The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War (catch all)

[CR6]

Anyone know of a good detailed Tactical or Operational History of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War? I am not looking for a political history but rather an account of what happened on the battlefield.

Suggestions?

Try this

[Rex Brynen]

"Winograd lays blame for war failings on IDF," Ha'aretz, 31 January 2007.

The final Winograd Committee report on the Second Lebanon War has categorically laid blame for the failings in the war on the Israel Defense Forces - criticizing nearly every arm and unit. With particular reference to the ground forces, the committee wrote, "They failed to meet most of the missions and challenges they were assigned."

Full report here (in Hebrew).

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 11 Mar 08: The Lessons of the Israeli-Lebanon War

The lessons from the Israeli-Lebanon War in 2006 are now far clearer than they were during the fighting and its immediate aftermath. The war has led to extensive criticism from military experts within Israel, as well as the work of the Winograd Commission. At the same time, the resurgence of the Hezbollah, and its partial rearming, have demonstrated just how difficult it can be to defeat an asymmetric enemy fighting on its own soil and with a popular base.

The attached briefing summarizes these lessons and attempts to put them in the broader context of the key lessons the United States should learn from the Iraq and Afghan conflicts. Examples of these lessons include:

• The need to properly characterize the enemy, the consequences of going to war, and the ability to achieve successful conflict termination: Different as the three wars are, and the conditions under which Israel and the US have fought, they do raise the common lessons that one of the most critical single choices in war is the choice of where, when, and why to fight.

In all three cases, Israel and the United States faced real enemies. At the same time, it is an open question as to whether Israel’s grand strategic failures in characterizing its enemy and the political situation Lebanon were worse than the US failure to understand the nature of the enemy and risks it was dealing with in Afghanistan and Iraq. In all three cases, both Israel and the US also went to war without a credible plan for conflict termination and for dealing with the aftermath of the wars they chose to fight.

• The need for realism in assessing the ability to use airpower. At a tactical level, Israel placed reliance on air power that cannot be compared to the way the US has used air power in the Afghan and Iraq conflicts, but which repeated many of the miscalculations about the ability of strategic bombing to achieve decisive political and military effects that characterized at least some of the strategic air and interdiction campaign in the Gulf War in 2001. These limits to airpower are as old as, Douhet but they are lessons that military forces seem to have to constant relearn

There are other lessons more unique to the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict that may serve as a warning of the shape of things come in Afghanistan and Iraq, or in future conflicts. One was how ineffective most IAF close air support sorties were in dealing with a Hezbollah that could take advantage of tunnels, sheltered buildings, and well-prepared concealment.

• The dangers of “proliferating” advanced light weapons to asymmetric and insurgent forces: Another warning comes from the Hezbollah use of advanced anti-tank weapons; manportable and light surface-to-air missiles, and anti-ship missiles. The situation in both Iraq and Afghanistan would be very different if the US and its allies faced anything like the same threat. It could have a major impact on the use of tactical airpower, but it would raise far more serious questions about the value of uparmoring and the security of tactical and logistic movements.

The attached brief explores a wide range of additional lessons, including the lessons regarding readiness and training, warfare in built-up areas, and missile and rocket attacks and defense.....

Complete 63-slide briefing in pdf at the link.

[Tom Odom]

If there is a lesson here, it is that it <has> been clear from Douhet to the present that the advocates of airpower have no better political understanding of this aspect of airpower than any man on the street and probably less. They tend to sharply exaggerate its ability to influence or intimidate leaders and politicians, and act as a weapon of political warfare.

Amen Brother Cordesman

[Ken White]

"...it would raise far more serious questions about the value of uparmoring and the security of tactical and logistic movements."

I think he agrees with me that all this MRAP overkill is of little long term value...

[Ski]

Thanks for the link, I have found Cordesman to be one of the most honest and realistic observers of the wars of the early 21st Century

[Tom Odom]

Latest history lesson I sent out.

"The lackluster performance of the IDF in the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war was the result of a multiplicity of factors. Halutz’s steadfast confidence in air power, coupled with his disdain for land warfare, increased the strength of the IAF at the expense of the ground forces. While continuing COIN operations against the Palestinians, the IDF saw its budget for ground forces slashed and training for major combat operations by divisions and brigades greatly reduced. Within the IDF reserve, equipment was not replaced or repaired, and the tactical skills of both reserve and regular ground forces continued to decline. Training for reserve tank crewmen was all but forgotten...

