chaptering this kid out of the Army. The SGM refused, even after I had collected a pile of counseling statements, had all the documentation to support my request. The SGM told me my workload would increase, that my other Soldiers would have to pick up his slack and I told him I didn't care, that his failure to pull his load required us to pick up the slack anyway. In short, I'd given this kid plenty of opportunity to straighten himself out, I'd spent alot of extra time personally in that endeavour. The SGM told me that at least he was a "warm body" whom I could task with extra details etc. My SGM refused to support me. So, the Soldier was transferred to another section that was supervised by a MSG, (I was a SSG at the time). The MSG bragged about how he would turn the kid around, that it was just a leadership problem. Well, a year later, he went to the SGM and made the same request I did, to chapter the kid out of the Army and they did. So, thats just one small example of what I call the "warm body" mentality that has infected the Army. And the officer corps has the same mentality. Avoid looking bad on paper at any cost, even if it means chaos within the ranks.
I was disappointed in my SGM for not backing a fellow NCO, he acted as though I didn't know what I was doing. But earlier in my career, as a buck sergeant, if I thought a Soldier needed to be chaptered out of the Army it was a done deal. I got support all the way up the chain of command.
The hand writing is on the wall, I don't know why there is such institutional reticence to take corrective action.
Don't taze me bro!
Source of "warm bodies"
I think the source of the "warm bodies" problem is political pressure from on high to keep the war in Iraq looking good. The media was quick to point out recruiting shortfalls, as well as a lack of retention among troops whose term was expiring. Combined, they give the impression that we're losing the war, the American people don't support the war, professional soldiers think it isn't worth fighting for, etc. It also makes senior leadership look like they are endangering the nation through an involuntary reduction in our armed forces.
Given that impression, it's clear that the orders were given to get recruitment up at any cost. At the White House, the Capitol Building and Versailles on the Potomoc it's more important to look like you're succeeding than to actually succeed.
I'm okay with giving guys a chance that the Army or Marine Corps might have overlooked in the past - but obvious losers shouldn't make it past initial training and into the units.
It started years ago.....
The warm body mentality actually began years ago when we pushed troops to divisions and the support/service support units began to experience real shortages.
I don't know if OPTEMPO is having an impact on the combat arms personnel readiness or not for sure. One would think so, since recruiting standards have been degraded recentley.
Don't taze me bro!
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