Actually the source for this has a fuller title: A more complex and conventional victory – revisiting the Dhofar counterinsurgency 1963-1975.
The Dhofar COIN campaign has a special place in British military history, even though at the time it was a virtually unknown war to the British public. Add in the almost unchallenged praise for the SAS, with a focus on the Battle of Mirbat (19th July 1972) – is now a relatively well known public incident. Post-Afghanistan some apparently want to use Dhofar as a model campaign for today rather than the ‘Malayan Emergency’.
So with interest I read an article in ‘Small Wars & Insurgencies’, an international academic journal, in the March 2012 issue, by Marc R. DeVore: A more complex and conventional victory – revisiting the Dhofar counterinsurgency 1963-1975.
Link to journal website:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fswi20#.VY2fLlI0piU
A 2021 update: a copy of the paper has been made available from the author and is added as the last post.
His argument is summarised as:The one outstanding success was British and Omani psy ops. Notably in the use of Islamism, long before its use in Afghanistan following the USSR’s intervention.Only Iran’s direct intervention and post-1973 greater Omani financial resources enabled large-scale offensive action. Previous counterinsurgency lessons proved of only limited vale.
‘Drawing on declassified primary sources, I argue that Oman’s victory was or owes itself to a far more complex combination of factors than is usually acknowledged’.
Note the local population was 30k in the 1960’s and 50k by 1970.
The insurgency started locally in 1963 and changed in 1967 when South Yemen (PDRY) emerged following the UK’s withdrawal from Aden. The insurgents renamed themselves People’s Front for the Liberation Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) and by 1970 had a Marxist agenda, duly supported by China, USSR and others.
PFLOAG set itself the dual tasks of defeating Omani government forces and forcibly reshaping Dhofar society. Helped by being better trained and trained the group controlled 80% of Dhofar province between 1968-1970, with two thousand trained guerrillas and four thousand part-time militia. One helpful factor was that Omani forces were from Northern Oman and Pakistan, who were unacceptable to the local Dhofar population.
In July 1970 a coup replaced the old sultan; this was not popular with the many UK officers who had served him – so they were excluded from the planning.
Local auxiliary forces, known as Firqats were developed from PFLOAG members who had surrendered. By October 1971 there three hundred men involved; they were often not reliable. In one group forty of the sixty-six retired after factional fighting and others refused in an offensive operation to fight during Ramadan to seize a town.
I was not aware that the insurgency involved for long periods – before Mirbat in July 1972 – Yemeni artillery firing across the border and Omani jets (flown by British pilots) hitting back with bombing missions. The UK feared PDRY would escalate, whilst the young sultan was not so concerned. By 1973 PDRY had a greater conventional capability, plus modern Soviet jets in support giving them potentially local air superiority.
In April 1972 a new forward base @ Surfait was established, albeit in an ineffective blocking position vis a vis cross-border supplies reaching the insurgents. In February 1973 PDRY a bombardment stopped all flights and to the rescue came Imperial Iranian helicopters. The British commander of the Omani forces had wanted to withdraw, the sultan did not. The base was regularly mortared and sometimes by PDRY artillery till 1975.
A fixed line, known as the Hornbeam Line was built from late 1972 onwards, with eight company or platoon bases; its impact on insurgent supplies was limited as up to twenty kilometre gaps existed between the bases and only August 1974 were the gaps closed. Another fixed line was also built.
Both sides mutually escalated in 1973. New weapons, including rockets and regular Yemeni soldiers supported insurgent raids and larger British numbers (SAS support, medics, mortar locating radar and advisers) with the Omani forces. Yemeni rocket fire lasted three months, August to November 1973.
In October 1973 Imperial Iran committed fifteen hundred soldiers, then in June 1974 another two thousand four hundred soldiers. A Jordanian SF battalion arrived too. The first Iranian unit used for the first time “free fire” zones to keep open the newly constructed road between Dhofar and Oman.
By the end of 1974 Oman could use eleven thousand soldiers and others in Dhofar: five thousand Omani (including Pakistani Baluch), three thousand Iranians, twelve hundred in Firqats, a thousand British (contract officers, loan officers and regular soldiers) and eight hundred Jordanians.
PFLOAG had six hundred full-time fighters and twelve hundred militia men.
Nevertheless Omani and Iranian forces were still being hurt hard in attacks. By resisting the Omani and allied conventional operation PFLOAG lost too much and became a hollow force. An end to the insurgency was declared by the sultan in late November 1975.
The author concludes:In the July 2012 issue of Small Wars & Insurgencies another author, I.I. Martinez, wrote ‘The Battle of Mirbat: turning point in the Omani Dhofar Rebellion’. He cites that after the battle PFLOAG lost at least 10% of its active members (80-200 dead) and the 2iC was killed. A bout of factional fighting followed, with twenty-five dead, leaders were executed and in the following months large numbers defected.Acknowledging that conventional offensives rather than traditional counterinsurgency techniques, played the predominant role in winning the Dhofar War is not to argue conventional operations are always the best response to insurgencies.
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