Gun Control in Counterinsurgency

[jcustis]

We face a peculiar dynamic in terms of weapons registration in my AO, which need not be that hard to resolve, but it is. Locals have weapons for sure, to include the ubiquitous AK-47 or variant, and some of the bigger players are known to control many weapons at once. The problem has arisen, however, that they are afraid to keep these weapons around for fear of being connected to the insurgency and a weapons facilitator, so in at least one case the weapons are reported to be buried. What is truly odd is the fact that these same villagers complain about being strong-armed and intimidated by the Taliban, yet have never reported a single instance where they used weapons to defend themselves. To some degree, they are caught between the proverbial rock and hard place of openly carrying an AK and risking getting fired upon by coalition forces, or being attacked by the Taliban for appearing to be actively defending themselves and putting up resistance. We assess that the average man who wants to register his weapon with GIRoA is even too afraid to take it to the DC in order to have its serial number recorded and logged into a district registry.

The bottom line is that the locals do not seem to have weapons on them at the right time to defeat the insurgents’ actions. Giving them a weapons registration card doesn’t necessarily mean they are suddenly start carrying an AK-47 in a cross-body fashion while they farm their fields or tend to the goats. I think a win for everyone down here lies in the more widespread use of pistols. For starters, they are short range, conversational distance affairs, with lower risk of collateral damage. They are also easier to conceal. If a patrol or vehicle checkpoint comes across a local with one on him, he need do nothing more than what conceal carry permit holders do in the US, assuming he has registered his weapon with the district government. Retrieve the ID card surreptitiously and present it for review. The coalition forces involved need to have the savvy to not retrieve the weapon and brandish in front of every onlooker, but a cursory inspection on the card and the individual is all that is required.

This all requires an almost herculean effort to combine information operations messages, engagement with district officials, security forces mentoring approaches, patrolling strategies, biometrics collection efforts, and litany of other synchronized tasks in order to be accomplished, but it can be done with the appropriate amount of effort and sense of “give a you-know-what.”

Now, in the current environment, concerns abound about central government control and authority, and masses of armed civilians moving about the districts under arms and potentially massing on their own to take action outside the scope of normal law and order, or outside the scope of the security apparatus. This worries many people for certain, from the President himself, down to think-tankers who spend a lot of time analyzing the influence of small arms in failed or failing states, and instability. There is good reason for concern, but it need not result in hand-wringing. In fact, in those areas that are under-governed, an armed society can shape itself into a polite and civil society, and resist the influence of those knuckleheads who would seek to take over a village via their own inkblot strategy. Right now, learned helplessness is keeping these people on their knees, and it doesn’t need to be that way

[jmm99]

and thank you, Jon, for a non-armchair response which tells us what the real, practical issues are.

It doesn't need any armchair comments from me; except I have to say that it ends in an astute observation:

Right now, learned helplessness is keeping these people on their knees, and it doesn’t need to be that way.

Thou art a worthy successor to the CAP guys of 45 years ago.

Regards

Mike

[40below]

We face a peculiar dynamic in terms of weapons registration in my AO, which need not be that hard to resolve, but it is. Locals have weapons for sure, to include the ubiquitous AK-47 or variant, and some of the bigger players are known to control many weapons at once. The problem has arisen, however, that they are afraid to keep these weapons around for fear of being connected to the insurgency and a weapons facilitator, so in at least one case the weapons are reported to be buried. What is truly odd is the fact that these same villagers complain about being strong-armed and intimidated by the Taliban, yet have never reported a single instance where they used weapons to defend themselves. To some degree, they are caught between the proverbial rock and hard place of openly carrying an AK and risking getting fired upon by coalition forces, or being attacked by the Taliban for appearing to be actively defending themselves and putting up resistance. We assess that the average man who wants to register his weapon with GIRoA is even too afraid to take it to the DC in order to have its serial number recorded and logged into a district registry.

The bottom line is that the locals do not seem to have weapons on them at the right time to defeat the insurgents’ actions. Giving them a weapons registration card doesn’t necessarily mean they are suddenly start carrying an AK-47 in a cross-body fashion while they farm their fields or tend to the goats. I think a win for everyone down here lies in the more widespread use of pistols. For starters, they are short range, conversational distance affairs, with lower risk of collateral damage. They are also easier to conceal. If a patrol or vehicle checkpoint comes across a local with one on him, he need do nothing more than what conceal carry permit holders do in the US, assuming he has registered his weapon with the district government. Retrieve the ID card surreptitiously and present it for review. The coalition forces involved need to have the savvy to not retrieve the weapon and brandish in front of every onlooker, but a cursory inspection on the card and the individual is all that is required.

I don't disagree with your point, Jim, it's excellent, but an AK comes with a strap, a pistol needs a holster, esp if you're wearing local manjammies. How long would it take for groups of Taliban to start frisking farmers? And one of two things will happen, they'll either come up with a pistol or an empty holster, neither of which indicates long-term survivability for the local. I'm given to understand that even American LEO are less than impressed to find empty pistol holsters on people, and the Talib are all about face-to-face contact, they don't roll around in Strykers.

I would still imagine the farmers would rather have a well-hidden AK or two than a pistol on their person (and where is a poor farmer going to get ammo for a pistol that doesn't fire ubiquitous 7.62 and needs regular cleaning so it works, unlike an AK?)

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

While 2nd Amendment advocates certainly claim bearing arms is a right, the “gun control” issue to me is really more about “prior restraint.”