... The missteps committed by the IDF in this war provide the US Army with valuable examples of potential difficulties when counterinsurgency operations are abruptly changed to major combat operations. For the US Army, which has been almost exclusively involved in irregular warfare for years, this issue is of paramount importance. While the US Army must be proficient in conducting major combat operations around the world, it is possible that years of irregular operations have chipped away at this capability, not unlike the situation encountered by the IDF."

This history lesson looks at the Combat Studies Institute's Occasional Paper #26 We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War by Matt M. Matthews. It makes a great follow up to OP21 Flipside of the COIN: Israel's Lebanese Incursion Between 1982-2000 by Daniel Isaac Helmer.

Matthew's monograph is interesting reading. This is a study of a military in war befuddled by confusion in its own doctrine and its own reputation. The introduction above offers ample reason to read this book. I would also offer a couple of caveats to this study. Armies develop cultural trends over the years of their existence and the IDF is no different. As a military built around short wars and aversion to casualties, the IDF has since 1948 put its greatest emphasis on the Israeli Air Force and its second greatest emphasis on its armored forces. Aside from certain units, infantry has been a distant third. Combined arms operations using all elements in concert has not been a hallmark of IDF operations. So as you read this understand that, while years of irregular operations in the territories exacerbated these tendencies, those traits did not necessarily originate there.

Secondly I would add emphasis to certain points. The IDF and Hezbollah have nearly a quarter century of history as enemies. It is true enough that Hezbollah was well supported and supplied by Syria and Iran over that period; it is also equally true that Hezbollah has remained very much a Lebanon-centric organization. As such it has had repeated opportunities to study previous IDF incursions and occupations of the area contested in this particular war. It is terrain that favors the determined and prepared defender. As a UN Observer in 1987 I watched these two antagonists spar repeatedly. Hezbollah began preparing for this match before the IDF pulled back in 2000. Finally I would say that while confusion of doctrine played a large role in this episode, the alternatives discussed concerning a rapid push to the Litani River to "demolish Hezbollah in six days" are just as disconnected from the reality of southern Lebanon as EBO and SOD proved to be.

You may download a copy at CSI

Best

Tom

[slapout9]

Excellent report especially the their 13 principles of war. And like I have always said the enemy understands exactly what EBO is....we don't.

[William F. Owen]

As this subject is extremely dear to my heart, I submit that this is a fascinating document and mostly a very useful one. However,

Out of the 400 tanks involved in the fighting in southern Lebanon, 48 were hit, 40 were damaged, and 20 penetrated. It is believed that five Merkavas were completely destroyed.
Clearly, Hezbollah has mastered the art of light infantry/ATGM tactics against heavy mechanized forces.

In context, out of 400 MBTs
48 MBTs hit - 12% hit
40 damaged – 10 % damaged.
20 penetrated – 5% penetrated.
5 destroyed. - 1.25% destroyed.

These were achieved over 30 days in the some of the best anti-tank terrain on the planet. These are, as I understand it, overall loss rates, from IED/Mine, ATGM and RPG. I know from my own sources that 2 of the total losses were IED and one to an AT-3.

[Rank amateur]

As this subject is extremely dear to my heart, I submit that this is a fascinating document and mostly a very useful one. However,



In context, out of 400 MBTs
48 MBTs hit - 12% hit
40 damaged – 10 % damaged.
20 penetrated – 5% penetrated.
5 destroyed. - 1.25% destroyed.

These were achieved over 30 days in the some of the best anti-tank terrain on the planet. These are, as I understand it, overall loss rates, from IED/Mine, ATGM and RPG. I know from my own sources that 2 of the total losses were IED and one to an AT-3.

Out of the 48 hit: 83 % were damaged, 42% were penetrated and 10% were destroyed.

[Tom Odom]

These were achieved over 30 days in the some of the best anti-tank terrain on the planet.

Absolutely correct. South Lebanon is deceptive in that what appear to moderate hills are actually limestone formations riven with deep cuts and switch backs. It is an AT-gunner's field of dreams.

This part of Lebanon is after all part of the Great Rift Valley as it reaches for the European land mass. In fact the Litani River Valley is the migratory route for African raptors; that little tidbit came to me from a 55 year old Norweigian reservist who had volunteered for OGL because bird--and especially hawk and falcon--watching was his passion.

Best

Tom

To give you an idea of how close things are I posted a pic of the IDF brigade Hqs in 1987 I took from the observation deck of OP Hin. The IDF Hqs straddled the border. Op Hin is just inside Lebanon oriented south and we had a hilltop IDF position just behind us which overlooked Bint Jbeil, which in 1987 was most definitely "Indian Country".

