WWI and the AEF
RJ, you might enjoy this forum. During WW I many British had the opinion that we threw away the lives of our own men needlessly--we lost about the same number of men during our six months of fighting in that war as during the entire time of our involvement in Vietnam. The British and to a lesser extent the French were advocates of "amalgamation," with U.S. battalions being under their command instead that of the AEF. Pershing wouldn't go along with it.
Pete,
Thank you for the forum direction.
The Brits lost most of the WWI generation of men in the trenches of France.
France and Germany didn't fair that well either.
The US came to the war late, but I do believe we helped end it quickly. My father fought in the AEF and was wounded at Chateau Thierry.
I believe Pershing was under orders not to let the America Troops be parceled out.
If I remember my history the Brits lost close to 50,000 men in Flanders in a single battle.I believe it was spelled Paschendale'
Last edited by RJ; 08-06-2010 at 05:18 AM.
Shortly after we declared war in 1917 the British and French offered to ship our troops to Europe free of charge provided they didn't bring any heavy weapons or equipment, and that we would allow them to serve under their command as individual soldiers or as American battalions. They said they'd train us and equip us with everything larger than the small arms that would be sent with the men. The hook in that proposal was there wouldn't have been an AEF worthy of the name, except as a sort of personnel replacement depot.
The first senior British officer to visit the U.S. after we declared war, Maj. Gen. Tim Bridges, a cavalrymen who had distinguished himself in 1914 at the battle of Mons, at first proposed that Americans enlisting or being conscripted for war service should perform their service in the British Army, thereby avoiding the need for American officers. Secretary of War Newton Baker refused to go along with it, and he told Pershing he shouldn't either.
A couple of U.S. historians (and nearly all the British ones) have faulted President Wilson for not allowing the amalgamation of U.S. forces into the British and French armies during the nearly successful German offensive of March 1918. As it turned out, the AEF's participation in major combat operations began at the end of April 1918, and by Armistice Day our forces held about 26 percent of the front line of the Western Front.
The amalgamation issue may have been a contributing factor to the "we told you so" attitude of British officers when they saw our casualties mount up when we fought for the most part under our own leadership during the period of April to November 1918.
WWI AEF Small Units Tactics
In 1934, the Infantry School (via one COL George C. Marshall) published what amounted to an anthology of small unit tactics from WWI - (some US, some allied, some enemy). The work was updated in 1938 by two of the editors (Harding and Lanham) who worked closely with Marshall on the first edition.
In four parts from CGSC-CSI (many other interesting titles - freebies - also here):
1939 Infantry in Battle 01.pdf
1939 Infantry in Battle 02.pdf
1939 Infantry in Battle 03.pdf
1939 Infantry in Battle 04.pdf
Total over 400 pages (well mapped)
The philosophy is summed from from the gitgo:
1938 Infantry in Battle - No Rules.jpg
IMO: That philosophy seems very relevant today to "COIN" situations and their comparisons - especially to the political side of the military-political equation.
Cheers
Mike
I just finished reading The AEF Way of War by Grotelueschen. The main thesis was the AEF advocated one particular doctrine and the fighting units, mostly divisions, mainly fought the way they thought best, especially after their first combats. Even when a division espoused the AEF doctrine, subordinate units within the division did it the way they thought best.
It was also an interesting look at group dynamics and leadership. I think it is worth the time.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Together
I recall when visiting the WW1 battlefields finding US Army memorials to those who had fallen serving in divisions under French & UK command in the early stages, including near Ypres. IIRC there was a period when Pershing had no choice in this matter as the US build-up gained pace and for a long time, if not to the end, relied on 'X' & 'Y' from the others.
It was a working coalition, with the USA learning alongside and later separately.
davidbfpo
.... so.... what did they want to bring? :-)Originally Posted by Pete
US tanks?
US Artillery?
US machine guns?
US Airplanes?
It seems to me... IMHO... that the allies would have been rather happy NOT to have to provide all of the above.
If I remember correcly, the French handed over 3 000 Field artillery pieces, Tanks, machine guns.... all stuff they could have used themselves.
