The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War (catch all)

[Uboat509]

I spent 18 months in the OPFOR at JRTC and my experience is that tanks tend to be very poor at fighting infantry, particularly infantry that isn't intent on staying still and providing an easy target. I have never been armor but it seems to me they get tunnel vision. A trick that I saw used effectively was to have a few OPFOR fire a few shot at the tank to get his attention and then run behind some cover. The tank would then follow and chase the dismounted OPFOR, right across the front of a T-62. Head to head an M1 is going to crush a T-62 every time but if the M1 is busy chasing infantry and not paying attention it tends to even the odds. The Israelis learned some hard lessons about infantry vs. tanks in the Yom Kippur war when they didn't have supporting infantry for their tanks initially. Back then the Egyptians were using the old Saggers which weren't terribly accurate to say the least. My mother has friend who was a tanker in the IDF back then and after one battle they counted something like 15 Sagger guide wires draped across his tank. Fast forward to this conflict with better IDF armor but also better enemy anti-armor and you can see the result. If the MSM reports from the battle are to be believed then at least some of the IDF infantry were poorly equipped, poorly trained etc. In those circumstances there might be a tendency to want to follow the heavily armored tanks rather than the other way around. At the same time an improperly trained tank crew might go into the fight buttoned up which would feel safer but which is much more dangerous because of the loss of SA. I will very interested to see the AARs form this fight. You know AQ et all will be too.

SFC W

[Steve Blair]

Our own armor force learned in Vietnam (and possibly forgot it) that tanks had to operate with crewmen exposed in order to be effective against an enemy that used mainly light infantry. Tank commanders would often engage targets using their override, with the gunner assisting the loader to keep up a high rate of fire. They also mounted extra machineguns on the M-48s, as they learned that suppressive fire was very important. Makeshift gun shields were also very common.

Armor can be effective in these conflicts, but it often has to change its accustomed role. Failure to do so can be costly.

[Merv Benson]

This report says that the Hezzies were using Russian AT-5 Spandral anti tank missiles. The serial numbers on many of these indicate they were in a shipment sold to Syria. Apparently the anti tank missiles were abundant enough to use them as anti personel weapons. Hezballah would usually attack the IDF troops that had "taken cover" in a house. I don't know enough about the terrain in southern Lebanon, but if they could dig in a fighting hole would probably give more protection than a house.

Hezballah also got Brit night vision equipment that had been sold to the Iranians for a UN drug interdiction program. Indeed, Hezballah may have been better equiped than the Israeli reserve units. A father of several reservist wrote:

...

Five of my sons and sons-in-law fought in this war. Now coming out of Lebanon and surviving some of the bloodiest fighting, they are filled with anger. Their short-term and long-term orders were confused and ever-changing. The emergency stocks for their reserve units were in horrible condition. One reservist special forces unit lacked basic communications equipment, they were provided guns that they had never trained on, and their rushed training was done in conditions unlike anything they would see in Lebanon.

...

Over the course of the war soldiers were held back for weeks when they were ready to charge. When they were finally dispatched, they were given unachievable missions in impossible time constraints. Soldiers were sent on daytime missions that should have been carried out only under the cover of darkness. Some died as a result.

...

Reports like this suggest that the cease fire actually help Israel much more than was believed at the time.

[Ray]

Thank you all.

One is aware of Infantry - tank equations and mechanised warfare as I was fortunate to experience the same in the conventional combat format. I could not agree more with the comments made by you all. Indeed, 'buttoning up' by tankmen is asking for trouble in such an environment. One of the safer ways is to be in the 'infantry leading' mode and tanks in support, especially in close country or in the urban scenario. I am not too sure as to what type of terrain the IDF confronted when these tanks were killed and so my comments are not to denigrate or suggest modes. They are mere conjectures.

The Hizb tactics sort of tickles my curiosity.

I am very keen to know more of the Hizb tactics since it will be used extensively elsewhere as it has become somewhat of a benchmark of success for those who wish to indulge in asymmetrical warfare.

Any links or articles available for study?

[slapout9]

Uboat509, that is an interesting post you made about getting tanks to come at you, because that is exactly what we did in the 82ND Airborne. I was at green ramp at Pope air force base, at Bragg waiting to board the aircraft in 1973 in response to Yom Kippur. What happened in Lebanon seems to be very close to what we called Retrograde operations. Infantry with portable missiles and artillery.

You throw bullets at tanks and get them to chase you (infantry) into a big ambush. You "advance"back wards in leap frog fashion with the tanks chasing you and then you light them up. The TOW missile was just coming on line in a big way in 73 so our plan was to mix 106 mm recoilless rifles mounted on jeeps(remember jeeps?) and TOW missiles and artillery. The US plan was to have the 82ND stand between Egypt and Israel until they stopped fighting. Fortunately we did not have to go. I don't know if the actual plan has been declassified but it would be interesting to see how close the recent operation in Lebanon was to the 82ND plan or concept of a light infantry-man launched missile based-anti-armor force.

[Neil Horn]

"Five of my sons and sons-in-law fought in this war. Now coming out of Lebanon and surviving some of the bloodiest fighting, they are filled with anger. Their short-term and long-term orders were confused and ever-changing. The emergency stocks for their reserve units were in horrible condition. One reservist special forces unit lacked basic communications equipment, they were provided guns that they had never trained on, and their rushed training was done in conditions unlike anything they would see in Lebanon."

I'm a newcomer and been browsing for a while, but this quote just caught me off guard... reservist or not, how can a SF unit lack basic comm and weapons proficiency. Moreover, how can they be ill prepared for the battle space? It's not as though they have to prepare for a wide spectrum of environmental conditions.?.