The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War (catch all)

[Jesse9252]

b.) Anyone who has studied the conflict is very aware that there was no real strategic objectives set by Israel, and that presented real operational problems in terms of formulating military action.

Okay, I'm confused here. I recognize that the war was executed without much logical coherence, but I thought (based on English-language research only) that the goals were pretty clearly articulated on the Israeli side. Cordesman lists them as:
1) Destroy the Iranian Western Command before Iran could go nuclear.
2) Restore the credibility of Israeli deterrence after the unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005, and countering the image that Israel was weak and forced to leave.
3) Force Lebanon to become and act as an accountable state, and end the status of Hezbollah as a state within a state.
4) Damage or cripple Hezbollah, with the understanding that it could not be destroyed as a military force and would continue to be a major political actor in Lebanon.
5) Bring the two soldiers the Hezbollah had captured back alive without major trades in prisoners held by Israel—not the thousands demanded by Nasrallah and the Hezbollah.

Is this incorrect?

[Rex Brynen]

1) Destroy the Iranian Western Command before Iran could go nuclear.

I'm not even sure what this means--but no, I don't think the IDF ever dreamed it could "destroy" Hizbullah. If they did, they would have gone for a war plan and ground commitment that looked like 1982. Degrade longer-range and potential non-conventional missile capabilities? Yes (and not achieved in any meaningful, lasting sense).

2) Restore the credibility of Israeli deterrence after the unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005, and countering the image that Israel was weak and forced to leave.

Yep.

3) Force Lebanon to become and act as an accountable state, and end the status of Hezbollah as a state within a state.

Maybe, although one would have to be pretty silly to imagine that "Lebanon" could do that.

4) Damage or cripple Hezbollah, with the understanding that it could not be destroyed as a military force and would continue to be a major political actor in Lebanon.

Damage, yes.. I doubt they were as ambitious as "cripple."

5) Bring the two soldiers the Hezbollah had captured back alive without major trades in prisoners held by Israel—not the thousands demanded by Nasrallah and the Hezbollah.

Yes.

[William F. Owen]

Rex Brynen, as usual has it right enough.

However one of the things that gets missed is that Israel had a plan for a war with Hezbollah. The incredible thing is, that when the shooting started, they simply did not stick to the plan. This is very well documented in Israel, but almost nowhere else.

What got done it it's place had almost no strategic rationale. - and not helped by the fact that aspects of equipment, training and logistics, critical to the plan, had not been implemented or implemented well enough.

[KingsofWar]

So William, Rex and others, which side more generally do you believe achieved a military victory immediately after the war? How about a political victory?

And did this scorecard change in the following four years?

[William F. Owen]

So William, Rex and others, which side more generally do you believe achieved a military victory immediately after the war? How about a political victory?

And did this scorecard change in the following four years?

Huh??? With respect, "Kings of War," these are not questions I would expect an MA student to be asking. They are simplistic.

Why is the condition "immediately after the war" less relevant than that "soon after the war?" Why are you separating "political" and "military." Who taught you Clausewitz at Kings?

I'll kick back the question I keep having to put to UK/US officers visiting Israel, which is:
"Do you think the IDF would have launched Operation Cast Lead, if they were worried about Hezbollah's rocket forces in the North?"

[Tukhachevskii]

Who taught you Clausewitz at Kings?

Obviously not the same people who taught me!!! Standards have really dropped (they even have Vivien Jabri teaching there now) WHOA!!! Scratch that I see, Jan Willem Honig is still there. (Can't blame the teachers for their student's laziness I suppose!)

[William F. Owen]

Huh??? With respect, "Kings of War," these are not questions I would expect an MA student to be asking. They are simplistic.

Apologies if I came on a bit strong here. Not my intent to deter you from your endeavour. Keep at me, but people like me are an everyday hazard in this business..... or should be!

[KingsofWar]

You'll have to pardon my terribly worded question. I of course have read Clausewitz and understand that war is an extension of politics by other means. I'm happy to say that Kings professors remain top notch. Ahron Bregman and Sue Onslow were fantastic, although I can't say the same about Julian Reid and his obsession with biopolitics.

What I meant to ask was ... 'Have the realities on the ground in Lebanon and Israel since the war's end slowly chipped away at the argument that Hezbollah defeated Israel? When taking into account Hezbollah's mobility restrictions, infrastructural losses, domestic political opposition, 4 years of enhanced deterrence, to name a few, can it be said that neither side achieved victory? Even when considering Hezbollah's even larger weapons stockpiles?

Rex touched on a bit of this...

[Rex Brynen]

So William, Rex and others, which side more generally do you believe achieved a military victory immediately after the war? How about a political victory?

And did this scorecard change in the following four years?

I can see what you are getting at here, but you might want to think through your concepts and terminology.

The only meaningful "military victory" is a political one, since war is an instrument of policy. That being said, you can separate out an assessment of "military performance" in an operational sense from the political-strategic outcomes of the war.

I realize that Wilf doesn''t much like the notion of a changing scorecard, but I think it does reflect the perceptions of the parties. In 2006, Hizbullah and broader regional audience would have regarded it as a Hizbullah win, while many Israelis would have regarded it as a losing draw.

Today, the Hizbullah/regional assessment hasn't much changed, but the Israeli assessment (after 4 years of deterrence) has.

The Middle East, by the way, is full of wars with unclear winners. Who won in 1973, Israel or Egypt? The IDF certainly won on the battlefield, surrounding the Egyptian Third Army. However, Sadat (unlike Assad) didn't launch the war to defeat Israel, but to break the diplomatic logjam--which it did, culminating in the 1979 peace treat and full recovery of occupied Egyptian territory. This is the reason why the war is still the subject of annual commemoration in Egypt.

Who won in 1982? The IDF certainly devastated the PLO, and forced it from Lebanon--but at the cost of creating a far more dangerous opponent, Hizbullah. Moreover, there is ample evidence that Sharon had a broader ambition to marginalize the PLO... yet, the war forced the PLO to become even more pragmatic, thereby enhancing its effective pursuit of the two-state solution that Sharon opposed. I would regard this as positive for Israel too, but I'm doubtful that the Israeli (Likud) leadership of the day would have regarded it as such.

In short, wars are messy things, with all sorts of complicated and unanticipated second- and third- order effects.

Policymakers, take note!