WWI and the AEF

[Pete]

The U.S. Army song "Old King Cole" is said to have been copied from the British Army during the First World War. Its lyrics give a fine description of the personnel policies and rank structure in the Army, about which at least one of our members is prone to making wry comments.

The following is from my Dad's copy of the Army Song Book compiled by the Adjutant General's Office and published by the War Department in 1941. It's in the public domain.

"The Army's gone to hell," said the generals;
"What's my next command?" said the colonels;
"Where're my boots and spurs?" said the majors;
"We want ten days' leave," said the captains;
"We do all the work," said the shavetails;
"Right by squads, squads right," said the sergeants;
"One two, one two, one," said the corporals;
"Beer, beer, beer," said the privates,
"Merry men are we
There's none so fair as can compare
With the Fighting Infantry."

[Old Eagle]

I highly recommend a CRITICAL reading of Pershing's memoirs from "The Great War".

Please brush off your old college notes about the advantages and disadvantages of first person accounts of events.

In it Pershing explains his version of the how and why he organized, trained, and employed the AEF the way he did. His line and box chart expansion of the Army was pretty innovative. The AEF had its own staff course in theater.

Another really fascinating section is on the re-establishment of large organizations using conventional tactics when the Army was at the time a small wars endeavor scattered across the frontier. So, as Gian likes to remind us, there are problems inherent in having a force that is overwhelmingly conducting non-conventional missions, then having a big balloon go up.

[Pete]

Touché, Mr. J.

[Bob's World]

I know industry mobilized long before the miitary did to provide weapons to the early combatants, was this just small arms?

"
The capacity of American military firms to produce large quantities of weaponry in a relatively short amount of time was next tested in 1914, when World War I broke out in Europe. Although the U.S. government initially adopted a policy of neutrality in the conflict, President Woodrow Wilson allowed American firms to sell arms and ammunition to the Allied powers. Desperate to supplement their own manufacturing capabilities, Britain, France, and Russia then contracted with American companies to produce large numbers of guns and cartridges. The British, for example, ordered one million Enfield rifles from Remington. As one such order followed another, American military exports jumped from $40 million in 1914 to $1.3 billion in 1916 and $2.3 billion in the final nineteen months of war. This marked the first time that U.S. arms manufacturers played a truly significant role in the international weapons trade.

Read more: http://www.americanforeignrelations....#ixzz0y5GCqiqa

[AdamG]

I know industry mobilized long before the miitary did to provide weapons to the early combatants, was this just small arms?

The outbreak of World War I in 1914 proved to be a bonanza for Bethlehem Steel. Orders for military products from Great Britain, France, and Russia soon filled the company’s coffers and the plants workforce swelled to over 35,000. Wartime profits enabled Schwab to undertake an expansion campaign, purchasing major steel plants in Steelton and Lebanon, Pennsylvania, and Sparrows Point, Maryland. By the time the United States entered World War I in 1917, Bethlehem Steel had become the third largest industrial company in America.

http://www.hsp.org/default.aspx?id=945

[Steve Blair]

I highly recommend a CRITICAL reading of Pershing's memoirs from "The Great War".

Please brush off your old college notes about the advantages and disadvantages of first person accounts of events.

In it Pershing explains his version of the how and why he organized, trained, and employed the AEF the way he did. His line and box chart expansion of the Army was pretty innovative. The AEF had its own staff course in theater.

Another really fascinating section is on the re-establishment of large organizations using conventional tactics when the Army was at the time a small wars endeavor scattered across the frontier. So, as Gian likes to remind us, there are problems inherent in having a force that is overwhelmingly conducting non-conventional missions, then having a big balloon go up.

Let's also remember that the American military model at this time called for a massive call-up of state volunteer units (which had happened during the Spanish-American War...with the attendant problems). The Army had always trained (when it trained at all) for large-scale conflicts. The biggest training flaw had always been the small size of the Army, which dictated the two-company posts.

In response to Bob's post...the industrial base had cranked up to a degree to deal with munitions orders and small arms, but things like mass-producing aircraft engines (Liberty engine, anyone?) were well behind that in terms of scale.

