Yom Kippur
Uboat509, that is an interesting post you made about getting tanks to come at you, because that is exactly what we did in the 82ND Airborne. I was at green ramp at Pope air force base, at Bragg waiting to board the aircraft in 1973 in response to Yom Kippur. What happened in Lebanon seems to be very close to what we called Retrograde operations. Infantry with portable missiles and artillery.
You throw bullets at tanks and get them to chase you (infantry) into a big ambush. You "advance"back wards in leap frog fashion with the tanks chasing you and then you light them up. The TOW missile was just coming on line in a big way in 73 so our plan was to mix 106 mm recoilless rifles mounted on jeeps(remember jeeps?) and TOW missiles and artillery. The US plan was to have the 82ND stand between Egypt and Israel until they stopped fighting. Fortunately we did not have to go. I don't know if the actual plan has been declassified but it would be interesting to see how close the recent operation in Lebanon was to the 82ND plan or concept of a light infantry-man launched missile based-anti-armor force.
As far as the original post concerning the 30 tanks, APCs, and IFVs being destroyed; this should not be a shock to the IDF. I seem to recall that in 1987 in Jenin that they lost so many soldiers inside APCs and IFVs that all of the IDF soldiers began riding on top of them. Glad to see we are not the only ones with a propensity for relearning the same old lessons the hard way.
The Seven Ps.
"Five of my sons and sons-in-law fought in this war. Now coming out of Lebanon and surviving some of the bloodiest fighting, they are filled with anger. Their short-term and long-term orders were confused and ever-changing. The emergency stocks for their reserve units were in horrible condition. One reservist special forces unit lacked basic communications equipment, they were provided guns that they had never trained on, and their rushed training was done in conditions unlike anything they would see in Lebanon."
I'm a newcomer and been browsing for a while, but this quote just caught me off guard... reservist or not, how can a SF unit lack basic comm and weapons proficiency. Moreover, how can they be ill prepared for the battle space? It's not as though they have to prepare for a wide spectrum of environmental conditions.?.
I keep seeing this same thing over and over. The IDF wasn't "allowed" to destroy Hizbullah but no one ever seems to have an answer as to how you destroy an insurgency by pure force of arms. The IDF wanted to move forward and take some more villages and clear out the bad guys. Then what? As we have proven in Iraq you can clear all the bad guys out of a village but if you don't A) occupy it and/or B) win the hearts and minds of the local populace then the bad guys will be back as soon as you leave. Israel clearly wants no part of another occupation of Lebenon and maybe I am a cynic but I just don't see them trying to win the hearts and minds of the local populace either, not that they could anyway. I think the military was stuck, they had to do something to stop the rockets of course but I think that destroy Hizbullah, however attractive, was an unreasonable goal. How far did they expect to go? Beruit? Demascus? Teheran?
It seems to me that the main purpose of this ground war was to stop the rockets unitl another solution could be found. Anything past that is just wasted resources taking ground that you don't intend to hold. Denied victory? The rockets have been stopped, a buffer zone has been created, the Lebonese Army has been forced to occupy southern Lebenon and the defense of Israel's border with Lebenon will be undertaken by a force which Israel will not have to pay for (not fully at least, perhaps they will have to contribute some funding, I don't know). It may not be VJ Day but it's a far cry from a loss.
SFC W
The politicians wouldn't let us?
I concur with Uboat and would add that Clausewitz's argument that war is an extension of politics is clearly beyond the comprehension of the Israeli officers lamenting to the press about how the politicians prevented their victory. First, a military victory was not possible, the best that could be hoped for was too pressure all sides into a political agreement (you could argue that was achieved, even if it is temporary, with the UN cease fire agreement). Second, a number of other articles clearly indicated that the Israeli Army wasn't prepared for a major battle due to equipment and other logistical shortfalls, and training shortfalls. There is wisdom in Tom's reply above, and unless Israel comes up with a feasible political strategy (much easier said than done), then a military victory will remain elusive.
Interesting that they were trying to operate buttoned up. They did not in 87 when I was on the ground. In fact in most cases, their 113s operated wih the rear door open--something that has its own set of problems.
