Gun Control in Counterinsurgency

[jmm99]

from Schmedlap
First, I would like to offer a comment in support of JMM's guidance (violating neither the spirit nor letter of it). One can hold an adamant toe-the-party-line NRA position on the 2nd amendment while also believing that strict gun control is necessary in a small war abroad (or vice versa). The reason for this is that the second amendment issue in our nation is an issue pertaining to... wait for it... the United States Constitution. The United States Constitution is ours, not the Iraqis', Afghans', or XYZians'. Our approach toward interpretation of the US Constitution has nothing to do with how we should approach similar issues in areas where the US Constitution is not the law of the land. So this certainly should not degrade into some BS-ing over domestic political ideologies.

Amen - well-stated.

As to your "two cents", I'd call that primary evidence (personal knowledge) which could be presented under oath.

My two cents worth: in a military environment under Laws of War ("martial law" in the vulgar sense), I'd go along with (say) census and registration of firearms for each household - that going into their dossier with all other data and intel. Of course, that's my ideal world where you guys are given the resources to do what (say) Galula and others recommend - more part of the police-political effort than the military effort.

Are you a lawyer yet ?

Best

Mike

[Schmedlap]

As to your "two cents", I'd call that primary evidence (personal knowledge) which could be presented under oath.

I'll take your word for it. I've got a grasp of the federal rules, but my understanding is that Michigan went its own way.

[Kiwigrunt]

My two cents worth: in a military environment under Laws of War ("martial law" in the vulgar sense), I'd go along with (say) census and registration of firearms for each household - that going into their dossier with all other data and intel. Of course, that's my ideal world where you guys are given the resources to do what (say) Galula and others recommend - more part of the police-political effort than the military effort.

That may be easier said than done. It appears that gun-registration in Canada has turned out to be a very expensive fiasco. If it doesn't work well, and is soooo expensive in a country like Canada, what chances have they got in a country like Iraq? The example that Schmedlap gave made sense and I assume that, as the man on the ground he was able to control it to a level he deemed necessary. But IMO, once you start legalising that manner of restrictions and you design and install mechanisms to control and police it, you may well create more headache than it's worth through second and third order effect and the law of unintended consequences.

Sorry JMM, not evidentiary posting, just my quick reaction.

[jmm99]

I posit this situation: a fictional country in which I am an indigenous national; and, for sake of play acting, a district civil affairs officer. The DCAO has direct control over police, including "Special Branch"; over other civil administration components; and also over mobile military forces who operate in the district. Basically, the Malaya triangular pattern of executive committee co-ordination, including but not limited to intelligence co-ordination.

My district is a contested district, with insurgent main forces neutralized (killed, captured or converted) or split into smaller size groups which can be handled by paramilitary police units. The district would be under "martial" or "emergency law" until restoration to what is considered by the natiional command authority to be an "acceptable civil environment".

The incumbant government, whose national command policy I represent, has an insurgency considered of existential importance to the incumbant government (my government). My choices are four: (1) stick with the government; (2) join the insurgency; (3) start a "third way" movement; or (4) leave the country. I posit that I stick with choice 1.

Among the many things I'd want to do in the district would be a census and dossier on each household, which would include, as only a part of the whole, a registry of all items that could be used as weapons against me and mine (e.g., firearms), or manufactured into weapons against me and mine (e.g., nitrogen compounds - e.g., fertilizer - easily converted to explosives and with some other simple household items and homemade components - e.g., into remote-controlled IEDs).

To do all that, I have to have the horses (personnel) in close proximity to the grassroots (villages and hamlets; or urban block by block). In Malaya (in the mature stage of the anti-terr effort), Special Branch (operating on a fairly limited budget) had accurate individual dossiers on about 50% of the insurgents.

Since I have posited that the insurgency is existential, the cost and number of personnel is limited only by what's in the national treasury and manpower pool. Obviously, my dream model has little to do with US involvement in Iraq and Astan.

The bottom line (in response to your post) is that the police and political measures required to defeat an existential insurgency may be needed there, but would be very inefficient (and probably not needed or tolerated) in a normal civil environment.