[Pete]

The U.S. Model 1917 Enfield rifle was a variation of the design of a weapon Remington and Winchester had been making for the British. As it turned out the British cancelled the contracts when they decided to keep their SMLE .303 rifle for the duration of the war. After we declared war we changed the caliber to .30-06 and made it for ourselves. There were also a lot of American contracts for small arms and artillery ammunition, as well as lots of complaints by the British about the quality of it.

The British Lewis machine gun was the invention of a U.S. Army officer of ordnance who was on the personna non grata list of the then-chief of ordnance, which was the reason the U.S. Army did not adopt one of best MGs of the war.

[Pete]

Remington and New England Westinghouse made Mosin Nagant rifles for the Russians. If I recall correctly their contracts were funded by the British as part of an effort to keep the Imperial Russians in the war. When the Czar was overthrown deliveries ceased, which is why so many of them are to be found in the U.S. Some have Springfield Armory acceptance marks because they were used as a secondary U.S. weapon. U.S. forces sent to Murmansk-Archangel and Siberia in 1918-19 were equipped with them. My Dad had an NCO in 1943 who had been in Siberia.

[Ken White]

The British Lewis machine gun was the invention of a U.S. Army officer of ordnance who was on the personna non grata list of the then-chief of ordnance, which was the reason the U.S. Army did not adopt one of best MGs of the war.

just not (officially) for infantry use though some were obtained by a few units. It was adopted late in the war in the form of the Savage Arms produced M1917, the .30-06 variant adopted and used mostly as an aircraft weapon. However, the Marines used theirs on the on the ground; Crozier insisted they be taken away from the Marines and issued them Chauchats ILO -- causing a near mutiny. In the event, the Navy and Marines used the gun well into WW II.

Lewis got his revenge. The US Army Ordnance 'designed' -- if you can call an MG42 adapted to gas operation and equipped with the world's most dysfunctional barrel / piston a design effort -- M60 piston and bolt are copies in part of Lewis' system.

[Pete]

During the First World War the British formed a Machine Gun Corps and we did too -- both ended during the funding cuts of the 1920s. In an earlier thread when the subject of Traversing and Elevating Mechanisms for MGs came up I mentioned that most soldiers (myself included) during my period of service in the late '70s to early '80s didn't know how to use them. Around 1980 the first sergeant of my battery told our troops to let him do the range cards for perimeter defense during ARTEPs because they didn't know how to -- in fact they wouldn't have known what they meant. At that time the M2 and M60 MGs had turned into point-and-shoot weapons as far as most troops, enlisted and officer, were concerned. I suppose that's an indictment of our unit training at the time.

[Pete]

In this particular message I'll admit in advance I'm at the outer limits of my ordnance knowledge, so I'll concede that I may be wrong. U.S. Army Ordnance had thown its weight behind the Benet-Mercie Machine Rifle, Caliber .30 U. S. Model of 1909 firing the .30-06 cartridge. The Lewis gun was probably a competitor to that weapon, which was why the chief of ordnance probably had an intense dislike for the inventor.

(Benet had commanded Benicia Arsenal near San Francisco, and his son Stephen Vincent Benet wrote the epic poem "John Brown's Body.")

The ordnance officer Julian Hatcher wrote in his book Hatcher's Notes how he had been sent in 1916 to the Texas border of Mexico to sort out the reliability problems with the Benet-Mercie MG. He said the issue was that the guys sent to the newly-formed MG units were the misfits, neer-do-wells and alcoholics all the other units wanted to get rid of. So what else is new? Plus ca change.

[carl]

Another really fascinating section is on the re-establishment of large organizations using conventional tactics when the Army was at the time a small wars endeavor scattered across the frontier. So, as Gian likes to remind us, there are problems inherent in having a force that is overwhelmingly conducting non-conventional missions, then having a big balloon go up.

The book I cited above "The AEF Way of War" argues that the AEF doctrine, championed by Pershing, was wholly inappropriate for conditions found on the western front. The doctrine was one created before our involvement in the war and said a lot about "determined infantry", "open order fighting" and musketry. That is what Pershing wanted to see.

The divisions got away from that starting with initial training by the French and British. Once they actually saw combat they did what worked on the field and ignored Army doctrine and what AEF HQ wanted.

The problem wasn't an inability to transition from irregular to conventional ops. The problem was the Army's inability to figure out what was needed before getting to the field. The units had to learn it when they got there.