Best
Tom
You may find interesting that a recently returned FINUL (French for UNIFIL)member has told me he has counted, himself, not through a third party, over 40 damaged/destroyed IDF MBTs/APCs when he was there. The IDF was especially sensitive about retrieving and evacuating the wrecks.
I hope to get to see his pictures soon. I'll try to keep the board posted.
Israel's Military Chief Admits Failings
24 August Associated Press - Israel's Military Chief Admits Failings.
In a letter to the troops, Israel's military chief acknowledged publicly for the first time Thursday that there were shortcomings in the military's performance during the recent fighting with Hezbollah guerrillas in Lebanon.
Israel went into the monthlong war as a united front against Hezbollah, but since the fighting ended last week, the country has splintered into a cacophony of reproachful voices.
Criticism of the military's preparedness and tactics swelled after the battles ended without a clear-cut victory for Israel. Questions about the wisdom of 11th-hour battles and reports of food and water shortages have fueled demands for a state inquiry into the war's conduct and the resignation of Israel's wartime leaders.
In a letter to Israeli fighters, military chief Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz wrote: "Alongside the achievements, the fighting uncovered shortcomings in various areas _ logistical, operational and command. We are committed to a thorough, honest, rapid and complete investigation of all the shortcomings and successes."...
Preliminary Lessons of the Israeli-Hezbollah War
17 August from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) - Preliminary Lessons of the Israeli-Hezbollah War by Anthony Cordesman.
Instant military history is always dangerous and inaccurate. This is particularly true when one goes from an effort to describe the fighting to trying to draw lessons from uncertain and contradictory information. The following analysis is based largely on media reporting, data provided by Israeli and Arab think tanks, and a visit to Israel sponsored by Project Interchange of the American Jewish Committee. This visit made it possible to visit the front and talk with a number of senior Israeli officers and experts, but Israeli officers and experts were among the first to note that the facts were unclear and that it might take weeks or months to establish what had happened.
This analysis is, however, limited by the fact that no matching visit was made to Lebanon and to the Hezbollah. Such a visit was not practical at this time, but it does mean the lessons advanced analysis cannot be based on a close view of what Liddle Hart called the "other side of the hill."...
The CSIS report is a good read but I am suspicious of any open source document that seems to provide so much information. But then it is in my nature to be suspicious, which is probably how I ended up in MI. There are a whole lot of unnamed sources. I would like to see some corroborating reports. In fairness I should note that I am not really all that familier with CSIS' products having only read one other. I would appreciate hearing from anyone who has more knowledge about them.
SFC W
Csis
http://www.csis.org/about/history/
Funny, you're suspicious of open source research, because I'm suspicious of the stuff we get from MI (lol). In all seriousiness I have found a number of CSIS's studies to be well researched and practical, but whether open source or classified the potential for bias obviously exists. Anyway the link above will take you to csis's history link (self promotion) which will shed some light on what they have produced. I know we supported a couple of their projects in the past (SOCOM) by providing access to soldiers to interview.
Back on the open source issue, I would encourage our MI personnel to exploit more open source material. I have never understood the intelligence community's outright bias against anything without a "SECRET" stamp on it. A reporter or researcher talks to source about let's say the Hezbullah/Israel conflict, then it results in an unclassified article or study, but if a MI person debriefs that source and writes the report it is SECRET and therefore credible, yet in many cases the PhD or reporter may actually be more a subject matter on that region. I have a lot of respect for the many good analysts I have worked with and am working with now, but this is one area we simply don't agree on.
Last edited by Bill Moore; 08-26-2006 at 04:50 AM.
Much Soul-Searching Ahead for Israeli Army
27 August Los Angeles Times - Much Soul-Searching Ahead for Israeli Army by Laura King.
Israel's much-vaunted military, which emerged bruised and bloodied from its 34-day conflict with the guerrillas of Hezbollah, is in the midst of an intensive reappraisal of the battlefield tactics, intelligence capability and weaponry it brought to bear in Lebanon.
Yet a war whose outcome veered closer to a loss than almost any in Israel's history is unlikely to result in fundamental changes in Israeli military doctrine, analysts and military officials say.