As to the Canadian link, there is also a pro-gun registry side of the argument (although I appreciate personally the anti-gun registry arguments linked ). As I understand the political situation, the Candaian Senate (as presently constituted) is pro-gun registry. In any event, what may be ineffective and/or inefficient in a normal, civil environment, may be necessary in an existential, contested paramilitary environment.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

My choices are four: (1) stick with the government; (2) join the insurgency; (3) start a "third way" movement; or (4) leave the country. I posit that I stick with choice 1.

Not specifically relevant, but a further option, often adopted in such situations, would be to stay nominally with the government and hedge your bets by maintaining a functional relationship with the other players. The balance point of that strategy would depend on your personal assessment of probable outcomes and your personal likelihood of being hung from a lamp post if the other guys win.

Among the many things I'd want to do in the district would be a census and dossier on each household, which would include, as only a part of the whole, a registry of all items that could be used as weapons against me and mine (e.g., firearms), or manufactured into weapons against me and mine (e.g., nitrogen compounds - e.g., fertilizer - easily converted to explosives and with some other simple household items and homemade components - e.g., into remote-controlled IEDs).

Short of kicking down doors and ransacking homes, which will only benefit your enemy, how do you achieve that goal? If your district has recently been in a state of insurgency with active conflict, it's likely that much of the populace will distrust or actively dislike government, and will see a registry of weapons as a likely prelude to confiscation. They aren't going to voluntarily reveal their armaments to a potential enemy. Seems to me that in practical terms the outcome of what you suggest would be a whole lot of weapons being carefully hidden away.

The discussion needs to keep in mind that self defense or security may not be the only reason or even the primary reason behind a desire to acquire and retain armaments. In many cultures a man without a weapon isn't quite a man, and people in these cultures will violently resist disarmament initiatives even if they face no immediate threat that requires them to be armed.

[jmm99]

be into "kicking down doors and ransacking homes" - I'm a low kinetic person.

I'm positing indigenous "COIN", where the people in my district are my people (some well-guided, some misguided and some uncertain). I'm not positing non-indigenous FID (much less foreign "COIN" or some half-assed form of co-belligerency) because that introduces too much complexity that clouds even more otherwise complex issues that have to resolved first.

Tactical alternatives to "kicking down doors and ransacking homes" abound - basically the opposites are being the bull in a china shop or a boa digesting a meal (making haste slowly). You may judge where you think my ground would be to stand snorting or to lay sleepily.

Rather than first moving into specific tactics, I'd first have to decide on the strategy to enter the district in the first place. I see two basic options:

1. "Clear, hold and build" (pretty much "standard COIN" for the last 40 years) - the direct approach with the most apparent short-term results - which I've tended to follow (as in post #7) as something of a norm in examples cuz that seems more familiar to most folks; OR

2. "Build, hold and clear" (build an unconventional force which will infiltrate and subvert the insurgent shadow government and forces; hold and expand strategic base areas and disperse the insurgent forces; and clear by the juncture of conventional and unconventional forces) - an indirect approach with slow apparent results (it took Giap four bites at the apple).

-------------------------
Those more inclined to the first course of action (which I do not reject out of hand), especially those who like the "clear" phase, might be more inclined to Heinlein's Starship Troopers.

On the other hand, the second course of action is somewhat akin to what we find in Isaac Asimov, Foundation - the Foundation's strategy, especially as found in Part IV, the Traders; as "engineered" by Limmar Ponyets and Eskel Gorov.

Limmar Ponyets and Eskel Gorov are not among Asimov's major characters, but I like their style in doing their "things" - infiltration, subversion, etc.; and using the target's weaknesses to create the conditions for the target's defeat (and often demise). Or, perhaps, the motto "Never let your sense of morals prevent you from doing what is right."

Part IV can be found here; e.g.:

Part IV, The Traiders
.....
TRADERS-… and constantly in advance of the political hegemony of the Foundation were the Traders, reaching out tenuous fingerholds through the tremendous distances of the Periphery. Months or years might pass between landings on Terminus; their ships were often nothing more than patchquilts of home-made repairs and improvisations; their honesty was none of the highest; their daring…

Through it all they forged an empire more enduring than the pseudo-religious despotism of the Four Kingdoms…

Tales without end are told of these massive, lonely figures who bore half-seriously, half-mockingly a motto adopted from one of Salvor Hardin's epigrams, "Never let your sense of morals prevent you from doing what is right!" It is difficult now to tell which tales are real and which apocryphal. There are none probably that have not suffered some exaggeration…

Encyclopedia Galactica

Review here (pp.44-45 of pdf) of the original version of “The Traders.” (Astounding Science Fiction, Vol. 34, No. 3, Issue 167, October 1944 as “The Wedge”).

