Restrepo and The Battle of Algiers

[TDB]

I watched Restrepo yesterday.

This is a story of soldiers dropped into an impossible situation, over which they have little control, and throughout which they can all sense that what they do is not apt to produce the larger effect that led to them being placed into such a situation to begin with. The result is that "bubble", reducing each soldier's world to him, the few men around him, the faceless enemy that oppose them, and the daily contest to stay alive.

This is a powerful story, but it offers little insights on insurgency or how to best deal with the situation in Afghanistan.

The irony of a group of foreign soldiers dropping into a region so self-governing and disconnected from anything in Kabul in order to convince the populace there to support something so irrelevant to their daily lives being "sold" to them by a foreign army bringing them promises that cannot be comprehended, wrapped in death and violence that are all too real is huge.

This is a microcosm of the application of foreign military power to defeat a resistance that is supported by a revolution. We attempt this all over Afghanistan. The Korengal Valley of Restrepo is a microcosm of the Helmand River Valley. One can, as the company commander does, draw a very real sense of accomplishment from establishing a small outpost such as Restrepo and holding it through hard effort; or in Clearing the Sangin district of Helmand as Gen Petreaus did; both efforts being equally valorous and honorable, and both efforts being equally moot and inappropriate to problem at hand.

The producers of the movie Restrepo have little understanding of the nature of insurgency, that is to be expected, they are just telling a story of human drama. Sadly, those who craft our efforts in Afghanistan tend to seem equally unable to see past the human drama to the greater elements behind the same.

Very well put, not simply in terms of the film only showing the great struggle of a few men in what is a huge theatre. Also in terms of those who are crafting the strategy. I came across this in the book Dead Men Risen, everytime a brigade commander is told he is about to deploy he arrives upon some grand strategy for his tour. It is all about his deployment, even in the post FM:3.24/COIN buzzword world. I don't want to go as far as to say that they only care about climbing the greasy pole of promotion, but it's short sighted.

As for the original point of the thread. In The Battle For Algiers, as you have rightly said the commanders only care about the battle not the war. In terms of Restrepo, the men only care about getting home alive and so will do whatever they have to. If this means dropping massive amounts of HE on mountains then so be it. Even when civilians are killed, as much as it pains them, their response is still very matter of fact. No training soldiers to see the bigger picture is hard when all they can see/hear is amount of fire being rained down on them.

[JMA]

Very well put, not simply in terms of the film only showing the great struggle of a few men in what is a huge theatre. Also in terms of those who are crafting the strategy. I came across this in the book Dead Men Risen, everytime a brigade commander is told he is about to deploy he arrives upon some grand strategy for his tour. It is all about his deployment, even in the post FM:3.24/COIN buzzword world. I don't want to go as far as to say that they only care about climbing the greasy pole of promotion, but it's short sighted.

I would like to believe that every incoming brigade commander is not given carte blanche to 'do his own thing'. Amazingly it seems to be the case when one reads books like Dead Men Risen and Losing Small Wars.

Yes it seems the successful brigade commanders get a CBE while the runners-up get a plain old DSO. It is an indefensible policy and begs the question as to what the Brit general at the 'Div HQ' was doing and what he was supposed to be doing.

To compound this problem the new brigadier armed with his new plan for Helmand would arrive with new troops (comprising at best an element who had done a 'short tour' 18 months previously). It is so amateur its like the boy-scouts. It absolutely boggles the mind that the Brit military has got itself into the state it has. This is early Boer War ineptitude.

Help may be at hand. You have probably noticed that a similar problem has developed with the top echelons of the Brit police. The government has hired a yank policeman (I think with gang experience from LA?) as an advisor (which has pissed the Brit police brass off) and are now considering introducing the US system of electing Chief Constables (Sheriffs). Watch this space. I believe there is a need for outside assistance to help 'fix' the crisis in the Brit military at ranks above Lt Col. There are various permutations possible to use outsiders in this process (all of which will be unacceptable to the current general staff of course) but whatever happens it needs to be on the scale of the Haldane Commission. It is the only hope as currently the cancer of incompetence and ineptitude is spreading down the rank structure at an alarming rate (and when it gets into and among the majors/captains it will be curtains for the military).