That is in part because Israel regards Hezbollah, a disciplined and highly motivated Islamist militia equipped with state-of-the-art weapons, as unique among its many enemies in the region, and strongly believes that its army remains capable of inflicting decisive defeat on any conventional force it might confront.
Most Israeli military strategists also firmly believe they could have won the conflict with Hezbollah had they not been hobbled by the missteps of a domestic political leadership untested by battle — a view that is likely to be aired repeatedly during what may be months of public inquiries into how the conflict was conducted.
At the same time, however, Israel is weighing the long-term implications of the militia's ability to inflict pain not only on Israel's military, but civilians. Israel's conclusions could have far-reaching effect on its dealings with the Palestinians, in particular with militant groups such as Hamas, the political ruling power in the Palestinian territories...
Hezbollah's ability to hold its own against the Israeli army, even for a limited time, has raised the specter of other enemies being emboldened to strike, perhaps together. But Syria, one of Hezbollah's chief backers, stayed on the sidelines of this conflict — fully aware, analysts said, that the Israeli military was capable of destroying not only its army, but its infrastructure and institutions of statehood.
Many Israeli analysts and commanders say the military's overall performance was far from the stinging defeat that Hezbollah claims to have inflicted. But they generally acknowledge that Israel's poor planning, carelessness and hubris played a part in high-profile failures at crucial moments, from the earliest days of fighting to the final hours...
Much has been made of Israel's overreliance on airstrikes to destroy Hezbollah's rocket-firing ability. The army chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, a former air force commander, was a chief proponent of the fierce air assault that preceded Israel's last-minute, large-scale ground push into southern Lebanon.
Halutz, whose job is now in jeopardy, has acknowledged "shortcomings" in the way the offensive was carried out.
London Times Take...
27 August London Times - Humbling of the Supertroops Shatters Israeli Army Morale.
... Just before midnight, the order “Fire!” — given by the squadron leader — could be heard in the Tel Aviv bunker. Within moments the first Hezbollah missile and launcher were blown up. Thirty-nine tense minutes later the squadron leader’s voice was heard again: “Fifty-four launchers have been destroyed. Returning to base.”
Halutz smiled with relief and called Ehud Olmert, the prime minister, who was enjoying a cigar as he waited by a secure red phone at his residence in Jerusalem.
“All the long-range rockets have been destroyed,” Halutz announced proudly. After a short pause, he added four words that have since haunted him: “We’ve won the war.”
Even as Halutz was declaring victory, 12 Israeli soldiers from the Maglan reconnaissance unit were already running into an ambush just over the border inside Lebanon near the village of Maroun a-Ras.
“We didn’t know what hit us,” said one of the soldiers, who asked to be named only as Gad. “In seconds we had two dead.”
With several others wounded and retreating under heavy fire the Maglans, one of the finest units in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), were astonished by the firepower and perseverance of Hezbollah.
“Evidently they had never heard that an Arab soldier is supposed to run away after a short engagement with the Israelis,” said Gad.
“We expected a tent and three Kalashnikovs — that was the intelligence we were given. Instead, we found a hydraulic steel door leading to a well-equipped network of tunnels.”
As daylight broke the Maglans found themselves under fire from all sides by Hezbollah forces who knew every inch of the terrain and exploited their knowledge to the full...
Hezbollah also suffered heavy casualties but its fighters slipped back into their tunnels to await the next round of fighting. It was immediately obvious to everyone in Tel Aviv that this was going to be a tougher fight than Halutz had bargained for.
As the war unfolded his optimism was brought crashing down to earth — and with it the invincible reputation of the Israeli armed forces.
In five weeks, their critics charge, they displayed tactical incompetence and strategic short-sightedness. Their much-vaunted intelligence was found wanting.
Their political leadership was shown to vacillate. Their commanders proved fractious. In many cases the training of their men was poor and their equipment inadequate. Despite many individual acts of bravery, some of the men of the IDF were pushed to the point of mutiny.
Last week, in an contrite letter to his soldiers, Halutz admitted to “mistakes which will all be corrected”. It is far from clear whether Halutz will remain in position to correct them...