The Foundation now controls the four kingdoms by means of religion, but outlying areas are beginning to see that the atomic religion is only a wedge for aggression, and refuse it entry. It is now becoming clear that religion is played out as a weapon, and that the next mode of expansion, trade, is in the air.

***About 75 years after the events of the previous story, Limmar Ponyets is dispatched to Askone, a world rich in raw materials that has thus far spurned any commerce with the Foundation, for fear that it would lead to the Foundation’s Scientism religion controlling their society. Ponyets’s job is to negotiate for the release of Eskel Gorov, a Foundation agent who was sent to find a way to initiate trade with Askone. This was a violation of that planet’s law, and Gorov is scheduled to be executed.

***The Askonian society is dubious of technology, and practices ancestor worship. The Grand Master (their elderly leader) is firm about not accepting any technology from the Foundation, and about proceeding with Gorov’s execution. However, Ponyets convinces them to release Gorov in exchange for a gold transmuter jury-rigged out of a “food irradiation chamber” (presumably a more advanced version of a microwave oven).

***More importantly, Ponyets accomplishes Gorov’s mission of creating an opening for Foundation trade. He blackmails a member of the governing council, Pherl, to buy all of his cargo, which consists of many devices and machines forbidden by Askonian law. This council member, who does not believe in his culture’s superstitions against technology, then has an incentive to work towards the legalization of those machines, so that he can begin using and selling them to recoup his loss. It is indicated that Pherl, who is young for someone so important in government, will be the next Grand Master shortly, further hastening Askone’s susceptibility to Foundation trade and the controlling religion that it brings with it. Ponyets and Gorov head back to Terminus with a shipload of tin, which Ponyets was able to extract from Pherl as part of their bargain.

Query, should AQ be translated as the "Base" or as the "Foundation" ?

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

I don't want to be into "kicking down doors and ransacking homes" - I'm a low kinetic person.

I'm positing indigenous "COIN", where the people in my district are my people (some well-guided, some misguided and some uncertain). I'm not positing non-indigenous FID (much less foreign "COIN" or some half-assed form of co-belligerency) because that introduces too much complexity that clouds even more otherwise complex issues that have to resolved first.

Tactical alternatives to "kicking down doors and ransacking homes" abound - basically the opposites are being the bull in a china shop or a boa digesting a meal (making haste slowly). You may judge where you think my ground would be to stand snorting or to lay sleepily.

I'd point out that indigenous COIN is often a very kinetic and very nasty business, and that in many (I'd guess most) areas that are or have recently been threatened by insurgency there's a history of human rights abuse by government forces and a very active distrust of government. I realize that you wouldn't be planning to do any of that stuff, but you'd likely be dealing with the legacy of such actions... if government is liked and trusted and there's no recent history of confrontation there probably won't be much of an insurgency.

I still think you'll have a very, very difficult time persuading the citizenry to reveal their arms holdings, with any strategy.

In some ways your scenario resembles the place where I live. We had an active insurgency going on from the late 70s to the early 90s, and there are still bands of NPA active in the area. From the local view the insurgency was fought to block government plans to dam rivers, log mountains, and set up mines; all those plans were shelved, so the locals see themselves as the winners. From the government point of view the insurgency was a subset of the NPA's armed struggle to topple the government. People here actively dislike the military and don't like them around, but are no longer shooting at them as long as they don't get too aggressive. The image of the NPA is a little better but most people don't want them around either, as wherever they go the soldiers also go.

The populace is heavily and illegally armed, but the weapons are not displayed. The police are local people and are not going to do a thing about it. Military forces know the guns are there but as long as the guns aren't used against them they pretend not to know: they've no desire to stick their heads back into that particular hornet's nest. So the deal is basically that the locals will keep the guns under wraps and not shoot soldiers as long as the soldiers stay low profile and avoid confronting civilians. It mostly works, though it's not ideal.