[Jedburgh]

SSI, 25 Sep 08:
The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy

Hezbollah’s conduct of its 2006 campaign in southern Lebanon has become an increasingly important case for the U.S. defense debate. Some see the future of warfare as one of nonstate opponents employing irregular methods, and advocate a sweeping transformation of the U.S. military to meet such threats. Others point to the 2006 campaign as an example of a nonstate actor nevertheless waging a state-like conventional war, and argue that a more traditional U.S. military posture is needed to deal with such enemies in the future.

This monograph, by Dr. Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations and Mr. Jeffrey Friedman, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, seeks to inform this debate by examining in detail Hezbollah’s conduct of the 2006 campaign. The authors use evidence collected from a series of 36 primary source interviews with Israeli participants in the fighting who were in a position to observe Hezbollah’s actual behavior in the field in 2006, coupled with deductive inference from observable Hezbollah behavior in the field to findings for their larger strategic intent for the campaign.

Complete 110-page paper at the link.

[William F. Owen]

Read the 2nd Paragraph.
So,

Israel's brief, violent, and ultimately inconclusive war against Hezbollah in 2006 is the new prototype guiding the Pentagon's war-planning process. "Hybrid warfare" -- a non-state actor's sophisticated employment of terrorism, conventional military action, propaganda, cyberwarfare, and high-technology weapons -- is now the focus of attention inside the Pentagon's policy office.

So the Hezbollah are the prototype?
This is a guerilla group, that;

• Can't use guided missiles
• Lost most of its long range SSMs in air strikes
• Can't use MANPADS
• Could only launch two of it's anti-ship missiles.
• Tried to hold ground - and failed
• Can't conduct counter attacks
• Can't fight in built up areas
• Can't patrol
• Abandons most of its equipment without destroying it
• Can't use mortars properly
• Can only get 25% of it's SR SSMs to hit built up areas
• Has given up conducting military action against Israel for the 3 years since the war.

To quote an IDF friend of mine, "There must be two Hezbollahs. The one I fought and the other one the US studied."

Personally, I believe the best information operations coup Hezbollah pulled off, was getting the Pentagon to believe they are better than the facts and the evidence show. It's either that or some folks just want to see the things that promote their personal agendas.

[Jedburgh]

CSI, May 09: Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD

.....The IDF Operation CAST LEAD against Hamas in 2008-09 was a small scale affair in comparison to the multi-division attack into Lebanon in 2006. The former operation, however, restored confidence in both the government and armed forces in the eyes of the Israeli populace. The reforms of the year and a half between conflicts paid great dividends to Israeli soldiers and aircrews. It also demonstrated Israeli resolve, created a schism in the Muslim Middle East and is only one of a series of escalations in what is becoming a very dangerous conflict in the region......

[William F. Owen]

CSI, May 09: Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD

Only read the First Chapter. I'd treat it with extreme caution. Quite a lot is plain wrong, not understood, or is based on opinion. Critical detail has also been omitted.
If anyone wants blow by blow details I'm happy to pitch in. The list is long!
Footnotes indicate that research was done on the internet or some e-mails with guys I know well. Basically little or no original research.

[Ken White]

several things stood out.

From the Introduction:

"American professional military personnel are well-acquainted with “the arrogant show of strength” that was Task Force Smith in Korea in the summer of 1950 and of its fate."

Any American professional military person who looks at Task Force Smith as an arrogant show of strength is badly -- really badly -- deluded. It was not any such thing, it was a rapidly thrown together and poorly designed effort to send a message and its likelihood of success was known to be poor.

These items from the final chapter:

"The US in contrast develops campaigns that have an enduring endstate. The concepts of campaigns and strategies that involve unified action are part of a comprehensive campaign that brings with it allies, coalitions, and regional partners."

How has that worked out for us...

Then there's this exercise in wishful thinking:

"The lack of a National Strategy related to strategic influence impedes the Department of Defense and military services."

One must recall that we have elections every two years; each of these has had and will have some effect, possibly quite subtle, on all our attempts at a coherent national strategy. While such an object would be beneficial, the likelihood of having one is slim. Thus, DoD and the service had better be prepared to adapt -- and to give sensible, competent advice on probabilities to the politicians.

Lastly, this is scary. Do we really want a Gestapo?

"Establish dedicated OPSEC planning and assessment specialists to manage the process and programs for the commander."

[crisselvin]

Israel accepted that the earlier attacks on the threat to its security, even that against Lebanon in 1982. However, its assault on Gaza was not justified and there are international calls for an investigation. But is there the political will to make Israel account for its war crimes

[William F. Owen]

Israel accepted that the earlier attacks on the threat to its security, even that against Lebanon in 1982. However, its assault on Gaza was not justified and there are international calls for an investigation. But is there the political will to make Israel account for its war crimes

a.) Who says Operation Cast Lead was not justified? Ever had rockets shot at your home?

b.) How come only Israel should be held answerable for war crimes, given the level of civilian deaths in both Iraq and Afghanistan?

c.) Why reference an extremist website as being typical of the views of Israelis.