Did the US have any of the above to bring in the first place?
best
Chris
AEF Equipment
Not sure about the origins of Pershing's insstence on an "American" army; But our (industrial) infrastructure did an abysmal job of providing heavy equipment.
Most our artillery, and even some of our light machineguns (The Chauchat) were supplied by the French & British. Same for Aircraft, tanks, all the specialist equipment you need for combat. Patton had FT-17's (French Production), one Battalion of the AEF was equipped with British Heavy tanks.
The industrial mobilization for WW II ran on about the same time horizon, very limited quantities towards the end of 1942, suffency in 1943, (two full years in, not counting the long lead by foreign sales in 1939/40), and almost everything we needed in 1944.
Actually, the (two) African American Divisions were given to the French, clothed and equipped by them, and the Infantry Regiments used as fillers (Round out units?) by the French. (That's Eight Infantry regiments, Brigade equivalents today).
Pershing
Pershing's main strength was his self-confidence and determination to have things done his way. During the last 20 years a few serious historians in America have faulted him for not lending troops to the BEF during the German offensive in March 1918; another suggested that he deserved to have been relieved of command for the confusion in how the Meuse-Argonne offensive was being conducted and that the Armistice of November 11, 1918 was what saved his reputation as a combat commander. Even after training, which was provided during that war by the British and French, the only way an army truly learns to fight is by fighting. The combat record of the AEF is therefore a glass that was half-full or half-empty depending on how you look at it.
As for the production of weapons during wartime, contracts require require lead time. Manufacturers of heavy equipment or weapons can't be expected to ramp up production lines, recruit and train workforces and then be delivering finished products after six months. The U.S. armed forces were much better prepared in terms of having military contacts in place when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941.
"Old King Cole"
The U.S. Army song "Old King Cole" is said to have been copied from the British Army during the First World War. Its lyrics give a fine description of the personnel policies and rank structure in the Army, about which at least one of our members is prone to making wry comments.
The following is from my Dad's copy of the Army Song Book compiled by the Adjutant General's Office and published by the War Department in 1941. It's in the public domain.
"The Army's gone to hell," said the generals;
"What's my next command?" said the colonels;
"Where're my boots and spurs?" said the majors;
"We want ten days' leave," said the captains;
"We do all the work," said the shavetails;
"Right by squads, squads right," said the sergeants;
"One two, one two, one," said the corporals;
"Beer, beer, beer," said the privates,
"Merry men are we
There's none so fair as can compare
With the Fighting Infantry."
Last edited by Jedburgh; 08-29-2010 at 08:47 PM. Reason: Added link.
Memoirs
I highly recommend a CRITICAL reading of Pershing's memoirs from "The Great War".
Please brush off your old college notes about the advantages and disadvantages of first person accounts of events.
In it Pershing explains his version of the how and why he organized, trained, and employed the AEF the way he did. His line and box chart expansion of the Army was pretty innovative. The AEF had its own staff course in theater.
Another really fascinating section is on the re-establishment of large organizations using conventional tactics when the Army was at the time a small wars endeavor scattered across the frontier. So, as Gian likes to remind us, there are problems inherent in having a force that is overwhelmingly conducting non-conventional missions, then having a big balloon go up.
Touché, Mr. J.
Let's also remember that the American military model at this time called for a massive call-up of state volunteer units (which had happened during the Spanish-American War...with the attendant problems). The Army had always trained (when it trained at all) for large-scale conflicts. The biggest training flaw had always been the small size of the Army, which dictated the two-company posts.
In response to Bob's post...the industrial base had cranked up to a degree to deal with munitions orders and small arms, but things like mass-producing aircraft engines (Liberty engine, anyone?) were well behind that in terms of scale.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
The book I cited above "The AEF Way of War" argues that the AEF doctrine, championed by Pershing, was wholly inappropriate for conditions found on the western front. The doctrine was one created before our involvement in the war and said a lot about "determined infantry", "open order fighting" and musketry. That is what Pershing wanted to see.
The divisions got away from that starting with initial training by the French and British. Once they actually saw combat they did what worked on the field and ignored Army doctrine and what AEF HQ wanted.
The problem wasn't an inability to transition from irregular to conventional ops. The problem was the Army's inability to figure out what was needed before getting to the field. The units had to learn it when they got there.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
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