WWI and the AEF

[carl]

Another really fascinating section is on the re-establishment of large organizations using conventional tactics when the Army was at the time a small wars endeavor scattered across the frontier. So, as Gian likes to remind us, there are problems inherent in having a force that is overwhelmingly conducting non-conventional missions, then having a big balloon go up.

The book I cited above "The AEF Way of War" argues that the AEF doctrine, championed by Pershing, was wholly inappropriate for conditions found on the western front. The doctrine was one created before our involvement in the war and said a lot about "determined infantry", "open order fighting" and musketry. That is what Pershing wanted to see.

The divisions got away from that starting with initial training by the French and British. Once they actually saw combat they did what worked on the field and ignored Army doctrine and what AEF HQ wanted.

The problem wasn't an inability to transition from irregular to conventional ops. The problem was the Army's inability to figure out what was needed before getting to the field. The units had to learn it when they got there.