You might want to tell us all, who you are where you are coming from on this.

[Zack]

Hello, not sure if this was the correct section for this, but if not I will move it.

I am just beginning research for my MA thesis, which (I think) will be about the use of air power against irregular foes, and how effective that is. I had initially planned on doing at least 2 case studies, but time constraints on both myself and my Professors (thesis is capped at around 60pgs, otherwise professors get cranky) it will just focus on the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel. I am looking for additions to what I have collected so far to read, and the general structure I plan on using (still up in the air to a degree though).

Books:
Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists by James Corum and Wray Johnson
Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War by Anthony Cordesman (from CSIS)
The War in Lebanon: A Reader edited by Nubar Hovsepian
34 Days by Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff
Bombing to Win by Robert Pape
The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare by Stephen Biddle and Jeffery Friedman
How Democracies Lose Small Wars by Gil Merom
Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation "Cast Lead" by LTC Scott Farquhar
Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and Response in the 21st Century
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife by John Nagl
Tradgedy in South Lebanon: The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006 by Cathy Sultan
The 33 Day War: Israel's War on Hezbollah in Lebanon and Its Consequences
Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Infidatas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army by Sergi Catignani
Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers by TV Paul

Articles:
On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law by Thomas Franck (American Journal of International Law)
Lebanon: Securing a Permanent Cease-Fire (Hearing before the Senate CFR)
Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict (Congressional Research Service)
Lessons and Implications of the Israel-Hizballah War (Washington Institute for Near East Policy)
Who Really Won the Second Lebanon War by Michael Totten (Commentary Magazine)
Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment by Andrew Exum (Washington Institute..)
Israel's Uncertain Strategic Future by Louis Rene Beres (Parameters)
When Close Doesn't Count: An Analysis of Israel's Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War by Major Bottoms (The Army Lawyer)
Crisis in the Levant: Lebanon at Risk by William Harris (Mediterranean Quarterly)
Between Victory and Defeat: Israel after the War with Hezbollah by Dov Waxman (CSIS)
Surprise and Terrorism: A Conceptual Framework by Daniel Morris (Journal of Strategic Studies)
Thoughts on "Hybrid" Conflict (SWJ)
The 2006 Lebanon War: Lessons Learned by Sarah Kreps (Parameters)
How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War by Efraim Inbar (Middle East Quarterly)
Hezbollah's Strategic Threat to Israel by Patrick Devenny (Middle East Quarterly)
Has Hezbollah's Rise Come at Syria's Expense? by Robert Rabil (Middle East Quarterly)
The End of Israeli Military Restraint by Or Honig (ME Quarterly)
The Psychological Asymmetry of Islamist Warfare by Irwin Mansdorf and Mordechai Kedar (MEQ)
Nasrallah's Defeat in the 2006 War by Eyal Zisser (MEQ)
Missile War is a new Challenge to Israel's Long Rule in the Sky by Scott Wilson (Washington Post)
Short '06 War Stokes Pentagon Debate by Greg Jaffe (WP)
Look Not to the Skies: The IAF vs. Surface to Surface Rocket Launchers by Noam Ophir (Institute for National Security Studies)
Back to Ground Rules: Some Limitations of Airpower in the Lebanon War by Noam Ophir (INSS)
The Limits of Coercive Airpower by Daniel Lake (International Security)
From Conflict Management to Conflict Resolution by Edward Djerejian (Foreign Affairs)
The Future of Lebanon by Paul Salem (Foreign Affairs)
Israel's War with Iran by Ze'ev Schiff (Foreign Affairs)
The End of Proportionality by Jonathan Keiler (Parameters)


The way I plan on breaking it down is:
Chapter 1: Intro to conflict, casus belli
Chapter 2: Theories of airpower & insurgency/counterinsurgency
Chapter 3: Capabilities of Hezbollah and IDF/IAF
Chapter 4: Decision making before/during/after war

If anybody has any additions to my reading list (or things I should remove), or any suggestions about my chapter breakdown, I would be grateful.

[Pattonmat89]

...that this is totally relevant, but the Strategic Studies Institute published a monograph last year about the Lebanon war. Again, like I said, not sure how much of it you can use, but who knows? I haven't read it in about a year. As the great Robert Jordan used to say, "Read and find out."

https://www.strategicstudiesinstitut....cfm?PubID=882