IDF Plans Massive Intelligence Overhaul
4 September Jerusalem Post - IDF Plans Massive Intelligence Overhaul by Yaakov Katz.
As one of the lessons of the war in Lebanon, the IDF plans to ask the Treasury for an immediate budget supplement of NIS 10 billion, most of which will be invested in rehabilitating the Intelligence Corps, a high-ranking defense official told The Jerusalem Post on Sunday.
Defense officials and politicians have accused Military Intelligence of failing to predict the outbreak of violence. In addition, it is also blamed for failing to adequately penetrate the Hizbullah command, as could be demonstrated by the failure to assassinate any of the group's top leaders or destroy its main nerve centers.
"There will be a massive investment now in Military Intelligence," the official said...
The war, he said, was a "wake-up call" for the country and showed the public and the government that the budget cuts over the years had created a military that was not ready to meet its challenges.
"They need to ask themselves what type of military they want to have," he said of the government and specifically the Treasury. "If they want the IDF to protect the country, then they need to allocate the necessary resources and funds."
The defense official said he was not concerned about being summoned to testify before an inquiry to investigate the IDF's level of preparedness and management of the war.
"For years we have warned that this would happen," he said. "Now that it has happened, it is time to fix things."
Israel: Winograd Committee Report Released
From today's VOA - Lebanon War Inquiry Could Topple Israeli PM. Reposted here in full per USG guidelines.
An Israeli inquiry into last year's Lebanon war could topple Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. As Robert Berger reports from VOA's Jerusalem bureau, Israel is in political turmoil after the commission of inquiry declared that it is taking aim at the national leadership.
The commission of inquiry into the war in Lebanon announced that it will include "personal findings" on Prime Minister Olmert. Israeli politicians and the media believe that means Mr. Olmert will be condemned for the way he handled the war, which is widely seen as a failure.
Despite a 34-day air and ground assault, the Israeli army failed to defeat some 5,000 Hezbollah guerrillas in South Lebanon. In addition, reserve soldiers returning from the battlefield complained of poor preparations and a lack of food and ammunition.
The interim report is due out next month and the final one at an undisclosed date. There is broad speculation that a critical report could force Mr. Olmert to resign under the pressure of public opinion.
Former Israeli general Uzi Dayan expects the report to come down hard on the prime minister, the defense minister and the commander of the Israel Defense Forces who already resigned.
"They made their mistake in the war by decision making, not knowing how to use, how to operate a big military force like the IDF, and finally the neglect of the home front," he said. "Their big failure is no leadership, no strategy."
But officials in Mr. Olmert's Kadima party are adopting a wait and see attitude.
"It's all speculation," Cabinet Minister Roni Bar-On told Israel Radio. He said there is no indication that the commission will blame the prime minister for the failure of the war or recommend that he step down.
But just a year after Mr. Olmert won a landslide election victory, it is very unlikely that he will complete his four-year term. Israeli media say the collapse of the government and early elections appear inevitable.
A Failure of Israeli SOD
- or a failure to implement it?
Taken from Israeli Haaretz Newspaper, 3/21/07:
Probe Reveals Logistics, Not Lack of Supplies, Hampered Army
By Amos Harel
Malfunctions in the transfer of supplies to the front was the main reason for the IDF's difficulties in the second Lebanon war, not a lack of supplies. This is the top conclusion of the in-house IDF investigation on the performance of logistics units in the war, presented yesterday by Major-General Avi Mizrahi, head of the Technology and Logistics Branch.
The investigation revealed logistics shortages, but the general staff believes the supplies would have reached the combat units if different directives had been issued to supply convoys. The convoys were hampered by the threat of Hezbollah anti-tank missiles and road-side bombs.
Mizrahi's committee - whose conclusions and recommendations were presented in a press conference yesterday morning - also looked into the employment of reserves soldiers during the war. "
Last edited by Jedburgh; 03-21-2007 at 12:13 PM. Reason: Added Link
Israeli Military History
Israel's military history despite its media and "casual glance" studies by western militaries is not as spectacular as protrayed:
a. 1948 War: when you look at the actual numbers of deplyed forces, the David Versus Goliath imagery so often portrayed is significantly reduced. Not taking anything away from the fledgling IDF; in many ways a more balanced look at things would give greater credit to the IDF in defeating its foes, especially the Arab Legion.