As for the original point of the thread. In The Battle For Algiers, as you have rightly said the commanders only care about the battle not the war.

I don't like where is thought approach is going.

In a war the politicians draft the grand strategy (which essentially charts where they want to be at the end of the war). This Grand Strategy then controls what the lower level military strategy can be. Everyone works that their level in accordance with the applicable strategy and RoE. Part of the problem (or even the main part of the problem) is that this FM:3.24 has been interpreted incorrectly (or written in a manner to create confusion). The ludicrous expectation that foreign soldiers can/should be able to flip from a RoE restricted combat role to a 'hearts and minds' civil affairs role in an instant is the main problem. Secondly that there is no acceptable government and no acceptable government forces to hand over to after the 'clear' phase of a combat operation (in Afghanistan) effectively means ISAF is on a hiding to nothing. The good news is that Patreus is no longer in the military and now the damage can begin to be undone.

By all means intervene on the side of the legitimate representatives of the people to prevent a military solution being imposed through an insurgency and control this with RoE to prevent the kind of problems (which occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan) which serve to estrange the people further or push them into the opposing camp (like bombing wedding parties or shooting up families at check points). The kind of living with the people 'hearts and minds' stuff is not a line infantry role.

In terms of Restrepo, the men only care about getting home alive and so will do whatever they have to. If this means dropping massive amounts of HE on mountains then so be it. Even when civilians are killed, as much as it pains them, their response is still very matter of fact. No training soldiers to see the bigger picture is hard when all they can see/hear is amount of fire being rained down on them.

Restrepo was a deeply disturbing movie. They were not conducting military operations they were trying to survive. Pity soldiers had to die before they realised the futility of the presence there. The other aspect of the problem in Afghanistan it raised is that the connection between the people and the Taliban is not understood. It ends up with the US held up in a beau geste fort surrounded by hostile locals and Taliban. If those kids were used to clear the area of Taliban so the ANA could move in and pacify the locals then they would propably be able to understand that... but don't stick them on a hill top in a strange land for months on end and expect them to understand why they are there.

[davidbfpo]

Citing JMA:

..You have probably noticed that a similar problem has developed with the top echelons of the Brit police. The government has hired a yank policeman (I think with gang experience from LA?) as an advisor (which has pissed the Brit police brass off) and are now considering introducing the US system of electing Chief Constables (Sheriffs). Watch this space...

You are on the right track, but to clarify and before some think policing in the UK needs to learn from US policing!

For complex reasons the UK government has 'issues' with how policing is delivered and how much it costs. Before coming to power it was clear the Conservatives wanted to have in England and Wales, in each county, an elected person to oversee policing, called a Police & Crime Commissioner; which would replace the current unelected oversight body. The riots in several cities, notably London, with the perception the top echelons failed to get a grip, added to the government's resolve to push reform through.

In London the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police resigned before the riots and it was mooted that the Prime Minister would welcome Bill Bratton, ex-police chief in New York and Los Angeles applying for the vacancy. That came to nought as by a quick change the post was made UK citizens only may apply. Then it was mooted Bill Bratton would become a special adviser on gangs, that too came to nowt; just attending a conference last week.

[JMA]

Citing JMA:

You are on the right track, but to clarify and before some think policing in the UK needs to learn from US policing!

For complex reasons the UK government has 'issues' with how policing is delivered and how much it costs. Before coming to power it was clear the Conservatives wanted to have in England and Wales, in each county, an elected person to oversee policing, called a Police & Crime Commissioner; which would replace the current unelected oversight body. The riots in several cities, notably London, with the perception the top echelons failed to get a grip, added to the government's resolve to push reform through.

In London the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police resigned before the riots and it was mooted that the Prime Minister would welcome Bill Bratton, ex-police chief in New York and Los Angeles applying for the vacancy. That came to nought as by a quick change the post was made UK citizens only may apply. Then it was mooted Bill Bratton would become a special adviser on gangs, that too came to nowt; just attending a conference last week.

Thanks for clarifying that David (I was just lazy to get into the detail).

I do think that the threat of bringing in someone like Bratton served to jerk the chain of the complacent senior police officers. A good trick if that was the intention... which they should apply with a suitable variation to the military. Can you just imagine all those old farts in the senior officers mess choking on their G&Ts? (gin and tonics)