The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War (catch all)

[Ray]

30 Tanks Wiped Out in Lebanon
12:01 Aug 11, '06 / 17 Av 5766

(IsraelNN.com) IDF officials admit that the biggest surprise of the ongoing war against Hizbullah is the ease by which terrorists have destroyed IDF tanks.

At least 30 tanks have been totally destroyed or seriously damaged in bomb and anti-tank rocket attacks involving state-of-the-art Russian anti-tank rockets.

About one-half of the military personnel killed in southern Lebanon were inside tanks.

http://www.israelnationalnews.com/news.php3?id=109793

This conflict has not gone as was usual in an Arab Israeli war.

I wonder what could be the reason.

Is it because of the state of art anti tank rocket? I believe RPG 29S was used.

Is it because of poor tactics?

Or, is it because the Hizbs were ingenuous in their tactics and use of weapons?

Poor political leadership and decision making?

Poor generalship?

IDF actually being ill equipped but nonetheless launched?

[SWJED]

... and while many are still digesting the "lessons learned – or unlearned" (and will be for some time) one reason might be the "operational pause" the IDF took south of the Litani River as the political leadership decided that international pressure to end Israel's Lebanon incursion was too great to bear.

Mechanized forces need to be "on-the-move" to be effective and are most effective in the conduct of "major combat operations." From first impressions the IDF faced more of a hybrid threat - heavy on the asymmetric with a sprinkling of conventional and reinforced with IO - and aided and abetted by a sympathetic and often supportive mainstream news media.

This is just my initial gut-reaction - as more information becomes available I am sure many reasons will emerge.

Other first impressions include an IDF over-reliance on air and lack of appreciation for the asymmetrical fight Hezbollah brought to bear - to include Hezbollah's (and by extension Iran's) use of IO - or "soft power" as referenced on another thread.

[Stu-6]

I doubt the RPG29 was the wonder weapon due to limited accuracy; guided missiles seem to be a more likely culprit. Even older missiles can deliver fatal shots to tanks from the tops, flank, and rear. If the IDF allowed missile crews to get behind them they would be vulnerable. As SWJED said tanks are designed for on the move fightin. . . with the enemy in front.

[J.C.]

The point about what missle or what weaponary was used is irrelavent. Israel used conventional weapons to attack a asymetrical problem. Like T.E. Lawerence theorized, you can not kill an idea. Hezbollah is an idea as much as it is an actual entity. If israel had used subtle political manuevering to poision the water around lebonon, by having Sunni opinion kill Iranian and Syrian imput, then they could have looked to strangle the hezbollah forces in southern lebonon. Instead they brought sympathy for hezbollah and the Lebonese people and killed any chance of accomplishing what they set out to do. So instead of asking what killed israeli tanks, we should ask why they used tanks or why they used planes. Maybe well placed acts of violence could have worked just as well. As with Iraq if their is a technology out there, it will have a counter measure and a why to beat it. The fact that it happens is rather pointless, it just means you have to find something else. I guess if any thing can be learned from this action is that israel could not control the battle space as we are having a hard time doing in our current operations.

Further, its good to still see good post and comments, didn't get much of that with the hooahs in benning.

[Uboat509]

I spent 18 months in the OPFOR at JRTC and my experience is that tanks tend to be very poor at fighting infantry, particularly infantry that isn't intent on staying still and providing an easy target. I have never been armor but it seems to me they get tunnel vision. A trick that I saw used effectively was to have a few OPFOR fire a few shot at the tank to get his attention and then run behind some cover. The tank would then follow and chase the dismounted OPFOR, right across the front of a T-62. Head to head an M1 is going to crush a T-62 every time but if the M1 is busy chasing infantry and not paying attention it tends to even the odds. The Israelis learned some hard lessons about infantry vs. tanks in the Yom Kippur war when they didn't have supporting infantry for their tanks initially. Back then the Egyptians were using the old Saggers which weren't terribly accurate to say the least. My mother has friend who was a tanker in the IDF back then and after one battle they counted something like 15 Sagger guide wires draped across his tank. Fast forward to this conflict with better IDF armor but also better enemy anti-armor and you can see the result. If the MSM reports from the battle are to be believed then at least some of the IDF infantry were poorly equipped, poorly trained etc. In those circumstances there might be a tendency to want to follow the heavily armored tanks rather than the other way around. At the same time an improperly trained tank crew might go into the fight buttoned up which would feel safer but which is much more dangerous because of the loss of SA. I will very interested to see the AARs form this fight. You know AQ et all will be too.

SFC W

[Steve Blair]

Our own armor force learned in Vietnam (and possibly forgot it) that tanks had to operate with crewmen exposed in order to be effective against an enemy that used mainly light infantry. Tank commanders would often engage targets using their override, with the gunner assisting the loader to keep up a high rate of fire. They also mounted extra machineguns on the M-48s, as they learned that suppressive fire was very important. Makeshift gun shields were also very common.