To illustrate my point above... back in 1988 a group of drunk soldiers fired weapons in the town center here and killed 2 kids, one 2 years old, one 11. Nobody was prosecuted or punished. 20 years have not chilled that memory one bit. My wife still feels very uncomfortable in the presence of anyone from the Philippine military, and most of the populace feels the same way. If the people who shot your kids (it's a tribal society, the kids of one are the kids of all) come around wanting to know how many guns you have, will you tell them?

[jmm99]

They keep; I Know

from this:

from Dayuhan
The populace is heavily and illegally armed, but the weapons are not displayed. The police are local people and are not going to do a thing about it. Military forces know the guns are there but as long as the guns aren't used against them they pretend not to know: they've no desire to stick their heads back into that particular hornet's nest. So the deal is basically that the locals will keep the guns under wraps and not shoot soldiers as long as the soldiers stay low profile and avoid confronting civilians. It mostly works, though it's not ideal.

They are my police (I'm the district civil affairs officer) and indirectly my military. Now, if you're telling me that my cops and troopers won't tell me what they know, then we're into a different problem.

Sounds to me that what you have is a pretty good solution. The local population in effect is its own power center, with its own armed force, so that, at the least, it has something of a Mexican standoff (the Magnificant Seven x2) with both the government and insurgents.[*]

So, this district officer would not rock the boat, but would want to know as closely as possible what potentially harmful stuff is out there. Patience and time would yield those answers - the python who slithers, not the bull who stomps. It would also help if the district officer is at least something close to local - and not some knucklehead born and raised in the capital's suburbia.

Outsiders ?

Which takes me here:

from Dayuhan
To illustrate my point above... back in 1988 a group of drunk soldiers fired weapons in the town center here and killed 2 kids, one 2 years old, one 11. Nobody was prosecuted or punished. 20 years have not chilled that memory one bit. My wife still feels very uncomfortable in the presence of anyone from the Philippine military, and most of the populace feels the same way. If the people who shot your kids (it's a tribal society, the kids of one are the kids of all) come around wanting to know how many guns you have, will you tell them?

Were the soldiers (and their Os and NCOs) outsiders ? I could relate to that if a bunch of Trolls (them that live under the Bridge; it being the Mackinac Bridge) were sent up here to garrison us Yoopers. Obviously, my solution (as the fictional district officer) would be different (both preventative and reprobative) than what occured in your town in 1988.

I suggest that, where the folks that represent the government are "outsiders" (wherever the locals draw that line), those folks (1) are very similar to an occupying foreign force; and (2) are practicing what is in effect foreign COIN - as we did in Iraq, and are in Astan, by being the lead sled dog.

So, the ideal is to have locals involved, as Giap had in SVN ca. 1959-1965. By the end of that time, he'd run through about 100K of his Southern-born military and political cadres; and had to use more and more Northern-born PAVN. That did have an adverse effect on the VC (although other factors also entered the picture).

Interesting discussion for me (although I'm a poor fiction writer). I'd say our views are probably similar; but, of course, not in lockstep - which would be no fun at all.

Regards

Mike

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[*] Illustrating the practical effect of an armed citizenry, keeping and bearing arms - something that appeals to this libertarian for more than esoteric legal and political theories.

[40below]

That may be easier said than done. It appears that gun-registration in Canada has turned out to be a very expensive fiasco. If it doesn't work well, and is soooo expensive in a country like Canada, what chances have they got in a country like Iraq?

Sorry JMM, not evidentiary posting, just my quick reaction.

The program you point to is long-run registration, not gun control. The former failed because long guns have legal and long-established use on farms, hunting etc. and a single-shot .22 rifle is rarely used in crime, hence the pushback on registering them. Canada has effective, and extremely well accepted among citizens, gun control on other weapons from handguns to assault weapons and "gun control" just isn't an issue, just licensing requirements for long guns.

Of course, if the guns never get into the hands of the citizens in the first place, you have an easier time regulating them, just like pretty much everything else you can think of. That's why I don't think you can transfer the Canadian experience to Detroit, let alone Basra.