This would be true in the US as well as many other countries. Consider this first; can we agree that in most countries the number of law abiding citizens who legally own guns typically heavily outnumbers those who use guns to commit crimes? This would exclude countries that have total gun bans, such as Japan (and Japan’s societal attitudes towards personal weapons ownership date back thousands of years and made a total gun ban fairly easy to implement).

If so, then the following is at the root of the world view of the two sides of gun control:

Gun Rights Advocates: As a free person you are considered innocent until you prove yourself otherwise and are trusted to inherently respect the rights of others and would only use firearms if necessary in self defense. (I would posit this applies to most people)

Strict Gun Control Advocates: You are to be considered untrustworthy and absent laws and strict enforcement will not inherently respect the right of others and would use firearms inappropriately. (I would say this almost universally applies to criminals, terrorists, insurgents, etc)

Criminals, to include terrorists and insurgents, tend to not obey the laws of the state so gun control laws will not prevent them from acquiring or using guns in criminal activity. The police and/or security forces cannot be everywhere all the time; that is unless you create a police force that is virtually 1 to 1 to the citizenry. That is both unfeasible from a fiscal standpoint and from the view that it would literally create a “police state.” So while “To serve, and protect” is a nice motto for many law enforcement agencies; the reality is an emphasis heavily weighted towards “serve” rather than “protect.” In fact most US courts have found the police have "no duty to protect" an individual citizen. They protect by removing criminals after the fact, thus "protection" come under the rules of law in the form of dissuasion to not break laws through the penalties for the inappropriate use of guns.

“Gun control” is just one of the several issues concerning a state's control over its citizenry. In a free society the state should limit its control over individual activity and restrict itself to advising the citizenry of potential danger or punishing those who do grievous harm. For example, I have no problem with warning labels on alcohol and tobacco products or even the government requiring McDonald’s to put caution “high saturated fat content” warnings on its Double Quarter Pounder with Cheese wrapper. But the government has absolutely no business telling me I cannot drink, smoke, and consume Micky D burgers all day long should I choose to. Or that I cannot own guns.

So one of the effects of criminalizing what was previously a legal activity, whether in COIN or in societies in general, is that there will be those who willfully disobey the law by possessing guns, preferring to feel secure and willing to suffer the consequences if they must use the weapon in self defense.

Another effect would probably be the expansion of an underground market for weapons, particularly if the security situation is poor and police and security forces unable to adequately provide security. This expansion of illegal activity would no doubt prompt a response from law makers and law enforcement thus adding to their responsibilities. As to what order of magnitude these would take on would depend on other factors such as the pre-ban number of weapons, the overall level of personal security, and the size of the security forces in relation to the security level.

[Rex Brynen]

If so, then the following is at the root of the world view of the two sides of gun control.

I'm not sure a great many societies would recognize the world views that you set forth as accurately describing their perceptions of the issue. Moreover, I suspect that there's no correlation at all between levels of general societal interpersonal trust and attitudes to gun control.

Let's take the Canadian case again. As 40below has already mentioned, there is much more support here for a significant degree of "gun control" than in the US, with the only issue that is really debated being the long gun registry. However, Canada actually has somewhat higher levels of interpersonal trust than the US, suggesting that while we think you're less likely to use a handgun in a bad way, we are also less likely to think you should have one in the first place.

I'm not stating that as a generalizable global hypothesis at all--it's only to argue that your perception of what the gun control issue is about is not one that would resonate in much of the rest of the Western world.

[Rex Brynen]

What is truly odd is the fact that these same villagers complain about being strong-armed and intimidated by the Taliban, yet have never reported a single instance where they used weapons to defend themselves.

Is this odd at all? Unless village action is collective, large-scale, and sustained to the point that it deters future intimidation, using a personal weapon against the Taliban seems likely to result in larger-scale retribution. Indeed, from an insurgent point of view, it would be essential to make the point that "resistance is futile." Unless counter-insurgent forces have sufficient presence and response time to prevent it, the insurgents control the "escalatory ladder." (This is probably why some of the more successful cases of village self-defence in Afghanistan occur near colaition forces or where there are embedded SF teams... think of it as the Magnificent Seven effect.)

This is potentially a very different situation from defending oneself from criminal activity, where the perceived cost-benefit structure is rather different from the criminal's perspective, and where criminals are likely to focus on the easiest pickings.

On a larger note on the gun control issue, it very much depends on the context. If we're talking rural Iraq or Afghanistan where gun ownership is longstanding and widespread, there may be little point (and indeed, some dysfunctional effects) of attempting civilian disarmament. Conversely, if the area is one where gun ownership (especially military small arms ownership) has been rare, growing civilian gun ownership can escalate small local conflicts over grazing rights, etc. into much larger, violent, and bloody confrontations than used to be the case (a growing problem, for example, in Kenya).

[jcustis]

How long would it take for groups of Taliban to start frisking farmers? And one of two things will happen, they'll either come up with a pistol or an empty holster, neither of which indicates long-term survivability for the local.

Hopefully they'll come up with a pistol to their temple. This is the whole point of allowing the common man to be armed. All the farmer need do is present the weapon to said Taliban center-mass areas, pull the trigger, rinse, and repeat as necessary.

I agree though, it requires collective response. We get collective complaints when patrols stop by to conduct engagement...perhaps it is best the collectively address the issues of knuckleheads encroaching on the perimeter of their village.