Armor can be effective in these conflicts, but it often has to change its accustomed role. Failure to do so can be costly.

[Merv Benson]

This report says that the Hezzies were using Russian AT-5 Spandral anti tank missiles. The serial numbers on many of these indicate they were in a shipment sold to Syria. Apparently the anti tank missiles were abundant enough to use them as anti personel weapons. Hezballah would usually attack the IDF troops that had "taken cover" in a house. I don't know enough about the terrain in southern Lebanon, but if they could dig in a fighting hole would probably give more protection than a house.

Hezballah also got Brit night vision equipment that had been sold to the Iranians for a UN drug interdiction program. Indeed, Hezballah may have been better equiped than the Israeli reserve units. A father of several reservist wrote:

...

Five of my sons and sons-in-law fought in this war. Now coming out of Lebanon and surviving some of the bloodiest fighting, they are filled with anger. Their short-term and long-term orders were confused and ever-changing. The emergency stocks for their reserve units were in horrible condition. One reservist special forces unit lacked basic communications equipment, they were provided guns that they had never trained on, and their rushed training was done in conditions unlike anything they would see in Lebanon.

...

Over the course of the war soldiers were held back for weeks when they were ready to charge. When they were finally dispatched, they were given unachievable missions in impossible time constraints. Soldiers were sent on daytime missions that should have been carried out only under the cover of darkness. Some died as a result.

...

Reports like this suggest that the cease fire actually help Israel much more than was believed at the time.

[Strickland]

As far as the original post concerning the 30 tanks, APCs, and IFVs being destroyed; this should not be a shock to the IDF. I seem to recall that in 1987 in Jenin that they lost so many soldiers inside APCs and IFVs that all of the IDF soldiers began riding on top of them. Glad to see we are not the only ones with a propensity for relearning the same old lessons the hard way.

[Tom Odom]

Interesting that they were trying to operate buttoned up. They did not in 87 when I was on the ground. In fact in most cases, their 113s operated wih the rear door open--something that has its own set of problems.

Best
Tom

[Wagram]

You may find interesting that a recently returned FINUL (French for UNIFIL)member has told me he has counted, himself, not through a third party, over 40 damaged/destroyed IDF MBTs/APCs when he was there. The IDF was especially sensitive about retrieving and evacuating the wrecks.

I hope to get to see his pictures soon. I'll try to keep the board posted.

[SWJED]

17 August from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) - Preliminary Lessons of the Israeli-Hezbollah War by Anthony Cordesman.

Instant military history is always dangerous and inaccurate. This is particularly true when one goes from an effort to describe the fighting to trying to draw lessons from uncertain and contradictory information. The following analysis is based largely on media reporting, data provided by Israeli and Arab think tanks, and a visit to Israel sponsored by Project Interchange of the American Jewish Committee. This visit made it possible to visit the front and talk with a number of senior Israeli officers and experts, but Israeli officers and experts were among the first to note that the facts were unclear and that it might take weeks or months to establish what had happened.

This analysis is, however, limited by the fact that no matching visit was made to Lebanon and to the Hezbollah. Such a visit was not practical at this time, but it does mean the lessons advanced analysis cannot be based on a close view of what Liddle Hart called the "other side of the hill."...

[Uboat509]

The CSIS report is a good read but I am suspicious of any open source document that seems to provide so much information. But then it is in my nature to be suspicious, which is probably how I ended up in MI. There are a whole lot of unnamed sources. I would like to see some corroborating reports. In fairness I should note that I am not really all that familier with CSIS' products having only read one other. I would appreciate hearing from anyone who has more knowledge about them.

SFC W

[Bill Moore]

http://www.csis.org/about/history/

Funny, you're suspicious of open source research, because I'm suspicious of the stuff we get from MI (lol). In all seriousiness I have found a number of CSIS's studies to be well researched and practical, but whether open source or classified the potential for bias obviously exists. Anyway the link above will take you to csis's history link (self promotion) which will shed some light on what they have produced. I know we supported a couple of their projects in the past (SOCOM) by providing access to soldiers to interview.

Back on the open source issue, I would encourage our MI personnel to exploit more open source material. I have never understood the intelligence community's outright bias against anything without a "SECRET" stamp on it. A reporter or researcher talks to source about let's say the Hezbullah/Israel conflict, then it results in an unclassified article or study, but if a MI person debriefs that source and writes the report it is SECRET and therefore credible, yet in many cases the PhD or reporter may actually be more a subject matter on that region. I have a lot of respect for the many good analysts I have worked with and am working with now, but this is one area we simply don't agree on.