Originally Posted by Zack
Do you know of any other way I could get those articles? If you have them, I would be immensely grateful.
And yes I will of course mention Douhet, Mitchell, & Trenchard, with deference.
If your library has access to JSTOR it should have all of that. Also try Web of Knowledge. Ask a librarian to help.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 05-13-2011 at 09:11 AM. Reason: Remove Zack's email.
I have checked both JSTOR and Web of Knowledge, with no luck. I guess we don't have full access to all of JSTOR. If nobody has them and can send them my way I will go see if the librarian can request them for me. Thanks though.
Send a PM to John T. Fishel he helped start that publication and knows all kinds of stuff about it.
Here is alink to the free version of the Air Campaign by Warden
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/warden/ward-toc.htm
Last edited by slapout9; 08-31-2009 at 03:59 AM. Reason: spellin
Zack, pay special attention to the 5 cases of War. The 2006 war was a case 5 War and Israel violated every principle Warden ever spoke about. This is important because he was and is blamed for a lot of the supposed EBO concepts that were used in the war, not a grain of truth in any of it, it fact (the 2006 war) is an excellent example of what will happen if you don't follow his advice on SBW (Systems Based Warfare).
PS: Afghanistan is a current example of a case 5 War and all the problems that go with it.
I definitely will, thanks for the tip.
Treat with extreme caution
Zack,
The only advice I would offer about attempting to analysis the 2006 War is be very careful of most Western English language analysis. It almost all contains substantial errors and fallacies.
EG: This from Exum
Actually in 2006 all the IDFs formation tactical radios were VHF/FM, with no encryption. Any actual knowledge of the IDF would have told him that.Yet, in asking how Hizb Allah intercepted Israeli communications during the 2006 war, it is worth noting that in cases when encrypted communication failed, IDF soldiers simply used their personal cellular phones to communicate.
Hezbollah only ever attempted to break one form of IDF encryption and in doing so compromised the attempt, thus it was countered.
This is one minor example.
Some of what has come out of CAC and other similar sources is also of doubtful veracity and usefulness.
Stephen Biddle's analysis (also not great but the best yet) is actually the only one I know that has any credibility because it used first hand sources.
To be constructive, I know a few of the men actually involved in the operational planning of the war in 2006, so if you PM me, I'll happily pass on questions. - so if you really want to know about the IDF using EBO, they can tell you first hand.
The single biggest issue (and the one not written about in English) with the 2006 Lebanon War was a failure to stick to the plan, because the plan kept being micro-managed at the Political level, and that casts doubts on the actually political objectives. IMO, it is an absolute case study of ignoring Clausewitz's observations.
Yes, lots of tactical problems, but again, everyone misses the political and economic dimensions that created the conditions where those became a problem - no time or money to train for proper combat operations - and huge faith in Air Power/EBO.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Ok cool, I will keep an eye out for that. Hopefully what I am reading will be enough that I will be able to pick up on that sort of stuff. Maybe you guys can help me fact check a bit when I get to writing.
I'd like to add that the 2006 war also showed up the doctrinal imbroglio (?) of the transition from standard wafighting to Shimon Naveh's rather appropriately entitled concept of SOD. From the commentaries I have read a large number of IDF staff officers were flumoxed by it and operations proceeded on the basis of EBO/RMA/NCW concepts when actually simply killing the enemy and taking his ground would have been more appropraite (i.e., classical warfare). This is, of course, in addition to the civil-military chaos Wilf mentions above. The article in Military Review presents this case rather well IMO (and is free to download).
This is exactly that 90% of folks have missed. The IDF have been doctrinally crippled by a bunch of avant-garde concepts, either home grown or from the US. The flow down from that was sets of mission verbs which made no sense, and tactical actions that were often irrelevant.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Shimon Naveh
Zack:
I didnt see it on your original list and also didnt see it on the posts suggesting other readings (although I may have missed it) but you should have a look at the work and thinking of Shimon Naveh, the Israeli GO, and so-called intellectual father of IDF thinking about war prior to 2006. He is mentioned briefly in the works by Matthews and Kober and others. Many of the critiques of the IDF in Lebanon at one point or another trace their way back to what some analysts see as the pernicious influence of Naveh and his purportedly whack-job ideas about theory and practice in war.
A place to start might be this interview with Naveh in Haaretz.
Wilf might have some things to add in this regard too.
gian
Actually, in the quote in question, Ex isn't saying anything about Hizbullah breaking Israeli military encryption. Rather, he is saying that when communications failures arose, IDF personnel used their cellphones to communicate instead. He's correctly implying that the GSM cellphones in use by the great majority of Israelis (IDF soldiers included) are unencrypted and hence extremely vulnerable to intercept--which is why, on more than one occasion, the IDF has issued warnings to military personnel about this.
/nitpick
They mostly come at night. Mostly.
- university webpage: McGill University
- conflict simulations webpage: PaxSims
Quote.
OK, but at the below unit level, the normal formations of the IDF did not have any encryption to fail. Some still used PRC-77!! You can listen to it on a commercial scanner. Bear in mind the UK VHF military comms system was totally open until they got that POS Bowman in 2005.Yet, in asking how Hizb Allah intercepted Israeli communications during the 2006 war, it is worth noting that in cases when encrypted communication failed, IDF soldiers simply used their personal cellular phones to communicate.
The cellphone conversations intercepted where soldiers civilians cell-phones that were being relayed through cell sites in the Lebanon. My cell phone frequently hops to Jordanian networks, when I'm on the West Bank. This is frequently alleged that the broke IDF encryption. It's simply not true.
The calls concerned were mostly to families and not operational communications (though in extremes some may have been)
The IDF military cell phone network is secure and comes from the US!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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