The realist in me says that “defeat” is no longer in the cards.
The realist in me says that “defeat” is no longer in the cards.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 07-02-2018 at 11:11 AM. Reason: 79,996v today
In an old Post No.28 in 2015 I referred to a new documentary being made available for payment. I missed looking at their website till today (due to a post in another, new thread).
Link:http://mysecretwardhofar.blogspot.com/
The website has five short clips and their YouTube arena has more.
Link:https://www.youtube.com/user/OperationOman
Note YouTube has nine hundred hits on Dhofar War!
Finally cross-border raiding is mentioned in part of the website; it involves Nick Downie, who was ex-SAS and on contract to Oman. Here is a quote:Link:http://mysecretwardhofar.blogspot.co...-for-nick.htmlBy that time I was a contract officer in SAF, charged with fomenting insurrection among the tribes of S Yemen. I commanded a unit of Yemeni exiles (bedouin) and we lived on the edge of the Empty Quarter. On one raid, we captured a substantial fort, 80 miles across the border. After the garrison surrendered, I filmed a bit of the action, before blowing it up with 1,100 lb of gelignite. This was three times more than was necessary. The fort literally vanished.
davidbfpo
Id'd today whilst looking for very old Rhodesian personalities; the author is Professor Clive Jones, of Durham University and was published originally in the journal 'Small Wars & Insurgencies' and available via a link to the university library. As yet not fully read.
The Abstract:Link:http://dro.dur.ac.uk/17178/1/17178.pdfThis article examines the role military intelligence played in the Dhofar campaign between 1970-1976. Drawing on an array of sources, it examines not only the crucial role played by military intelligence in prosecuting a successful operational campaign against a Marxist inspired insurgency, but equally, the importance that intelligence played in consolidating the Al-Bu-Said dynasty when across Oman and Dhofar itself, the material benefits to be had from the discovery and production of oil had yet to be realised.
His other article still has no web link alas: Jones, Clive. (2011). Military intelligence, tribes, and Britain’s war in Dhofar, 1970-1976. Middle East Journal. Vol, 65, No.4, p.557-574. A quick search cannot find an open access edition.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 01-25-2020 at 09:40 AM. Reason: 92,741v today; 13k up since Jan 2018; 106,275v today14k up since June '19
davidbfpo
A US Army officer whilst @ Kings College London submitted his Ph.D. thesis 'Combined Omani-British strategy during the Dhofar rebellion (1963-1982)' and the Abstract states:Link:https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/...bb970e60).htmlThe Omani government defeated the communist-aligned Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) during the Dhofar Rebellion (1963-1982) by implementing a national policy to pursue a military strategy, supported by information, economic, and diplomatic efforts. The Sultan’s government, aided significantly by the British and other Gulf states, set the conditions for military victory by integrating all aspects of national power to support a singular, local strategy. Most accounts of the conflict limit their analysis to the military aspects of the campaign, although in recent years a small body of work emerged on the diplomatic aspects of the war. However, to understand the complexity of the strategy required to win in Dhofar, all of its aspects must be examined before and after the coup that deposed Sultan Said bin Taimur in favour of his moderate son, Qaboos, in July 1970. The combined Omani-British strategy during the Dhofar Rebellion was an example of how to fight a war by integrating aspects of national power. Both states balanced national and regional interests to fight the insurgents. A strategic analysis of the war allows historians, strategists, and policymakers to reassess the narrative that Qaboos radically changed the direction of the war by embracing a ‘hearts and minds’ approach, the importance of Qaboos’s diplomatic efforts during and after the 1972 Sarfait campaign, Said’s efforts to plan and implement a modernisation plan following commercial oil production, the British contribution to the failure to develop a holistic strategy during Said’s reign, and the actions required to secure Dhofar after the termination of major military operations in 1975. A comprehensive examination of the conduct of the war places it within its historical and cultural context and allows government leaders and historians to better understand the limitations of applying its lessons within the context of modern conflicts.
Sometimes Kings thesis appear online, I have not readily found it.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 08-18-2020 at 08:21 PM. Reason: 136.5k views today
davidbfpo
Spotted two articles on RAF officers serving in Oman, on 'Loan Service' for two year unaccompanied tours and one covers the Dhofar War, in particular the famous attack on Mirbat Fort - which the SAS got plaudits for, with RAF-piloted Strikemasters delivering air support. Link pg. 125 onwards:
There is another article, which details the scene, role and aircraft over a longer period. Pg.117-124
Link to both: https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/documents/research/RAF-Historical-Society-Journals/Journal-49.pdf
Last edited by davidbfpo; 11-09-2020 at 11:43 AM. Reason: 229,300 views today
davidbfpo
A new Journal article that has many web links and so could be useful. It ends with:Link: https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/ar...isors-securityIf the United States intends to assist its allies and partners by building military capacity, a blend of conventional and special operations support is ideal. The combined British-Omani counterinsurgency campaign in Dhofar provides an outstanding template for a balanced security force assistance strategy.
davidbfpo
Post 24 refers to an article 'The United Kingdom's last hot war of the Cold War: Oman, 1963-75' by De Vore and has been made available by the author. Contact davidbfpo for a copy via PM. Alas too large to upload.
davidbfpo
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