b. 1956 Suez Crisis--the main fights in this "war" were in the Sinai between the Egyptians and the Israelis. It somehow often gets overlooked that this was an Anglo-French-Israeli venture and that British and French actions against the northern end of the canal played a significant role in dividiing Egyptian military attentions. As for the Israel-Egyptian fights in the Sinai; this was essessntially a war fought at the battalion level. The Egyptians bloodied the Israelis quite severely at Abu Agheila. Sharon as a battalion commander (former Unit 101 Commander) showed the same tendencies of recklessness and inability to cooperate with equals or follow orders from above. His unit was ambushed as a result at Mitla Pass, taking significant casualties.
c. 1967 War. Four phases. Air and a stunning victory for the IAF essentially guarantees IDF complete air coverage with free roaming flying artillery. Sinai is 2nd phase fought as a brigade-level war. This time Egyptians collapse; notably at Abu Aghelia. The IAF punishes the fleeing Egyptian columns severely. Third phase and parallel to 2 is seizure of Jerusalem; this is an infantry-centric fight in urban terrain against the Jordanian Arab Legion. The final phase was against Syria to seize the Golan Heights on the day that Israel had ageed to a ceasefire.
d. 1970-1973 War of the Canal. Gradual shift toward looking at the Bar Lev line as a main defensive line versus an outposted frontier leaves the IDF vulnerable.
e. 1973 October War--Syrian and Egyptian forces attack massively at once against the Golan for Syria and Sinai for Egypt. IAF loses local air superiority over the Golan and the Canal Zone. IDF counterattacks in the Sinia are disjointed and without air cover or artillery. This becomes a war of divisional maneuver against fixed hasty defenses. Sharon as a division commander at one stage fights his own war, ignoring or undercutting the Sinai front command (corps). Ultimately Sharon forces a crossing of the Canal and encircles Third Army. Nominally he threatens Cairo--but the IDF has no logistic legs to mount such a campaign and the length of the 73 War has severely hurt Israel. On the Golan, the Syrians come within a single tank platoon (the last one in the fight for 7th Armored Brigade) in breaking through.
f. 1978 Operation Litani into Lebanon; the IDF seeks to push the PLO back from its northern border setting up a security zone in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL deploys but not completely across the southern area as the IDF continues to control access into the Litani river valley as the gateway to the Bekka Valley.
g. 1982 Sharon as defense minister with PM Begin's support launches another attack to clear southern Lebanon; IDF pushes toward the Bekka Valley prompt the Syrians to enter the war. Sharon takes on the Syrians and wins. the IAF defeats the Syrian AF dramatically; the ground fight is a closer thing. Sharon on his own and according to many concealing the action from Begin sends the IDF north into Beirut. Ultimately Sharon and IDF complicity in allowing Chritian Phalangist militias to attack Palestinian refugee camps, slaughtering women and children, leads to Sharon's censure.
h. 1982-2000 (roughly) Israel sets up the South Lebanese Army as a "Christian miltia" in the south; the ensuing guerrilla war in many ways leads to the creation of Hizballah as a military and political force. Ultimately Israel withdraws.
I put all of this on here because the IDF fights on strategic assumptions that do not always play out and do not necessarily apply to our own military:
Assumption 1: Wars must be quick and fought outside Israel proper. That means emphasis on heavy maneuver backed with absolute air superiority.
Assumption 2: Someone will intervene so grab as much territory as possible to use at the bargaining table. This was especially prevalent in the Cold War.
Assumption 3: Logistics and personnel are designed for the short war. This played a large role in the 1973 War and again in the 1982 drive to Beirut.
Assumption 4: High threat wars like 67 and especially 73 are the greatest danger to the IDF and Israel. as such they must drive Israeli doctrine, tactics, and training.
The fallacies in some of the above are well known to us:
A. the most dangerous war is not necessarily the most likely.
B. Shock and awe may be irrelevant to final outcome.
C. You can never safely assume away logistics and personnel needs.
D. there is little room for grand maneuver and big battalions inside caves or the intricate warren of an Arab town
I would say that much of this again emerged in the latest incursion into Lebanon.
Tom
To be sure, Israel would benefit from a "refocus" on infantry warfare. Thanks for the illuminating and interesting survey.
Flipside of the COIN: Israel’s Lebanese Incursion Between 1982 – 2000
US Army Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper 21 - Flipside of the COIN: Israel’s Lebanese Incursion Between 1982 – 2000 by Captain Daniel Helmer, US Army.
In view of the adoption of the term “The Long War” by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to describe US operations against terrorism and state sponsored terrorism, we have decided to change the title of our long running series of studies on irregular warfare – from the Global War on Terrorism Occasional Papers to the Long War Occasional Papers.
This CSI Occasional Paper is the fi rst in the renamed series. The purpose of the series, however, remains unchanged. That is, to provide short historical monographs on topics of doctrinal and operational relevance to the US Army and military professionals for an Army at war.
We are therefore pleased to offer Long War OP #21: Flipside of the COIN: Israel’s Lebanese Incursion Between 1982-2000, by Captain Daniel Helmer. Captain Helmer’s study, written while studying at Oxford University, addresses the Israeli view of the threat posed by various armed factions in southern Lebanon over an 18-year period. This was a period during which Israeli used air strikes, ground invasions, and border operations to contain or defeat the military threat to its national security.
Among the key points the author makes in this study is the inability of Israel to use military force to secure a lasting political end state in Lebanon that was favorable to its security needs, despite some stunning battlefield victories.
Helmer also notes that both Palestinian and Hezbollah leaders recognized they could not militarily defeat Israeli military forces, despite occasional tactical success, but that this was not their political objective. Rather, they needed only to survive and to maintain their forces in the field to achieve their long-term objectives. Weaker powers have often employed this strategy against their stronger opponents. He also notes the steady dwindling of political and public support in Israel for the occupation of Lebanon and the role this played in Israel’s decision to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000.
As the recent 2006 Israeli attack into Lebanon against Hezbollah terrorists has shown, however, these strategic challenges and dilemmas remain unsolved. In the fi rst decade of the 21st century, it is clear that these dilemmas are not unique to Israel and that the United States might draw some insights relevant to our own situation.
The Combat Studies Institute also plans a future study on the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict. We at CSI hope this Occasional Paper will contribute to the Army as it conducts operations in the Long War. CSI -- The Past is Prologue!
A pair of papers looking at the intel aspect of the invasion and occupation:
From the (Canuck) Journal of Conflict Studies back in '96:
Perceptions and Misperceptions: Influences on Israeli Intelligence Estimates During the 1982 Lebanon War
The second is from Intelligence and National Security, Autumn '01:...In simplified terms, Operation Peace for Galilee (as the invasion was code-named) was based on a combination of misconceptions about Israel's alliance with the Maronites in Lebanon and an overestimation of Israel's military capabilities, underlined by the mistaken belief that force could achieve real peace. Israel saw Lebanon as a Christian state and the Maronites as the predominant community backed militarily by the Lebanese Forces. Moreover, Israel perceived the Maronites it was liaising with as representative of the community and as reliable.
To fully understand this failure in Israel's national intelligence estimates, not only the actual misconceptions but also the process of intelligence evaluation needs to be analyzed. Moreover, within this framework, it is essential to examine the signals as well as the noise that obscures them and can prevent them from being understood. In the Lebanon War, as in other historical examples, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2 the Yom Kippur War,3 or the US failure to predict the Iranian Revolution in 1979, 4 the intelligence failure was not due to lack of information about the adversaries, but to an incorrect evaluation of the available information, noise, false signals or deception, misconceptions and ideology....
"A Reach Greater than the Grasp": Israeli Intelligence and the Conflict in South Lebanon 1990–2000
(AKO log-in required)
This article examines the way in which intelligence was used by Israel
in its war against Hizb’allah in south Lebanon. By using ideas drawn from the literature on strategic culture, it argues that in trying to replicate methods used in countering Palestinian insurgents, Israel’s intelligence agencies failed to appreciate fully the finite political aims of Hizb’allah’s guerrilla struggle. As such, the paucity in Israel’s collective intelligence effort allowed operatives of Hizb’allah’s military wing, al-Muqawama, to score notable intelligence triumphs over Israel, triumphs that did much force the IDF into a unilateral withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000....
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